Identify a replacement? They already have replacements. Peacekeeper and Midgetman!!! They should just reactivate those programs and save time and scarce resources. (I know, I know, not likely to happen until the current occupants of the Oval Office and SecDef's office are booted out. And even then there will have to be major purges of deadwood in both the DOD and Air Force.)

[Groan] I'm begining to sound like a broken record. :(
 
Hammer Birchgrove said:
Didn't the Peacekeeper have some limitations which helped the decision to shut down that project?

No. They got a lot for them though IIRC.
 
bobbymike said:
quellish - sorry should have been in my previous post but I thought I read somewhere that the Army Hypersonic Weapon also included a new Army developed booster or do I have this wrong?

Every time I have seen a specific booster named for AHW, it's been one of the Sandia STARS boosters.
 
Winning Warheads
Congress needs to work hard to ensure that Life Extension Programs (LEPs) stay on track for the W-76 and B-61 nuclear warheads, House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee Chairman Michael Turner (R-OH) said this week. "The B-61 is our deterrent weapon for Europe, and the only bomb currently in line for our air-launched cruise missiles and the Joint Strike Fighter. Any delays with the B-61 will also compound delays for subsequent W-78 and W-88 LEPs, meaning the weapons for our ICBMs and SLBMs," he said at an April 14 Capitol Hill breakfast.
----------------------------------------
So what happened to the W-87 on MMIII? Unless they aren't being upgraded.
 
Final Minuteman 2020 Booster:

Airmen from the 341st Missile Maintenance Squadron at Malmstrom AFB, Mont., have emplaced the final Minuteman III ICBM upgraded with new propellant and internal components in its silo. "We're relieved it's done," said SSgt. Matthew Truitt, 341st MMXS missile handling team chief, who was among the airmen that fit the 68,000-pound missile in its launch facility earlier this month. The Air Force added new propellant to the boosters on its fleet of 450 Minuteman III missiles under the Propulsion Replacement Program. The changes were part of the modifications to keep these missiles viable out to at least 2020. The first 100 boosters did not initially receive the new internal components, just the propellant. So the Air Force went back and had them done later. Those first 100 were known as "2012 boosters" before the addition of the extra components. Now they are known as "2020 boosters," just like the other upgraded Minuteman missiles. (Malmstrom report by SSgt. Dillon White)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Next up MMIII replacement. My plan twice the payload, new warhead, maneuvering ultra-accurate RV, conventional PGS compatible, IOC 2020.
 
U.S. Studying Options for New Generation of ICBMs

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — U.S. Strategic Command has begun to study options for the replacement of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, said Air Force Gen. Robert Kehler, Stratcom commander.

What size, weight, shape the missiles will take has not been determined, he told reporters at the Space Symposium here. The Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the nation will need to sustain and invest in nuclear forces and the command is proceeding with studies and analysis as a result of the review, Kehler said.

Similarly, plans for a new long-range bomber are under way, although the Air Force is the lead on that program. Stratcom would be the primary user of such an aircraft/ Kehler said the command was mostly in agreement with the Air Force on bomber requirements. He declined to get into specifics other than to say that the aircraft should have a balance of survivability, range and payload performance.

Stratcom still believes that it should have the option of having a prompt conventional global strike capability, which could deliver a non-nuclear weapon anywhere in the world within minutes and deep within an enemy's territory. The command has been looking at the hypersonic test vehicle as a possible solution and a second test is scheduled for this year. He didn't know of any other solutions in the works.

Original concepts would have placed conventional warheads aboard Trident missiles, but that idea was scrapped because the trajectory of the missile would be identical to a nuclear weapon. There were concerns that an enemy would no know the difference and assume that it was under nuclear attack. The hypersonic vehicle travels at a different trajectory and could not be mistaken as a nuclear weapon.
 
U.S. Air Force Changes Mind -- Again -- on Funds to Study ICBM Options
Friday, April 22, 2011

By Elaine M. Grossman

WASHINGTON -- More than two months after the Obama administration submitted its fiscal 2012 budget request to Congress, the U.S. Air Force cannot say exactly how much it will spend to explore options for modernizing its ICBM fleet, nor where the money will come from (see GSN, March 23).

Relatively small dollar amounts are involved: probably less than $3 million as part of a $671 billion Defense Department budget for the next fiscal year. However, repeated Air Force fumbling over whether it programmed 2012 funds to study future ICBM options has offered political grist to Senate Republicans who question whether President Obama is seriously committed to updating aging U.S. nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms. Senator Lindsey Graham has said he suspects the funding lapse constitutes the beginning of "a gradual retreat" from the administration's nuclear modernization promises (see GSN, Feb. 18). A top Air Force budget official and the Pentagon comptroller's office said in February the service had requested no funds for work next year on an "Analysis of Alternatives" for a future ICBM fleet, to be deployed following the anticipated 2030 retirement of today's Minuteman 3 fleet.

This was despite an Energy Department report last November stating that a preliminary ICBM study, termed a "Capabilities-Based Assessment," was already "under way" and funded at "approximately $26 million per year" (see GSN, Feb. 15). Together, the preliminary assessment and the more advanced Analysis of Alternatives represent an important step in the defense acquisition process, one in which future missile technology alternatives and potential fielding options are to be explored. A replacement for today's Minuteman 3 missiles -- based in underground silos -- might be smaller and possibly deployed aboard mobile platforms such as trucks or trains, according to experts. The Obama team last fall repeatedly cited the Energy Department's so-called "Section 1251 Report Update" as an indication of its commitment to modernize nuclear weapons and delivery systems in cultivating Senate Republican support for ratifying New START, a U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty. The document summarized administration plans for rebuilding the nation's Cold War-era nuclear weapons complex and updating the atomic arsenal.

