A peek on future american SLBMs and ICBMs

My guess is this will become a BIG political issue.
 
Skybolt said:
My guess is this will become a BIG political issue.
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I doubt it. It's so far off the radar that the average Joe doesn't know or care about it. We've got $trillions in entitlements, oil spills, and 30 million illegals to keep us preoccupied. If they won't do anything about those messes do you really think they'll even bat an eye over not being able to build "evil" nuclear weapons and extra-evil ICBMs? (They'll be sure to ignore the fact that every one of our potential enemies is still building them or trying to of course.)
 
sferrin said:
Skybolt said:
My guess is this will become a BIG political issue.
Click to expand...

I doubt it. It's so far off the radar that the average Joe doesn't know or care about it. We've got $trillions in entitlements, oil spills, and 30 million illegals to keep us preoccupied. If they won't do anything about those messes do you really think they'll even bat an eye over not being able to build "evil" nuclear weapons and extra-evil ICBMs? (They'll be sure to ignore the fact that every one of our potential enemies is still building them or trying to of course.)
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Spot on. The question is: what should we do, and what can we do, to make Joe Public aware of the issue? "We" can't even make regular people interested in the (civilian) space programs, except for what they cost... ::)
 
Public attention depends on what the media choose to put to their attention. Media attention depends on what politicians want they give attention to. Just take a dozen politicians start to talk about preparedness and industrial base and global menace and so on, and the media will start to talk about it, and the public will think it is important. Doesn't matter that the public "understands" why it is important. Downt' matter that the politicians understand why it is important. It is enough they understand that it is politicaly useful. Just look at what happened with the SST and, six months later, with the Shuttle. Back then the PROBLEMS were sewage (yes... take a look at the Congressional records), the race revolts, the ghettos in the big towns, and Vietnam.
 
Skybolt said:
Public attention depends on what the media choose to put to their attention. Media attention depends on what politicians want they give attention to. Just take a dozen politicians start to talk about preparedness and industrial base and global menace and so on, and the media will start to talk about it, and the public will think it is important. Doesn't matter that the public "understands" why it is important. Downt' matter that the politicians understand why it is important. It is enough they understand that it is politicaly useful. Just look at what happened with the SST and, six months later, with the Shuttle. Back then the PROBLEMS were sewage (yes... take a look at the Congressional records), the race revolts, the ghettos in the big towns, and Vietnam.
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If you think the current administration is interested in anything that doesn't get a lot of cheap votes right NOW I've got a bridge for sale. ;)
 
Skybolt - I agree in principal that if someone showed real leadership (or several prominent politicians) an issue can begin to get national attention. It is probably true for many defense technologies, maybe most, if there was a concerted effort to tell the general public that the US risks not only the industrial base but the lives of soldiers then I would agree. But I am really pessimistic about anything that has the word or connotates anything "nuclear". I mean look at the global warming debate the perfect zero emission technology ready today and safe is nuclear power, how many new plants have been built?

During the 80's when the Cold War was "hot" the US could barely hold together the political will to deploy 50 MX's. Like him or not former President Bush tried for years to bring the nuclear issue into the 21st Century through the RRW and the ACI (Advanced Concept Initiative) Members of his own party shut him down even when the latter, ACI program, was going to cost $40 million and be largely a paper study.

Unfortunately and much to my consternation the political will to modernize anything nuclear is ZERO on both sides of the aisle.
 
bobbymike said:
Skybolt - I agree in principal that if someone showed real leadership (or several prominent politicians) an issue can begin to get national attention. It is probably true for many defense technologies, maybe most, if there was a concerted effort to tell the general public that the US risks not only the industrial base but the lives of soldiers then I would agree. But I am really pessimistic about anything that has the word or connotates anything "nuclear". I mean look at the global warming debate the perfect zero emission technology ready today and safe is nuclear power, how many new plants have been built?

During the 80's when the Cold War was "hot" the US could barely hold together the political will to deploy 50 MX's. Like him or not former President Bush tried for years to bring the nuclear issue into the 21st Century through the RRW and the ACI (Advanced Concept Initiative) Members of his own party shut him down even when the latter, ACI program, was going to cost $40 million and be largely a paper study.

Unfortunately and much to my consternation the political will to modernize anything nuclear is ZERO on both sides of the aisle.
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Why would they do that when the pols can get more votes with "free" toys for everybody? Sad to say, the average voter isn't interested in anything more cerebral than a free lunch. That's why these idiots keep getting voted in. If someone actually dared to get up and promise to fix the big problems, no matter how painful the medicine, the MSM would be all over that and they'd be painted as whack-job lunatic.
 
From Aerospace and Defense News

ATK Completes Installation of World's Largest Solid Rocket Motor for Ground Test
NASA's First Stage Test is Currently Scheduled for Early September

(Promontory, Utah, July 7, 2010) -- Engineers and technicians at Alliant Techsystems (NYSE: ATK) and NASA have completed installation work on the second Ares I First Stage five-segment Development Motor (DM-2), in preparation for its static-fire, which is currently scheduled for early September.

The Ares I First Stage is the largest solid rocket motor ever built. It was designed to maximize astronaut safety while providing the nation with a reliable launch capability for both crew and cargo missions. As the prime contractor, ATK continues to perform on schedule and cost in support of NASA's space exploration programs.

The motor, which is 154 feet in length and 12 feet in diameter, has been installed horizontally in a specialized test stand in Utah. Results from this test will be compared with data from the ground test of the first five-segment motor and Ares I-X test flight both successfully completed last year.

"A robust ground and flight test program is a critical part of human-rating to ensure reliability and safety when launching crew into any orbit," said Charlie Precourt, VP and GM of ATK Space Launch Systems. "This test is a vital milestone in further growing the performance database for this new five-segment solid rocket motor."

Although the five-segment motor is based on the design heritage of the flight-proven Solid Rocket Boosters on the Space Shuttle Program, it was upgraded utilizing modern technologies and materials. These include the addition of a fifth segment, changes to the propellant grain, a larger nozzle opening and upgraded insulation and liner.

"We designed this motor using a knowledge base gained from over three decades of operations, during which we constantly monitored and improved our design," said Precourt.

ATK technicians are in the process of instrumenting the five-segment rocket with sensors and gages to collect measurements on more than 750 data channels. This information will be used to evaluate performance, roll control, acoustics, motor vibrations, oscillations, nozzle modifications and insulation upgrades. The full-scale motor test will advance the safety, technology and knowledge of solid rocket motors.

When fired, the motor will produce 3.6 million pounds of maximum thrust or 22 million horsepower. Utilizing the in-line configuration with a single five-segment solid rocket motor first stage and liquid upper stage, this launch vehicle is designed to lift more than 54,000 pounds of payload directly to Low Earth Orbit.

"The combination of a solid propulsion first stage and liquid propulsion upper stage provides optimum payload capability, reliability and lowest cost," said Precourt. "These motors were designed not only to carry humans to orbit but also for use on a heavy lift vehicle where performance and reliability are key requirements."
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Now this would be my next generation ICBM and Prompt Global Strike Missile ;D
 
"Largest solid motor ever built" ? ::)
My PR collegues at times are unbearable.
 
Skybolt - I have seen this mistake a few times when they mean largest "built and launched" or largest "man rated" solid rocket motor. I believe Aerojet's 260" diameter was the largest built (h/t sferrin who told me about it)
 
Story from the Air Force Research Laboratory

AFRL test marks return to 'in-house' rocket fuel development

by Kenji Thuloweit
95th Air Base Wing Affairs

7/16/2010 - EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AFNS) -- Air Force Research Laboratory scientists here returned to the organization's roots with their latest rocket test recently. AFRL technicians have tested rockets of all sizes and fuels of all make-ups for years. What makes this latest test unique is that all components of the test were developed at the laboratory by AFRL employees.

Researchers conducted a 15-pound Ballistic Test and Evaluation System, or BATES, test. In a BATES test, a small scale apparatus is used to test rocket propellant and designs in a standardized rocket motor casing. "What's special about this test is that it was entirely in-house," said 1st. Lt. Rob Antypas, the AFRL program manager and a developmental engineer. "The propellant was made here, the rocket motor and nozzle were designed and fabricated here, and then we put it on the test stand."

Lieutenant Antypas said this was the first time in a long time that AFRL people designed their own in-house rocket motor in order to conduct a test. Rocket motor development had been contracted previously. This type of research, development and testing for new solid rocket fuels looks to become the normal procedure for AFRL.

In order for Air Force scientists to develop more powerful and efficient rocket fuel for future space vehicles and rockets, they will have to do it primarily alone for the time being. Because of costs and funding cuts, civilian solid rocket companies are doing very little, if any, development of new and improved solid rocket fuels, the lieutenant said.

"Although we used a standard propellant that has been formulated before, this first test helps us to develop a baseline so we can make our own propellant formulations and test them out and push farther in the solid rocket world because the industry is no longer doing this," he said. "If we're going to build a new space-lift motor for the Air Force, we're going to need the capability to push the limits of propellant testing and manufacturing beyond what the civilian world can do."

Specifically, Air Force scientists are looking for rocket propellants that can provide better thrust, burn longer and perform more efficiently. "This new capability not only serves to train the next generation of Air Force civilian and military rocket scientists but also allows the laboratory to serve as an independent evaluation source of contractor proposed propellants and missile motor performance," said Michael Huggins, AFRL space and missile propulsion division chief.

AFRL officials have dedicated resources and are conducting administrative measures to bring back the capability to develop their own propellants from scratch. Lieutenant Antypas said this first test is considered an overall success. He noted the three-second test provided an extraordinary amount of data due to new high speed digital video cameras used for recording. Workers on the project hope to conduct a 70-pound BATES test after a few more preliminary 15-pound propellant tests. The next test is scheduled for August 5.

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Bolding mine. I have posted before about how important energetics research is for solid rocket motors and explosives (often times the chemical formulations are very similar) These are critical industrial skills that the US cannot afford to lose. The energetics industrial base is not in good condition, while AFRL's investment is welcome it is only part of the picture, you need a healthy private sector which as the above story indicates is being cut.
 
Future Navy Submarine to Stick With Nuclear Mission
Tuesday, Aug. 10, 2010

By Elaine M. Grossman - Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Navy will focus the mission of its future strategic submarine solely on nuclear deterrence, and -- at least initially -- the vessel will carry the same type of ballistic missile as fielded today, a senior officer said last month (see GSN, April 30).

(Aug. 10) - The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Florida, shown off the island of Crete in March. The United States plans to design its next generation of ballistic-missile submarines for nuclear deterrence missions, a high-level Navy official said last month (U.S. Navy photo).

Defense leaders had earlier said that new submarines in the fleet -- which are to begin replacing the service's 14 Ohio-class "SSBN" boats in 2029 -- could carry both nuclear- and conventionally armed missiles (see GSN, April 24, 2008 and Sept. 18, 2007).

However, in recent weeks, military leaders have significantly trimmed back their plans, citing both congressional concerns and financial constraints.

"Right now the mission of the Ohio replacement program is nuclear strategic deterrence," Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy Strategic Systems Planning office, said at a July 22 breakfast event on Capitol Hill. "We've made that clear in our discussions with both the House and the Senate. And we understand that very clearly, the direction that this is a single-mission platform."

Defense Secretary Robert Gates in March warned that the future submarine could be very costly.

