CVA-01 and Sea Harrier

[JFC Fuller]

I’d say it’s a fair call based on the operational specs of all USN carriers and aircraft built since the 1950s. That is an at least 30 knot catapults steamed aircraft launching speed.

Given that the Midway class date from the 1940s rather than the 1950s I'd say its something of a leap of faith.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I’d say it’s a fair call based on the operational specs of all USN carriers and aircraft built since the 1950s. That is an at least 30 knot catapults steamed aircraft launching speed.

Given that the Midway class date from the 1940s rather than the 1950s I'd say its something of a leap of faith.

Both the Mid and Coral Sea were rebuilt in the 50s and then a second time in the 60s/70s. During these consecutive rebuilds displacement grew by 66% (!!!) yet speed remained the same.

 

[JFC Fuller]

And those rebuilds are instructive for us, SCB-101.66 gave CV41 (Midway) a top speed of 31.6 knots and a sustained speed of 29.7 knots, less than 2 knots more than CVA01. The CVA01 speed was for 6 months out and in the tropics, if, the SCB-101.66 speed is clean and straight out of the yard then the difference is virtually non-existent. Either way it is not 5 knots.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

And those rebuilds are instructive for us, SCB-101.66 gave CV41 (Midway) a top speed of 31.6 knots and a sustained speed of 29.7 knots, less than 2 knots more than CVA01. The CVA01 speed was for 6 months out and in the tropics, if, the SCB-101.66 speed is clean and straight out of the yard then the difference is virtually non-existent. Either way it is not 5 knots.

29.7 minus 25 = 4.7 which rounded to the nearest common denominator is 5…

And BTW 1 the main issue in dropping the speed in the RN’s operational requirement was measuring it hull deep. Six months fouling by itself is not so bad compared to the difference between a sea trials run and an operational ship with air wing, stores and full fuel.

BTW 2 Beedall says that the sustained speed of the CVA-01 in its final iteration (with armour) was likely to be down to 27 knots (no piped steam to catapults) and that was after they increased the size of the boilers to try and overcome the increasing loss of speed. And this is all in the paper design. Ships tend to have a habit of having their performance move in one direction between design and in service. And it’s not upwards.

 

[alertken]

AG: JFCF: peace! to spats on WOD. What matters is what Staffs thought there and then...and RN had flown fit kit only, ever with 1945 USN types. F-4K was as welcome to the User as aluminium pre-fabricated housing was in rubbloid Docklands in 1947: a palace, compared with the alternative.

We have drifted from OP: Q: would SHAR have been deployed, 1980s, on CVAs? My A: No. Neither it nor CVS would have been invented. Yes, I know this is whiffery, but...If:
Ministers had not chopped CVA-01, 22/2/66, and If:
Ways had been found 16/1/68 to preserve £+UK economy whilst remaining East of Suez (such as by BAOR-style offset {i.e pecuniary consideration for the mercenary} by those being defended), such that CVA-02, even -03 might have emerged, then...
A post (by OBR) elsewhere has suggested CVA-01 commissioned 1972 vice Victorious, -02 1977 vice Ark, -03 1984 vice Eagle. On 21/2/66 we had 52 F-4K and (?)84 Buccaneer S.2 on order...and had funded AFVG on 17/5/65 with a notion of buying 175 (to be split I know not how, RAF:RN). So the first A to this whiff is that F-4K would have been replaced by AFVG/RN. CVS, so Sea Harrier would not have been inseminated.

When Marcel got AFVG deleted, 29/6/67, UKVG was seen by all as a work-work ploy to keep Warton intact awhile; maybe some doodling of an RN version...but doodle it would have been. No full funding merely for a run of some scores, drip-delivered over a couple of decades. Delete from your mind any UK-solo V-S swinger. They were on CVA-layout schemes simply as dimensional models. No-one, least of all BAC, wished to perpetuate the forge that had given us Swift then Scimitar. In the space 29/6/67 to 4/68 Healey would have funded some enhancement for Buccaneer S.2(RN).

So now he's been invited into the NATO Discussion Group NKF-75 - F-104G replacement, himself replacing France, booted out for presenting any-and-only Mirages. As JFCF alludes, it was miraculous that Healey caused Bundesmarine, Luftwaffe and It.AF to recruit Wizzos. Belgium, Netherlands and Canada recoiled and went off to US single-seaters. UK/FRG/Italy stayed and delivered Europe's then-largest industrial programme. Factions tried so hard to sink it through >a dozen National General Elections. Billboard ads in FRG (doubtless Red-funded) compared the cost of one MRCA with 3 hospitals. The only way it survived was a creed of commonality. Only stores would be "peculiar" - because they would be User inventory- common (so: RAF: WE177A, FRG/It.: B-61). UK did not request its fellow IDS-partners to acquiesce in BAC/avionics vendors' effort moving on to (to be) ADV until IDS was well in hand. And what fun it was, administratively, demonstrating that not a pfennig or lira was going into ADV. Please purge from your mind Sea Tornado. No, no, and no. Ever. Politically. Doesn't matter if you can squirm into some notional engineering could-be. No. The mere hint, and fixed price/Guaranteed Spec/meaty techno-offset F-15 is licenced into Augsburg, Turin...and soon after, Preston. As many on this Board would wish - especially vice ADV.

F-4K+Buccaneer MLU would serve until, as always for FAA, they drop. For F-4K, Turkey, Israel and Germany suggest that might be about now-ish, by a US-built F-18K. Bucc, you will recall, was grounded 2-7/80 for fatigue in land-use. So: A-6Es, ex-Desert AF.

 

[Thorvic]

When Marcel got AFVG deleted, 29/6/67, UKVG was seen by all as a work-work ploy to keep Warton intact awhile; maybe some doodling of an RN version...but doodle it would have been.