The Senate in December approved the arms control pact in a tally that included 13 GOP votes (see GSN, Dec. 22, 2010). Last month, though, an Air Force spokesman said the service had in fact included only $2.6 million in its new budget plan to study ICBM technology options, funded in a line item dedicated to long-range planning for ICBM "demonstration and validation." This figure was just one-tenth of the funds promised in the Energy Department report, but the service insisted that the earlier $26 million commitment was in error and that the lower dollar amount would be sufficient. Rather than initiate the Analysis of Alternatives in 2012, as pledged in the Section 1251 report, the Air Force would continue with preparatory studies next year and launch the formal analysis in 2013 instead. Experts say the Air Force decision to take a one-year slip in the major study's start date -- a delay that the service has not publicly justified -- could mean the Pentagon will be unready to brief the president by 2014 on a recommended "specific way-ahead for an ICBM follow-on," as laid out by the Energy Department's November report.

The funding uncertainties and apparent delays are gaining broader notice this spring on Capitol Hill, according to one nuclear weapons consultant, who asked not to be named because of the issue's political sensitivity. A number of lawmakers in both parties are increasingly disturbed by a growing perception that ICBM modernization is not garnering the level of Air Force attention and commitment that it deserves, the consultant said. The Air Force is currently spending roughly $1 million in fiscal 2011 funds on the initial Capabilities-Based Analysis, which began in January and should be complete by July, the spokesman said last month. The service now expects that the total cost for the ICBM Analysis of Alternatives will be $26 million, to be spent between 2012 and 2014.

Last week, however, the Air Force changed its story yet again. In a written statement, the service backed off of the $2.6 million spending pledge for 2012, saying those funds were actually allocated for other ICBM studies unrelated to the Analysis of Alternatives.

"Currently, there is a $2.6 [million] line item in the [fiscal 2012] budget," but it pays for studies that "are not part of the ICBM Follow-on Materiel Solution Analysis," the service stated in written "talking points" released to Global Security Newswire. Fiscal 2012 begins on October 1. "The AOA can be accomplished in this line item as long as appropriate funding is added to support the effort," said the Air Force, referring to the Analysis of Alternatives. The service was unable to say by press time exactly how much funding would be appropriate or specify the source of dollars to pay for the study work next year. The April 12 talking points paper did say the Air Force would "internally source" funds for this purpose in fiscal 2012, suggesting it would leech a limited amount of money from other programs. As for the $2.6 million line item, the service instead will use those funds to underwrite studies on ICBM launch facility security, emergency air supplies for launch control centers, power storage technologies, and concepts for testing missile guidance, according to its talking points paper. In walking away from its statement last month that it would spend the $2.6 million on the ICBM modernization studies -- an effort the White House identified as a priority last fall -- the Air Force has left several issue experts flummoxed. "I'm sympathetic to claims of confusion within big bureaucracies, but this is perilous territory," said Christopher Ford, who directs the Hudson Institute's Center for Technology and Global Security. "The administration's credibility is on the line as a team that takes seriously the imperatives of maintaining an effective deterrent into the indefinite future until such time, if ever, that the president's talk of 'zero' bears fruit." Obama in a 2009 speech in Prague pledged to take "concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons." At the same time, he said that as long as these weapons exist, the nation "will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary."

Ford said the service's apparent omission of funds to begin the Analysis of Alternatives in 2012 was "a heck of an unfortunate thing to just forget," given that the White House "sold New START in part on the strength of promises to ensure modernization." The White House last fall pledged to spend $85 billion over the next decade updating warheads and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. It is also expected to invest hundreds of billions more on delivery platforms such as submarines, missiles and bomber aircraft. At Obama's behest last year, the Pentagon is now eyeing the possibility of taking new reductions to the strategic nuclear arsenal below the levels set by the New START agreement (see GSN, March 23). The move has some conservatives concerned about the prospects that deeper cuts could spell doom for the ambitious nuclear modernization efforts they support. Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who led GOP opposition to ratifying New START, last month released a letter signed by 41 Senate Republicans urging the Obama administration not to take any such cuts without consulting closely with Congress.

"It would be troubling if the administration proposed reductions to U.S. nuclear forces that reduced your commitment to modernize U.S. nuclear warheads, the triad of delivery systems, and the nuclear weapons infrastructure at at least the levels you proposed and pledged during the New START treaty ratification process," the lawmakers said. Under the treaty, which caps each side's deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 and delivery systems at 700, the United States has said it would retain no more than 420 Minuteman 3 ICBMs. Today the nation has 450 fielded ICBMs.