"When that program really begins to ramp up, in the latter part of this decade, it will suck all the air out of the Navy's shipbuilding program," he told a House panel. "And so some tough choices are going to have to be made, either in terms of more investment or choices between the size of surface fleets you want and the submarine fleets."

The replacement submarines could cost roughly $7 billion apiece, measured in 2009 dollars, according to one independent estimate.

Expected to remain in service through the 2080s, the strategic boat has not yet been designed in detail. Only when more is known about the submarine's specifications can the service offer a realistic cost estimate, Benedict said at the breakfast forum, co-sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association.

"The size, diameter, of the [missile] tubes ... plays heavily on costs," he said. "The speed at which that submarine is required to not only surge to a patrol area -- [the] flank speed -- but also then patrol speed [affects costs]."

Another potential military requirement for the new boat will be its survivability; a submarine that operates quietly at high or low speeds would be harder to detect, he said.

Though the craft would be designed for the nuclear mission, Benedict would not rule out the idea that it could take on a conventional role sometime in its service, much as the Navy has spun off a conventional "SSGN" version of its Ohio-class vessels.

"We are making no design limitations in this program that would preclude future capabilities, much like we have in [the] Ohio [class]," he said.

During the Bush administration, the Defense Department proposed building a non-nuclear version of the Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile for "prompt global strike," a mission that would allow Washington to hit a target anywhere around the world within 60 minutes.

However, Congress banned testing or production of the so-called Conventional Trident Modification, citing concerns that Russia or China might misinterpret the launch of such a missile as a nuclear salvo, triggering an international crisis. The emphasis in developing a prompt global strike weapon has since shifted to an Air Force ground-based missile platform, potentially deployable by 2015, that is viewed as less likely to be destabilizing (see GSN, July 1, 2009).

Benedict left open the possibility that Washington might change its mind on the matter.

"We will design the appropriate requirements and cost for the Ohio [class] replacement program as a strategic [nuclear] deterrence platform," the admiral said. "If, at some point in the future, there are other capabilities that the leadership and the administration wants, then we'll look at how we would modify it, much as we did the SSGN. But we are not designing the Ohio replacement program specifically to have any conventional prompt global strike capability."

The Navy currently maintains four Ohio-class boats that have been converted to the SSGN configuration, which allows them to carry conventional cruise missiles and special operations forces. However, to date, no conventional prompt-attack weapons have been fielded.

Under the "New START' nuclear arms control pact, signed by the U.S. and Russian presidents in April, the United States would maintain 240 Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

That is down from today's 288 deployed Trident missiles, which carry a total of 1,152 warheads, according to nuclear force analysts Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen.

The service could retire two of its SSBN ballistic-missile submarines toward the end of this decade, leaving it with 12 such vessels, according to the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review, a soup-to-nuts assessment of strategy and forces completed in April.

A reduction in the Ohio-class boats, though, is not expected to affect the total quantity of 240 nuclear weapons deployed across the strategic submarine fleet.

The future submarine will remain equipped with Trident D-5 ballistic missiles, at least for an initial period, according to Benedict. Retaining the D-5 weapon will help maintain continuity during a 13-year period between 2029 and 2042, when the Ohio-class vessels gradually retire and their replacements transition into the force, he said.

"From a cost standpoint, maintaining one strategic weapons system adds tremendous value," said Benedict, referring to the D-5 missile. "Being able to focus the integration from the [submarine] platform only -- rather than to have two variables, a new [strategic weapon system] as well as a new platform -- reduces risk.

"If you look at this program," he added, "we have always tried to hold one stable and move the other. So [we] either adjust the platform and hold the [nuclear weapon system], or hold the platform and design a new [weapon]."

Some nuclear experts have said the service could save money by basing the design of its Ohio-class replacement on that of the smaller Virginia-class submarine, which potentially could carry shorter missiles without a major redesign.

However, if the D-5 is to fit inside a Virginia-class design, the service would have to modify the submarine with a "humpback" silhouette to make it capable of housing the weapon's long missile tubes, Kristensen noted in an interview yesterday.

In fact, according to some observers, a weapon system as large as the D-5 is no longer necessary in light of a reduced international threat and White House plans to cut the nuclear stockpile.

"Why would you continue to build a D-5 missile that can carry as many as 12 warheads when you're only [planning] to carry four, to remain under the New START caps?" said one former nuclear officer, who requested anonymity. "A smaller, C-4 sized missile seems a lot more appropriate."

The Navy first deployed the Trident C-4 nuclear-armed ballistic missile in 1979, and phased it out beginning in the 1990s as the D-5 entered service. Each C-4 missile could carry no more than eight warheads and fly only two-thirds of the D-5's 7,000-mile range.

The D-5 is "a mighty big missile to commit to carrying for the next 50 years," agreed Kristensen, who directs the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project. "You may not need a missile with as long a range as the D-5, because there's no one out there with a capability to hunt these ballistic missile submarines any more."

A diminished threat would suggest the submarines have more freedom of movement, allowing them to steam closer into target areas than might have been the case in the past, he suggested.

Thus far, the Navy has maintained that the D-5 is still a military necessity, but officials might change their minds "if it costs you another $50 billion [to] build a system to house such a big missile," said Kristensen. He noted that several years remain before the submarine design must be finalized.

The Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged that "there appears to be no credible near or midterm threats to the survivability of U.S. SSBNs," but said the Pentagon "aims to anticipate potential threats" in designing the new submarine.

The Navy today is building 108 updated "life-extension" versions of the D-5 missile, which it plans to begin fielding in three years. The modified D-5s will include newly produced rocket motors, remanufactured flight hardware and modern guidance instruments.

"The D-5 has been deployed for more than 20 years and is expected to be deployed for at least another 32, making it operational longer than any other missile system," Benedict said. The life-extension variant will remain viable through 2042, "matching and possibly extending its service life to that of the Ohio-class submarine," the admiral noted.

In the coming years, though, the $25 million per-copy cost of the D-5 missile could grow, Benedict said. As NASA and military service demand for solid-rocket motors declines, the aerospace industrial base will shrink and "the cost to produce and maintain D-5 missiles will significantly increase," he said.

Construction of the first Ohio-class replacement submarine is slated to begin in 2019, Benedict said.
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My take away from this and other articles is that the scientific and technical competencies required to preserve the "solid rocket" and "ballistic missile" industrial base including such things as energetics, guidance and re-entry vehicle technologies will continue to erode to the point the US will no longer be the premier "missile technology" nation within a generation.

Now when you consider that fifty + years ago Aerojet was producing 260" diameter solid rockets with a projected thrust of over 5 million lbs thrust along with 156" and 120" boosters (Ares 5 segment booster is rated at over 3 million lbs thrust and is considered the largest solid rocket ever "flown") it is sad to consider the waning of the industrial base.

If I was "President" my stimulus package would have included large increases in science and technology funding for these types of technologies. We would be are Mars before my second term was done ;D
 
Why build a 12-warheads capable D-5 when yiu'll gave to carry only 4 ? Because you could carry 4 very heavy warheads... manouvering warheads tend to be heavier than purely ballistc one, not to mention the space for penaids... This game is now and always one of smoke and mirrors....
Besides, no mentions of SSNs, a small one warhead conventional ballistic missile could dbe fitted in SSNs tubes, even torpedo tubes.
 
Nuclear Weapons News

Nuclear-Weapon Simulator Runs Test
Wednesday, Aug. 11, 2010

A nuclear-weapon research tool at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico produced five high-quality images in support of U.S. stockpile stewardship efforts, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 7, 2009).

The radiographs, produced using two electron accelerators at the laboratory's Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility, focused on a "surrogate-material implosion system," according to an agency press release. The facility creates multiple images of detonating nuclear-weapon parts for hydrodynamic assessments of the components.

The test took place after the completion of various upgrades and other work at the site.

“The results of this successful DARHT test demonstrate NNSA’s commitment to ensuring we have top-quality tools and first-rate people required to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of nuclear weapons stockpile without testing,” NNSA Deputy Administrator Don Cook said in a statement. “The recent technical upgrades and facility maintenance at DARHT were important investments to NNSA’s infrastructure to help solve tough national challenges.”

The facility is slated in fiscal 2010 to conduct two additional hydrodynamic tests, which examine how solid substances behave like liquids in extreme environments. The fiscal year ends Sept. 30 (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, Aug. 10)
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Sandia Lab Could Get Funding Boost
Wednesday, Aug. 11, 2010

The Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico appears likely to receive a significant funding boost in fiscal 2011 for modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons, the Albuquerque Journal reported yesterday (see GSN, July 16).

A sizable portion of fresh expenditures at Sandia would fund updates for B-61 nuclear gravity bombs, an effort Sandia head Paul Hommert called the laboratory's largest such undertaking since the 1970s (see GSN, July 20). The Obama administration requested $160 million to fund the project in the budget year beginning Oct. 1.

The long-term goals of the B-61 Life Extension Program are still uncertain, though. Advocates of a smaller, less-expensive modernization effort have sought to keep the bombs much like they were originally built.

The debate over the B-61 program's objectives reflect the larger controversy emerging over a broader funding expansion sought by the administration for the nation's stockpile stewardship efforts. The exact extent of the boost remains unclear; lawmakers in the House of Representatives have sought 8 percent in additional funding, while their Senate counterparts have pursued a 10 percent increase. Some Republicans have sought even more funding for nuclear weapons work.

A number of arms control advocates, meanwhile, have criticized the additional spending as "nuclear pork" for securing ratification of a new nuclear arms control with Russia (see GSN, Aug. 9). In addition, some supporters of U.S. nuclear weapons efforts expressed concern that the country would ultimately prove unwilling to maintain the elevated spending level in future budget cycles.

Still, the anticipated budget expansion appeared to have wide support from both Democratic and Republican legislators.

The funding increase "really does flow from having a national policy consensus," Hommert said (John Fleck, Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 10).
 
25 years ago from the Air Force Association

Gains and Gaps in Strategic Forces
By Edgar Ulsamer
Senior Editor (Policy & Technology)

While the US hesitates on strategic modernization, the Soviets prepare to deploy two new ICBMs and flight-test three more.
The pièce de résistance of AFA's national symposium on strategic issues, held on June 27-28, 1985, was history in the making: the arrival of the first operational B-1B at Offutt AFB, Neb., and the symbolic turnover of the aircraft to Strategic Air Command by Air Force Secretary Verne Orr. The event's climax was with a dramatic demonstration of the B-1's high-speed, low-level penetration capability. The participants in the sym­posium—including Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, then CINCSAC Gen. B. L. Davis, and AFSC Com­mander Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze—were part of the welcoming committee that witnessed the arrival of the aircraft from Edwards AFB, Calif.

Secretary Orr and General Skantze termed the B-1 program a resounding success, "ahead of schedule and under cost." The latter pointed out that although it took two decades to produce the first B-1, once the go-ahead was given, "it's been a positive case study in program management." After nailing down the requirements, General Skantze said, "the Air Force stuck to them. Cost, schedule, technical, and supportability needs caught equal attention." But the program, he added, is more than a successful product of a strong military and industry team: "It's a testament to a forward-thinking Congress and American public. Without their consen­sus, the bomber leg of the triad—and so the whole triad—would not be as strong as it is today."