The RN interest in AKVG was killed by the CVA-01 cancellation and the culling of the Carrier fleet, the RAF then took the lead in the program and focused on the Strike role rather than the Interceptor to make up for their loss of P1154 and TSR2, where as the French wanted the interceptor the most. UKVG then became a UK only VG strike aircraft and eventually the Tornado.
The trouble with AFVG is most UK authors mark it as the first steps to Tornado down the Strike Aircraft route, nobody has really looked into the RN aspect as they dismiss OR346 as being killed off by P1154 and then F-4 as the end of the matter, yet AFVG was to be an RN interceptor and very closely follows the Vickers 583 concept.

 

[JFC Fuller]

29.7 minus 25 = 4.7 which rounded to the nearest common denominator is 5…

Perhaps I should have presented the data more clearly, my apologies. The above calculation is apples to oranges, based on the known data it should be as follows:

Full: 31.6 - 30 = 1.6
Sustained: 29.7 - 28 = 1.7
During intensive aircraft operations: xx - at least 25 = ?

xx being a Midway during sustained aviation operations and currently unknown. It is also possible that the SCB 101 numbers are clean and lightly loaded.

And BTW 1 the main issue in dropping the speed in the RN’s operational requirement was measuring it hull deep. Six months fouling by itself is not so bad compared to the difference between a sea trials run and an operational ship with air wing, stores and full fuel.

Indeed, and it's the fact that the RN requirements were usually deep and dirty (and in the tropics) that often gives the impression of RN ships being relatively slow. That's what I have being trying to articulate, perhaps not very well, for the last few posts. It is also not just fouling that progressively reduces a ships speed, power output will progressively decline over time as well- especially in a steam plant.

BTW 2 Beedall says that the sustained speed of the CVA-01 in its final iteration (with armour) was likely to be down to 27 knots (no piped steam to catapults) and that was after they increased the size of the boilers to try and overcome the increasing loss of speed. And this is all in the paper design. Ships tend to have a habit of having their performance move in one direction between design and in service. And it’s not upwards.

Well Beedall's article says 27-28 knots, which suggests only a very minor reduction from the previously required 28, and at cancellation the design was still being tweaked. At one point in his article he also gives a maximum speed of "over 30 knots" suggesting top speed may be understated fractionally but again it is clear we are dealing with fractions of knots and not multiples. On both the direct speed comparisons we have between a Midway and CVA01 we are below 2 knots in difference which is a small enough margin to be accounted for by variances in the conditions of the ships. Of course we can speculate about performance not meeting expectations but the fact is that we have stated design parameters and they are our best guide to actual performance as the ship was never built.

 

[starviking]

*to be fair the original plan from 60-61 envisaged six carriers being built, but we'll quietly ignore that.

What is your source for this? Grove "Vanguard to Trident" has a 1959 Admiralty committee suggesting all five of the existing carriers be replaced one-for-one but the Admiralty itself deciding to present a request for just four to the Chiefs of Staff. There is then a stall until the Kendrew committee reports in favour of carriers in 1962 and by 1963 MoD thought it could only ask for two but the Treasury would agree only to one new carrier and two reconstructions.

Richard Beedall's site gives 6 carriers as the requirement in the 1961 defense paper "Limitations of the Future Cost of Defence". See http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cva01.htm

 

[JFC Fuller]

Richard Beedall's site gives 6 carriers as the requirement in the 1961 defense paper "Limitations of the Future Cost of Defence". See http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cva01.htm

Well spotted Starviking, thank you! I had completely missed that. There seems to have been various studies and reports done producing numbers from 4-6.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Geoff is right that any consideration of what replaced the Buccaneer has to go back to 1966 when the RN cancelled their ongoing plans for such as the carrier force was abolished. At that time it was the AFVG and one could assume Dassault would still scupper this and it would then become the UKVG. With CVA-01 and the carriers enthusiastically funded the RN would still be in the game for a Buccaneer replacement.

Ken is also right in suggesting the UKVG is unlikely to become the Tornado with the RN involved because of the specifics of the F-104 users group requirements. Also one has to wonder in the CVA-01 world what happened to the F-111K? It was probably cancelled or not even funded as obviously the carriers would have won the battle with the RAF and their moveable Australia mapping.

So is it possible that the UKVG could have progressed from 67-68 to an all-British funded strike/interceptor aircraft for the RN and RAF? Maybe. But if they didn’t have the money and the RN had to turn to the USN it would be at this time when the 1975-76 VFAX and A-18A is almost a decade later. If the RN was looking for an American strike aircraft in the late 60s there is one clear stand out: the A-7E.

The A-7E was at the time the leading edge of avionics with an integrated nav-attack system with moving map display and so on. It also used the British Spey engine. If it needed to be made slower then Vought could always add a variable incidence, blown wing as in the Crusader which would drop the approach speed and minimum launch speed down to RN levels. To accommodate RN ways of doing things a two seat version could always be built to keep the Observer on board. It may not be as fast and as long legged down low as a Buccaneer but it had excellent payload and a goodly 400-600 NM radius of action. It was also light and cheap which would help for a cost conscious early 70s RN trying to cover three new strike carrier decks.

 

[starviking]

Well the ancestor of the SLUF, the Crusader, had potential to be built as a two-seater in the UK - so it would not be too much of a stretch to see the SLUF offered.

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1963/1963%20-%202107.html

 

[starviking]

On the subject of US vs. UK carrier speeds and how they are quoted, Friedman's US Carrier has a few interesting comments:

On page 259, a 32 knot speed in trials is considered as representing 30 knots sustained warload.
Page 280 has a reduction in sustained speed below 30 knots as being unacceptable in 1958.

 

[JFC Fuller]

So is it possible that the UKVG could have progressed from 67-68 to an all-British funded strike/interceptor aircraft for the RN and RAF? Maybe. But if they didn’t have the money and the RN had to turn to the USN it would be at this time when the 1975-76 VFAX and A-18A is almost a decade later. If the RN was looking for an American strike aircraft in the late 60s there is one clear stand out: the A-7E.