At an April 6 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Ranking Member Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) voiced worries that the Obama administration might delay or modify its plans to modernize ICBMs as further reductions to the strategic nuclear arsenal are contemplated. "One of the biggest unanswered questions in the future is the ICBM force," he said. "I am very concerned." Sessions noted that last year's Nuclear Posture Review, a major Pentagon assessment of atomic forces and strategy, said the ICBM Analysis of Alternatives would seek "cost-effective" deployment options that support "continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence." None of the military brass testifying at the subcommittee hearing could elaborate on the meaning of that passage in the review. They did say, though, that the ICBM fleet might well drop below the 420 missiles the administration spelled out as a maximum level under the terms of the new U.S.-Russian agreement.

"If further policy looks are made at further reductions we are not yet tasked to go any further" below the levels laid out by New START, said Maj. Gen. William Chambers, the Air Force assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. "So the 'up to 420' is our guiding baseline right now." That said, the Air Force is currently "wrestling" with the question of whether the Minuteman 3 force should be reduced to 400 deployed missiles under New START, Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, said at the hearing. A decision is expected "within the next few months," he said. Ford called into question whether uncertainty about bankrolling the upcoming ICBM modernization studies is a sign that the Air Force continues to struggle with its nuclear mission, following "a long decline in attention and an embarrassing record of occasional mistakes since the end of the Cold War."

The service in late 2006 accidentally shipped four nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan, and in August 2007 mistakenly allowed a B-52 bomber to transport six nuclear-armed cruise missiles across several U.S. states, among other mishaps. The Air Force subsequently reorganized its management of the mission, to include the creation of Global Strike Command, whose focus is primarily on nuclear-armed bombers and ICBMs. From the perspective of some arms control advocates, though, the White House should think twice before investing heavily in any new missile system to replace the Minuteman 3, which was first fielded in 1970. "Problems funding the first new ICBM studies may be mere bureaucratic lapses," said Stephen Young, a senior analyst with the Union of Concerned Scientists. "Whatever the reason, I would hope one of the options considered would be to not build a new ICBM."

In light of Obama's objective of ultimately eliminating the world's nuclear weapons, Young rued the administration decision in the run-up to New START ratification to issue "essentially ironclad guarantees that it would replace or modernize each leg of the triad," he said. This was despite earlier hints in the Nuclear Posture Review that the White House would reserve judgment on whether to replace each type of strategic delivery vehicle, Young said. Ford offered a different view. "If President Obama wants to be taken seriously as a responsible steward of our nuclear deterrent, his team can't afford to 'forget' modernization again," he said.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sx9Tovevx6w


Obama is dangerously naive.
 
While I never agreed that New Start was necessary seeing that SORT reduced deployed nuclear levels down to 1700-2200 warheads I was alarmed by how low the launcher limit was of 700 (with 100 in reserve like that really means anything). This seemed directly counter to arms control stabilization theory of reducing warheads/launcher but keeping enough launchers to make a first strike impossible.

If the US goes to 420 MMIII's plus 12 Trident's, or SSBN(X)'s, the US has 432 aimpoints covered by 1550 Russian weapons (yes I understand that current technology limits tracking and targeting of SSBN's that may not last forever, plus any nuclear capable bombers will not make it to the target IMHO and there may be only 20 "nuclear" bombers anyway)

So then you find out that Russia was already at or slightly below the 700 launcher limit and that with retiring missiles they would have been hard pressed to keep 700 deployed launchers as replacements were slow to come online. The US is the only side destroying capabilities under New Start. Now combine this with an unwillingness to modernize, a decaying nuclear weapons infrastructure and I begin to get worried about the future security environment. I stated on several blogs that once New Start was ratified the promised modernization plan for nukes would get lost in the budget shuffle.
 
bobbymike said:
I stated on several blogs that once New Start was ratified the promised modernization plan for nukes would get lost in the budget shuffle.

I wouldn't trust Barry to keep his word on anything. 2012 can't come soon enough.
 
The real question is whether Los Alamos and the country need this facility at all. ...This facility will generate nothing but cost to national security, to the environment and to the taxpayer, no matter what design they choose. So the point is: Why build it?

--Los Alamos Study Group head Greg Mello, criticizing federal plans to build a new plutonium facility at the nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------
With this mindset why not dismantle everything, it all may impact the environment at some point, jeez you kidding me. This kind of talk terrifies me.

I am not a scientist or a politician but I say the country needs it to insure a strong deterrent response build-up capability if the global situation changes. I sure hate to have to try and build one after the flag has gone up. Maybe we can tell our enemies to wait ten or more years so we can reconstitute our forces before they can attack ::)
 
In a thread about the future a glimpse of the past:

Peacekeeper's New Keepers:

The Air Force last month delivered a 195,000-pound Peacekeeper missile to the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History in Albuquerque, N.M. "This significant object will be one of the largest items in our already-extensive collection," said museum director Jim Walther. Divided into stages for airlift aboard a C-5 transport, museum officials intend to display the missile immediately, albeit in pieces, until workers fully reassemble it over the next several months. Retired in 2005, the 71-foot-tall Peacekeeper was regarded as the Air Force's most destructive and accurate ICBM. Walter said this Peacekeeper unit is thought to be the last of its kind available for pubic display, adding that the "museum is fortunate to receive and preserve it for future generations."
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bolding mine - Yes preserve so when we can't build them anymore we can look upon our past glory and ask why we gave it all away.