But in spite of their obvious pride in and support of the B-1B program, the symposium speakers shied away from recommending continued acquisition of the B-1B beyond the 100 aircraft currently budgeted. General Davis conceded that SAC could easily "find uses for additional B-1s, but we have to allow for what the budget affords . . . in a world of finite resources." He stressed that "I can live with 100 B-1s," provided they are backed up by the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), also known as Stealth, "which takes advantage of a lot of technology that simply can't be put on the B-1B." As­serting that "there are no show-stoppers" slowing down the ATB, he emphasized that it "is in our interest to pursue that program and to produce" the Stealth bomb­er. General Skantze explained that the Air Force's two-bomber policy was born in 1981 of the need to "put 100 B-1s rapidly into the force." At that time, he said, ATB had to be considered a high-risk venture, making the case for a two-bomber approach all the more compel­ling.

Consistent support of this approach by the Air Force has been "our strength," but it does not mean that, as "individual Air Force officers, we wouldn't want some more B-1s." But personal desire must not stand in the way of USAF's fundamental bomber strategy or jeopar­dize the ATB program. The Commander of AFSC's Aeronautical Systems Division, Lt. Gen. Thomas H. McMullen, told the AFA meeting that the dispute over B-1 vs. ATB "is behind us" and that there is no good reason to resurrect it: "The issue now is to sustain the momentum" of the ATB program.

Referring to a congressional amendment that would require public disclosure of the total costs of the ATB program before Congress authorizes production of the Stealth bomber, General Skantze suggested that such a measure was not in the national interest at this time:

"The things we do in the Stealth technology program [represent] the highest technical leverage that we can generate to buy the technological edge over [the Soviet Union's quantitative advantages]. Maintaining the de­tails of these programs—even their dollar values—in a classified form benefits national security. I would not want to make this public unless it is absolutely neces­sary."

The Strategic Threat

The growth of Soviet military capabilities is prolific across the board, but especially pronounced in the stra­tegic offensive and defensive sector, the Defense Intelli­gence Agency's Deputy Director for External Affairs, A. Denis Clift, told the AFA symposium. Major strides by the USSR, the DIA official explained, include the development and pending deployment of two mobile advanced-technology ICBMs, the ten-warhead SS-X-24 and the initially single-warhead but eventually MIRVed SS-X-25. The SS-X-24 is expected to be deployed in silos next year and on rail-mobile launchers the year thereafter. This weapon will replace the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 silo-based ICBMs that carry fewer warheads. The SS-X-25 seems to be a replacement for the SS-11s.

A version of the mobile SS-X-25 appears capable of carrying several warheads. This weapon is designed to be "hidden in the countryside," which makes tracking, monitoring, and targeting by the US difficult, according to Mr. Clift. In addition, the SS-X-25, which is roughly the same size as the US Minuteman ICBM, is housed in "garages" with sliding roofs and thus can be launched rapidly, even when these weapons are not dispersed in the field in on-road or off-road mobile fashion. The USSR's commitment to the mobile deployment of its new family of ICBMs clearly represents a major invest­ment decision. Such systems require substantially broader support infrastructures than do silo-based sys­tems and thus are much more costly to operate and maintain.

In addition to the two new mobile ICBMs, the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, the Soviets will put at least three other new ICBMs into flight test in the near future, Mr. Clift disclosed. These new weapons are part of the so‑called fifth generation of Soviet ICBMs and include a new silo-based heavy ICBM to replace the SS-18 (the world's largest ICBM with about twice the throw-weight of MX), a new version of the SS-X-24, and a new version of the SS-X-25. The follow-on to the SS-18 and the growth version of the SS-X-24 are solid-propellant mis­siles, according to the DIA official. The current rate of buildup suggests that, by the mid-1990s, the Soviet ICBM inventory will be made up almost entirely of new, fifth-generation systems.

In the related and, under certain circumstances, com­plementary field of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the Soviets are expected to have fielded more than 450 SS-20 launchers by 1987. More new SS-20 bases were started in 1984 than in any previous year. The total would have been even higher if the Soviets had not deactivated SS-20 bases in the central USSR to convert to SS-X-25 bases. A follow-on to the SS-20 began flight tests in 1984. This new version also carries three war­heads and probably provides improved lethality. The presently deployed SS-20 force carries about 2,400 war­heads, according to Mr. Clift.

The modernization program is equally intense and comprehensive in the field of Soviet sea-based strategic offensive forces and will result over the next few years in the replacement of the entire MIRVed Soviet SLBM force and the deployment of much better nuclear-pow­ered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). In addition to the deployment of Delta IV and Typhoon SSBNs that is under way, an advanced new class of Soviet submarines is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s. Also in the offing is the deployment of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM on Delta IV and Delta III SSBNs. The increased range of this new SLBM, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile carried by the Delta class, will make the SS-NX-23­equipped SSBNs more survivable. They will be able to operate closer to Soviet shores, where their own naval forces can protect them better. There is also evidence that the Soviets are readying a replacement for the SS-N-20, which is a six-to-nine MIRV SLBM carried by the Typhoon-class SSBNs, as well as a growth version of the SS-NX-23, Mr. Clift said.

The Soviet commitment to modernize comprehen­sively their strategic offensive forces extends to the USSR's strategic bombers. The fact that the Soviets—for the first time since the 1960s—are modernizing their bombers on a high-priority, all-encompassing basis sug­gests that Moscow is assigning a greater role in intercon­tinental attack to these weapons. Especially noteworthy in this context is the fact that the Soviets did not want to delay this modernization by waiting for the full opera­tional capability of their brand-new Blackjack bomber. As an interim step, Moscow instead resumed production of an older type of heavy bomber, the Bear, and thus was able to deploy a new air-launched cruise missile, the AS-15 ALCM, at least four years earlier than otherwise possible, according to the DIA official. About twenty-five of the newly produced Bear bombers, known as the "H" models, have entered the Soviet inventory so far, he added. Blackjack, a strategic bomber similar to the B-I B but faster and larger, is expected to enter the operational inventory in about three years.

The AS-15 ALCM is the first in a series of deploy­ments of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles. US intelligence experts expect to see between 2,000 to 3,000 nuclear-armed cruise missiles enter the Soviet inventory over the next ten years. These new cruise missiles will include air-launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched variants. Among these new designs, according to Mr. Clift, is the 3,000-kilometer-range SS-NX-21, which will be carried by such new Soviet attack sub­marines as the Victor III class, the Sierra class, the Mike class, and the Akula class.

Growth in Intercontinental Attack Forces

In the aggregate, the growth of Soviet strategic offen­sive forces over the next few years could result in a doubling of the number of deployed nuclear warheads.

The Soviet strategic forces consist now of some 9,000 warheads deployed on some 2,500 ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers. Assuming that the Sovi­ets remain roughly within the limits specified by SALT II—meaning that they only modernize and don't in­crease the number of launch platforms—their deployed warhead inventory will grow to somewhat more than 12,000. If, on the other hand, the Soviets exercise no restraint and instead choose to step up their capabilities, US intelligence credits them with the ability to reach an inventory of deployed warheads by the mid-1990s of somewhere between 16,000 and 21,000.

Hand in glove with the expansion of Soviet strategic offensive forces is an across-the-board modernization of strategic defenses. The Soviets are expected by 1987 to complete the modernization of their antiballistic missile (ABM) system ringing Moscow. Consisting of 100 silo-based high-acceleration missiles and modified Galosh interceptors, this system will provide the Soviets with both an exo- and an endoatmospheric (outside and in­side the atmosphere) defense capability, according to Mr. Clift. This improved intercept capability will proba­bly be adequate to protect key targets in and around the Soviet capital from small-scale strategic attacks.

By the end of the decade, a new network of large phased-array radars will probably have achieved full operational status, giving the Soviets a much improved capability for ballistic missile early warning, attack as­sessment, and accurate target tracking. The US intelligence community is not sure if this network of phased-array radars will constitute the backbone of a Soviet territorial ballistic ABM system or is merely a first step in that direction, to be followed by additional genera­tions of advanced ground-based ABM radars.

Augmenting the ABM efforts currently in train is the pending deployment of the SA-X-12, a versatile, hybrid system that can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. This mobile sys­tem will probably be deployed in quantity with Soviet ground forces by the end of this year and is judged to be effective against some types of US strategic ballistic missile reentry vehicles as well. This weapon, the DIA official pointed out, blurs the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. As the Soviets develop yet newer, more capable air defense missile systems, this differentiation problem is bound to become more se­vere.

It is clear already to US intelligence experts that the USSR's continuing development programs give that country the potential for widespread ABM deploy­ments. The Soviets have in production the major com­ponents for an ABM system that could be used for widespread or even nationwide coverage. The compo­nents include radars, above-ground launchers, and the high-acceleration missiles that will be deployed around Moscow. The US intelligence community has concluded that the Soviets could undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defense of Moscow, de­fend key targets in the Western USSR, and extend pro­tection to key targets east of the Urals by the early 1990s. Complementing the Soviet ABM program is the modernization of the USSR's air defense network.

Deployment of highly capable, new, low-altitude stra­tegic air defense weapons is being stepped up. Deploy­ment of the new SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) is proceeding apace. New combat aircraft with much better capabilities against low-flying aircraft are entering the Soviet inventory in large numbers, and deployment of the Mainstay airborne warning and con­trol system (a counterpart to USAF's E-3A AWACS) is getting under way. However, there is general consensus in the US intelligence community that, during the next ten years, Soviet air defenses probably won't be capable of inflicting sufficient losses against attacking US bomb­ers and cruise missiles to prevent large-scale damage to the USSR.

Protecting the Leadership

To the Kremlin, the sine qua non of "winning" a nuclear war is to ensure the survival of the leadership of the state and party. With as little as a few hours' warning, Mr. Clift told the AFA meeting, a large percentage of the wartime management structure could survive the initial effects of a large-scale US nuclear attack. US intelli­gence sees evidence of up to 1,500 relocation facilities for Soviet leaders at the national and regional levels. Deep underground facilities for the top national leader­ship probably guarantee their survival in case of a pro­tracted conflict.

Closely linked to Soviet efforts to achieve a surviv­able infrastructure are programs that bolster the surviv­ability of their command and control facilities. The Sovi­ets' confidence in their ability to wage global conflict while at the same time limiting damage to the "mother­land" hinges on the twin requirements of protecting their own command and control facilities against destruction by US strategic forces and of the ability of their strategic forces to disrupt or destroy this nation's command and control systems. Because of the extensive redundancy and extreme hardness built into the Soviet command and control net, it seems highly likely to US intelligence experts that the Soviets could maintain overall continu­ity and connectivity of these facilities, even though some degradation might occur. Also, they might lack adequate endurance. Conversely, there is little doubt that the Soviets, in case of nuclear conflict, plan to launch repetitive attacks against US and allied strategic command control and communications (C3) nets in an attempt to prevent or impair the coordination of re­taliatory strikes. The obvious objective would be to ease the burden on Soviet strategic defenses and to deny the US the ability to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute its forces.

Advanced Technology Threats

The Soviets treat space as an integral part of their overall offensive and defensive force structure, not as a separate arena or a sanctuary, according to US intelli­gence assessments. At the same time, the Soviets do not yet appear capable of denying the US use of its space assets in case of global war. The Soviet ASAT space weapons—backstopped by the nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptors and two ground-based high-energy lasers—appear capable of destroying or interfering with some US national security spacecraft in near-earth or­bit. At the same time, they seem to lack the ability on a comprehensive basis to threaten military spacecraft in higher orbits.

