Questions for people better qualified than myself.
  • OK some good questions; I will answer what I can.
  • Would the S-Tank be as well as Chieftain or instead of it? No I think we still have Chieftain, although much improved hopefully, as the S-Tank would be for RA Anti-tank Regts, along with Swingfire and Infantry Battalion anti-tank Platoons to back up the Milan. Not sure it would be in the RAC Recce Regts as the CVR(T) Striker, and all the other CVR(T) variants, are still likely to be in service.
  • If it's the latter who operates it? Is it the RAC or the RA? If it was to replace Chieftain then both; but not sure the UK was ready for a fixed gun tank.
  • If it's the RAC we've only got 19 regular regiments & the 5 Yeomanry regiments in the TA to play with.
    • According to my copy of the Encyclopaedia of the Modern British Army, 3rd Edition, by Terry Gander, published October 1986, price £19.95 net from the WH Smith in my local big town. There were 5 Yeomanry Regiments. These included 2 equipped with the FV721 Fox which were intended to reinforce BAOR and the other 3 were for Home Defence & not armoured in any way because they were equipped with 3/4 metric ton Land Rovers.
    • How about equipping them with S-Tanks? I still think even these unarmoured units would only get the S-Tank in their anti-tank Platoons.
  • If it's the RA new regiments can be formed or those disbanded as part of the Mason Defence Review can be converted to the S-Tank. Or if we give them to the handful of surviving RA regiments in the TA they can have them instead of the 105mm light gun.
  • As I mention above it would make a great piece of kit for the RA anti-tank Regts but replacing the 105 mm Light Gun, a howitzer, seems a bit odd. Unless you mean convert them to anti-tank units of course.
    • If it's the RA we can call it the ABBA because it's Swedish and continues the tradition of giving SPATGs names that begin with the letter A, e.g. Archer and Alecto. Ha, why not!
  • Mrs Thatcher might have been hard on the RN but she did expand the TA. This included forming new infantry battalions. In the run up to World War II the TA arms of the RAC and RA were expanded by converting infantry battalions to those corps. So another possible source of units to equip the S-Tanks is converted TA infantry battalions. Yes that is a possibility but I think that this would only happen, as you say in WW2, in a long conventional war.
Regards, VikingTank.
 
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Would a 6x6 CVR(W) been light enough to be air portable? That is by RAF Transport Command's Hercules and Belfasts? As far as I know that was part of the specification that produced the Fox and Vixen.
Umm good question; the Belfast could carry 3 x Saladin Armoured Cars, each weighting just under 12 tons, and the Herc x 2 I think. The French AMX10RC weighed 18 tons, and x 1 could fit into a Herc, so as long as the CVR(W) does not exceed that then yes; I think!

Regards VikingTank.
 
The very first thing that should be improved is the management and allocation of labor (as in getting Vickers involved from the start instead of later) so that combined with a more appropriate powerpack, Chieftain can enter service more or less in 1962 as intended, and preferably while meeting the reliability and engine power expected of a mature peacetime tank early in its life.

The next step is looking at all the weight efficiency improvements we can find to reduce weight for improved mobility and reduced wear, or increase the armor or some other weight-intensive parameter.

The biggest issue I have with the OTL tank is that the powerpack's actual design doesn't follow its intended philosophy at all. Britain basically took components meant for a light tank or light MBT (TN12 derived from FV300's TN10, V8 or opposed-piston engine of 700hp or less). Normally the limited power would be compensated by the very small size and low weight of the powertrain to devote more weight to armor and firepower for a given weight limit, but for the Chieftain the powerpack ended up being somewhat bigger and heavier than more conventionnal/high powerpacks of the day. This is due to:
- L60 being fitted vertically and being pretty big and heavy for what it does already (iron parts, low super/turbocharger boost)
- the hull sides being angled, which drive the height up since all the components still have to fit but now have less space at the bottom.

The other area when big savings can be made is the suspension:
- the roadwheels are absolutely superheavy by the standards of contemporary tanks of the same weight class, due to being fairly simplistic in design. You can easily save several dozen kgs or up to 100kg per wheel, or 1200kg in total
- the Horstmann bogies are extremely heavy for the performance they offer. Two contemporary alternatives exist: torsion bars that have the potential for greater travel and save a lot of weight, or external independent coil springs ala Merkava which remove the travel limitation when one wheel of a bogie is compressed (since wheels are now independent) and remove much of the weight of the steel needed to connect the wheels in one bogie. Savings on the order of 1000-2000kg. By switching to Leo 2/Abrams/T-tank style bottom hull (straight bottom with angled connections to the sides) and straight sides, you would retain or even improve the mine protection while saving height since now you can relocate stuff closer to the bottom of the tank. This would offset the height increase that torsion bars would have added. If torsion bars are used, the wheels could be reduced in diameter to fit a 7th wheel and improve ride further.

Layout:
- I mentionned ditching the angled sides and the mild Vee bottom. As I said this would allow a reduction in hull height. Packaging would be improved because most things in a tank are fairly rectangular and there would be wasted space along angled walls. This would also allow the turret basket to be dropped almost to floor level or to be increased in width at the bottom, since the angled sides precluded that. Bonus point is that this would make Chieftain easier to upgrade with foreign turrets or powerpacks, which was an issue with all British sloped side designs.

- You could probably even go as far as exploiting the benefits of the reclined driver's seat as much as possible and use the same general hull shape as the M1 Abrams. Historically Chieftain mostly used that to make up for the seat being mounted on rails over the Vee, instead of directly on a straight floor. A fully welded hull front, rather than cast may end up being superior to the cast layout in this configuration (improved resistance of rolled steel offsetting the efficiency of the cast shape).

- I might advise using a lighter style of skirts, either completely rubber or the 10mm thick steel skirts Leopard 1 used, that hang from the sponson. This would save weight since the side bars used to fix Chieftain-style skirts would be deleted and wouldn't contribute to mud buildup. Note the 10mm thick skirts are no worse ballistically than Chieftain ones and will still cover the area above the wheels.

Turret: nothing notable to alter.

Firepower: autoloading the ammo could have yielded further space and weight savings and would be a nice parallel to the Soviets and their two-part autoloaded ammo. Probably too expensive and complex for the British however, who ditched even the powered rammer on Chieftain because "the loader alone already met ROF requirements".

The gun can't really be improved much without going for riskier technology (APFSDS, smoothbore and combustible case ammo) or compromising on the original requirements.

Ammo stowage: testing in 1984 on a Chieftain led to Challenger replacing the wet stowage bins with armored bins. Foreign testing indicated that wet stowage only really worked well against low energy fragments that armored bins can already stop while being lighter and not having liquid in them. Maybe the British had not tested wet vs armored stowage at the time and drew the wrong conclusions?