OZYMANDIAS

I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed.
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
--------------------------------------------
Thought this poem was appropriate for some reason. :'(
 
Nuke News slightly off topic but since the warheads will be on top of these systems kind of appropriate

Bill Would Authorize Full Funding of NNSA Nuke Budget
Wednesday, May 4, 2011

The draft fiscal 2012 defense authorization bill would allow lawmakers to grant the Obama administration's full funding request for National Nuclear Security Administration activities to maintain and update the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, along with an extra $109 million for U.S. missile defense operations, the House Armed Services Committee announced on Tuesday (see GSN, April 13).

The portion of the bill slated for review by the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Wednesday "contains many sound measures and budget recommendations that will provide key capabilities for our warfighters and strengthens our nation’s strategic forces,” panel Chairman Michael Turner (R-Ohio) said in a statement. "Through a bipartisan effort we have been able to invest in our nuclear deterrent by fully funding the National Nuclear Security Administration’s $7.6 billion request to support its modernization plans. Furthermore, we will strengthen our missile defense initiative through an increase of $109.7 million above the President’s request of $10.1 billion for ballistic missile defense. Maintaining this deterrent is important for the security of our homeland and our allies," Turner said. The next budget year begins on October 1. The bill would permit as much as $300 million in fiscal 2012 funding for planning and assembly of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement complex at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico (see GSN, April 28). It would allow $160.2 million in spending for the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. The legislation would authorize up to $223.6 million in funding for the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb Phase 6.3 Life Extension Program, and $51.1 million for the W-78 warhead Phase 6.2/2A Life Extension Study.

The head of the National Nuclear Security Administration would be required by Feb. 1, 2012, to submit a report in cooperation with the Energy Department on any potential new concentration of U.S. "special nuclear material" and capabilities. The Government Accountability Office would be expected to review the document, according to the bill. The congressional auditing entity would be instructed to complete by Feb. 1, 2012, a review of a 2009 report by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Air Force on potentially bolstering the air-based transit of nuclear weapons and related assets. The legislation mandates that the heads of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Program, the Air Force Global Strike Command and the U.S. Strategic Command evaluate on a yearly basis the nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear command-and-control systems within their respective areas of oversight. The Defense secretary and Nuclear Weapons Council should receive the reports each year on December 1, the president should receive them on March 1, and Congress should receive them no later than March 15. The bill calls on the president to issue a yearly statement on plans for updating the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons complex and delivery vehicles, as well as spending projections covering one decade.

The legislation mandates that the Defense secretary by December 12, 2011, issue a report in coordination the heads of the Strategic Command, the Air Force and the Navy on plans for complying with the New START arms control pact. The Government Accountability Office would be expected to assess the report. The bill would establish a "sense of Congress" that any elimination of nuclear weapons be backed by comprehensive policy, threat and strategy reviews, and that specific guidelines are needed for potential future nuclear-weapon curbs. The legislation would instruct the Government Accountability Office to assess the protection and auditing procedures for Pentagon and NNSA sites handling large special nuclear materials caches, including commercial sites holding such materials. The office would prepare an initial assessment by February 1, 2012, and its final review by July 2, 2012.

The legislation would cut by $149.5 million the authorization for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (see GSN, March 22). It would restrict fiscal 2012 spending on the program until the Pentagon chief either "negotiates a multilateral termination," or "restructures the program and ensures deliverables are transferred to one or more current program(s) of record." The Defense secretary would also have to provide figures on the total U.S. liability cost, terms of terminating the program contract and other details. The bill would increase the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system's funding authorization by $100 million from $1.2 billion. The Defense secretary would be expected to present a proposal by the head of Missile Defense Agency for dealing with test problems involving the system. The report must outline the time line and assets needed for the effort, and certify that the MDA head has "thoroughly investigated the root cause and that the plan is sufficient to resolve issues." The bill would increase the authorization for Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1-B interceptor acquisition funding by $50 million from $565.4 million; Standard Missile M-3 Block 2-A co-development funds by $40 million from $424.5 million; and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense launchers and tooling/test gear acquisition and interceptor production ramp-up funding by $50 million from $833.2 million. It would zero the funding authorization for the for Precision Tracking Space System, increase the Airborne Infrared program's authorization by $20 million from $46.9 million, and increase the funding authorization for Directed Energy Research -- including the Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser System and Airborne Laser Test Bed -- by $50 million from $96.3 million (U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee release, May 3).
 
bobbymike said:
Winning Warheads
Congress needs to work hard to ensure that Life Extension Programs (LEPs) stay on track for the W-76 and B-61 nuclear warheads, House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee Chairman Michael Turner (R-OH) said this week. "The B-61 is our deterrent weapon for Europe, and the only bomb currently in line for our air-launched cruise missiles and the Joint Strike Fighter. Any delays with the B-61 will also compound delays for subsequent W-78 and W-88 LEPs, meaning the weapons for our ICBMs and SLBMs," he said at an April 14 Capitol Hill breakfast.
----------------------------------------
So what happened to the W-87 on MMIII? Unless they aren't being upgraded.

I just don't understand why we are modernizing something as old fashioned as gravity bombs. Clearly there is something I am not understanding. Given the defenses they will have to penetrate, isn't it wasting numbers of treaty limited warheads that could go to more difficult targets, like stealthy cruise missiles or re-entry vehicles going Mach 16?