In the view of US intelligence experts, it is likely that the Soviets would attempt to destroy or damage US satellites during an intense conventional conflict or in the initial stages of a nuclear war. It is probable, how­ever, that Soviet ASAT capabilities would not survive a US nuclear attack. The Soviets appear to recognize this shortfall and are working on improved ASAT systems.

A critical first step in this direction, the DIA official suggested, involves intense buildups of space-launch capabilities and development of a "spaceplane" capable of performing ASAT missions. Such a vehicle might do double duty by also serving as a defense mechanism for future large space stations. The Soviets are adding two huge launch systems to their arsenal of launchers. One of these new launch systems generates about 1,000,000 pounds of thrust on liftoff, while the other one appears capable of producing up to 6,000,000 pounds of thrust and of delivering into orbit payloads weighing as much as 150 tons, according to Mr. Clift.

The potential benefit of directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons in such missions as warfare in space, air defense, conventional warfare, and, over the long term,

ballistic missile defense seems abundantly clear to Sovi­et planners-and designers. The US intelligence commu­nity, Mr. Clift told the AFA meeting, estimates that the Soviet laser program, measured by US standards, amounts to a $1 billion a year effort. Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range appear to include high-energy lasers potentially capable of functioning as ASAT weap­ons. A massive Soviet program seems to aim at the development of ground-based laser weapons for termi­nal defense against US ballistic missile RVs. The Soviets are expected to test the feasibility of a ground-based ABM laser during the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy laser facilities at Saryshagan. Operational deployment of such a weapon, the DIA official specu­lated, probably won't occur until after the year 2000.

Other high-energy laser developments under way in the Soviet Union seem to be oriented toward strategic air defense applications as well as for use aboard air­craft. In addition, work is progressing on high-energy laser weapons for use in space. It is likely, the DIA official said, that the Soviets will test a prototype high-energy, space-based laser ASAT weapon in low orbit by the first half of the next decade. But even if the tests are successful, such a system probably could not reach operational status in less than ten years from now.

There is evidence that major research programs in progress in the Soviet Union are probing the feasibility of space-based particle-beam weapons. The technical requirements associated with such an undertaking are judged to be extremely severe and militate against the probability of prototype testing before the year 2000, Mr. Clift suggested. In another area of advanced tech­nology, that of radio-frequency (RF) weapons, the Sovi­ets are thought to have mastered all associated research and development hurdles and are probably capable of developing prototypes of such a system. RF weapons can interfere with or destroy critical components of missiles and satellites. Lastly, the Soviets are known to have conducted major research and development pro­grams since the 1960s on technologies with potential applications for hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapons.

Overall, US intelligence finds that Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces absorb about one-fifth of that nation's defense spending. Current US estimates suggest that the combined investments and operating expenditures for projected Soviet strategic offensive forces—comprised of intercontinental attack and inter­mediate-range weapons—and strategic defensive forces will grow by between five and seven percent over the next five years. This growth rate forecast assumes that there will be no widespread ABM deployments. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide to go ahead with a territorial ABM system, spending on strategic forces in the aggregate might increase by as much as ten percent over this period. While Soviet economic problems ap­pear to be severe, there is no evidence that the Kremlin will forgo any major strategic programs, according to US experts.

The ICBM Challenge

The decision by Congress to curtail the Administra­tion's acquisition and deployment level of MX was dis­cussed by a number of symposium speakers and faulted on operational as well as economic grounds. The effects of different administrations and Congress continually adjusting the number of MX Peacekeepers to be pro­duced and deployed, according to General Skantze, are profound: "In fact, we will never produce Peacekeeper missiles at an economic rate because of the political perturbations." He termed the MX program a classic case of vacillation by Congress and the executive branch. The missile was conceived in the mid-1960s, but Congress did not authorize full-scale development of the missile until 1979.

"After three false starts with earlier basing modes that cost the taxpayer $3.5 billion, Congress last year voted to deploy 100 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos. Now, some elected officials don't like the basing mode for Peacekeeper and are restricting the number we can. produce and deploy. . . . That costs money and more money. It sends confusing signals about our national will [and] detracts from our ability to provide an essential military capability," the AFSC Commander com­plained. General Davis commented on Congress's plans to limit the missile's deployment by saying that "fifty is better than none, but it's not enough to meet the very real military requirement." He termed it "unfortunate" that MX "has become such a political football. Military requirements and military utility hardly enter into the debate anymore."

General Davis and Maj. Gen. Aloysius G. Casey. the Commander of AFSC's Ballistic Missile Office, pointed out that reducing the number of deployed MXs to fewer than one hundred weapons—and thus to fewer than 1.000 warheads—does violence to the economics of the program because a fixed number of 123 additional mis­siles is needed for long-term testing, regardless of the size of the deployed force. Based on an assumed life span of fifteen years. the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SAC determined that 123 spare missiles-108 for operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and another fifteen for "aging surveillance"—are needed to demonstrate on a recurring basis to both the National Command Au­thorities and the Soviets that the weapon will work well and reliably in an operational environment. This number of test assets. General Davis said, is an irreducible mini­mum for maintaining an essential level of confidence in the operational effectiveness of the MX "whether you deploy [fifty, one hundred], or a thousand."

General Casey termed the halving of the number of deployed MX Peacekeepers a "very unwise choice for the country." A fifty percent cut in the number of de­ployed MX missiles and of the warheads they carry results in a cost savings of only $2.883 billion—or thir­teen percent of the total program costs—because of the requirement for 123 spare missiles, he pointed out. Shaving thirteen percent off the total program costs by cutting the deployed force in half would have major repercussions in terms of the weapon's operational ef­fectiveness and arms-control leverage, he stressed. Be­yond the obvious impact on the credibility of the US strategic deterrent, deploying 500 fewer MX war­heads—and fifty fewer missiles—than planned would result in a "degradation of the resilience of Peacekeeper to SLBM attacks that [involve] relatively short arrival times." The Soviets, for one, would have fewer hard­ened launch control centers to contend with as the number of deployed MX missiles is reduced, according to General Casey.

Congress's vote on the MX program last year, he explained, was focused almost exclusively on the weap­on's contribution to arms control at the expense of "its military value." Also. General Casey told the AFA meeting, "Our own rhetoric about survivability over the past ten years also has shifted the emphasis away from the value of the weapon [and] its contributions to deterrence." He stressed that the heart of deterrence "is the fear of counterattack" and that, concomitantly, "the survivability of nuclear forces should not be looked at as an absolute quantity." There isn't any system, he ex­plained, "that can't be wiped out when enough of a threat is applied. Deterrence is a relative term measured [by] the price of the attack, the relative ability to with­stand the attack, and the response of the surviving force." Measured against these standards, MX "has great military value" because of its large throw-weight and accuracy, he pointed out. He added that if absolute survivability were the ultimate and sole measure of merit of effective deterrence, there would be an easy answer to the problem: "We know how to build a survivable missile. We [would] put it deep under ground [even though] it might take a few weeks to get out." When people are told that, under this scheme, it would take a few weeks to fire the missile, "their eyes glaze over. The point is that absolute survivability is not the most impor­tant military characteristic" of a strategic nuclear weap­on, General Casey said.

Historically, he suggested, deterrence of totalitarian regimes worked when it imbued would-be aggressors with the fear of losing the underpinnings of their political existence, their military forces. Nazi Germany did not invade England during World War II because Hitler, who cared little about his own "countervalue" targets, appar­ently feared that he might lose the Wehrmacht in the process, General Casey theorized. He extended this reasoning to argue that in deterring the Soviet Union it is as important to make clear that both its countervalue and counterforce targets would be attacked and de­stroyed in case of nuclear war. This circumstance makes the hard-target capability of the US strategic offensive forces—embodied by MX—the cornerstone of effective deterrence, he told the AFA meeting.

The BMO Commander calculated that one MX Peace­keeper warhead is the equivalent of about five or six Minuteman III warheads in terms of hard-target kill capability. Referring to the contention that the US Navy's newest SLBM—the D-5, which is expected to enter the operational inventory by the end of this de­cade—could and should be substituted for MX, General Casey suggested that this would be an unwise decision: "I have great respect for the US Navy's SLBMs. But let me say that right now we have demonstrated better performance and accuracy [in eight MX test flights] than [are the hoped-for] goals of D-5."

The SSBN force, like the other elements of the strate­gic triad, have their own peculiar pluses and minuses and achieve full effectiveness only in concert with other strategic weapons. The drawbacks associated with SSBNs, he explained, are "that they are vulnerable in port, they are relatively vulnerable at sea, they have to worry about command and control, and should they ever get a location threat [meaning to become detectable in broad ocean areas], they would be reduced to very few targets."

General Casey found it ironic that Congress would pressure the Administration to reduce the MX deploy­ment at a time when the Soviets need to be dissuaded from continuing their massive buildup of new, large-­throw-weight ICBMs: "The deployment of one hundred MX Peacekeepers is really the minimum we [must] do in furtherance of our planned approach to arms control and, ultimately perhaps, of the reduction of" the MIRVed ICBMs on alert. The Air Force, he said, will continue its highly promising work on superhard silos as a possible means for increasing the survivability of MX.

The SICBM Program

The central importance of the ICBM force to strategic deterrence, General Davis told the AFA meeting, is behind the Air Force's and the Administration's plan to have "one system deployed, one in production, and another in development. It's a situation we haven't seen in the strategic arena for a very long time." The ICBM in development is the small ICBM (SICBM), or Midget­man. General Casey said the SICBM program is "off to a fast start," with twenty-three contractors already signed up and industry providing excellent contributions to the broad concept definition in progress. The program's full-scale engineering development phase is scheduled to get under way in October 1986, he reported.

The Air Force and its contractors are examining ways to base the new weapon in superhard silos as well as to deploy it in hardened mobile launchers. The latter ap­proach, he explained, offers flexibilities similar to those of SSBNs and strategic bombers, meaning "you can operate in different areas and [thereby] change the at­tack price." Superhard silo basing, on the other hand, "has all the advantages of fixed silos in terms of O&M costs." New techniques promise that this basing mode "can be made much, much harder than we originally thought." A bonus aspect of these technical advances, he added, is the fact that the cost of superhardening has come down from the original estimates. Also, ICBMs deployed in superhard silos, "regardless of what hap­pens to SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative], are the most easily defended system" by means of ballistic mis­sile defenses.

General Skantze, elaborating on the Air Force's man­agement approach to the SICBM program, said that "in pre-full-scale development, every stage of the small ICBM is being competed. We have two to four con­tractors working on each subsystem." Because of bud­get considerations, "we will down-select' to one for each system segment for [full-scale development]; how­ever, our goal is to maintain second sources through FSD if feasible. Early contractual and technological competition minimizes risk during production and sets the stage for a reliable, capable, affordable weapon sys­tem."

Assuming that the SICBM is held to a single-warhead configuration, there "can't be any doubt that its cost-­per-warhead will be greater than that of MX," General Casey told the AFA meeting. The entire cost of the MX program, based on one hundred deployed and 123 spare missiles, comes to $16.6 billion in FY '85 dollars or $21.5 billion in "then-year dollars," he said. This translates into a cost of $166 million per fielded missile—or "$16.6 million per warhead that is ninety-eight percent of the time on alert for twenty years." Measured in current dollars, that figure is below the fielded cost of Minute­man II, he said. The fielded per-warhead cost of Midget­man, General Casey reported, "probably will be five to six times that [of MX], because a missile goes with every warhead."