The A-7E was at the time the leading edge of avionics with an integrated nav-attack system with moving map display and so on. It also used the British Spey engine. If it needed to be made slower then Vought could always add a variable incidence, blown wing as in the Crusader which would drop the approach speed and minimum launch speed down to RN levels. To accommodate RN ways of doing things a two seat version could always be built to keep the Observer on board. It may not be as fast and as long legged down low as a Buccaneer but it had excellent payload and a goodly 400-600 NM radius of action. It was also light and cheap which would help for a cost conscious early 70s RN trying to cover three new strike carrier decks.

If anything the best replacement for the Buccaneer in the 1970s is the Buccaneer. The last new build RAF Buccaneer S.2B (XZ.432) was delivered in October 1977 so it was still very much available for production right through to the late 70s. The large and spacious fuselage would have made an avionics upgrade relatively easy if it was felt that it was required and if not the type could have effectively been delivered without any further expenditure on R&D. As you pointed out earlier in the thread, in the 1970s HSA (Hawk Production and HS.146 development aside + assuming it's not consolidated with BAC) had little to do so low rate Buccaneer development and manufacture would give them something. Ferranti continued working on TFR right up until they were kicked off Tornado so systems could have been developed and famously a pair of Buccaneers were used as systems test-beds for Tornado so the airframe was adaptable if one really wanted to stretch its capabilities. At minimum, low rate production of the S.2/S.2D to keep the fleet at strength into the 80s or beyond would solve the problem. The USN A-6 programme with its combination of upgrades, re-winging and new-build airframes offers us a perfect example of what could have been done with the Buccaneer with relative ease. Seems like the most obvious solution.

Buccaneer Tornado test-bed: http://www.blackburn-buccaneer.co.uk/Pages1_files/Radar_Index.html

 

[zen]

Buccaneer is not the problem and yes its rather obvious the 'cheap option' is actually to continue with the type.


AFVG could transmute under joint needs of RN and MN, but it's blindingly obvious that Tornado won't happen if the RAF andf RN are pushing for something very different from a Starfighter successor.


Its the fighter (bomber/missile-carrier destroyer) thats the crucial issue. F4 helps, but its the F14 or at least its radar missile combination that is most attractive as a solution. UK at first sight may not be able to afford this.

 

[shedofdread]

One still can't help but wonder; if the P150 ('Quick Bucc' ) had been produced as a Buccaneer replacement, we wouldn't have needed all this VG business.

What sort of export market would the P150 have found? How many foreigh sales would be required for the project to break even? Then no need for messy, slow collaborations...

 

[JFC Fuller]

Its the fighter (bomber/missile-carrier destroyer) thats the crucial issue. F4 helps, but its the F14 or at least its radar missile combination that is most attractive as a solution. UK at first sight may not be able to afford this.

Absolutely, unfortunately, due to the cost of the F-14 I think we end up in a scenario where the UK sustains the Phantom and the Buccaneer to the mid/late 80s as the USN did with the Phantom or into the mid/late 90s as the USN did with the A-6 and the MN did with the F-8P before the RN moves either to off-the-shelf F/A-18s or abandons catapults altogether and goes down the P.1216 route. A possible outrider is some new UK CTOL type derived from the various BAC studies of the 80s that lead to EAP.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If anything the best replacement for the Buccaneer in the 1970s is the Buccaneer.

More Buccaneers for the RN has two big problems in the early 70s time frame (assuming the RN sticks with AFVG and then UKVG until these either run out of money or transform into a single variant, RAF only Tornado) and that is cost and confidence. A Texas built Corsair with all the latest avionics is still going to be cheaper than 1970s built S.2s and the RN has to cover the decks of three strike carriers which means 150 odd aircraft. And they lose the 25 odd training viable S.1s via Gyron failure in December 1970.

Then in 71-72 the front engine spars on the S.2s fail with premature fatigue. So with a new assessment of the Buccanneer’s long term airworthiness in the early 70s is we need 100 new planes within 10 years no matter how new our S.2s are! Now this may result in an S.3 Buccaneer with all the goodies like nav-attack avionics, afterburners and a high strength airframe for long life and +20,000 more lbs takeoff weight (maxing out the CVA-01 and increasing range and payload). Or it could result in the RN ditching the Banana Jet.

Covering the decks of aircraft carriers is a lot more demanding a procurement task than keeping air force squadrons up to strength. You have to keep flying at the highest of aircraft stresses or you lose carrier competency. So there is no long term low rate effort until a technical fix comes through. Airframe life is consumed at a faster rate. Plus your attrition (at least still in the analogue age) is much higher necessitating continuing production. The RAF can get by with troublesome Buccaneer fatigue but the RN can’t. They would need an earlier and more definite solution. Since Ark Royal was the single Omega carrier in the 70s it wasn’t an issue. But with a full strike carrier force operating at high tempo it would have been insufferable.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

AFVG could transmute under joint needs of RN and MN,

AFVG was designed for the needs of the RN and some debate about le Royale (they wanted a 16,000 lbs version!).

but it's blindingly obvious that Tornado won't happen if the RAF andf RN are pushing for something very different from a Starfighter successor.

But the actual Tornado IDS could not be described as a like for like replacement of the Starfighter. Not in a million years. But a UK only Tornado could happen with the F-104 users going off and buying multinational built F-15s or sitting on their thumbs till the F-16 comes along. UK only Tornado could be built in RN and RAF versions in strike and then interceptor and be pretty much like the real thing (or without wing gloves in which case it’s called a UKVG).

Its the fighter (bomber/missile-carrier destroyer) thats the crucial issue. F4 helps, but its the F14 or at least its radar missile combination that is most attractive as a solution. UK at first sight may not be able to afford this.

