Current Nuclear Weapons Development

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Developing technology to keep the nuclear stockpile safe, secure and reliable

The last nuclear test, code-named Divider, took place 30 years ago, on Sept. 23, 1992. That year, President Bush declared a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, which became permanent in 1995, during the Clinton administration. This ending of the era of nuclear testing coincided with a...
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The last nuclear test, code-named Divider, took place 30 years ago, on Sept. 23, 1992. That year, President Bush declared a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, which became permanent in 1995, during the Clinton administration. This ending of the era of nuclear testing coincided with a Presidential announcement of the beginning of stockpile stewardship.

As the decision to potentially halt nuclear testing approached, the nuclear security establishment (NSE) provided explicit analysis of what could be done with limited tests, continued tests at lower yields and under a no-test regime. Once the decision was made to end testing, it became clear that the plans for a non-testing regime needed to be further developed to ensure we could maintain the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear stockpile without testing. Leaders from the Department of Energy (DOE) and Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, convened to develop a complete strategy and map out an R&D effort that would come to be known as the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). Its mission was ensuring the readiness of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force without nuclear tests.
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A sad 30th anniversary
 
Forest Green said:
The worrying thing here is that there is literally no point to North Korea having nuclear weapons unless they plan to invade South Korea. China to the north provides more of a deterrence against an invasion of North Korea than a few nukes ever will, so the only reason they would be useful is if they intended to use them to ward of intervention should they invade the South.
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I think it's the other way around. China is more threatened by North Korea's nukes and the American response
 
From AAIA Defense Conference Agenda

Strategic Missile Systems
Please direct questions to:
Mark Olmos, Northrop Grumman
Alexander Edsall, The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
Presentations are solicited for sessions for Strategic Missile Systems, focusing on future requirements, development of new technical and operational concepts, modernization and sustainment of existing weapon systems, lowering life cycle costs, and application of innovative engineering and manufacturing processes. Challenges include lowering future cost of ownership, mitigating technology obsolescence and industrial base evolution, providing flexibility, diversity, responsiveness, accuracy, and survivability for long-term effectiveness, and assuring safety, security and reliability. Technical presentations are solicited for engineering, science and technology developments applicable to fire control and launch systems, missiles, and reentry vehicles.
  • Advanced Concepts, Including Penetration Aids, Underwater Launch, & Radiation Hardening
  • Advanced Technology for Thermal Protection, Propulsion, Avionics, Sensors & Materials/Structures
  • Aging Effects, Surveillance, & Age Management
  • Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles
  • Concepts to Leverage Technologies, Design Approaches, & Infrastructure Across Weapon Systems
  • Design & Operational Concepts for Future Strategic Weapon Systems
  • Ground Test, Flight Test, & Alternative Test Methods
  • Land-Based Strategic Missile Systems
  • Modeling & Simulation Techniques for Strategic Missiles & Subsystems
  • Other Component Technologies for Meeting Unique Strategic Requirements
  • Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent
  • System Enablers for Affordability for Strategic Missiles
  • Test & Evaluation for Strategic Missiles, Booster, Reentry & Subsystems
  • Underwater Launch
  • Weather Effects on Reentry Vehicle Performance
  • Other Topics in Strategic Missile Systems
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Air launched ballistic missile discussion would be interesting :cool:
 
Very interesting:).

bobbymike said:
Air launched ballistic missile discussion would be interesting :cool:
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Even though it's old stuff I'd love to hear anything new about the XAGM-48 Skybolt.

On another does anyone have a link to a thread on this board concerning past US nuclear tests and nuclear weapons development?
 
I'm not familiar with the W80 Mod 4 what are its new capabilities over previous mods?
 
Podcast Chinese Nuclear Weapon Programs
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NucleCast - Dr. John Swegle - Chinese Weapons Programs | RSS.com

John Swegle works as an independent consultant through the National Strategic Research Institute at the University of Nebraska on issues related to the effects of nuclear weapons and proliferation on US national security. Immediately prior to that, he was a Senior Advisory Scientist at the...
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The issue isn't the amount plutonium on hand (The US still has plenty of weapons-grade Pu-239) and don't forget there are literally tens of thousands of pits in storage in the US from decommissioned warheads. The problem is having the facilities to safely fabricate new pits which isn't a trivial task given the extreme toxicity and pyrophoricity of plutonium for example.
 
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news.usni.org

Report to Congress on Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation - USNI News

The following is the Jan. 23, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation. From the report The U.S. government has continued to express concerns about China’s record concerning the proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to...
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sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
www.usni.org

The Value and Limits of Nuclear Deterrence

How should the United States deter adversaries from nuclear escalation?
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By having a robust deterrent instead of the anemic, decrepit one we have now.
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The SSBNs seem pretty convincing to me. I think all of the existing programs (LRSO, SSBN, Sentinel, B-21) provide enough capability if they are sufficiently funded and fielded in the needed numbers. Maintaining peer deterrence is enough, IMO. It just needs to be expanded to two players, and I think existing programs can hit that target in time for the late 2020's when Chinese nuclear expansion starts to press up against US deterrence. IMO in the long run, Russia can't afford to maintain what it has in the 2030's.
 
Josh_TN said:
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
www.usni.org

The Value and Limits of Nuclear Deterrence

How should the United States deter adversaries from nuclear escalation?
www.usni.org www.usni.org
Click to expand...
By having a robust deterrent instead of the anemic, decrepit one we have now.
Click to expand...
The SSBNs seem pretty convincing to me. I think all of the existing programs (LRSO, SSBN, Sentinel, B-21) provide enough capability if they are sufficiently funded and fielded in the needed numbers. Maintaining peer deterrence is enough, IMO. It just needs to be expanded to two players, and I think existing programs can hit that target in time for the late 2020's when Chinese nuclear expansion starts to press up against US deterrence. IMO in the long run, Russia can't afford to maintain what it has in the 2030's.
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SSBNs are but one leg of the triad. I'm talking about our nuclear infrastructure/capability in its entirety. We can't make new warheads. We can barely make pits. None of our ICBMs, existing or planned, are mobile. None of our ICBMs, existing or planned, are in the class of the DF-41 or SARMAT. None of our cruise missiles, existing or planned, are even supersonic let alone hypersonic. We have no tactical nuclear weapons aside from a small bomb that is over half a century old. Our largest nuclear weapon is barely a megaton. (Yes, yes, we all know about accuracy but if you need to hit a LARGE target you're forced to use multiple of your limited number of weapons instead of one.)
 
Forest Green said:
bobbymike said:
New Start is deader than disco. Time for a 50-60s style nuke buildup. ;)
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I would settle for 2,000 ICBMs delivered and 2,000 SLBM delivered and 1,000 bomber delivered. I think the 1988 level of ~16,000 strategic nukes is probably overkill.
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I was also imagining a few thousand IRBMs, GLCMs (sub, super & hypersonic) and SLCMs ringing SE Asia.
 
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NucleCast - Dr. Chris Yeaw - Ultra-Low Yield Weapons - Why does Russia have so Many? | RSS.com

Dr. Christopher Yeaw is the Associate Executive Director for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Programs at the National Strategic Research Institute, U.S. Strategic Command’s University Affiliated Research Center (UARC). An integral component of the University of Nebraska, NSRI leads and...
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S01 E40 - Dr. Chris Yeaw - Ultra-Low Yield Weapons - Why does Russia have so Many?
 

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