Ammo capacity: it might be wise to just go back to 40-50 rounds like most 120mm wielders. This would save some weight overall. When the Chieftain prototypes were lightened they had to reduce ammo capacity to 56-52 rounds, but weirdly enough went back to 62 in service even though weight kept creeping up.

Ammo choices: it might be preferable to replace HESH with HEAT-MP and HE or HE-FRAG. HEAT was generally better accross the board in the AT role and isn't really worse against infantry in the open (less blast than HESH, but more frag). HE is straight up better than HESH against anything but very reinforced fortifications that aren't exactly common in the Cold War, and at that caliber it will hurt tanks quite badly. Would also make up for the reduced ammo load I suggested.

FCS: short of making the compromise of adding an optical RF in the cupola or the turret, not much to do.
Wow Elan Vital; great stuff not sure I can add much to that.

If all those items can be done with the technology of the time you have a more reliable, lighter, faster, more manoeuvrable tank with better ballistic protection and the ability to be upgraded with better armour etc. Gets my vote. This would mean at least Canada, Israel (a lot under licence) and possibly the Netherlands buying it as well; throw in Sweden and you have a real success story. Of course if the UK FCO decides to ban Israel from buying it then you may get as many, or more, Middle East sales.

Great work, I learnt a lot there thanks, regards VikingTank.
 
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Would a 6x6 CVR(W) been light enough to be air portable? That is by RAF Transport Command's Hercules and Belfasts? As far as I know that was part of the specification that produced the Fox and Vixen.
Umm good question; the Belfast could carry 3 x Saladin Armoured Cars, each weighting just under 12 tons, and the Herc x 2 I think. The French AMX10RC weighed 18 tons, and x 1 could fit into a Herc, so as long as the CVR(W) does not exceed that then yes; I think!

Regards VikingTank.
If it helps there was a time in the late 1960s when the RAF was to buy at least 15 C-5 Galaxies to replace the 23 Britannias in Nos. 99 & 511 Squadrons. Delivery was to be by March 1977. I don't know but I suspect that the RAF would have wanted to buy more to replace the Belfasts in 53 Squadron and VC.10s in 10 Squadron.
 
Hello all, new to the board. I am going to try to give some more detailed responses later but (and an early version was posted on another thread) this is my opus, currently on version 9

I am working on version 10 after gathering voluminous information, including detailed GDP89 task organizations and deployment.

The major take-away is that 1 BR Corps was organized in fighting for 8 days at 100% strength, then a further 2 days at 40% strength. Based on the post Yom Kippur War
Battlefield Attrition Study/Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales.
 
Essentially BAOR was supposed to be a Corps of three Armoured Divisions. But unlike the US and West German Armoured Divisions the UK never managed to provide two armoured and one mechanised brigade for each division.
During its life the organisation of BAOR went through various changes but the resources were never there to make the Divisions.full NATO formations.
 
Yes, it was only a total of eight Armd/Mech Bdes from the late 60’s early 70’s (with a sidetrack to the ill-conceived Task Force era) to the end. All the “Haul Down” reports from 1982 on always indicate that another Armd AND Inf Bde were needed……besides an increase in 155mm artillery and ammo.
 
Hello all, new to the board. I am going to try to give some more detailed responses later but (and an early version was posted on another thread) this is my opus, currently on version 9

I am working on version 10 after gathering voluminous information, including detailed GDP89 task organizations and deployment.

The major take-away is that 1 BR Corps was organized in fighting for 8 days at 100% strength, then a further 2 days at 40% strength. Based on the post Yom Kippur War
Battlefield Attrition Study/Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales.
That's incredible. Thanks for uploading it.

What was of particular interest to me (because I'm a bean counter) was "Appendix B: Major Army Equipment 1989-90 (Based on the Statement on The Defence Estimates 1989 and 1990)" that starts on Page 114.

For example from the Field Artillery table on Page 115.
  • The 53 M107s & M110s (16 & 37) were about what I expected because I thought that about 50 of the M107/M110 family were purchased (although I can't remember where I read it).
  • The 111 M109s were about double what I expected, because I thought that about 50 were purchased (although in common with the M107s & M110s I can't remember where I read it) rather than the original "buy"of 40 M109A1 and 69 M109A2.
    • However, is 111 M109s a typo? The footnote said the current inventory was 69 M109A2 and 40 M109A3 = 109.
  • The 179 AS90s on order with an option of 50 more = 229, which is nearly the same as the 221 SP70s that were wanted according to Terry Gander's "Encyclopaedia of the Modern British Army - 3rd Edition" (which also says West Germany wanted 400 and Italy wanted 90).
  • The 200 Abbot SPHs is more than I expected. According to the notes I made from "Jane's Armour and Artillery 1995-96" many years ago only 178 were made for the British Army (12 prototypes, 146 standard production Abbots & 20 Value Engineered Abbots) with 151 in the British Army at November 1990.
 
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Part of Post 88.
  • The 111 M109s are about double what I expected, because I thought that about 50 were purchased (although in common with the M107s & M110s I can't remember where I read it) rather than the original "buy" of 40 M109A1 and 69 M109A2.
    • However, is 111 M109s a typo? The footnote said the current inventory was 69 M109A2 and 40 M109A3 = 109.
This is a summary of the entry on the M109A2 in Terry Gander's "Encyclopaedia of the Modern British Army - 3rd Edition" which was published in October 1986.
  • The first paragraph says that the M109 entered service with the British Army in 1965 and that in 1978 these vehicles were fitted with longer barrels known as the M185 to give their self-propelled carriages a new designation of M109A1, later M109A2.
  • The next paragraph says that the M109A2 is the standard equipment of the Royal Artillery's medium self propelled batteries based in Germany. The first two vehicles were obtained for trials in 1975 and that the barrel retrofit programme was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1978.
  • The third paragraph is a description of the vehicle.
  • The fourth paragraph says that the M109A1s now in service have been updated to a new standard known as M109A2, that new vehicles have been purchased from the United States with all up-to-date modifications incorporated and finally that these "new" vehicles are sometimes referred to M109A3s.
  • The fifth (and final) paragraph says that there is little sign that the SP70 will enter service as scheduled and that in the meantime numerous changes can be made to the basic M109A2 to improve its range and all round performance. Several concerns are now promoting new and longer barrels for the M109A2 and revised turrets to go with them. Autoloaders are another option and some of these may be incorporated into future British Army M109A2s.
Therefore, based on that it looks like 40 vehicles were purchased in the 1960s, 2 were purchased in 1975 and 69 were purchased in the 1980s = 111. However, the designations are the opposite to what @OldBill17 wrote, i.e. the M109A1 vehicles purchased in the 1960s were updated to M109A2 standard and that the vehicles purchased in the 1980s were M109A3, while @OldBill17 says that the original vehicles were updated from M109A1 to M109A3 and the new vehicles were M109A2s.
 