Something like the Foxhunter-Sky Flash? Which was designed to defeat the same BACKFIRE target as the AWG-9. As to the F-14 it is at least 25% heavier than the Phantom in landing weight and would require significant upgrade of CVA-01’s arrestor gear to be recovered.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Not problems at all,when one takes into account the dollar issue of buying Corsairs and the new support infrastructure needed for the avionics as well as the new training regime and weapons integration (WE.177 and Martel) the cost margin is likely to diminish rapidly. Buccaneer was already relatively cheap to procure compared to the Phantom anyway. The S.1's can, if needed, be replaced by new build S.2s and the Crusader would require a training platform too. Replacing the Buccaneer, and all the infrastructure that goes with it, with a less capable platform that may only be marginally cheaper seems rather pointless when UK industry can and did carry on manufacturing the Buccaneer.

Also, the fatigue problem was actually in 1980 and it turned out to be a relatively minor issue with virtually all the aircraft recoverable with repairs (over half with either no or only minor repairs with repairs estimated to take from 1 day to 1 week; the aircraft were only grounded for a few months and even this only lasted so long because bad weather delayed recovery of the wreckage from the one aircraft that crashed) and it was ultimately decided to run the aircraft to later half of the 1990s so in the 1970s there is no confidence problems with the type.

Something like the Foxhunter-Sky Flash? Which was designed to defeat the same BACKFIRE target as the AWG-9. As to the F-14 it is at least 25% heavier than the Phantom in landing weight and would require significant upgrade of CVA-01’s arrestor gear to be recovered.

If you have the final design parameters for the CVA01 arrestor gear, perhaps you could post them?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Also, the fatigue problem was actually in 1980 and it turned out to be a relatively minor issue with virtually all the aircraft recoverable with repairs

That’s a different issue. If you’re unaware of the 1971-72 premature fatigue issue I’m sure you’d be able to look it up at Flight Global or any decent book on the Buccaneer should cover it because it was quite significant requiring spar replacement.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If you have the final design parameters for the CVA01 arrestor gear, perhaps you could post them?

Any reasonable person would expect that the parameters would be aligned to the heaviest, fastest landing aircraft it was designed to operate (35,000 lbs of F-4K at just under 140 knots). In the absence of any further evidence that the CVA-01 was designed to operate A3Js, F-111Bs or Avro Vulcans we shouldn’t indulge more argumentum ad ignorantiam.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Replacing the Buccaneer, and all the infrastructure that goes with it, with a less capable platform that may only be marginally cheaper seems rather pointless when UK industry can and did carry on manufacturing the Buccaneer.

I wouldn’t rate the A-7E as less capable than the Buccaneer S.2 because capability is more than just easy figures like range and speed. The A-7E can do a whole range of combat thingies that the Buccaneer can only dream of even with two people in the plane. Unless the RN was desperate they would want to be building a strike aircraft in the 1970s with advanced avionics so they could strike all weather targets against high level defences.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Any reasonable person would expect that the parameters would be aligned to the heaviest, fastest landing aircraft it was designed to operate (35,000 lbs of F-4K at just under 140 knots). In the absence of any further evidence that the CVA-01 was designed to operate A3Js, F-111Bs or Avro Vulcans we shouldn’t indulge more argumentum ad ignorantiam.

Well as a reasonable person who does not enjoy argumentum ad ignorantiam I can state that in 1963 the design parameters were for the recovery of 40,000lb aircraft (speed unknown), after that the trail goes cold. However, the whole way through the programme the RN is looking at the aircraft generation beyond the F-4K and Buccaneer (which is why 70,000lb capable catapults are frequently requested and may have been included in the final design) so it is far from inconceivable that the arrestor gear capabilities may have crept up too. I only asked because the certainty with which you suggested that major modification would be needed to the arrestor gear implied you had actual data, my apologies.

I wouldn’t rate the A-7E as less capable than the Buccaneer S.2 because capability is more than just easy figures like range and speed. The A-7E can do a whole range of combat thingies that the Buccaneer can only dream of even with two people in the plane. Unless the RN was desperate they would want to be building a strike aircraft in the 1970s with advanced avionics so they could strike all weather targets against high level defences.

So upgrade the Buccaneer's avionics, like the US did with the A-6, then you end with an aircraft that can do all the "combat thingies" that the A7 can and possibly more. As it turned out the Buccaneer was perfectly adequate for RAF needs the whole way through the 70s and into the 80s anyway. It's questionable that the RN would need an operational pool of 100 aircraft. When the UK ran three carriers in the 1980s they only operated two air groups, if that pattern were to be the case for CVA01 (with 18 Buccaneers per squadron) the UK could and probably would get a way with an operational pool of about 50-60. If three air groups were sustained that number might get up to 80 (kept steady in both cases by low rate production) but not much more.

That’s a different issue. If you’re unaware of the 1971-72 premature fatigue issue I’m sure you’d be able to look it up at Flight Global or any decent book on the Buccaneer should cover it because it was quite significant requiring spar replacement.

Could you provide a source for this? the only major 1971-72 Buccaneer news that I am aware of is the order for 16 aircraft for £20 million in October of 1971. Thanks.

 

[Thorvic]

Nah the RN wouldn't have got the Corsair, should the carriers and FAA have survived 1966 then its more likley they would have been coerced into the Jaguar M if a lighter single seat strike aircraft was required.
The UK's preference would have been a Naval Strike version of the AFVG once the Interceptor version had entered service to replace the Bucc in the late 70s early 80's. But in the spirit of Anglo-french cooperation they would probably have been forced to settle on the AFVG/Jaguar M combo along with the French MN !

 

[uk 75]

Another fascinating thread with huge amounts of detail.

My favourite iteration of CVA 01 is the 1963 Jane's drawing version with twin Seadarts aft carrying the Vickers Swing wing beasts dropped in favour of P1154. This is of course fantasy rather than what-if, but in model form it is brilliant, though for some reason the one I had made ip for me I decided to have Mauler instead..

P1154 RN is also a fun beast but a combination of these and Bucaneers does not really work. If P1154 had been a true multi role stovl it could have substituted for both Phantoms and Bucaneers but if my Grandmother had wheels she would be a wagon!