The Need for SRAM II

One of the key issues dividing this Congress involves standoff weapons that can augment strategic bombers in nuclear as well as conventional warfare. Key here are SRAM II, the advanced cruise missile (ACM), and JTACMS, the joint tactical missile system. The short-range attack missile (SRAM) now in operation is a rock­et-propelled missile, the last one of which was delivered ten years ago. As General McMullen pointed out, the SRAM force is approaching the end of its service life. Its replacement, SRAM II, he explained, is to be carried on penetrating bombers, the B-1B initially and eventually also on ATB. The SRAM II program is in "pre-full-scale development, which means we're defining the missile and answering fundamental questions like whether it will be rocket- or ramjet-propelled." (Since then, the Aeronautical Systems Division reportedly recom­mended to the Department of the Air Force that ramjet propulsion be dropped from further consideration.)The central traits of the SRAM follow-on design, he added, are greater survivability, range, accuracy, and reliability than the original design.

The first generation of operational cruise missiles, known as the ALCM-B, started to enter the inventory about five years ago; the last of the 1,763 ALCM-Bs will be delivered to SAC in October 1986, according to the ASD Commander. The program—"one of the successes that [in terms of media coverage] falls on the cutting room floor"—is being completed on schedule and under cost, with the Air Force having turned back "nearly $40 million in budget savings during the last two years," he reported. He added that "the high survivability, the long range, and the accuracy of the relatively low-cost cruise missile [place] a large number of enemy targets at risk, even in the face of more sophisticated air defenses and hardening measures." Once launched by the bomber force from standoff positions, "it penetrates well be­cause it is small and flies low—and hence is hard to detect. At the same time, because we send in lots of them, the cruise missile will create confusion; they should saturate and thereby dilute enemy defenses" and make life much easier for the penetrating bomber force that follows.

At the time the decision was made to terminate the ALCM-B buy at 1,763 missiles, development of a follow-on system, the advanced cruise missile (ACM), was initiated. This program, General McMullen said, is now in full-scale development and will result in a weapon that "outdoes ALCM in important areas like range and pen­etrability." Other details of this design, which incorpo­rates advanced low-observable technology, are classi­fied.

The JTACMS, in addition to serving as a sophisticated conventional standoff missile, could, in the view of some congressional experts, serve as a substitute for SRAM II if it were equipped with a nuclear warhead. JTACMS is a promising candidate for deployment on all strategic bombers—B-52, B-1B, and ATB—according to General McMullen. He suggested, however, that its primary ap­plication should be in conventional warfare missions.

General Davis acknowledged that the combination of HE (high-energy conventional explosives) and the accu­racy of standoff weapons measured "in tens of feet" makes it possible to attack some SIOP (single integrated operational plan, this country's strategic master plan) targets by nonnuclear means. Advanced conventional weapons of this type, General Davis told the AFA meet­ing, "have enough lethality to do the essential job, such as taking down [Soviet] plants that are producing strate­gic nuclear material."

Such targets, he explained, don't require total de­struction. Taking down part of the target to put the plant out of commission would be sufficient. "We can do this with nonnuclear weapons. As a result, it might be attrac­tive to deal with certain parts of the SIOP targeting complex by conventional means, even though we won't be able to do the whole job without nuclear weapons." Overtime, he predicted, an increasingly greater share of SIOP targets could be dealt with in this manner, "but I don't believe we will ever be able to disinvent nuclear weapons."

In the related field of theater warfare by conventional means, Aeronautical Systems Division is working on technologies that enhance SAC's ability to perform such missions: "We are upgrading the conventional weapon capability of the non-ALCM-carrying B-52Gs to include the Harpoon antiship missile and the capability to inter­face with any conventional weapon built to MIL STD [military standard] 1760—a standard definition of the interface between weapons and aircraft," according to General McMullen. Another significant ASD effort in support of SAC's bomber fleet, he said, is the Common Strategic Rotary Launcher, which "will mount up in the B-52H bomb bay and will carry all of the air-droppable, air-launched strategic weapons." General McMullen added that these launchers, "with a slight mod[ifica­tion], will then be used on the B-1B when the B-52s phase out. What's more, a... similar launcher will go on the ATB."
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Intereseting view of what was known in the unclassified world on URSS programs (BTW, for the most part taken for the yearly "Soviet Military Power" reports). What the author could have written had it know the emergency program launched by Gorbachev to counter SDI (fast burning ICBMs, extralarge boosters, breakthrough low cost secretly deployed ICBMs, etc , details still sketchy) ?
 
http://personal.inet.fi/cool/foxfour/ussr92/icbm.html (actually might do a minor update of this soon)
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,3057.0.html
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1085.0.html
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1076.msg8671.html#msg8671
 
Outgoing Stratcom CINC General Kevin Chilton worried about industrial base (from Global Security Newswire):

Chilton expressed concern that there was no plan to replace the Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, but noted that the Navy has started work on replacing the Ohio-class strategic missile submarines (see GSN, Aug. 10). He suggested it also should begin planning a replacement for the D-5 Trident missiles the subs carry.

He also worried about the future of the solid rocket industrial base that would be needed to produce replacements for the Minuteman and the D-5.
 
Global Strike Command Minuteman III test launch successful
by Capt. Jamie Humphries
Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs

9/18/2010 - VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. -- Air Force Global Strike Command crews launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from north Vandenberg Sept. 17 at 3:03 a.m.

The operational test launch demonstrates the weapon system's reliability and accuracy, officials said.

The missile's single unarmed re-entry vehicle traveled approximately 5,300 miles, to a pre-determined target in the Pacific Ocean about 200 miles southwest of Guam.

"We had been through so much training and so many dry runs that by launch night we were excited to execute the mission," said Capt. Amy Grant, launch director for the test launch.

"The launch process requires tremendous teamwork and involves months of preparation," said Col. David Bliesner, 576th Flight Test Squadron commander. "The data gained from these launches allows us to maintain a high readiness capability and ensures operational effectiveness of the most powerful weapons in the nation's arsenal."

The 576th FLTS directed and conducted the missile launch, which was supported by operations and maintenance task forces from the 91st Missile Wing, Minot AFB, N.D., and the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Neb.

"This test launch was conducted to ensure nation's most powerful weapons are safe, secure and effective," said Lt. Col. David Schrader, 91st Operations Support Squadron operations director. "This launch validates the processes that we use day-to-day at the missile wings."

The entire ICBM community, including Air Force Global Strike Command and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, will use the data collected from this mission for continuing evaluation of the nation's long-range missile force.

Captain Grant said that her role for the test launch gave her perspective. She said she saw the launch facility and the missile maintainers at work on site, which helped her understand the larger process.

The launch marked the third and final Minuteman III operational test launch conducted by Global Strike Command this year. All three tests were successful.

Operational testing of the Minuteman III began in 1968 and the first follow-on operational test launch occurred March 23, 1971, at Vandenberg.
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Some related news from Insidedefense.com:

NNSA Chief: Developing Common ICBM, SLBM Warhead Is Doable
Posted: September 21, 2010
Developing a nuclear warhead that can fit on both land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles faces a number of not-insurmountable challenges, according to the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

SSBN(X) Will Still Use D5 Missiles; More Details On New Baseline This Fall
Posted: September 21, 2010
Despite scaled-back requirements, the next generation of ballistic missile submarines will use the D5 missile, according to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development.
 
Proposed Ballistic-Missile Submarine Nears Pentagon Review
Monday, Sept. 27, 2010

By Elaine M. Grossman

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Navy's emerging plans for a new nuclear-armed submarine are slated to undergo a pivotal Defense Department review in November, with the initial backing of a key congressional committee in hand (see GSN, Aug. 10).

(Sep. 27) - A top-level Pentagon board is set in November to review Navy plans for initial work on a next-generation replacement for U.S. Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, like the one shown above (U.S. Navy photo).

The Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 14 said it fully supported the fiscal 2011 plans to perform design, engineering and prototyping work on the next-generation ballistic-missile submarine.

Lawmakers noted, though, that they had imposed a 10 percent reduction in funds on the Obama administration request for $493 million because program delays this past year would prevent the Navy from completing all its earlier anticipated work for 2011. The partial funding would leave the effort with $444.7 million for the coming year.

The Senate panel's counterpart committee in the House has not yet acted on an unreleased subcommittee version of the defense appropriations bill. However, according to one Washington insider, the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee offered full funding for the proposed submarine, dubbed the "SSBN(X)."

With the new fiscal year beginning on Oct. 1, Congress is expected to pass a continuing resolution that would allow the Defense Department to maintain operations temporarily until the appropriations legislation is enacted. For the more formal legislation, defense appropriations would likely be consolidated with other funding bills into an omnibus spending package, sources said.

Meanwhile, the Navy this summer reportedly submitted to Ashton Carter, the Pentagon acquisition czar, its major design recommendations for the new submarine, which is to replace today's Ohio-class vessels.

Carter earlier this month said that to cut costs, the Defense Department would limit the replacement submarine's "size and speed," though he indicated that design details remained classified.

An "emphasis on affordability is already being applied to the next-generation ballistic missile submarine, where we are trimming [design] requirements without compromising critical capability," said Defense Secretary Robert Gates, appearing alongside Carter at a Sept. 14 press briefing.

"The per-unit estimated cost had risen as high as $7 billion. It is now roughly $5 billion," Gates said. "The goal is a reduction of fully 27 percent in a program where total cost is expected to be more than $100 billion."

Design features to be decided during the Defense Acquisition Board meeting, led by Carter, will include how many launch tubes each boat will contain, which could affect the number of weapons the vessel can carry, according to defense sources. Today's Ohio-class submarines feature 24 launch tubes, each of which can shoot a single Trident 2 D-5 ballistic missile.

Another detail on the drawing boards is the size of each launch tube, which could affect the types of future missile the submarine might field.

Like today's nuclear-armed submarines, the replacement vessels will initially carry the Trident D-5. The new boats are also expected to be capable of carrying a next generation of nuclear-armed missiles. They might be fitted with a small number of conventionally armed weapons, as well, according to Navy officials.

Retaining D-5 missile capability in the new submarine will help maintain continuity during a 13-year period between 2029 and 2042, when the Ohio-class boats gradually retire and their replacements are introduced into the force, Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy Strategic Systems Planning office, said in July on Capitol Hill.

Under the "New START" nuclear arms control agreement, signed by the United States and Russia in April, the Pentagon anticipates reducing its Ohio-class vessels from 14 to 12 and capping its Trident D-5 missile force at 240.

Today the fleet carries 288 deployed D-5s, armed with a total 1,152 nuclear warheads, according to Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. The same number of D-5 warheads is expected to be retained after New START enters into force, despite the reduction in missiles, the two nuclear force analysts reported. The numbers would allow for a slightly higher average warhead loading on each missile, if the Pentagon so desired.

If Carter's review board approves Navy plans, the SSBN(X) effort will move into its first major phase as a Pentagon acquisition program, called "Milestone A."

Leading up to the November gathering, the Navy in May 2009 completed an analysis that explored various alternatives for meeting a continued military requirement for a portion of the nation's nuclear stockpile to be deployed on submarines, according to service budget documents. The Pentagon has not released the results of the classified study.