Flying an aircraft, even a Stealth B-2, OVER a target to drop a B-61 or B-83 seems like suicide against an S-400/S-500 defended target. And as the only tactical nuclear weapon for NATO the US has I can't help to think our credibility with our allies will be diminished as even newer air defenses are brought on line and sold to our enemies and evolve.
 
bobbymike said:
Bolding mine - Yes preserve so when we can't build them anymore we can look upon our past glory and ask why we gave it all away.

Huh? Not true. It is not the same issue as the warheads. The US has plenty of launch vehicle knowledge and it is in constant use. The SRM sustainment programs will keep that limited industry viable. OSC is using a new series of SRM's for it's Taurus II vehicle. This is also helping.

There is no longer the need for the same numbers of missiles as in the past.
 
Byeman said:
bobbymike said:
Bolding mine - Yes preserve so when we can't build them anymore we can look upon our past glory and ask why we gave it all away.

Huh? Not true. It is not the same issue as the warheads. The US has plenty of launch vehicle knowledge and it is in constant use. The SRM sustainment programs will keep that limited industry viable. OSC is using a new series of SRM's for it's Taurus II vehicle. This is also helping.

There is no longer the need for the same numbers of missiles as in the past.

I was being dramatic for the sake of literary flare. However, while I fully agree we could start to build a new ICBM tomorrow we are not going to build a new ICBM for 20+ years. This is a story about people not technology. Preserving knowledge and having industrial and human resource capacity are two completely different issues. People are not going to select a profession for study if they may never get the chance to ply their wares or use their knowledge. As an extreme example I don't know of people clammering to learn to build buggy whips.

Check into the story of "Fogbank". This was a specialized material for nuclear warheads and while we had knowledge we had to reconstitute the industrial capacity to start producing it again. There was also nobody around that had first hand experience producing the material. Even with the knowledge they still didn't know for sure they were doing it right. Reading a cookbook and saying your are a chef does not work in real life and building an ICBM or nuclear warhead/RV is the mother of all recipes.

In the future our enemies will not wait while we build the necessary industrial capacity.
 
bobbymike said:
Byeman said:
bobbymike said:
Bolding mine - Yes preserve so when we can't build them anymore we can look upon our past glory and ask why we gave it all away.

Huh? Not true. It is not the same issue as the warheads. The US has plenty of launch vehicle knowledge and it is in constant use. The SRM sustainment programs will keep that limited industry viable. OSC is using a new series of SRM's for it's Taurus II vehicle. This is also helping.

There is no longer the need for the same numbers of missiles as in the past.

I was being dramatic for the sake of literary flare. However, while I fully agree we could start to build a new ICBM tomorrow we are not going to build a new ICBM for 20+ years. This is a story about people not technology. Preserving knowledge and having industrial and human resource capacity are two completely different issues. People are not going to select a profession for study if they may never get the chance to ply their wares or use their knowledge. As an extreme example I don't know of people clammering to learn to build buggy whips.

Check into the story of "Fogbank". This was a specialized material for nuclear warheads and while we had knowledge we had to reconstitute the industrial capacity to start producing it again. There was also nobody around that had first hand experience producing the material. Even with the knowledge they still didn't know for sure they were doing it right. Reading a cookbook and saying your are a chef does not work in real life and building an ICBM or nuclear warhead/RV is the mother of all recipes.

In the future our enemies will not wait while we build the necessary industrial capacity.

You still don't understand. The LV industry supports the ICBM industry. That is where the industrial and human resource capacity will reside. Building a ICBM is no different than an LV.
 
Byeman said:
You still don't understand. The LV industry supports the ICBM industry. That is where the industrial and human resource capacity will reside. Building a ICBM is no different than an LV.


You don't really believe that do you?
 
sferrin said:
Byeman said:
You still don't understand. The LV industry supports the ICBM industry. That is where the industrial and human resource capacity will reside. Building a ICBM is no different than an LV.


You don't really believe that do you?

What's not to believe? The differences are only in application and basing (and reliability). ICBM's have become LV's. And why couldn't a Athena I or II be used as an ICBM? Or the Taurus II upperstages be used in conjunction with a new first stage.
 
It's easier to use a military missile as a launch vehicle than the other way 'round. Different requirements.
 
sferrin said:
It's easier to use a military missile as a launch vehicle than the other way 'round. Different requirements.

not really, they both have unique requirements. Space launch had higher reliability requirements.
 
Byeman said:
sferrin said:
It's easier to use a military missile as a launch vehicle than the other way 'round. Different requirements.

not really, they both have unique requirements. Space launch had higher reliability requirements.

Yes, they do have unique requirements which is why it's easier to go one way than the other. Which is why you see numerous military missiles being used over the years as space launchers and, well, pretty much NO space launchers being used as military missiles.
 
sferrin said:
Byeman said:
sferrin said:
It's easier to use a military missile as a launch vehicle than the other way 'round. Different requirements.

not really, they both have unique requirements. Space launch had higher reliability requirements.

Yes, they do have unique requirements which is why it's easier to go one way than the other. Which is why you see numerous military missiles being used over the years as space launchers and, well, pretty much NO space launchers being used as military missiles.

No, the only reason current military launchers are used for space launch is because they are excessed. It has nothing to ease of conversion. there is an intensive refurb/rebuild and modification process that ICBM went and go through to be used as a space launcher. No different than what would be needed to convert a Athena to ICBM.
 
stew3 said:
I just don't understand why we are modernizing something as old fashioned as gravity bombs.