This leaves CVA01 being built instead of the Ark Conversion and joining Eagle in service in about 74. This assumes all the political factors vanish and we have a Fantasy Football team government in which Sir Alec Douglas Home wins the 1964 and 1968 elections! By 1975 (my magical date) HMS Queen Elizabeth is in service with Eagle laid up in reserve. Sir Alec hands over to Lord Carrington who also relinquishes his peerage and the Tories have clung on to power in the 1972 election just before the 1973 Oil crisis. HMS Duke of Edinburgh remains a gleam in the RN's eye as the RN discovers it needs the Escort Cruisers delayed from 1962 and more SSNs. The re-equipping of the five Polaris boats with Poseidon is also agreed by the Hubert Humphrey administration which takes over from Johnson in 1969.

The TSR 2 enters service in small numbers with the RAF in 1970 after a protracted development phase but only 50 aircraft are ordered (to replace the Vulcans allocated to NATO SACEUR after the Polaris force took over the deterrent).

The RAF gets its Phantoms but VSTOL dies with the P1154 as the Tories are less imaginative than Harold Wilson and Denis Healey and pilots hate the P1127. The RAF continues to hate the Buccaneer but by 1969 with both Phantoms and Buccaneers in service and TSR 2 deliveries due to end in 1972, British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley team up with Dassault (Mirage G) and McDonnell Douglas (F4S swing wing Phantom) to develop a multi role aircraft for the late 70s to replace TSR 2, Buccaneer, Phantom and Lightning.

The Hunter replacement task gets kicked into the long grass after the 1971 withdrawal from East of Suez. Phantoms take over the UK Mobile Force and RAF Germany close support roles. Replacing the Gnat is left to multinational UK, France, Germany competition in which BAC P59 and HS 1129 go up against Dornier, Breguet etc. The resulting trainer is also employed in the close support role by the RAF after it becomes clear that Phantoms are too fast and heavy..

So by 1982 Eagle is about to decommission and HMS Queen Elizabeth has just replaced its Phantoms and Bucs with either the Phantom S or the Mirage GM.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

1963 the design parameters were for the recovery of 40,000lb aircraft (speed unknown), after that the trail goes cold.

40,000 lbs is the maximum landing weight of the F-4 Phantom. Minimum approach speed at that weight with pylons (for drag) would be 137 knots for the F-4K. The F-14A ad a maximum landing weight of 52,000 lbs and an approach speed in this condition of 133 knots. However gear designed to absorb this level of force is the same as that able to recover 40,000 lbs at over 150 knots. I very much doubt the RN was specifying gear to recover such high speed landings.

(which is why 70,000lb capable catapults are frequently requested and may have been included in the final design

Discussing gear and catapults with just weight figures is useless. Speed is just as important. According to Beedall the BS-6 of the CVA-01 could launch a 70,000 lbs aircraft at 100 knots. Which equates to a 60,000 lbs aircraft at 120 knots. These later figures 60,000 lbs and 120 knots happen to be the maximum launch weight and take-off speed of the F-4K.

However, the whole way through the programme the RN is looking at the aircraft generation beyond the F-4K and Buccaneer) so it is far from inconceivable that the arrestor gear capabilities may have crept up too.

But the facts indicate a close alignment between the CVA-01s catapults and gear with the performance of the F-4K at maximum weight and launch and recovery speeds. Which when one considers that the RN was looking at its next generation of designed to requirements aircraft from 1960 onwards (Type 583, P.1154) of considerably lowering such speeds (by around 20 knots compared to the Buccaneer and F-4K) you can see where their hope for heavier aircraft was. Also the AFVG and UKFG would have very low stall speeds thanks to the VG wing with full length flaps on both the leading and trailing edges. The only VG aircraft AFAIK with this treatment (ie no wing gloves).

I only asked because the certainty with which you suggested that major modification would be needed to the arrestor gear implied you had actual data, my apologies.

Enough data to understand the capabilities of this launch and recovery gear as outlined above. I’m sorry to bust some cherished what-if fantasies like RN F-14s flying from CVA-01s and the like but there is a significant difference between the launch and recovery capabilities of British and American aircraft carriers.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Nah the RN wouldn't have got the Corsair, should the carriers and FAA have survived 1966 then its more likley they would have been coerced into the Jaguar M if a lighter single seat strike aircraft was required.
The UK's preference would have been a Naval Strike version of the AFVG once the Interceptor version had entered service to replace the Bucc in the late 70s early 80's. But in the spirit of Anglo-french cooperation they would probably have been forced to settle on the AFVG/Jaguar M combo along with the French MN !

The RN only became interested in the Jaguar M because of the cancellation of the CVA-01 and their attempts to retain some form of carrier aviation via smaller and lighter aircraft and ships. I only brought up the A-7 as an option because of its cheapness as a strike alternative. An argument it seems from some corners which can only apply to their favoured F/A-18 vs a British solution but not the even cheaper A-7.

However I think it is safe to assume that if the HMG was funding the RN for three new carriers in the 60s and 70s they would also be funding them for a new multi role strike aircraft. Which would also be desperately needed by the RAF as a Canberra and interim tactical strike aircraft replacement (Jaguar and Harrier). Under these circumstances and the steady state opposition to the AFVG by Marcel Dassault (and with Israeli Mirages destroying all comers in 67 he was at the height of his influence) it’s a pretty safe bet that UKVG would be funded to full scale development and production. In which case you would probably have the BAC “Thunderstorm” flying by 1972 and in service delivery around 76-78.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

P1154 RN is also a fun beast but a combination of these and Bucaneers does not really work. If P1154 had been a true multi role stovl it could have substituted for both Phantoms and Bucaneers but if my Grandmother had wheels she would be a wagon!

The RN planned to fly the P.1154 like a conventional aircraft catapulting them from the bow and hooking them to land. The adjustable nozzles would have been used to reduce the take-off and approach speeds down to around 100 knots.

This leaves CVA01 being built instead of the Ark Conversion and joining Eagle in service in about 74. This assumes all the political factors vanish and we have a Fantasy Football team government in which Sir Alec Douglas Home wins the 1964 and 1968 elections!