A final report on the Navy's review of options was completed last September and, in December 2009, the Pentagon's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office certified the service's assessment, the Navy documents state.

However, the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year told the Defense Department it was dissatisfied with the process thus far. It admonished the Pentagon for not sharing with Capitol Hill more information about its analysis of alternatives, in advance of the Milestone A decision and the administration's request for hundreds of millions of dollars in new program spending.

The lawmakers said in May that although they support the continuation of a "robust sea-based strategic deterrent force" after the Ohio-class submarines retire, the Defense Department has moved too hastily on deciding what capabilities the new boats must have.

"First," the panel stated in its report on the fiscal 2011 defense authorization bill, "the basic requirement of how much and what type of deterrent capability is sufficient for the national military strategy has not been communicated to the committee."

Second, the lawmakers complained, the House panel "has not been afforded the opportunity to review the analysis of alternatives conducted by the Navy, which determined that a submarine large enough to support the Trident 2 D-5 missile weapons system is the preferred vessel to continue deterrent capability."

Finally, the committee said it "has concerns that the decision to proceed with a submarine program of similar size as the Ohio-class ships was made prior to the analysis of alternatives, and that a potential use of a modified Virginia-class submarine, in production today, was discounted in favor of maintaining the Trident 2 D-5 weapons system."

Using the smaller Virginia-class attack submarine as a basis for the new SSBN(X) could help the Navy avoid billions of dollars in spending on a new design, according to advocates. The drawback, detractors say, is that without a major redesign, a submarine smaller than the Ohio-class design would likely be limited to carrying shorter-range ballistic missiles.

If the Trident D-5 were required to fit inside a Virginia-class design, the service would have to modify the submarine with a "humpback" silhouette to make it capable of housing the weapon's long missile tubes, Kristensen said last month.

In an e-mailed response to questions last week, he said the time has come to reassess whether such long-range missiles -- and a correspondingly large submarine to accommodate them -- are still required in the post-Cold War era.

"For the foreseeable future, it simply makes no sense to design an SSBN with a capability similar to what was needed to evade Soviet attack submarines, equip it with long-range SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] to maximize patrol areas, and deploy these SSBNs with two crews at an operational tempo that is similar to what we did during the height of the Cold War," said Kristensen, who directs the Nuclear Information Program at the Federation of American Scientists.

"Given the enormous price tag, Russia's problems in fielding its next SSBN and SLBM, China's slow SSBN program and recent SLBM development problems, Britain's inability to afford a new SSBN, and India's growing SSBN plans, I think it is time to think about how to limit deployment and operations of nuclear weapons at sea, rather than continuing business as usual but with more [international] players," he said.

However, one retired submarine officer said it is imperative that the Navy effort embrace new technologies and avoid getting mired in delays. The source asked not to be named in this article because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

"We need to move forward with the new submarine. There is no plausible future where it isn't required," he told Global Security Newswire last week. "The last ships of the [new] class will still be in service 60 to 70 years from now. That puts a great premium on building in flexibility and adaptability and using the best technology available. That costs money."

The former officer said Gates should move cautiously in his effort to trim costs on the next-generation vessel.

"Balancing the need for building such a ship with the equally important need to control costs is a real challenge for DOD and the Navy, [but] like so many public policy decisions, it isn't a choice between right and wrong but a balance between competing-but-incompatible goals," the retired submariner said.

By contrast, Kristensen suggested that SSBN(X) costs could be more significantly reduced as part of a fundamental reassessment of how strategic security requirements translate into military hardware.

"I'm all for Defense Secretary Gates' effort to trim the SSBN requirements," he said. "But it should not just be about saving money, but also about changing the nuclear posture and [reducing] the role of nuclear weapons."

Kristensen was referring to President Barack Obama's April 2009 pledge in Prague to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." A year later, the Pentagon committed itself to implementing that objective as part of its Nuclear Posture Review, a 49-page report on strategy, forces and readiness.

The administration announced some limited changes to nuclear targeting policy in the posture review and has continued Bush-era investments in long-range, conventionally armed "prompt global strike" weapons as a niche alternative to atomic arms.

However, some critics grumble that the administration could take additional substantial steps to bring its warhead and delivery-system investments more in line with the goal of limiting the role of nuclear weapons.

At a July hearing, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) asked whether the Navy had "done any studies on whether a replacement such as the Virginia-class submarine can perform the same [nuclear deterrence] duties, with obviously an alteration in the missiles and the ship somewhat."

Navy Undersecretary Robert Work responded that his service had indeed considered that option in its analysis of alternatives.

However, Work said, "the judgment is that because we have elected to go with the D-5 missile, that using the Virginia is not the right way to go, that it is a much better and more efficient thing to exploit our existing infrastructure on a 42- or 43-foot diameter hull."

Skelton scolded Work for what he said appeared to be a Navy failure to consider the use of a smaller missile in the next-generation boat, which might make the Virginia-class design more feasible as an alternative. Any need to design a larger replacement submarine "might well eat into your attempt" to field a 313-ship Navy, he said.

"I think you ought to ask the engineers about a missile that might fit in the smaller submarine rather than the multibillion dollars you might have to sink into a replacement for the Ohio-class submarine," the committee chairman said.

Skelton's panel stated in its May defense spending document that it would "withhold authority" for the Pentagon to obligate more than half of the $493 million in fiscal 2011 funds requested for the SSBN(X) development program, "until the secretary of defense certifies to the committee the necessity to continue sea-based deterrence with the Trident 2 D-5 weapons system."

This defense-secretary report is also expected to spell out the guidance the Navy used in crafting its list of alternatives, projected costs and schedules for any alternatives, and the "reasoning" the Navy used in opting to require that the new boat carry the D-5 missile. No similar language was advanced by the committee's counterpart panel in the Senate.
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I would like to see this commitment to modernizing the Air Force portion of the nuclear deterrent. If we are to read between the lines will the US be going to an all Trident deterrent after 2020 or 2030?
 
Some good news for the solid rocket industrial base

DoD Plans to 'Do No Harm' With Rocket Policy
By JOHN REED
Published: 28 Sep 2010 17:22

"First, do no harm to industry" will guide the Pentagon's purchases of solid rocket motors in the next decade, said Brett Lambert, the Pentagon's director of industrial policy. The Pentagon is to release its plan in coming weeks.

"We will do what we need to with the industrial base" to maintain the skilled engineers necessary to develop next generation solid rockets," Lambert said. "We're not going to do anything where industry has to shrink or contract to the point where if we ask them to reconstitute they would be unable to." He pledged to keep spending enough to ensure the DoD can maintain the thousands of ground-based and submarine-launched nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. "There is no question we will maintain a base significant enough to meet" the needs of maintaining the size of the nation's nuclear missile fleet as laid out in the latest Nuclear Posture Review and this year's strategic arm treaty with Russia, Lambert said.

That treaty calls for the U.S. to maintain up to 420 deployed ground-based ICBMs, up to 60-nunclear capable bombers and 240 deployed submarine launched missiles in the coming decades. He also indicated that the department will likely increase funding to purchase and maintain the rockets used to do everything from launching satellites into space to standing by to lob nuclear warheads across the globe. Many have wondered what President Obama's canceling of NASA's Constellation Rocket program – originally intended to replace the Space Shuttle – will mean to the Pentagon, which relies on many of the same manufacturers as the space agency to meet its rocket needs. "We realize there probably will be an increase in cost based on our [solid rocket] needs," Lambert said.
 
Some interesting "nuclear" news from Global Security Newswire.

Pentagon Inks B-52 Modernization Deal
Thursday, Sept. 30, 2010

The U.S. Defense Department yesterday said it had signed a contract valued at close to $12 billion for updates to its nuclear-capable B-52 bombers, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2009).

The eight-year deal with aerospace giant Boeing Co. "provides for the acquisition and sustainment activities needed to support B-52 weapon system modernization," according to a Pentagon release (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 29).

"This B-52 modernization contract will include several delivery orders over an eight-year period," according to a Boeing press release. "The Air Force announced a contract ceiling of $11.9 billion. This is a contracting vehicle that will allow engineering sustaining contracts, studies, production and other activities to occur in support of the B-52. No funds were committed with this contract announcement. We expect our first delivery order to be awarded on Sept. 30" (Boeing Co. release, Sept. 29).

There are now 85 B-52s on operational duty, according to the Air Force. The long-range bomber is designed to carry conventional and nuclear weapons. It is expected to remain in service past 2040 (U.S. Air Force fact sheet, April 23).
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$12 billion for B-52 upgrades that's close to $200 million per platform. Sounds like General Patrick McLanahan and Jon Masters from the Dale Brown novels won the contract. Are we finally going to see delta winged BUFF's with V tails loaded with UAV's and DE weapons? :eek:
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U.S. May Disable Some Submarine-Based Nuclear Arms Capacity

Thursday, Sept. 30, 2010
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- To implement the U.S.-Russian "New START" arms control agreement, Washington is likely to "inactivate" one-sixth of its capacity to launch nuclear weapons from submarines, according to defense officials (see GSN, Sept. 27).

(Sep. 30) - A U.S. Trident 2 D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The United States could modify the capacity of its strategic submarines to carry D-5 missiles in implementing a new nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, defense officials said (Getty Images).

The alteration, if performed, would involve rendering unusable four ballistic missile launch tubes on each of 14 Trident submarines. Today the vessels feature 24 active launch tubes, each containing a single D-5 ballistic missile. The change would bring that number down to 20 missiles per boat. "Nothing has been decided because the final force structure [under the treaty] has not been chosen," said one Defense Department official, who was not authorized to speak publicly about the issue and requested anonymity in this article. "But it is about a 98 percent certainty that that's what we'll do." Though technical details remain uncertain regarding how the modifications would be made, U.S. officials anticipate the changes would be verifiable by Russian arms control inspectors.

The partial inactivation of launch tubes would also almost certainly be reversible, allowing Washington to meet treaty caps but retain some flexibility in how its smaller nuclear arsenal is arrayed in the future, defense sources said. U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START agreement in April. Now pending before U.S. and Russian lawmakers for ratification, it limits each side to 1,550 deployed warheads aboard 700 strategic delivery vehicles, such as aircraft, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ground-based ICBMs. Another 100 delivery platforms could be kept in reserve.

Once the treaty enters into force, the Obama administration plans to "deploy no more than 240 Trident 2 SLBMs at any one time," James Miller, the principal deputy defense undersecretary for policy, told a Senate committee in July. Just 12 of today's 14 Trident submarines are operational, with two boats in overhaul at any given time. Warheads or missiles in vessels undergoing the periodic maintenance are not counted under New START limits.

The Defense Department currently fields 288 Trident D-5 missiles, filling each of the 24 launch tubes aboard 12 deployed submarines. As New START is implemented and the launch-tube modifications are made, the Navy would be able to reduce to the Pentagon objective of 240 missiles using this math: 20 missiles multiplied by 12 operational vessels.

The Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review -- a major assessment of strategy and forces released in April -- stated that the Navy will continue to field 14 total ballistic-missile submarines for the time being, but might reduce to 12 such boats before the end of the decade. With two of those typically in overhaul, just 10 would be regarded as operational day to day.