Gravity bombs on aircraft are recallable. Hypersonic cruise missiles with nuclear warheads or ICBMs aren't.

So each time you see a television or movie about how the heroes manage to stop a nuclear missile launch by blowing up the missile by sending the abort codes...LAUGH.

Flying an aircraft, even a Stealth B-2, OVER a target to drop a B-61 or B-83 seems like suicide against an S-400/S-500 defended target.

It seems more likely that our nuclear bombers will penetrate behind a hail of conventionally armed cruise missiles which can be used for something other than WWIII, like trying to kill Gadhaffi.

I also would not be surprised if we are working on JDAM style kits for our gravity bombs, to enable them to do long range, high accuracy standoff glides as well.
 
Byeman said:
sferrin said:
Byeman said:
sferrin said:
It's easier to use a military missile as a launch vehicle than the other way 'round. Different requirements.

not really, they both have unique requirements. Space launch had higher reliability requirements.

Yes, they do have unique requirements which is why it's easier to go one way than the other. Which is why you see numerous military missiles being used over the years as space launchers and, well, pretty much NO space launchers being used as military missiles.

No, the only reason current military launchers are used for space launch is because they are excessed. It has nothing to ease of conversion. there is an intensive refurb/rebuild and modification process that ICBM went and go through to be used as a space launcher. No different than what would be needed to convert a Athena to ICBM.
You're missing quite a bit of history that sferrin referenced like the first 50 or so years of large rocket technology when Atlas's and Titan's became space launch vehicles at the same time they were ICBM's there was nothing "excess" about them.

Also you just undercut your entire argument and supported my argument [to continue to have a robust and separate ICBM industrial capacity] when you said, "It has nothing to ease of conversion. there is an intensive refurb/rebuild and modification process that ICBM went and go through to be used as a space launcher. No different than what would be needed to convert a Athena to ICBM".

So even using your premise, do you think our enemies will give us the time to "intensively refurb/rebuild our Athena fleet" changing them to ICBMs? And tell me how many Athena's will be stockpiled ready for conversion to ICBMs if 10 years from now if the MMIII fleet becomes unreliable? Do you think these are risks we should take as a nation?

I would begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles. I would continue this program until such time we have "peace on earth and goodwill to all mankind." so arguably forever ;)
 
bobbymike said:
1. So even using your premise, do you think our enemies will give us the time to "intensively refurb/rebuild our Athena fleet" changing them to ICBMs? And tell me how many Athena's will be stockpiled ready for conversion to ICBMs if 10 years from now if the MMIII fleet becomes unreliable? Do you think these are risks we should take as a nation?

I would begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles. I would continue this program until such time we have "peace on earth and goodwill to all mankind." so arguably forever ;)

1. Your basic premise is false. The MM III is not going bit flop and become instantly unreliable. The point is as long as there are launch vehicles in production, the skill sets and industrial capacity to build ICBM's will be kept healthy. No need to continuously build ICBM's to keep it healthy.

2. Again, no R&D is needed, the skill set will be maintained. No need for a long and drawn out design cycle. Launch vehicles can be developed in 5 years.
 
Byeman said:
bobbymike said:
1. So even using your premise, do you think our enemies will give us the time to "intensively refurb/rebuild our Athena fleet" changing them to ICBMs? And tell me how many Athena's will be stockpiled ready for conversion to ICBMs if 10 years from now if the MMIII fleet becomes unreliable? Do you think these are risks we should take as a nation?

I would begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles. I would continue this program until such time we have "peace on earth and goodwill to all mankind." so arguably forever ;)

1. Your basic premise is false. The MM III is not going bit flop and become instantly unreliable. The point is as long as there are launch vehicles in production, the skill sets and industrial capacity to build ICBM's will be kept healthy. No need to continuously build ICBM's to keep it healthy.

2. Again, no R&D is needed, the skill set will be maintained. No need for a long and drawn out design cycle. Launch vehicles can be developed in 5 years.

First of all my MMIII unreliability is a hypothetical not a premise (a premise is a declarative statement, I said "if" MMIII not "MMIII's ARE" unreliable.

You are the one making declarative statements with zero evidence. No R&D is needed, the skill set will be maintained? Really how because Elon Musk is building Space X we will be able to build ICBM's? You really believe this? No need for a long drawn out design cycle. Again, really no need ever? How do you definitively know these things. Do you have any idea how many people have left or been laid off from the solid rocket industrial base? Do you know Congress ordered a solid rocket industrial base strategy study because they were so worried about it after Ares was canceled and that is today not 20 years from now with Zero ICBM's being built.

Using the current MMIII replacement timeline of 2030 combined with your recent post. Using that example, we do nothing (no R&D absolutely nothing) in the fields of ICBM research until 2025 and then taking the 5 years you say it takes say to industry (who you would say it to 15 years from now is quite interesting to contemplate) OK now build us an ICBM.

Now look at my approach, do you not think your approach is far too risky because we have NO IDEA what industry can do and what capacity it will have 15 years from now. Given the average age of scientists and engineers in aerospace (and the number of baby boomers, in general, retiring over the next 15 years) Who is going to build these ICBM's? Are you going to "order" people starting university in about 2017 or 2018 to study to masters and PHD levels all the necessary disciplines required to build an ICBM. Do you think there will be a bunch of empty "ready to go" factories available in 15 years to start building ICBMs? Do you order 70 year old engineers with the "knowledge" [as you put it] "out of retirement and back on the job"? Are you going to answer "use existing commercial launch facilities, personnel, etc"? What if they are being used do you shut down commercial launcher production and use the factory floor space for ICBM construction? What if the PRIVATE enterprise says no thanks we are building space launchers do you "take over the factory"? We may not have time to do this 15 years from now!