If the Profumo Affair hadn’t been made public then a Conservative win in 64 at least is almost a certainty.

British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley team up with Dassault (Mirage G) and McDonnell Douglas (F4S swing wing Phantom) to develop a multi role aircraft for the late 70s to replace TSR 2, Buccaneer, Phantom and Lightning.

Full scale development of the F-4S was dependent on US support and involvement. They weren’t interested so it died a quick death. The whole point of multi-national programs for the UK was not to bring in outside design know how but to share costs.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Could you provide a source for this? the only major 1971-72 Buccaneer news that I am aware of is the order for 16 aircraft for £20 million in October of 1971. Thanks.

“Flying the Buccaneer” by Peter Caygill pages 67-69 focus on the 1970s premature fatigue problem.

 

[JFC Fuller]

40,000 lbs is the maximum landing weight of the F-4 Phantom. Minimum approach speed at that weight with pylons (for drag) would be 137 knots for the F-4K. The F-14A ad a maximum landing weight of 52,000 lbs and an approach speed in this condition of 133 knots. However gear designed to absorb this level of force is the same as that able to recover 40,000 lbs at over 150 knots. I very much doubt the RN was specifying gear to recover such high speed landings.

I am sure you may doubt it, but the necessity is for a source.

Discussing gear and catapults with just weight figures is useless. Speed is just as important. According to Beedall the BS-6 of the CVA-01 could launch a 70,000 lbs aircraft at 100 knots. Which equates to a 60,000 lbs aircraft at 120 knots. These later figures 60,000 lbs and 120 knots happen to be the maximum launch weight and take-off speed of the F-4K.

Well weight itself is obviously not completely useless as weight forms 50% of the equation so it gives us a good starting point, as you just demonstrated.

But the facts indicate a close alignment between the CVA-01s catapults and gear with the performance of the F-4K at maximum weight and launch and recovery speeds. Which when one considers that the RN was looking at its next generation of designed to requirements aircraft from 1960 onwards (Type 583, P.1154) of considerably lowering such speeds (by around 20 knots compared to the Buccaneer and F-4K) you can see where their hope for heavier aircraft was. Also the AFVG and UKFG would have very low stall speeds thanks to the VG wing with full length flaps on both the leading and trailing edges. The only VG aircraft AFAIK with this treatment (ie no wing gloves).

Enough data to understand the capabilities of this launch and recovery gear as outlined above. I’m sorry to bust some cherished what-if fantasies like RN F-14s flying from CVA-01s and the like but there is a significant difference between the launch and recovery capabilities of British and American aircraft carriers.

Well, the few facts we have, we still don't know the final configuration of the arrestor gear. And there were certainly no cherished fantasies here, I never suggested that CVA01 could operate the F-14, I was just curious to know if you had actual data for final CVA01 arrestor gear. And lets be clear, there is a significant difference between the launch and recovery capabilities of UK carriers and US carriers designed and built post-war. As great an aircraft as the F-14 was even had the UK decided to retain a large carrier fleet (which is practically inconceivable anyway given the manpower requirements of CVA01) the F-14 is really too much aircraft for them, outside their price range, too large and initially too niche.

Mr Caygill's book has just been Amazoned and I await it with baited breath, neither Flight Global, Hansard, or multiple books I have checked (including Blackburn Aircraft Since 1909) mention any Buccaneer fatigue issues until 1979-80 so it will be interesting to see what "Flying the Buccaneer" has to say.

 

[Hobbes]

Well it is obviously not useless as weight forms 50% of the equation, as you just demonstrated.

No. The relevant formula is F=1/2 mv2.

 

[JFC Fuller]

No. The relevant formula is F=1/2 mv2.

My point was that mass is still required (and represents half of the equation inputs, the other being velocity) and is thus important.

 

[Hood]

As ever an interesting discussion.

I'm somewhat uncomfortable with a three CVA fleet. I don't think such a scheme is feasible if we're trying to stick to some kind of real-world reality. At best I'd figure on a two-ship carrier fleet. In 1965/66 the RN just might have got its way (although Mountbatten was never very attached to big carriers and favoured a smaller VTOL type) over the RAF and F-111K option is ignored and two CVA ordered. Commissioning dates are likely to be 1974-75 for the first and 77-78 for the second. By then EoS is dead and a need for a third carrier (even as a reserve) isn't really warranted especially if Hermes survives as some kind of ASW escort carrier with a deck load of Sea Kings until the early 1980s. The escort fleet is a big problem, I can see HMS Bristol being finished but her sisters never-started. Bristol was never fully operational and I think perhaps at most the RN might have squeezed out of the Treasury a couple of extra Type 42s at most.

The Fleet Air Arm never really had any up to date aircraft on its decks post-war until the Bucc. Sea Vixen was about 5 years too late and was about until the end of the 60s. The RAF is kicking its heels, TSR.2 and F-111K are gone, P.1154 is gone, AFVG offers some kind of glimpse to retain a strike role. It certainly doesn't want the Bucc and given the RN has destroyed three key types within 4-5 years and it's left with subsonic Kestrel. I don't think the RAF would take kindly to any Admiralty interference to get a fighter version of AFVG and re-live the whole P.1154 saga again. I don't think the government would either, remember by this time the Plowden Report has more or less stated all new projects need to be co-operative efforts, it doesn't believe the UK industry can go it alone. Also, the temptation is there for the RN to call for its own all-singing all-dancing effort. A common-airframe VG Interceptor/ Strike Aircraft for the 1970s with latest equipment. Such a design isn't going to be ideal for the RAF unless the UK goes it alone with some kind of three-model option. The Admiralty can't get the money given the carriers and SSBN and SSN fleet is consuming a lot of the Estimates money. It would be told, as historical, get on with the F-4K and Buccaneer S.2. And so it would, perhaps with a few additional airframes but with a two CVA fleet probably not.