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Yes Minister, Yes Prime Minister were never entered by BBC for the Montreux TV Comedy Awards. As a Current Affairs Politics lecture it was avidly watched by PM Thatcher.
Clips of "Yes Minister" were used in my International Business classes, particularly the one about how "bribery isn't HMGov policy, merely HMGov practice" in the lectures about the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
 
From circa 1977 the British Annual Abstract of Statistics included a Formation of the Armed Forces table showing the number of front-line units in HM Forces.

This is an extract from the tables for 1966-76, 1969-79, 1977-75 and 1981-91 which shows the "Teeth arm forces" of the Regular Army from 1966 to 1991.

Regular Army units from Annual Abstract of Statistics.png

Notes

[1] The number of personnel and the amount of equipment in each regiment and battalion varies according to the role currently assigned.
[3] Regular Army only.
[4] Including the Gurkhas.
[5] Prior to 1977 the Army Air Corps was not organised into regiments.

Source: Ministry of Defence
 
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Hello all, new to the board. I am going to try to give some more detailed responses later but (and an early version was posted on another thread) this is my opus, currently on version 9

I am working on version 10 after gathering voluminous information, including detailed GDP89 task organizations and deployment.

The major take-away is that 1 BR Corps was organized in fighting for 8 days at 100% strength, then a further 2 days at 40% strength. Based on the post Yom Kippur War
Battlefield Attrition Study/Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales.
Another excellent source on the BAOR is "The British Army in Germany (BAOR and After) an Organisational History 1947-2004" by Graham E. Watson and Richard A. Rinaldi.
 
Remember that up until the Abrams, no tank could fire effectively on the move. NONE.

So the S-tank was not particularly at a disadvantage compared to Chieftain or M60, and was actually tested head-to-head and scored better on the US comparative tests than either.

That said, remember that the S-tank is a 1950s design in terms of armor, the USSR/East German 125mm ammo will go completely through an S-tank unless it hits the diesel engine.
 
Remember that up until the Abrams, no tank could fire effectively on the move. NONE.

So the S-tank was not particularly at a disadvantage compared to Chieftain or M60, and was actually tested head-to-head and scored better on the US comparative tests than either.

That said, remember that the S-tank is a 1950s design in terms of armor, the USSR/East German 125mm ammo will go completely through an S-tank unless it hits the diesel engine.
If the only criterion for shooting effectively on the move is it has to hit 80% of the time at 3km at 50kph or another hilariously ambitious figure then sure (although even then Leo 2 was earlier and better stabilized compared to the M1).

But the stabilization systems fielded in the USSR since the late 50s and the addon systems used by NATO in the 70s (or the British system available on Chieftain) already achieved remarkable hit probabilities up to 1500m at low but still decent speeds, which is already enough to cover most available sightlines in Central Europe.
 
If the only criterion for shooting effectively on the move is it has to hit 80% of the time at 3km at 50kph or another hilariously ambitious figure then sure (although even then Leo 2 was earlier and better stabilized compared to the M1).

But the stabilization systems fielded in the USSR since the late 50s and the addon systems used by NATO in the 70s (or the British system available on Chieftain) already achieved remarkable hit probabilities up to 1500m at low but still decent speeds, which is already enough to cover most available sightlines in Central Europe.
Again, the S-tank scored better than the M60 on the US Army's shooting tests, which IIRC revolved around shooting from a short halt at the time. And the S-tank has excellent acceleration capabilities due to light weight and strong engines so it is highly capable of shooting and then scooting to the next location.
 
Post 85 in full.
Hello all, new to the board. I am going to try to give some more detailed responses later but (and an early version was posted on another thread) this is my opus, currently on version 9

I am working on version 10 after gathering voluminous information, including detailed GDP89 task organizations and deployment.

The major take-away is that 1 BR Corps was organized in fighting for 8 days at 100% strength, then a further 2 days at 40% strength. Based on the post Yom Kippur War
Battlefield Attrition Study/Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales.
This is an extract from @OldBill17's PDF.

Major Army Equipment 1989-90 - Field Artillery from Oldbill17's PDF.png

Notes
  1. MLRS was programmed for three regts with 18 x MLRS each. 54 in service w/17 WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
  2. The option for 50 more would have enabled all eight field regts in BAOR to be so equipped, with 37 for WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
  3. All M109’s were A2 (69) or A3 (40) versions. Original buy was 40 x M109A1 and 69 x M109A2. (The A3 was the designation of A1s rebuilt to A2 standard).
I'd already commented in Posts 88 and 89 that the number of Abbots and M109s was larger than I expected.

The number of L118 Light Guns in service was higher than I expected too. According to the table no L118 Light Gun regiments were in service, but 112 Light Guns were in service.

I thought 4 regiments were equipped with the weapon as follows:
  • 7 Parachute Regiment RHA - 3 regular batteries - which was part of 5 Airborne Brigade
  • 29 Commando Regiment RA - 3 regular batteries and one TA battery - which was part of 3 Commando Brigade
  • 100 (Yeomanry) Field Regt RA (V) - 3 TA batteries - which was part of 2 Infantry Division
  • 101 (Northumbrian) Field Regt RA (V) - 3 TA batteries - which was part of 2 Infantry Division
  • Plus 14 Field Regiment RA (Royal School or Artillery at Larkhill on Salisbury Plain) provided a battery of Light Guns to support AMF(L).
That's a total of 14 batteries (7 regular and 7 TA) which at 6 guns per battery is a total of 84 guns, not 112.

However, on Page 48 of @OldBill17's PDF it says that 101 and 102 Regiments had the number of guns per battery increased from 6 to 8 on 1st October 1985. Therefore, if there were 8 Light Guns in all 14 batteries the total in service would be 112 as per the table.
 
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Post 85 in full.
Hello all, new to the board. I am going to try to give some more detailed responses later but (and an early version was posted on another thread) this is my opus, currently on version 9

I am working on version 10 after gathering voluminous information, including detailed GDP89 task organizations and deployment.

The major take-away is that 1 BR Corps was organized in fighting for 8 days at 100% strength, then a further 2 days at 40% strength. Based on the post Yom Kippur War
Battlefield Attrition Study/Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales.
This is the "tube artillery" of BAOR in July 1989 according to @OldBill17's PDF.