I am not willing to risk the security of the US on the hope we can build ICBM's starting 15 years from now. But let me say this so we don't keep going "round and round" [as we will never agree] What you are saying is not necessarily wrong it is just a dangerous approach for such a vital national security need.

Here is a recent quote from Ashton Carter, ""This isn't the 1950s or 1960s, when most of the technical talent of the country grew up in defense and wanted to stay in defense," Carter said in a May 6 interview. "We need to be attractive and make sure that we can attract and retain really good people taking an interest in national security problems."

How are you going to "attract and retain" people capable of building (all the necessary skills from solid propellant energetics to reentry vehicles to advanced guidance sets) an ICBM when you start by telling them, "oh you're not actually going to be working on any of these technologies for 15 years but we like you to retain your skill set when we call you in 2025."

Are you going to say "well if they are working in the commercial launch sector then they have retained their skill set". while that is somewhat true [but arguable] what if they don't want to leave their jobs (that they have worked at for the last 15 years) to start a new job building ICBMs? Again, do you order then by political or presidential proclamation to "report to ICBM construction facility "a" immediately?

So to sum up, you say - We don't have to do anything in the field of ICBM research or development for the next fifteen or so years and approximately 5 years prior to needing them we order "the construction of a new ICBM".

While I say, from my previous post - begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles.

Now here is a declarative statement, my approach would most certainly assure the ability to produce ICBM's in the future. I will leave others to decide whether your approach would give us that same certainty.
 
New designs tend to try to be revolutionary instead of evolutionary, which explodes the costs. Why not just re-start production of MM3s with updated electronics? The fundamental design and performance is proven, why mess with success?
 
bobbymike said:
1. You are the one making declarative statements with zero evidence. No R&D is needed, the skill set will be maintained? Really how because Elon Musk is building Space X we will be able to build ICBM's? You really believe this? No need for a long drawn out design cycle. Again, really no need ever? How do you definitively know these things. Do you have any idea how many people have left or been laid off from the solid rocket industrial base? Do you know Congress ordered a solid rocket industrial base strategy study because they were so worried about it after Ares was canceled and that is today not 20 years from now with Zero ICBM's being built.

2. Using the current MMIII replacement timeline of 2030 combined with your recent post. Using that example, we do nothing (no R&D absolutely nothing) in the fields of ICBM research until 2025 and then taking the 5 years you say it takes say to industry (who you would say it to 15 years from now is quite interesting to contemplate) OK now build us an ICBM.

3. Now look at my approach, do you not think your approach is far too risky because we have NO IDEA what industry can do and what capacity it will have 15 years from now. Given the average age of scientists and engineers in aerospace (and the number of baby boomers, in general, retiring over the next 15 years) Who is going to build these ICBM's? Are you going to "order" people starting university in about 2017 or 2018 to study to masters and PHD levels all the necessary disciplines required to build an ICBM. Do you think there will be a bunch of empty "ready to go" factories available in 15 years to start building ICBMs? Do you order 70 year old engineers with the "knowledge" [as you put it] "out of retirement and back on the job"? Are you going to answer "use existing commercial launch facilities, personnel, etc"? What if they are being used do you shut down commercial launcher production and use the factory floor space for ICBM construction? What if the PRIVATE enterprise says no thanks we are building space launchers do you "take over the factory"? We may not have time to do this 15 years from now!

4. How are you going to "attract and retain" people capable of building (all the necessary skills from solid propellant energetics to reentry vehicles to advanced guidance sets) an ICBM when you start by telling them, "oh you're not actually going to be working on any of these technologies for 15 years but we like you to retain your skill set when we call you in 2025."

5. Are you going to say "well if they are working in the commercial launch sector then they have retained their skill set". while that is somewhat true [but arguable] what if they don't want to leave their jobs (that they have worked at for the last 15 years) to start a new job building ICBMs? Again, do you order then by political or presidential proclamation to "report to ICBM construction facility "a" immediately?

1. I never said anything about Spacex. I specifically referred to new and current SRM based LV's

2. There is SLBM work ongoing. It is helping to maintain the SRM industrial base along with new SRM's for space launch.

3. You are not listening. New LV development is sustaining these skills.
Basically you don't understand the industry. There is no "factory" for SRM's like there is for launch vehicles. The same facilities that wind SRM casings can be used for both commercial and defense motors and same goes for the mixing and pour facilities. At the low rates you are proposing, capacity is not an issue. Aircraft and smaller missile drive the capacity of the guidance system sector, adding a few more per year isn't going matter.

4. Again, it doesn't matter. They are already working in these fields for launch vehicles. RV are not part of these discussion but a new ICBM doesn't mean new RV's but anyways, RV research is ongoing.

5. There is nothing to leave. The solid motor industry doesn't really know the difference who they are supporting. It would be the next project. Designers are always looking for the next project.
 
stew3 said:
New designs tend to try to be revolutionary instead of evolutionary, which explodes the costs. Why not just re-start production of MM3s with updated electronics? The fundamental design and performance is proven, why mess with success?

