A peek on future american SLBMs and ICBMs

SSBN (X) News from Defense News:

Lawmaker Wants Key Submarine Document
By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS
Published: 22 Apr 2010 20:45

A key congressman who oversees U.S. Navy programs on Capitol Hill is threatening to recommend against funding development of a new ballistic missile submarine if the service doesn't fork over its analysis of the program.

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Seapower subcommittee, complained in a letter sent April 22 to Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the Navy "refuses to share" the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the SSBN(X) program - a document that, Taylor says in the letter, was completed last year.

Rather than commit to replacing the current crop of large Ohio-class submarines armed with Trident II D5 ballistic missiles with similar ships, Taylor wants to see what a smaller, Virginia-class submarine armed with a less-lethal ballistic missile would cost. Instead, he says, the Navy already has decided it wants the bigger and more expensive ships - which some sources say could cost as much as $70 billion.

"I have repeatedly asked officials of the Department of the Navy if less-expensive alternatives to building the Ohio-class were examined," Taylor said in the letter. "I have repeatedly been told that only the Trident solution met the requirement."

The Navy's refusal to share the AoA with Congress, Taylor said, "is under the guise that final approval has not been obtained."

Yet, he pointed out, $495 million was spent last year to develop a missile compartment "that would only support a Trident II D5 weapon" - and the Navy is asking for an additional $672 million this year "to continue development of an exclusive Trident replacement vessel."

As a result, Taylor threatened to work against the Navy's SSBN(X) request unless the AoA is sent to Congress, along with an explanation for how much nuclear deterrent capability the nation needs.

Taylor asked Gates to "direct the Secretary of the Navy to deliver to me the completed AoA for this program notwithstanding any final approvals from other officials in the Department of Defense."

Additionally, Taylor said in the letter that he would ask House Armed Services Committee chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., for a "thorough investigation" of how the SSBN(X) program "apparently bypassed acquisition requirements" and already began system design and development, and ask for a full committee hearing "to determine the true national requirement for sea-based nuclear deterrence."

The letter comes as Taylor's committee is preparing its markup of the 2011 defense authorization bill, expected to take place in mid-May.
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I find this an interesting comment from a US politician who actually sits on the Armed Services Committee - Additionally, Taylor said in the letter that he would ask House Armed Services Committee chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., for a "thorough investigation" of how the SSBN(X) program "apparently bypassed acquisition requirements" and already began system design and development, and ask for a full committee hearing "to determine the true national requirement for sea-based nuclear deterrence."

We need hearings as to the requirement for sea based nuclear deterrence ??? I thought the need has been pretty clear for about 40+ years now. Unless he is talking about how many and what size, then I guess it makes sense although what he means is not really clear from his statement.

Also, I support his request to release the SSBN (X) AoA so I can read it :D
 
"Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss"

What a surprise. ::)

"smaller, Virginia-class submarine armed with a less-lethal"

What the hell is the matter with these people? Why would you want to replace what you've got with an inferior product?
 
Ya that "less lethal" comment is puzzling. Even a smaller missile with nukes is hardly less lethal to the inhabitants at ground zero. But it is also contradictory to what politicians are saying about "less lethal". Does he mean conventional, well I thought conventional SLBM's were too dangerous because they would spark a nuclear war due to their similar flight profile to a nuke armed SLBM. Does he mean "less lethal" nukes? As in smaller yield weapons? Well the Congress had stopped all research and development on so-called mini or micro nukes as well as the RNEP (robust nuclear earth penetrator) and the ACI (advanced concept [nuclear weapon] initiative). Confusing statements indeed.
 
Is this the hand of Obama we see here?

It does'nt make sense!
 
The steel comment was referring to the specific STS SRB casings that were forged back then. Even the forge doesn't exist anymore.

Tactical missiles have less delta vee requirements so don't benefit as much from a better mass ratio. Composites are good for low mass high strength. So high pressure where steel would become heavier.
Directional loading too here, IIRC. The filament wound SRB:s used from Vandenbergh would have been lighter. But that case ended anyway. The recent EELV smallish solids use composite cases, the Castors, I assume also Peacekeeper etc.
 
mz said:
The steel comment was referring to the specific STS SRB casings that were forged back then. Even the forge doesn't exist anymore.

Tactical missiles have less delta vee requirements so don't benefit as much from a better mass ratio. Composites are good for low mass high strength. So high pressure where steel would become heavier.
Directional loading too here, IIRC. The filament wound SRB:s used from Vandenbergh would have been lighter. But that case ended anyway. The recent EELV smallish solids use composite cases, the Castors, I assume also Peacekeeper etc.

Agreed. My only disagreement is was with the notion that propellant composition dictates case material which is demonstrably not true. Peackeeper used a CFRP casing as do the Castors. D-5 uses Kevlar (not sure why off the top of my head). If I had to hazard a guess I'd say the reason tactical missile casings are steel (4130) is that it's more damage tolerant (think handling).
 
mz said:
The steel comment was referring to the specific STS SRB casings that were forged back then. Even the forge doesn't exist anymore.