1st Artillery Brigade - 12 M110, 24 M107 and 36 FH70 as follows:
General Support Group North​
12 M107 - 32 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
General Support Group South​
12 M107 - 5 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​
Corps Support Group​
12 M110 - 39 Heavy Regiment, RA​
1st Armoured Division - 48 M109 and 24 Abbot as follows:
24 Abbot - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 18 FH70 and 48 L118 Light Gun as follows:
18 FH70 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
24 L118 Light Gun - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 L118 Light Gun - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 48 M109 and 24 Abbot as follows:
24 M109 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 Abbot - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 48 Abbot and 18 FH70 as follows:
24 Abbot - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 Abbot - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​

Total 348 tube artillery pieces in 17 regiments as follows:
12 M110 in one regiments of 12 guns.​
24 M107 in 2 regiments of 12 guns​
96 M109 in 4 regiments of 24 guns​
96 Abbot in 4 regiments of 24 guns​
72 FH70 in 4 regiments of 18 guns​
48 L118 Light Gun in - 2 regiments of 24 guns​

Except that it was really 36 FH70 in 2 regiments of 18 guns for a total of 312 tube artillery pieces in 15 regiments.

That is because 27 and 45 Field Regiments are in twice, viz:
27 Field Regiment was part of General Support Group North & 2nd Infantry Division​
and​
45 Field Regiment was part of General Support Group South & 4th Armoured Division​

I thought that they might be typos for the other regiments equipped with the FH70, but then I remembered that there were only 3 FH70 regiments in the whole British Army. The third regiment in July 1989 was 47 Field Regiment, RA which in April 1984 moved from Mansberg Barracks, Gutersloh to Baker Barracks, Thorney Island and exchanged their 24 Abbots for 18 FH70s. (Source: http://british-army-units1945on.co.uk/royal-artillery/47th-regiment-ra.html).
 
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Post 96.
This is an extract from @OldBill17's PDF.

Major Army Equipment 1989-90 - Field Artillery from Oldbill17's PDF.png

Notes
  1. MLRS was programmed for three regts with 18 x MLRS each. 54 in service w/17 WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
  2. The option for 50 more would have enabled all eight field regts in BAOR to be so equipped, with 37 for WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
  3. All M109’s were A2 (69) or A3 (40) versions. Original buy was 40 x M109A1 and 69 x M109A2. (The A3 was the designation of A1s rebuilt to A2 standard).
I'd already commented in Posts 88 and 89 that the number of Abbots and M109s was larger than I expected.

The number of L118 Light Guns in service was higher than I expected too. According to the table no L118 Light Gun regiments were in service, but 112 Light Guns were in service.

I thought 4 regiments were equipped with the weapon as follows:
  • 7 Parachute Regiment RHA - 3 regular batteries - which was part of 5 Airborne Brigade
  • 29 Commando Regiment RA - 3 regular batteries and one TA battery - which was part of 3 Commando Brigade
  • 100 (Yeomanry) Field Regt RA (V) - 3 TA batteries - which was part of 2 Infantry Division
  • 101 (Northumbrian) Field Regt RA (V) - 3 TA batteries - which was part of 2 Infantry Division
  • Plus 14 Field Regiment RA (Royal School or Artillery at Larkhill on Salisbury Plain) provided a battery of Light Guns to support AMF(L).
That's a total of 14 batteries (7 regular and 7 TA) which at 6 guns per battery is a total of 84 guns, not 112.

However, on Page 48 of @OldBill17's PDF it says that 101 and 102 Regiments had the number of guns per battery increased from 6 to 8 on 1st October 1985. Therefore, if there were 8 Light Guns in all 14 batteries the total in service would be 112 as per the table.
The table says that 179 AS90 were planned with options for another 50 which would have increased the total to 229.
  • 179 were enough to equip 6 regiments - 144 in the regiments plus 35 for WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
  • 229 were enough to equip 8 regiments - 192 in the regiments plus 37 for WMR, Repair Pool, & Training.
Earlier in the thread I suggested that M108 should have been purchased instead of the Abbot because they could have been converted to M109s in the 1970s.

If that had been done the British Army would have had 311 M109s in 1989 instead of 200 Abbots and 111 M109s. That's enough to equip 11 regiments on a scale of 24 M109 per regiment with 47 for WMR, Repair Poll and Training. @VIKINGTANK suggested using the money spent on SP70 before it was cancelled in the "Real World" to buy more M109s in this "Version of History". If his suggestion is combined with my suggestion the British Army aught to have enough M109s to equip 12 regiments on a scale of 24 M109s per regiment. The personnel for the 4 extra regiments would be found by converting the 2 FH70 and 2 Light Gun regiments in BAOR from those weapons to the M109.
 
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Following on from Post 98.

According to @OldBill17's PDF the 4 divisions in BAOR had 12 field artillery regiments and 276 guns in July 1989 (96 M109, 96 Abbot, 36 FH70 and 48 Light Guns) as follows:

1st Armoured Division - 48 M109 and 24 Abbot as follows:
24 Abbot - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 18 FH70 and 48 L118 Light Gun as follows:
18 FH70 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
24 L118 Light Gun - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 L118 Light Gun - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 48 M109 and 24 Abbot as follows:
24 M109 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 Abbot - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 48 Abbot and 18 FH70 as follows:
24 Abbot - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 Abbot - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​

In my timeline the 4 divisions in BAOR still had 12 field regiments in July 1989. However, each regiment was equipped with 24 M109s for a total of 288 as follows:

1st Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 M109 - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​

Or put another way 288 x 155mm guns (all self-propelled) instead of 132 x 155mm (96 self-propelled) and 144 x 105mm (96 self propelled).
 
A cynical friend of mine suggested that Soviet troops would have been so shocked by the lavishness of West German shopping centres that they would have degenerated into a hoard of looters, assuming they coped with the huge traffic jams on German roads.
He was in the TA for the big Lionheart exercise and met young German officers his age who reckoned they would saddle up and head East into the GDR (I think they were ironic.about the W German policy of Forward Defence (Vorneverteidigung).
I think it was the Polish Army who revealed that the Soviets planned to use nuclear strikes on a massive scale to punch through NATO lines.
The commitment of III US Corps to Northern Germany (a brigade was ststioned near Bremerhaven) would have been helpful, assuming it could arrive in time by air from the US and pick up its kit.
The biggest mismatch was in the air where Soviet airpower was much more rigid and less agile than NATO.
Fortunately the Soviet rulers were much more cautious than Western pundits claimed and did not put any of this to the test.
Legions coming home was figurative but thanks for the clarification.
The changes in composition including equipment types were fairly significant.

Interesting you say this, watching Deutschland 83 ..if its close to how life on both sides of the border are, and from a Bundeswehr side during the height of the cold war. We have seen how life is from both our UK ( iam raised and grew up 1970s/1980s) and from US mil viewpoint ...

I gather from the tv series however fictional, depicts West Germans questioning themselves both in the military and civilian life about how things run...

cheers
 
Or put another way 288 x 155mm guns (all self-propelled) instead of 132 x 155mm (96 self-propelled) and 144 x 105mm (96 self propelled).
That's in addition to the M107 and M110, right?
When I first read that statement I was completely nonplussed by it and at the time of writing this reply I am somewhat nonplussed by it.