Why not just restart the F-4 line while we're at it? ::)
 
Also, the recent upgrades to the MM III fleet didn't go that well. Environmentally friendly propellant, anyone?
 
Byeman said:
The point is as long as there are launch vehicles in production, the skill sets and industrial capacity to build ICBM's will be kept healthy. No need to continuously build ICBM's to keep it healthy.

2. Again, no R&D is needed, the skill set will be maintained. No need for a long and drawn out design cycle.


Ummm... have you ever seen the troubles that arise from simply transferring a solid rocket motor program from one contractor to another? I've seen it several times. It's ugly. There's more to building even simple rockets than having the drawings and having people with general knowledge of rocket design and construction. Often times there are *single* people who have knowledge and/or experience that make something work. Hell, I was one of 'em once, because some vital step in a manufacturing plan got left out when the program got transfered to another company.

A lot of aspects of older designs, such as MMIII are what they are because the answer to a new employees question "why is it like that?" is "we don't really know, it's been like that for forty years."
 
Byeman - I am at a loss trying to get you to answer my specific concerns. I say "empty" ICBM factories, you say "don't need it you will have enough space in the commercial launch SRM facilities. You are saying the same thing, somewhere in 15 years there will be the extra capacity required to build ICBMs AND commercial SRMs. Who is going to keep this extra capacity? The government with massive debt? Industry at a loss out of the goodness of their hearts? I say where will the men come from you say, "they will be winding commercial SRMs". You still would have to MOVE THEM to ICBM motor production. They can't do two things at once.

I am off to work so do not have the time to pick apart your response so I will ask you a simple question given the following (which I will assume you will agree with):

1) The US under current policy wants a MMIII replacement by 2030
2) Given number 1 above whose approach is less risky

a) Yours - do nothing ICBM specific for 15 years and then start ICBM production in 2025
b) Or mine - begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles.
 
bobbymike said:
2) Given number 1 above whose approach is less risky

The difference in the risk minor compared to other tangibles (cost, public opinion, etc)
 
bobbymike said:
1. You are saying the same thing, somewhere in 15 years there will be the extra capacity required to build ICBMs AND commercial SRMs. Who is going to keep this extra capacity? The government with massive debt? Industry at a loss out of the goodness of their hearts? I say where will the men come from you say, "they will be winding commercial SRMs". You still would have to MOVE THEM to ICBM motor production. They can't do two things at once.

2. Or mine - begin a rapid research, development, test and evaluation of a new advanced ICBM immediately with production starting at 40/year in 2020 fully replacing MMIII out to 2030. Then to keep skill sets and industrial capacity healthy build 10/year for the decade to 2040 removing the first production "AICBM" ten at a time placing them into the 100 launcher "reserve" fleet allowed under New Start. You could then have a continuous ongoing upgrade program insuring the best technology available was on each new batch of ten missiles.

1. The production rates are low enough that there will be over capacity. 10-20 per year is low and can be done simultaneously.

2. No need for 'rapid'. There is no crisis.
 
Byeman - Interesting take on Tank production. But to use your ICBM analogy all these laid off workers can go the the "Commercial Armored Car" market and then seemlessly integrate back into building tanks and APC's in three years. So all these problems if they idle tank production lines for three years but you want to idle ICBM activity for FIFTEEN years.

The House Armed Services Committee voted on Wednesday to add $425 million to next year’s budget so the Army can keep open its production of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, on the theory that keeping the line going will ultimately be cheaper than idling for three years, as the Army now plans. “These production lines can’t be turned on and off like a light switch,” said Maryland Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, the Republican chairman of the HASC’s air and land forces subcommittee.

The proposed three-year shutdown would force contractor General Dynamics to lay off too many skilled workers, and could force its small suppliers out of business, opponents say, which would raise the price tag on everything when the Army wanted to resume production. The Army’s current plans call for idling its tank factory from 2013 to 2016, then beginning a major recapitalization program for the M1 fleet. Bartlett’s measure would provide funding to keep the line “warm.”
 
bobbymike said:
Byeman - Interesting take on Tank production. But to use your ICBM analogy all these laid off workers can go the the "Commercial Armored Car" market and then seemlessly integrate back into building tanks and APC's in three years. So all these problems if they idle tank production lines for three years but you want to idle ICBM activity for FIFTEEN years.

Bad analogy again. There are "commercial" ICBM's, they are launch vehicles. there is no difference in a SRM for a LV or ICBM. same goes for guidance systems. Also dont forget about SLBM refurb. There is still work ongoing in the industry, it is not idle.
 
Byeman said:
bobbymike said:
Byeman - Interesting take on Tank production. But to use your ICBM analogy all these laid off workers can go the the "Commercial Armored Car" market and then seemlessly integrate back into building tanks and APC's in three years. So all these problems if they idle tank production lines for three years but you want to idle ICBM activity for FIFTEEN years.

Bad analogy again. There are "commercial" ICBM's, they are launch vehicles. there is no difference in a SRM for a LV or ICBM. same goes for guidance systems.

Jesus, would you stop with this garbage already?


Byeman said:
Also dont forget about SLBM refurb. There is still work ongoing in the industry, it is not idle.

Refurb isn't the same as design and manufacture. That should be obvious.
 

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