If the Defense Department goes forward with trimming its Trident submarine fleet in the coming years, it would have the option of reversing the launch-tube inactivation and renewing its capacity for the remaining 10 operational vessels to carry 24 missiles apiece, maintaining the level of 240 missiles fielded across the fleet, officials said. The launch-tube measure could thus be seen as a "bridge" to the probable reduction in the quantity of ballistic-missile submarines by the end of the decade, said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. "Otherwise, they'd have to wait till the end of the decade to reduce missiles out there," he said in an interview this week.

However, some observers believe it might be politically difficult for the Navy to return to loading 24 nuclear missiles per vessel later in the decade. After having maintained nuclear deterrence for several years by sailing with just 20 weapons on each submarine, it could appear that an additional four would be unnecessary, the argument goes. "If they go to sea with only 20, that would cause people to re-evaluate the requirements for the D-5 life-extension program, which assumes 24 missiles," said one industry analyst, referring to the Navy's current effort to field 108 updated versions of the submarine-based weapon. "So if you drop four missiles per boat, then you could reduce the buy by 48 missiles."

The Navy plans to introduce the life-extension version of the D-5 missile into the fleet in three years. The modified arms will include newly produced rocket motors, remanufactured flight hardware and modern guidance instruments.

A decision to reduce the number of missiles on Trident vessels "would also say that the option of 24 tubes per boat on the new submarine design doesn't look like it would be valid any more," said the analyst, who asked not to be named in discussing sensitive fielding options. The Navy's next-generation ballistic missile submarine, called the SSBN(X), could have as few as 16 launch tubes or as many as 24, with design details expected to go before a top-level Pentagon review board for decision in November, defense sources said.

The Nuclear Posture Review asserted that a reduction to 10 operational submarines "will not affect the number of deployed nuclear warheads" on the vessels. The Ohio-class submarines currently carry a total 1,152 warheads and, once the New START reductions are taken, they would likely carry just under 1,100, Kristensen estimated.

If the Pentagon declines to reactivate the four launch tubes once the submarine fleet shrinks to 10 deployed boats, the Navy could retain the same number of warheads across its remaining 200 missiles by arming them with five to six warheads apiece, instead of today's average of four, Kristensen said.

Taking policy considerations into account, a reversible inactivation of the launch tubes also offers Obama administration leaders a "hedge" against any resurgence in Russian strategic forces or some other strategic surprise, officials said. The New START agreement includes a clause that allows either side to withdraw if it determines that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized its national security.

The nation has seven years to take reductions in its force structure, following the accord's entry into force. Defense Department engineers are just now beginning to assess how they might suspend the usability of four launch tubes on each boat, according to Pentagon sources.

Under one engineering approach, the Navy might simply remove the gas pressure system that allows a ballistic missile to be ejected by "cold launch," before its rocket motors kick in. Another method could involve inserting a narrow sleeve into each tube that would make it impossible for a D-5 missile to fit inside. A third option might be to replace each of the four D-5s with a "ballast can," a 15-foot weight that a submarine could carry for stability when a missile is not in its tube, according to sources. "That's what the Navy has to figure out," the Pentagon official said.

Beyond the submarine leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, Washington under New START expects to "retain up to 420 of the current 450 Minuteman 3 ICBMs, each with a single warhead," Miller told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 20. "And we plan to retain up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H heavy bombers, while converting remaining nuclear-capable B-1B bombers and some B-52 bombers as well to a conventional-only capability."
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I will refrain from political commentary ;D
 
pf.jpg
 
Congressional Research Service report on SSBN (X)

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/reports/2/118055/crs-reviews-ssbn(x)-missile-submarine-program.html

Full down loadable report at the bottom of the story.
 
Some more information on the B-52 modernization story

Why The B-52 Got $11.9 Billion

Why The B-52 Got $11.9 Billion
By Colin Clark Thursday, October 7th, 2010 3:44 pm
Posted in Air

When the Air Force announced an $11.9 billion sustainment contract to Boeing last week for the venerable and enduring B-52 eyebrows shot up along the Potomac, especially on Capitol Hill.

It appeared to provide roughly $127 million per airplane spread out over eight years, one hell of a lot of money for a plane that originally cost $9.3 million in 1955 (somewhere around $76 million per in current dollars). So we checked with the Air Force to get some details on just what was happening and why.

Congressional aides were flabbergasted by the contract, for which no money has been authorized and almost none obligated. When I shared the Air Force response with some congressional aides they were not happy since I got an answer more quickly than they did. One of them put it this way: “I can’t validate or comment yet on what you’ve been given, other than the fact that it’s “ops normal” on how the Pentagon chooses to interact and engage with the Hill.” (There were also a few choice words about how “dysfunctional” the legislative affairs office at the Pentagon is, but we won’t go into that.)
Click here to find out more!

Here are the details on the B-52 deal. It’s an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. The amount is “based on estimated costs derived from current activities and in-house estimates for future projected support requirements for B-52 modernization.” In an interesting approach, the Air Force gave the contract a “sufficient ceiling” for “programs critical to maintaining B-52 mission capability as funding is appropriated and authorized.” That may allay some of the concerns on the Hill about the deal.

While it is an astonishing amount of money, almost nothing is actually being spent so far. “No funds were obligated with the award of the basic IDIQ contract, but the basic contract contains a $600,000 minimum order quantity provision,” Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Jack Miller said in an email. That was the first payment for a $2.3 million order of 16 Evolutionary Data Link (EDL) Phase III kits” and some “basic engineering support through 29 Feb 12.”

On top of that tiny sum, the contract should also pay for “Combat Networks Communication Technology (CONECT) production, Extremely High Frequency (EHF) engineering development and production, Strategic Radar Replacement development and production, Tactical Data Link engineering studies, MIL-STD-1760 Internal Weapons Bay production, trade studies, and other programs critical to maintaining B-52 mission capability out to the year 2040.”

Given the amount of the contract I thought there might be some re-engining or fuselage work. Not so, says Miller. It could, of course, be done under the contract “if authorized and funded,” he noted.

Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/10/07/why-the-b-52-got-11-9-billion/#ixzz11jDWy9Dx
 
LM Receives $106 M for Next-Gen ICBM Reentry Field Support Equipment

Published on ASDNews: Oct 7, 2010

King of Prussia, Pa. - Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) announced today that it has received a $106 million engineering, manufacturing and development contract from Northrop Grumman Corporation to develop the next-generation Reentry Field Support Equipment (RFSE) for the U.S. Air Force's Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system.

Under the 58-month contract awarded in July, Lockheed Martin will design, develop, test and deliver two sets of RFSE. Production of an additional 10 RFSE sets for deployment to all operational Air Force Minuteman III wings will be performed under a follow-on contract. The RFSE will replace the aging Minuteman III Reentry System Test Set (RSTS). Lockheed Martin will continue to sustain the RSTS, for which it is the original equipment manufacturer, until deployment of the replacement RFSE.

"This contract represents an important modernization effort for the Air Force's Minuteman III reentry systems," said Les Lyon, director of Air Force Reentry Programs, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. "Lockheed Martin is committed to providing the Air Force with the highest quality hardware and systems engineering in support of the operational ICBM force."

The RFSE, which represents a substantial enhancement to the Minuteman III sustainment effort, will be used to support testing and maintenance of all Minuteman III reentry systems - both the Mk12A and Mk21 configurations.

The RFSE in conjunction with the recently deployed Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) support equipment will provide a full suite of new support equipment for the Air Force's Minuteman III reentry systems. Lockheed Martin completed deliveries of all SERV ground support equipment in April and is continuing to deliver SERV flight hardware. The SERV program enables each Minuteman III missile to carry one, two or three Mk12A reentry vehicles or a single Mk21 reentry vehicle from the decommissioned Peacekeeper ICBM force, ensuring continued reliability and effectiveness.

Lockheed Martin is a principal teammate to Northrop Grumman, the ICBM prime integration contractor for the U.S. Air Force. Lockheed Martin has been the principal designer, manufacturer and sustainer of the Minuteman reentry systems since the 1960s.

Lockheed Martin leads the industry in performance and domain expertise in strategic missile and missile defense systems. Lockheed Martin designs and produces ballistic missiles, interceptors, target missiles and reentry systems with unmatched reliability. Lockheed Martin's focus on operational excellence yields affordable high-quality systems and services.
 
From Insidedefense.com: Air Force Anticipates Planned Reduction To Ballistic Missile Arsenal

The Air Force has begun preliminary discussions on how it will draw down portions of its intercontinental ballistic missile force, in order to meet the mandates outlined in a new international arms control treaty between the United States and Russia.
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If we are going to fewer ICBMs I would use that as a rationale to modernize the MMIII with a new missile in a new superhardened silo or even bring back the idea of mobile launchers (all these ideas would be deemed too expensive in today's budgetary environment and no politician has the political will to insist we modernize nukes but I digress).

Speculation is a reduction to 420 land based missiles so they better be survivable, IMHO.
 
From Insidedefense.com:

SSBN(X) Will Likely Have Smallest Tube Possible For D5 Missile
In order to minimize costs, the Navy is looking at an 87-inch diameter missile tube for the next generation of ballistic missile submarines, the smallest size necessary to accommodate the D5 missile, according to officials.
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Question for SP members, can the current Trident accommodate a larger missile? Also, my personal comment for SSBN (X) I think you are going to see the smallest, cheapest possible submarine, say 16 missiles, able to carry out the nuclear deterrent mission.
 
US loses communication with 50 Minuteman Missiles;

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/communications-dropped-to-50-nuke-missiles-in-icbm-snafu/
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Time for a MIII replacement housed in new superhardened silos (yes I'm a broken record)
 
Presentations from 2010 AIAA Missile Sciences Conference November 16th to 18th:

1) Future Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Capability as a Function of Submarine Missile Tube, Launcher, and Two and Three Pack Missile Architecture
2) Expanded Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Launch Envelope with Trident II Missile in a Capsule Launched from the Next Generation SSBN
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1) opens a lot of speculation of the possibility of smaller (maybe single warhead) missiles packed two to three per launch canister in the SSBN (X).

See the whole conference program here - http://aiaa-mmsc10.abstractcentral.com/login
 
From Air Force Association:

Kehler: Maintain and Modernize Triad: Gen. Robert Kehler, the nominee to head US Strategic Command, on Thursday called on the nation to maintain a nuclear triad and to modernize each of the triad's legs. "It is critically important that we continue with both sustainment and modernization of all the legs of the triad," Kehler told the Senate Armed Services Committee during his nomination hearing. He currently leads Air Force Space Command at Peterson AFB, Colo. In addition to developing the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine replacement, Kehler said "it’s important also to have a replacement long-range strike aircraft and . . . to begin the process to modernize the nation's land-based strategic deterrent." He said he does not think "there's anything different that needs to be done right now," in terms of pursuing the future LRS platform, when specifically asked if he would favor some change.
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Kehler also said a MMIII replacement capabilities study followed by an AoA will start in FY11 to begin the process of developing a ICBM follow on system by 2030.
 