The M107s and M110s weren't in the four divisions, they were part of 1st Artillery Brigade. Therefore, they weren't in the "Real World" and this "Version of History" divisional artillery orders of battle shown in Post 99.

For BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in the "Real World" please see the list in Post 97 which you "liked" at 21:17 on Thursday 5th October 2023.

This is BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in this "Version of History". That is the "tube artillery" of its four divisions (already listed in Post 99) plus the "tube artillery" of 1st Artillery Brigade.

1st Artillery Brigade - 12 M110, 24 M107 and 48 M109 as follows:
General Support Group North​
12 M107 - 32 Heavy Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 27 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 2nd Infantry Division - see below)​
General Support Group South​
12 M107 - 5 Heavy Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 45 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 4th Armoured Division - see below)​
Corps Support Group​
12 M110 - 39 Heavy Regiment, RA​
1st Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 27 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 1st Artillery Brigade - see above)​
24 M109 - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 M109 - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 45 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 1st Artillery Brigade - see above)​

Totals: 24 M107, 288 M109 and 12 M110 - Grand Total: 324 tube artillery pieces.
 
When I first read that statement I was completely nonplussed by it and at the time of writing this reply I am somewhat nonplussed by it.

The M107s and M110s weren't in the four divisions, they were part of 1st Artillery Brigade. Therefore, they weren't in the "Real World" and this "Version of History" divisional artillery orders of battle shown in Post 99.
Ah, gotcha, my eyes must have glazed over a bit there.


For BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in the "Real World" please see the list in Post 97 which you "liked" at 21:17 on Thursday 5th October 2023.

This is BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in this "Version of History". That is the "tube artillery" of its four divisions (already listed in Post 99) plus the "tube artillery" of 1st Artillery Brigade.
My concern was that you weren't including any good counterbattery or long range guns before MLRS came on line.
 
Part of Post 75.
Ref the Saladin/Saracen yes in full agreement, and thanks for the link (good read and most sensible), they could have both been upgraded (it would be a pretty big upgrade) and been used by 2 Div coming from the UK; lets call it 2 Light Armoured Div shall we! And correct so much better than Saxon.

Its a shame that the CVR(W) program only brought about Vixen (cancelled) and Fox; the Fox was really only suitable for roads/tracks and gentle X-Country - we did have them at one time but I never saw them in difficult country so I cannot comment for sure. A 6x6 CVR(W), perhaps in co-operation with the French, would have worked far better and may have lead to more overseas sales.

Regards, VikingTank.
My thoughts on how to turn 2nd Infantry Division into 2nd (Heavy) Armoured Division.
  • I've suggested a way to give 2 Division 72 M109s instead of 18 FH70s and 48 Light Guns.
    • See Posts 98, 99 and 102.
  • Instead of the 4x4 CVR(W) family of the "Real World"how about more CVR(T) vehicles?
    • That is Scimitars instead of the Fox.
      • And.
    • A variant of the Spartan APC for the liaison role instead of Vixen.
  • I've thought of 3 alternatives to the Saxon.
    • No. 1 buy more Warriors.
    • No. 2 buy more Stormer APCs.
    • No. 3 buy more M113s.
      • Earlier in the thread I suggested building circa 3,000 M113s under licence to 1971 instead of circa 3,000 FV432s.
      • The licence would include the right to export the M113 & its derivatives to certain countries and as a result it might still be in production in the 1980s so the British Army could buy more instead of the Saxon.
    • However, I believe that some Saxons were needed to replace the Saracen and Humber Pig in the internal security role.
  • Convert 4 of the TA infantry battalions in 2nd Division into MBT regiments, so it has 4 MBT regiments, 5 mechanised infantry battalions and 72 M109s like the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armoured Divisions. This means either:
    • Buying another 4 regiments worth of Challenger 1s.
      • Or.
    • When the first 4 regular MBT regiments convert to the Challenger 1 pass the redundant Chieftain tanks onto the 4 TA infantry battalions earmarked for conversion.
I appreciate that each of the above involves spending a bit to a lot more money. However, I'm assuming that this is a "Version of History" where the British economy performs better in the 1970s & 1980s and where the British Armaments Industry delivers its goods & services "on time and at cost" or at least "not as late and not as over budget" as it did in the "Real World".

As far as I know the Warrior was "in service late and over budget" in the "Real World" which led to the planned number of vehicles being cut from 1,900 to about a thousand (but only 789 were delivered due to the Cold War ending) and the Saxon had to be purchased to make up the numbers. Is that correct?
 
Part of Post 75 - again.
Its a shame that the CVR(W) program only brought about Vixen (cancelled) and Fox; the Fox was really only suitable for roads/tracks and gentle X-Country - we did have them at one time but I never saw them in difficult country so I cannot comment for sure. A 6x6 CVR(W), perhaps in co-operation with the French, would have worked far better and may have lead to more overseas sales.

Regards, VikingTank.
After uploading Post 104 I remembered the Canadian AVGP (Armoured Vehicle General Purpose) programme (later known as the LAV I) which was a family of 6x6 vehicles based on the six-wheeled version of the Swiss Mowag Piranha I.

Therefore, how about a 6x6 CVR(W) in co-operation with the Canadians instead of the French?

The British Army would buy it instead of the Fox, Saxon & Vixen and in return the Canadian Army would buy Chieftain instead of Leopard 1, British built M109s instead of US built M109s and British built M113s instead of US built M113s.

Edit 21:00 BST 06.10.23.
According to https://www.canadiansoldiers.com/ Canada purchased.
  • 174 M113½ Lynx command and reconnaissance vehicles delivered from 1968.
  • 1,143 M113 APCs from delivered from 1965 to the early 1990s. The website also says the Canadian Army/Land Command operated the M548 tracked cargo carrier and M577 command post, but not whether they were included in the 1,143 M113 APCs.
  • 76 M109 SPGs delivered 1968-71.
  • 127 Leopard 1A3 tanks were purchased in 1979 - except that the 1986 edition of Jane's Main Battle Tanks says 128 (114 MBT, 6 AVLB and 8 ARV).
  • 491 Armoured Vehicles General Purpose (AVGP) delivered from 1976.
 
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According to its Wikipedia Article the British Army purchased 1,057 Alvis Stalwart High Mobility Load Carriers (HMLC) which were delivered 1963-71. That is 125 Mk1 ordered 1962 (delivered 1963-65) and 932 Mk2 (delivered 1966-1971). Its Wikipedia article also says that the Stalwart was adopted and entered service with the British Army in 1964 as a general transport truck in preference to the FV431, the load carrier variant of the FV430 series.