And so as the ship's complete the RN needs to shop around for replacements for the 1980s. A two aircraft-type deck seems unlikely given the desire to cut costs and the fact that multi-role is the in thing. A common aircraft needs to do both roles.
What are those roles;
Defence of the Fleet: The Carrier groups are well layered with Sea Cat and Sea Dart with Sea Wolf likely in the 1980s to replace Sea Cat. This requires a long-range fighter with good loiter-time but also needs rapid climb to minimise launch to engagement time. Tu-22M, Tu-16 and Tu-142 most likely threats. Sidewinder for fighter-threat but the main weapon is going to be something like Sparrow/ Skyflash. Two seat perhaps if the Admiralty feels a single-pilot can't multi-task enough. Radar then would be something similar to the AI.24 unless an American system is brought. F-4K has all the above.
Strike: Ground attack seems unlikley unless going to be used for supporting troops ashore, probable favouring of stand-off weapons plus a nuclear-strike role with WE.177 against Soviet airbases and ports in the Far North. This would seem to indicate a terrian-following radar but also a radar that can designate naval targets for Martel and later Sea Eagle ASMs for the anti-ship role. That leads to whatever radar having to be a multi-role radar, like the GEC-Marconi Blue Hawk.
So where does that leave the contenders?
Sea Tornado - like Ken I believe that the delicate politics would exclude any British-only carrier-based variant unless the Treasury is willing to stump up the full development costs on top of ADV and the baseline bomber variant. Given the RAF harbouring grievances against CVA and the percieved RN scuppering an entire generation of its treasured projects likely the Boys in Blue are going to be active in Whitehall to kill it. Also a multi-role type with a British multi-mode radar would seemingly cause further problems. The Treasury and MOD penny-pinchers would try to merge the RAF variants to a common multi-role type, that would mean the RAF accepting a less-than optimal fighter and perhaps killing a future dogfighter for use in Germany. That would mean the baseline Tornado would differ from the European IDS, unless they too brought the Blue Hawk radar. As Ken says, the Brits tried hard not to force the Europeans to buy British kit to keep the delicate balance. The European nations don't want a fighter anyway and so the whole enterprise could collapse. Also the technical implications would either make the land-based variant less optimal in terms of weight or the carrier-based version would be less common- Given only 80% of ADV was common to IDS a UKCV version might be nearly 20-30% different again to either.
Jaguar M - probably a fine design but I'd say the Admiralty would want more from it than it offered. It would want better radar, strike capability and load lifitng capability. However faced with keeping with what it has, buying more American stuff of the same basic vintage as what it already has, plus political pressure to buy European might have made it look favourable given the Buccaneer S.2s fatigue problems. If the French Navy felt the same their combined political might have pushed things past Dassualt's dirty tricks. Even so the French have the Enteard M to fall back on. The RN have nothing (unless BAC can somehow be encouraged to re-invent the work or take it over as a UK only version). Break-even would be too high to make much money and export prospects slim.
A-7 or A-6 - fine on paper but, why would the RN buy American aircraft of much the same vintage as the F-4 and Buccaneer even though they have updated avionics? A-6 is still a subsonic type not much better than the S.2. It might make more economic sense, in some qaurters, to keep the Bucc line flowing by making a series of new-build or rebuild S.3 using some bits off the Tornado programme. It's no worse soloution and to replace both the F-4 and S.2 with a common airframe excludes these two as they can't replace the F-4K. In any case the CVA can't operate F-14 and F/A-18 is still some time away. The FAA has to skip a generation of fighters anyway so it might as well hold out for a true multirole type.
F/A-18 or Rafale or EFA - By the 1980s not much has been done, perhaps a few rebuilt S.3s with new spars and some new avionics and a few F-4S as attrition replacements from the US. By then the path to a true multi-role type is open. Buy the F/A-18 and perhaps co-operate with CASA in Spain in some kind of European licence-deal (RAF probably not too chuffed at risk to EFA), include a carrier-based fighter-bomber within the EFA. This might have made Dassault's ears prick-up. Perhaps the Brits back the Dassault option with its French carrier-based version and the EFA become a Rafale design instead of the BAe/ DASA design? Also that could lead to an Anglo-French carrier programme to replace the CVA-01 and 02 and the two French carriers with a common, perhaps still nuclear, CdG-type design (perhaps with a British reactor for greater speed?).

 

[JFC Fuller]

Hood,

I think you have pretty much nailed it. On fleet size, in the mid 60s the RN was already suffering a manpower crisis yet CVA01 would have had a crew about 20% larger than Ark Royal, and the cost problems are equally obvious. F/A-18 is probably marginally easier than Rafale or EFA simply because its available earlier and the politics might be easier. That said if the Buccaneers and Phantoms can have their fuselage's strengthened and repaired it might just be possible to push them to the mid-90s as the RAF was planning on doing with parts of its fleets of both types.

 

[Thorvic]

I don't think the RAF would take kindly to any Admiralty interference to get a fighter version of AFVG and re-live the whole P.1154 saga again. I don't think the government would either, remember by this time the Plowden Report has more or less stated all new projects need to be co-operative efforts, it doesn't believe the UK industry can go it alone. Also, the temptation is there for the RN to call for its own all-singing all-dancing effort. A common-airframe VG Interceptor/ Strike Aircraft for the 1970s with latest equipment.

Eh ?....Your falling into the same trap i mentioned earlier of the UK perception of the AFVG theses days is flavoured as a predicessor to the Tornado. The Actual AFVG program was very much focused on the Naval Interceptor, with secondary naval strike capabilities. The land version was also dual rolled as the French Air Force also wanted an interceptor. In the UK we tend to see the mock up at Warton and a poor 3 view based upon that mock up, in the French press i have seen a decent official cut away drawing of the AFVG with the semi recessed sparrows, together with deck lift drawings of all the British & French carriers of the period to illustrate the footprint of the AFVG.
It does illustrate an area that could really do with a well researched book, covering that period of the mid 60's and what was envisaged for the 70's as opposed to what actually happened and the various compromises and make do's that we had to put up with. probably why its UK75's favourite period !