From the Air Force Association:

Extensive Investment in USAF's Nuclear Enterprise Ahead:

The Air Force will see a significant amount of investment in its nuclear-capable platforms and infrastructure in the coming years, said Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, Air Force Global Strike Command boss. The White House has indicated that the US will invest more than $100 billion over the next decade to modernize and sustain the nuclear deterrent. About $40.5 billion of that total is destined for the Air Force's nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs, Klotz said at AFA's Global Warfare Symposium in Los Angeles. Looking ahead, the Air Force wants to install the 1760 data bus in the bomb bays of its B-52s so that the bombers can carry satellite-guided weapons internally. Other B-52 investments include a modernized radar and a replacement for the ALCM standoff nuclear cruise missile. The B-2A bombers are currently receiving a modern active electronically scanned array radar. Future B-2 upgrades include defensive management systems and weapons system software integration resources, he said. As for the Minuteman III fleet, the planned $7 billion tip-to-tail modernization is well underway, including new guidance electronics, adapted Peacekeeper re-entry vehicles, new secure communication links, and new propellant.
—Marc V. Schanz
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Bolding mine. $7 billion for MMIII modernization, with the state of the solid rocket industrial base why not just build a replacement?
 
bobbymike said:
$7 billion for MMIII modernization, with the state of the solid rocket industrial base why not just build a replacement?
Click to expand...

Because then you can convince Congress and the anti-nuke crowd that you are only "modernizing" the MMIII instead of building a new missile in a MMIII envelope.
 
GeorgeA said:
bobbymike said:
$7 billion for MMIII modernization, with the state of the solid rocket industrial base why not just build a replacement?
Click to expand...

Because then you can convince Congress and the anti-nuke crowd that you are only "modernizing" the MMIII instead of building a new missile in a MMIII envelope.
Click to expand...

I would still like the Air Force to develop a MMIII replacement sooner than 2030 as well as a very large Conventional ICBM for the prompt global strike mission.
 
Pentagon Said Likely to Back New Design for Ballistic Missile Submarine
Tuesday, Dec. 21, 2010
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Defense Department is likely to pursue a brand new design for its next nuclear-armed submarine, following a Navy recommendation during a key program review earlier this month, according to experts and observers (see GSN, Sept. 27).

The Pentagon's Defense Acquisition Board on December 9 completed an initial design review meeting on the so-called "SSBN(X)" effort, spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin confirmed last week. However, she indicated the department was not ready to release the review's results. If approved by defense acquisitions czar Ashton Carter, the replacement submarine for today's Ohio-class ballistic missile vessels would enter its first major acquisition program phase, called "Milestone A." A recent Congressional Research Service report estimated it would cost roughly $70 billion to replace the 12 ballistic missile submarines expected to populate the U.S. fleet by the end of this decade. The nation currently fields 14 Ohio-class boats.

The Navy has not released total cost projections for the new underwater craft, but has estimated it would spend $29.4 billion on the effort between fiscal 2011 and 2020. That figure, though, excludes costs for roughly two subsequent decades during which the 12 new submarines would be built and delivered. The next-generation submarine is to initially carry today's Trident D-5 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, but later could be fitted with new-design nuclear missiles and possibly conventional weaponry (see GSN, Aug. 10).

The first Ohio-class submarine to be replaced reaches the end of its 42-year service life in 2027. One subsequent vessel is slated to retire each year after that, with the last submarine expected to age out in 2040. The SSBN(X) submarines are to enter the fleet between 2029 and 2042. One pivotal decision believed likely to come out of the Defense Acquisition Board review pertains to the approach the Navy will take in developing and building the replacement submarine. In an official "analysis of alternatives" that also has not been released, the Navy considered three possible design concepts for the Ohio-class follow-on, according to a recent Energy Department report.

First, the Navy could base its design on the Ohio-class vessel. This would have the potential benefit of saving much of the cost involved in designing a new submarine, which one 2008 estimate pegged at roughly $7 billion. However, service officials have said this approach would have the disadvantage of locking in older technologies that fail to meet the Navy's needs. For example, it could be difficult to include in an Ohio-class design the silencing technologies the Navy believes are needed to combat modern detection equipment that future adversaries might field, among other features, according to naval sources. The service could alter the Virginia-class attack submarine design so that it could carry ballistic missiles. This approach could also offer cost-cutting advantages and transition the service to a smaller ballistic-missile vessel at a time when traditional Cold War nuclear threats are receding, according to analysts.

On the downside, modifying the more diminutive Virginia-class vessels would give the submarines a "humpback" appearance -- thanks to the insertion of a compartment for the large D-5 missiles -- and that could result in reduced capability in such areas as speed, maneuverability and stealth, the Navy has argued. "A Virginia Insert SSBN would require redesign of the Virginia and would have technical and operational shortcomings and risks," the CRS report quoted the Navy as stating in March. That leaves the Navy endorsing a new-design approach, the third option considered for the SSBN(X) in the service's analysis of alternatives, according to program experts. Though a new-design submarine involves additional cost, the Navy recently tailored back its size and speed requirements for the boat, defense leaders said this fall.

An "emphasis on affordability is already being applied to the next-generation ballistic missile submarine, where we are trimming [design] requirements without compromising critical capability," said Defense Secretary Robert Gates, appearing with Carter at a September 14 press briefing. Pentagon-watchers said this month's Milestone A meeting was likely to have resulted in a schedule for the new submarine's development and testing, as well as possible cost-reduction goals for the program. "The big problem is going to be money, because no one knows what they're going to cost," Norman Polmar, a longtime Defense Department consultant on naval issues, told Global Security Newswire yesterday. There is little debate, though, over the basic necessity of replacing today's aging submarines.

"To maintain an at-sea presence for the long-term, the United States must continue development of a follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine," stated the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review, an assessment of strategic forces and strategy completed in April. "Since the lead times associated with designing, building, testing, and deploying new submarines are particularly long, the secretary of defense has directed the Navy to begin technology development of an SSBN replacement."

In February the Navy said that "owing to the unique demands of strategic relevance, [the new submarines] must be fitted with the most up-to-date capabilities and stealth to ensure they are survivable throughout their full 40-year life span," according to the Congressional Research Service. Among the new capabilities the service is seeking in the new submarines is a nuclear fuel core that would last as long as the vessel, an improvement on the Ohio-class reactors that required midlife refueling, the October 28 CRS report states. Whether Carter and his defense buying panel have fully backed all of the Navy's requests for SSBN(X) remains unclear, but it is "almost 100 percent certain" that the Pentagon will opt for a new design, one congressional source said last week.

Critics say, though, that the Navy analysis of alternatives failed to seriously assess the prospects for viable alternatives to a new design, effectively setting up the idea of designing a boat from scratch as the only acceptable option. "That's the beauty of the Goldilocks approach, is that two options will always be unacceptable and then you land on the one you prefer anyway," Hans Kristensen, who directs the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project, said in an interview yesterday.

The recent design review was also expected to decide whether the submarine will feature 16 or 20 missile tubes, according to the Capitol Hill aide and others who asked not to be identified in discussing the sensitive matter. Each tube would be capable of launching a single D-5 ballistic missile or a future ballistic missile of up to the same size, but also might be able to fire multiple smaller weapons, according to experts. To cut costs, the Navy is believed to be pressing for 16 missile tubes in the new submarine, though that does not mean that a new-design vessel would be smaller than the Ohio-class boat, which has 24 missile tubes, according to the CRS report.

In a recent briefing, "the Navy stated that an SSBN(X) would probably be about the same size and have roughly the same displacement as an Ohio-class submarine, even though it might have only 16 or 20 missile tubes," according to the congressional report. "Over time, technological advancements tend to add weight to a submarine design (compared with the same submarine produced 30 years earlier)." In part because of technologies the Navy has long embraced to insulate the submarine's nuclear-reactor propulsion system, "there are real physical limits to how small you can make it," Kristensen said of the next ballistic missile submarine.

Polmar argued, though, that the Navy should consider using newer and smaller quieting technologies, such as "active" silencing approaches that cancel out reactor noise with other noise. Both of the analysts also said that if the Pentagon could accept a more limited patrol range for its next ballistic-missile submarine, the reactor and the overall size of the craft could be smaller. "We don't have to stay as far at sea as we did during the Cold War," Polmar said. On Capitol Hill earlier this year, lawmakers urged the Navy to consider buying a submarine smaller than the Ohio class -- such as a variant of the Virginia class -- that would be limited to launching a less-sizable missile like the Trident C-4, the weapon that the D-5 replaced.

"I think you ought to ask the engineers about a missile that might fit in the smaller submarine rather than the multibillion dollars you might have to sink into a replacement for the Ohio-class submarine," House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) told Navy Undersecretary Robert Work at a July hearing. Work responded that the Navy had considered using the C-4, but opted instead to go with the D-5, even if that effectively ruled out using a Virginia-class design. Rear Adm. Terry Benedict explained to a Capitol Hill breakfast audience the same month that retaining D-5 missile capability in the new submarine would help maintain continuity during a 13-year period between 2029 and 2042, as the Ohio-class boats gradually retire and their replacements transition into the fleet. Benedict directs the Navy Strategic Systems Planning office.

Though the decision would allow the Navy to avoid the cost and developmental risk of undertaking both a missile- and submarine-development program at the same time, it also would mean the Ohio-class replacement must be large enough to fit the D-5, which has a range of roughly 4,000 nautical miles. "At the outset, we have a predecisional notion that we're going to keep the D-5, making other [submarine] options straw men," Kristensen said. Polmar agreed that the Navy should seriously consider using the C-4 or a new-design missile that is roughly 35 feet in length, as it could still offer the service some 3,000 nautical miles in range.

Under the New START nuclear arms control agreement -- a U.S.-Russian pact currently on the Senate floor for a ratification vote -- the Pentagon anticipates capping its Trident D-5 missile force at 240. Today the fleet carries 288 deployed D-5s, armed with a total 1,152 nuclear warheads. The reduction in two vessels by the end of this decade is not, in itself, expected to affect the number of D-5 warheads fielded at that time, according to nuclear force analysts Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council. The numbers would allow for a slightly higher average warhead loading on each missile, if the Pentagon desired.
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So if D-5 is capped at 240 launchers does that mean the makeup of the Triad after New Start (700 launcher limit) will be 420 MMIII's, 240 D-5's and 40 nuclear capable bombers. Or alternatively less "nuclear" bombers with some deployed PGS systems?
 
Senate amendment to recently ratified New Start Treaty (these amendments have no affect on the treaty but express the wishes of the Senate)

Amendment 4864 was adopted “which requires the President to certify prior to entry into force of the treaty that he intends to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, namely a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM.” Future roadmaps for each of these systems currently are being considered and debated within the Department of Defense and administration.
 
So it seems the "stretched Virginia" option is out. It is interesting to see what they want to do with an Ohio-sized sub with less tubes. I don't take at face value the "weight increase" story, electronic equipment went DOWN in weight in the last twenty years and automation could well drive down the personnel requirements, SAVING weight. My guess is that they will go for a turbo-electric drive or something more exotic (MHD ?). And a complementary armament too (hypersonic mid-range boost-glide not covered by START II ?).
 
Up the thread a few posts I discussed a recent topic of a seminar at the AIAA Missile Sciences Conference that was about placing three missiles per Trident size missile tube. My speculation would be maybe only 16 missile tubes per missile but still have 24 missiles per boat. With the New Start reduction to 1550 warheads will the Navy build a smaller "submarine launched global strike missile" as described on ATK's website?

There is also talk of a "common" USAF and Navy new nuclear warhead, well could you have a common "missile" with an extra stage for the Air Force based on a single warhead platform?

My speculation is just based on budgetary realities that would probably make it more feasible to, at least from a Congressional standpoint, to "team up" as it were to develop these new systems.
 

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