With hindsight, was FV431 the better choice? As far as I know the Stalwart did what it was designed to do, but it did need a lot of maintenance and all the vehicles were withdrawn in 1993. Meanwhile, the FV432 APC and its derivatives remained in service with the British Army to this very day.

I know that the Stalwart was developed (via the Salamander) from the Saladin armoured car and Saladin APC, but how many components did they actually have in common with the Stalwart? I'm asking the question because 1,057 FV431s instead of 1,057 Stalwarts would increase the number of FV430 vehicles built from about 3,000 to about 4,000 and as I'm a believer in economies of scale 1,057 FV431s might have been cheaper to build and operate than 1,057 Stalwarts.

However, I've also suggested that the British Army purchased the M113 family of vehicles instead of the FV430 family, in which case 1,057 M548s might have been cheaper to build and operate than 1,057 Stalwarts.

The M548 did serve in the British Army in the "Real World" because the Tracked Rapier was mounted on M548s, the M677 launcher for the Lance missile was based on the M548 and according to the Wikipedia article on the M548 the British Army used it as a logistical vehicle during the 1991 Gulf War. Therefore, 3 families of vehicle might have been reduced to one, i.e. the M113 family instead of the FV430 family, M113 family and Stalwart.
 
... as I'm a believer in economies of scale 1,057 FV431s might have been cheaper to build and operate than 1,057 Stalwarts...

Economies of scale and commonality are important but wheeled support vehicles have some obvious advantages over tracks.

My understanding is that the FV62x series were chosen over the FV431 because the Stalwarts were amphibious and better able to self-deploy. The amphibious parts tends to support your M548/M113 alternative ... but I can't really see the MoD giving up on British manufacturers' designs so entirely in the early 1960s.
 
Economies of scale and commonality are important but wheeled support vehicles have some obvious advantages over tracks.

My understanding is that the FV62x series were chosen over the FV431 because the Stalwarts were amphibious and better able to self-deploy. The amphibious parts tends to support your M548/M113 alternative ... but I can't really see the MoD giving up on British manufacturers' designs so entirely in the early 1960s.
For what it's worth (1) points taken and (2) my suggestions are not criticisms of the people who made the choices in the "Real World" - they were professionals making the what seemed to be the best choice at the time and I'm an extremely low level enthusiast who has the benefit of hindsight.

Does self-deploy mean a Stalwart could be driven all the way to where it needed to go and a FV431 or M548 had to be put on the back of a lorry for part of the same journey? If so fair enough.

For what it's worth (3) the Stalwart required a lot of maintenance (as I understand it) and if that meant it had a lower availability rate than the FV431 or M548 that would have been a secondary argument if favour of buying either vehicle instead of Stalwart.

For what it's worth (4) the Stalwart's amphibious capability seems to have been more trouble than it was worth because (as I understand it) all the Stalwarts lost that capability well before they were withdrawn.

Is M108, M113 & M548 built under licence instead of the FV430 family & Stalwart giving up on British manufacturer's designs "so entirely" and is "so entirely" good English? The British Army did buy M107, M109 & M110 in the "Real World" and it still buys Chieftain in the 1960s, followed by CVR(T) & CVR(W) in the 1970s and Challenger 1 & Warrior in the 1980s in my "Version of History".

However, if standardisation had been taken to it's logical conclusion the British Army would have bought:
  • Leopard 1 or M60 instead of Chieftain.
  • M1 Abrams or Leopard 2 instead of Challenger 1 and Challenger 2.
  • Bradley instead of Warrior.
  • The nearest American or German equivalents to CVR(T) & CVR(W) instead of CVR(T) & CVR(W).
  • And for the Army Air Corps: UH-1 Iroquois or UH-60 Black Hawk instead of Lynx; and OH-58 Kiowa instead of Gazelle.
Before the middle 1960s most British military helicopters were licence-built American designs such as the Dragonfly, Sioux, Wessex & Whirlwind and between then & the end of the Cold War HM Forces would buy a large number of licence-built SH-3 Sea Kings and a few score of US-built Chinooks so buying licence-built American designs instead of Gazelle and Lynx seems rather plausible to me.
 
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Economies of scale and commonality are important but wheeled support vehicles have some obvious advantages over tracks.
In that case what are your opinion (good and/or bad) about my proposal (in Post 104) to built more Scimitars instead of Fox and a liaison version of Spartan instead of Vixen.

My idea was inspired by what @VIKINGTANK wrote about the Fox in Post 75.
Its a shame that the CVR(W) program only brought about Vixen (cancelled) and Fox; the Fox was really only suitable for roads/tracks and gentle X-Country - we did have them at one time but I never saw them in difficult country so I cannot comment for sure. A 6x6 CVR(W), perhaps in co-operation with the French, would have worked far better and may have lead to more overseas sales.
And this comment about the Ferret (which the Vixen was intended to replace) at the end of Post 54 by @VIKINGTANK.
Actually the Ferrets often ended up being towed cross-country, especially on the training areas, by a FV432 as they could not cope with the mud; really useful when they were meant to be locating firing positions for the Milan ATGW.
 
I know that there are documents about Franco-British cooperation regarding GSOR 1010/CVR(T) and ERAC among the Châtellerault archives photodump, so I will try to find them again. They show where British and French interests converged and diverged.
 
However, if standardisation had been taken to it's logical conclusion the British Army would have bought:
  • Leopard 1 or M60 instead of Chieftain.
  • M1 Abrams or Leopard 2 instead of Challenger 1 and Challenger 2.
  • Bradley instead of Warrior.
  • The nearest American or German equivalents to CVR(T) & CVR(W) instead of CVR(T) & CVR(W).
  • And for the Army Air Corps: UH-1 Iroquois or UH-60 Black Hawk instead of Lynx; and OH-58 Kiowa instead of Gazelle.
Before the middle 1960s most British military helicopters were licence-built American designs such as the Dragonfly, Sioux, Wessex & Whirlwind and between then & the end of the Cold War HM Forces would buy a large number of licence-built SH-3 Sea Kings and a few score of US-built Chinooks so buying licence-built American designs instead of Gazelle and Lynx seems rather plausible to me.
Bradley instead of Warrior is an improvement.
I'm not sure anyone really made equivalents to the CVR(T)s
And Huey or Blackhawks would be a downgrade to Lynx.
 
In that case what are your opinion (good and/or bad) about my proposal (in Post 104) to built more Scimitars instead of Fox and a liaison version of Spartan instead of Vixen...

Agreed: Anything instead of Saxons ;p

The entire operational approach resulting in Saxon was flawed. It may sound like I'm arguing against my earlier point but, just because wheeled vehicles can readily self-deploy doesn't mean that they should. Instead, as things get dodgy, truck/bus/fly crews in to man pre-positioned, tracked APCs. In the RW, that would have been FV432s. The issue with your UK alternative types is timing. Warrior was a full decade later than Saxon. Stormer was half a decade later still.