 

[JFC Fuller]

It does illustrate an area that could really do with a well researched book, covering that period of the mid 60's and what was envisaged for the 70's as opposed to what actually happened and the various compromises and make do's that we had to put up with. probably why its UK75's favourite period !

Absolutely, in many ways AFVG is the missing piece from the whole saga. Healey stated in Parliament that when the UK entered the AFVG programme they were after a Lightning successor to enter service in 1977 whilst the French wanted it as a strike Aircraft from 1974. He went on to state that by May 1966 the British also wanted the type as a strike aircraft to replace the Vulcan's from 1975 but that the French were by then moving towards an interceptor (one assumes as an F8 replacement in the MN as well as an air force role) and that an operational requirement for "this mixture of roles" had already been agreed. However, it is difficult to discern whether the UK still wanted the type as an interceptor as by this time the decision had been taken to use the Phantom to replace the Lightning and the Jaguar to replace the Phantom in the strike role. One theory I have is that perhaps the UK was thinking of initially procuring the AFVG as a strike aircraft before then moving to procure it in the interceptor role from about 1980 to replace the Phantom's too though that also seems unlikely as the Phantom would still be relatively young by then and there appears to have been no intention of acquiring enough aircraft to replace both the Vulcans and the Phantom's. RN interest in the type is even harder to discern, AFVG only overlapped CVA-01 by a matter of months and those months were the death throes of CVA-01. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the MN carriers were notably smaller than CVA-01 to the extent that British officers were scathing about them during the CVA-01 design process. By the time AFVG came into being the RN (I suggest) would have been very careful about suggesting it wanted to be part of another expensive aircraft programme or that it was looking at aircraft that could fly from smaller carriers especially as in the RAF AFVG was intended to supplement and not replace (at least to 1966) the F-4 Phantom that the RN was then acquiring. By the time of the cancellation it was being reported that the AFVG weight was up to 42,000lbs and that it was unlikely to be adopted as a carrier based aircraft in France. The Flight Global article linked below seems to give the post 1966 review RAF force structure plan, I have summarised it below with the addition of some other data I have accumulated, it is worth noting that this article states that the ambition at the time was ultimately for the AFVG to start to replace the Phantom in the interceptor role "eventually":

AFVG: 175 supporting 10 squadrons (to enter service from 1974/5)
F-4 Phantom: 10 squadrons (this fits the 1962 target of 10 Lightning squadrons)
F-111K: 50 supporting 4 squadrons (mainly East of Suez)
Jaguar S: 96 supporting 5 squadrons (by 1975)
Harrier: 60 supporting 4 squadrons (further aircraft ordered later; 3 x 12 aircraft RAFG squadrons consolidated into 2 x 18 aircraft RAFG squadrons in 1977)
Jaguar B: 130 for training

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1967/1967%20-%200114.html

 

[Archibald]

Nah the RN wouldn't have got the Corsair, should the carriers and FAA have survived 1966 then its more likley they would have been coerced into the Jaguar M if a lighter single seat strike aircraft was required.
The UK's preference would have been a Naval Strike version of the AFVG once the Interceptor version had entered service to replace the Bucc in the late 70s early 80's. But in the spirit of Anglo-french cooperation they would probably have been forced to settle on the AFVG/Jaguar M combo along with the French MN !

My little contribution to that fascinating thread: in 1972, and after the Jaguar M obvious failure, the MN considered buying A7 Corsair. The MN had very old relation with Vought, reaching as far back as 1939 and the V-156F. The deal was the Corsair were to be build by Aerospatiale in Toulouse (Dassault government-owned nemesis). It was more or less the last time Dassault had a French competitor on the combat aircraft segment...

 

[uk 75]

Abraham

Thanks for your comments. I agree with all of them with some qualification.

P1154 was not a stovl aircraft but rather an attempt to turn the P1154 into a Phantom. I dont think it was ever a serious candidate for the RN, though the models look fun.

The Conservatives might have won the 1964 Election even with the Profumo scandal it was a very close run thing and Home did much better than anyone thought likely.

I was assuming that the US Navy and Marines had already adopted their versions of the VG Phantom perhaps as a hedge against the F14 not being deliverable on time. Given Hawker Siddeley's close relationship with MCDD on the AV8 they might have been a logical UK partner on VG Phantoms.

What emerges from the various threads and picked up by Geoff's remarks about AFVG was the UK's search for a Phantomlike aircraft of its own or at least in collaboration with Europe. I recall that in the beginning MRCA (later the Tornado) was always compared with Phantom and praised for doing the same jobs with a smaller aircraft. There is a line through from the BAC 583 via AFVG to MRCA. The Germans who also adopted Phantoms also tried to develop their own version starting with the weird US FRG AVS programme through the Neues Kampfflugzeug to MRCA.

All of which takes me back to the 1963 artists impression in Janes with its wonderful 1970s fighter/attackers on deck. These swing wing aircraft were the first step on the path that became Tornado.

I posted on another thread some Dassault artwork of a Mirage G design for the Aeronavale. A joint BAC Dassault design merging the Mirage G experience with the Warton VG expertise was politically and economically cursed but had the background been different both the RN and FN would have received an interesting aircraft in the 1970s. This AVG would have remained in service on CVA 01 and Foch/Clemenceau into the 90s until their successors came on the scene.

 

[Thorvic]

This AVG would have remained in service on CVA 01 and Foch/Clemenceau into the 90s until their successors came on the scene.

Actually it would have been the noughties or even this decade, the AFVG would have entered service in the 70's, so its replacement would have been the Eurocanard. That of course leads to another hornets nest of issues as the UK may have sided with the French for a Naval EFA and French would not been as desperate for the Rafale M to be rushed uinto service if it had the AFVG instead of Crusader !.

The crux of the problem however is whilst we know of the RAF plans and revisions as the goal posts changed the RN FAA ones were virtually terminated in one giant cut in 66, and long term planning instead to the withdrawal of the carriers and their airwings :'( . The RN no longer figured in fixed wing combat aircraft plans till the mid 70's....