I also see your suggestion of British Army M113s as a political non-starter. In peacetime, trade deficits and national debts are always going to play a part in procurement decisions. The same year that Saxon entered service, the British national debt was £54B. In September 1976, the British government applied for a US $3.9B IMF emergency loan to cope with a plummeting GBP. [1] That may go some way to help explain a lame procurement like Saxon.

Going out on a what-if limb here, a more politically and economically palatable solution would have been a 'Next-Gen' for the FV43x series. For this new 'FV432+', I would double-wall the steel armour (akin to the Swedish pbv 302) to create a naturally-buoyant amphibian. Then, move the MCV-80 programme forward by creating an FV43x-based IFV - using the FV432 track system; Perkins V8 diesel (turbo 510 deriv.?); 30mm L21 in a Scimitar turret. That FV107 turret I would clad in steel add-on plate over Scimitar's aluminium armour (other than for training vehicles).

On more Scimitars instead of Fox: I have no fixed opinion on this one. In hindsight, we see the FV721 as a loser. At the time, a direct replacement for the Ferret probably seemed to make a great deal of sense (including Whitehall having one eye upon a then desperately-needed export market).

In Post #105, you mention the Canadian 'LAV 1' AVGP - aka Grizzly ISC, Cougar DFS, and Husky ARV - as well as cooperation with France. In reality, the 6x6 AVGP was a dog (mainly due to the excessive gap between its first and second wheel rows). One of the rival candidates for the AVGP contest was the French VAB. That Renault vehicle was superior to the GM/Mowag in many ways - its huge wheels not only made it more tractable, they added ground-clearance (reducing potential landmine damage - as compared with the GM/Mowag). [2]

Had the three nations collaborated on a common wheeled APC programme ... the UK, Canada, and France might have developed their own versions of the 4x4 VAB. It may be worth noting that the AVGPs were being phased out of CF service beginning in 2005 while AdT VABs only began retiring in 2018.

___________________________

[1] On the debt side, it is also worth remembering that it would be another 30 years before the UK finally paid off its outstanding WW2 loan debt to the US. Other European powers were forgiven their wartime debts or greatly benefited from a very generous Marshall Plan. That - and FMA funding - made licensing US equipment much more acceptable to those 'on the continent'.

[2] Mind you, that extra height would probably have eliminated DND's Cougar tank-trainer concept. But no loss. Putting those Scorpion turrets and their RO L23A1 guns onto available M113 hulls would have made for more convincing tank trainers anyway.
 
The design of FV4333 Stormer was completed by January 1976. So a FV432 replacement could have been ready by 1980. Saying that FV432 production didn't end until 1971 so you could argue that they are relatively new and replacement was not the right option at that time - and as we've seen OTL they have had a long life since then with upgrades.

As for MICV - studies began in 1967 (a Fox or Scimitar turret). The medium IFV to replace FV432 began in 1972 when the GSR was released, in service date slipped to 1985, then 1986. 30mm RARDEN was selected over a 20 or 25mm cannon. GKN appointed prime contractor in 1977, on 1 Jan 1979 is rebranded MCV80.
Then came the UK IFV interlude - a Bradley variant, mocked up in 1979 but in May 1980 the government went with MCV80 - FMC just weren't offering a good enough deal. First prototypes ran in 1983. Warrior entered full service in 1988.

I suspect that the funding issue that Apophenia mentions affected the length of the studies - cheaper to fund paper than steel - but also so much confusion and multi-projects (MCV spinning off into light tanks etc.)

500 Saxons feels like overkill. Vital in places like Northern Ireland and other places like Hong Kong where not much firepower was needed but you needed to feel safe. Saying that it was intended for rear-areas work. I don't know how much they cost, but a smaller buy for just IS duties might free up some cash to speed up Warrior a year or two (I'd settle for an AH Warrior using a standard Fox turret).
 
Going out on a what-if limb here, a more politically and economically palatable solution would have been a 'Next-Gen' for the FV43x series. For this new 'FV432+', I would double-wall the steel armour (akin to the Swedish pbv 302) to create a naturally-buoyant amphibian. Then, move the MCV-80 programme forward by creating an FV43x-based IFV - using the FV432 track system; Perkins V8 diesel (turbo 510 deriv.?); 30mm L21 in a Scimitar turret. That FV107 turret I would clad in steel add-on plate over Scimitar's aluminium armour (other than for training vehicles).
Is this "Next-Gen" FV43x built instead of the CVR(T) family of vehicles? In which case would there have been a tank version in place of Scorpion and Scimitar? Was your FV43x-based-IFV inspired by the FV432s that were fitted with RARDEN turrets taken from Fox scout cars?
 
The entire operational approach resulting in Saxon was flawed. It may sound like I'm arguing against my earlier point but, just because wheeled vehicles can readily self-deploy doesn't mean that they should. Instead, as things get dodgy, truck/bus/fly crews in to man pre-positioned, tracked APCs. In the RW, that would have been FV432s. The issue with your UK alternative types is timing. Warrior was a full decade later than Saxon. Stormer was half a decade later still.
Re the Saxon. According to my copy of the "Modern British Army" by Terry Gander (third edition, published 1986) the first production vehicles were produced for export in 1976, but the initial batch of 50 vehicles for the British Army wasn't ordered until 1983 and the first bulk order for 450 vehicles wasn't placed until January 1984. Therefore, in practice Saxon was half-a-decade ahead of Warrior.

Re the Stormer. As @Hood wrote in Post 113 the prototype was completed in January 1976 and in this "version of history" we could have had it developed in parallel with the Spartan which entered service with the British Army in 1976.
 
[1] On the debt side, it is also worth remembering that it would be another 30 years before the UK finally paid off its outstanding WW2 loan debt to the US. Other European powers were forgiven their wartime debts or greatly benefited from a very generous Marshall Plan. That - and FMA funding - made licensing US equipment much more acceptable to those 'on the continent'.
I'm somewhat nonplussed by your statement, because I don't see why the UK having its WW2 load debt forgiven, would have made building more US military equipment under licence much more acceptable to those 'in the British Isles'.

For what it's worth my understanding (which may be completely wrong) is that the US loaned that money to the UK on rather generous terms. That is they charged a lower than normal rate of interest and allowed a repayment period that was longer than normal.

Evidence of this may be that:
  • In the first ten financial years following World War One (1919-20 to 1928-29) the total national debt service was £353 million a year on a national debt that averaged £7.7 billion.
  • In the first ten financial years following World War Two (1946-47 to 1955-56) the total national debt service was £550 million a year on a national debt that averaged £26.1 billion.
The national debt was 3.4 times larger, but the cost of servicing it was only 1.6 times larger. If the latter had been 3.4 times larger too the average for 1946-47 to 1955-56 would have been £1,197 million a year, which was £647 million more that the "Real World" cost of servicing the national debt.

£647 million was a lot of money in those days. Britain's average defence spending from 1946-47 to 1955-56 was £1,150 million a year and average civil spending for those years was £2,267 million.
 
On the debt side, it is also worth remembering that it would be another 30 years before the UK finally paid off its outstanding WW2 loan debt to the US. Other European powers were forgiven their wartime debts or greatly benefited from a very generous Marshall Plan. That - and FMA funding - made licensing US equipment much more acceptable to those 'on the continent'.
One small issue with this argument is that the UK received more Marshall Plan aid than any other country.
For what it's worth my understanding (which may be completely wrong) is that the US loaned that money to the UK on rather generous terms. That is they charged a lower than normal rate of interest and allowed a repayment period that was longer than normal.
What was an issue for the UK was the strings that came with US financial support, in particular dollar/sterling convertibility and an emphasis on European integration over trade with the Commonwealth. Those aspects restricted the British economy during the key years of reconstruction.
 
FDR got Lend Lease through Congress 3/41 as "an Act for the Defense of US", which why it was terminated abruptly (goods offloaded US-dockside) when Japan surrendered. Some Brit writers moan that US did not move 8/45 to L/L Phase 3 to put UK back on its feet: but that would have been a Reconstruction Loan. US did that 6/46 with £-convertibility/Open Door Trade - YP above, extinguished 2005. It carried interest, which attracted criticism of L Keynes, who negotiated it: but the money came from US taxpayers who might work out that Brits back on their feet might start exporting things that would unemploy...them. That Loan included settlement of net Lend/Lease, inc mutual waiver of patent issues: criticism then of US theft of BritBrain, such as M52 supersonic. If L/L in 1941 had been to benefit the Axis we would have seen that as a casus belli. Elected Politicians must work within the Art of the Possible.

NOM is right that such issues were remote from make or buy decisions in Defence Procurement. When Truman came up with his Doctrine of aiding free peoples (which his political opponents would have shut down if they had won 11/48 Election - so there's a fun Whiff) the logic of US scale meant that anything they chose to build would be available in price/schedule for which no UK pol would be fired and if we had it we could Inter-operate with US - which from 1949 became their stated Policy (NATO).

The wonder is that US' Allies assigned resources to making any-Defence-thing. Only France and UK might contemplate Missions not Allied with US, so the operational sovereignty point was moot for them. Japan duly licenced/bought Off-the-Shelf almost everything, liberating their engineers to destroy MoTown.The rest of us tried to balance home employment with efficient procurement. Some decisions proved dubious: you see me constantly noting the futility of duplication (so scores of UK SAM v 000s of Hawks), but the point is made here that we did not know in 1947 that, for example, US SAMs would be available on good terms.

Common sense was the measure UK pols tried to apply: if we need small quantity, Buy, larger, Make. They got it wrong sometimes.
 
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The wonder is that US' Allies assigned resources to making any-Defence-thing. Only France and UK might contemplate Missions not Allied with US, so the operational sovereignty point was moot for them. Japan duly licenced/bought Off-the-Shelf almost everything, liberating their engineers to destroy MoTown.The rest of us tried to balance home employment with efficient procurement. Some decisions proved dubious: you see me constantly noting the futility of duplication (so scores of UK SAM v 000s of Hawks), buthe point if made here that we did not know in 1947 that, for example, US SAMs would be available on good terms.

Common sense was the measure UK pols tried to apply: if we need small quantity, Buy, larger, Make. They got it wrong sometimes.
It is generally a very good idea for any country to be able to make all their defense items in house. To the point that even the WTO doesn't consider it protectionism for buying your-country defense goods as long as the your-country goods are less than 50% more expensive than the international offer.
 
I also see your suggestion of British Army M113s as a political non-starter. In peacetime, trade deficits and national debts are always going to play a part in procurement decisions.
I disagree, because the FV430 family and Stalwart were purchased in an era when Blue Streak, Blue Water, P.1154 and TSR.2 were cancelled in favour of missiles and aircraft purchased directly from the USA.

The M113s that I'm suggesting be purchased instead of the FV432 family and M548s that I'm suggesting be purchased instead of the Stalwart would would have been built in the UK under licence instead of directly from the USA, therefore the effect on the balance of payments and national debt would have been considerably less than for example the 170 Phantoms that were purchased.

Also, while GKN was building 3,000-odd FV432s and Alvis 1,000-odd Stalwarts, Westland was building several hundred helicopters under licence from Sikorsky many of which were for export because the licencing agreement allowed Westland to sell them in certain territories. Therefore, the licence agreement on the M113 and M548 is likely to have included the right to sell them in certain territories too and if so several countries that purchased M113s and M548s from the USA in the "Real World" would have bought them from the UK in this "version of history". That would have been a great improvement on the "Real World" because GKN didn't export any FV432s and Alvis only exported a few score Stalwarts.

Meanwhile, Vickers will be building 166 M108s under licence for the British Army instead of 146 production Abbots and 20 Value Engineered Abbots for the British Army. This would also have allowed it to build M109s under licence too instead of the M109s purchased from the USA which would help the balance of payments too. However, the USA might not allow the UK to sell 68 M108s to India instead of the 68 Value Engineered Abbots that it sold to India in the "Real World". In that case Vickers might sell an SPG based on the Vickers MBT to India instead.
The same year that Saxon entered service, the British national debt was £54B. In September 1976, the British government applied for a US $3.9B IMF emergency loan to cope with a plummeting GBP. [1] That may go some way to help explain a lame procurement like Saxon.;
According to the source I quoted in Post 115 the MoD didn't order the first batch of 50 Saxons until 1983 and the bulk order for 450 until January 1984.

According to the Annual Abstract of Statistics.

The National Debt (sterling and foreign currency) was £127,927 million on 31.03.83 and £142,844 million on 31.03.84. Although some of that increase from the National Debt of £56,586 million at 31.03.76 would have been due to inflation.

The debt interest increased at an even faster rate, i.e. £964.0 million in the financial year 1975-76 to £6,485.1 million in 1983-84. That is it had increased by about six-and-a-half times when the national debt had increased by about two-and-a-half ties.

Meanwhile, the number of unemployed had risen from 1.3 million in mid-June 1976 to 2.9 million in mid-June 1983 and 2.9 million in mid-June 1984. Which means 1.6 million more people receiving the 1970s & 1980s equivalents of Job Seekers Allowance and 1.6 million less people paying income tax.

Therefore, Britain's financial position was considerably worse in the early 1980s than it had been in the middle 1970s. That would go a long way to explain why the number of Warriors purchased was less than planned and why Saxon was purchased.
 

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