Tactical missiles have less delta vee requirements so don't benefit as much from a better mass ratio. Composites are good for low mass high strength. So high pressure where steel would become heavier.
Directional loading too here, IIRC. The filament wound SRB:s used from Vandenbergh would have been lighter. But that case ended anyway. The recent EELV smallish solids use composite cases, the Castors, I assume also Peacekeeper etc.

Shuttle ASRM was to use filament wound (different project than FWC SRM) and the SRMU for Titan was compostie.
 
Byeman said:
mz said:
The steel comment was referring to the specific STS SRB casings that were forged back then. Even the forge doesn't exist anymore.

Tactical missiles have less delta vee requirements so don't benefit as much from a better mass ratio. Composites are good for low mass high strength. So high pressure where steel would become heavier.
Directional loading too here, IIRC. The filament wound SRB:s used from Vandenbergh would have been lighter. But that case ended anyway. The recent EELV smallish solids use composite cases, the Castors, I assume also Peacekeeper etc.

Shuttle ASRM was to use filament wound (different project than FWC SRM) and the SRMU for Titan was compostie.

Saw Titan segments at ATK in Clearfield, UT where they also wind (or wound) Castors and Trident casings. Well, they did back in the early 90's when I visited them anyway. The guy doing the tour mentioned how they moved the Titan casing segments on air-pallets (like an air-hockey puck) and a guy crashed one, scratching it, and instantly turning it to scrap.
 
Orionblamblam said:
Maybe these warheads retain the thermonuclear warheads, but the yields are set to "stun."
They aren't talking about "clean" hydrogen bombs again, are they? I bet the pro-MAD group wouldn't be keen on making nukes more "green".
 
Orionblamblam - Normally thermonuclear weapons are set to SUN :D

Hammer - because all physics is not known I disparately hope the US has a rigorous and vigorous nuclear weapon R&D program because if, and it is a big if, pure fusion weapons are possible the US better get there first. The US must remain world leader in all things nuclear.
 
sferrin - Do you know what is the largest diameter filament wound rocket casing body is? Just curious.
 
My dime of worth, hopefully. The composition of the propellant of a solid motor does effect the noozle material. The Polaris A-3 didn't reach the target range because the intended propellant formulation produced gases too hot for the noozle to handle. So they had to fall back on another, less perfomant, formulation. There was an interesting article on AW&ST in 1962 (or 63 ?) on this.
 
bobbymike said:
Orionblamblam - Normally thermonuclear weapons are set to SUN :D

Hammer - because all physics is not known I disparately hope the US has a rigorous and vigorous nuclear weapon R&D program because if, and it is a big if, pure fusion weapons are possible the US better get there first. The US must remain world leader in all things nuclear.
Oh I agree that research into clean nukes should be taken, especially considering the possible civilian uses. I just speculated that those who want the nuclear deterrent to be as, well, deterring as possible, wouldn't want nukes that would be more "easier" to use.

Then again, there are tactical nukes, including neutron warheads which more or less is a variation of the "clean" hydrogen bomb, and AFAIK they have been pretty deterring as well.
 
Skybolt said:
My dime of worth, hopefully. The composition of the propellant of a solid motor does effect the noozle material.

While that may be true, it's the case material that was in question. The case stays relatively cool due to insulation.
 
bobbymike said:
sferrin - Do you know what is the largest diameter filament wound rocket casing body is? Just curious.

Shuttle FWC SRM but only tested and not flown. Titan IV SRMU has flown
 
News on the SSBN (X). In the run up to the New START Treaty this NEW program was introduced seemingly out of the blue. Now a couple months later and Gates is ready to cancel the program, WHAT ??? From Global Security Newswire:


Gates to Signal Concerns on New Ballistic Missile Subs
Friday, April 30, 2010

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a speech next week, is expected to address concerns with moving ahead with a costly plan for construction of new ballistic missile submarines, Politico reported (see GSN, March 17, 2009).

The subtext to the address at the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo could be taken as his intention to eliminate the program if the decision is not made earlier in the lower tiers of the Pentagon.

Work on the vessels is expected to begin in next the fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1. Each would cost $7 billion and they would begin entering service in 2027, succeeding today's Ohio-class submarines.

However, Gates also plans to highlight international relations, the worldwide financial situation and other issues that could require renewed consideration of Navy plans, according to Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell.

The defense secretary has previously expressed concerns about the submarine program.

“When that program really begins to ramp up, in the latter part of this decade, it will suck all the air out of the Navy's shipbuilding program,” Gates told a House panel last month. “And so some tough choices are going to have to be made, either in terms of more investment or choices between the size of surface fleets you want and the submarine fleets.”

A move against the project could run afoul of the senior ranks of the Navy and of lawmakers, particularly those elected from areas that would be involved in the production effort.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus noted the expense of the project but said the service is trying to balance that spending plan with budgets for later shipbuilding efforts.

The Obama administration's recently released Nuclear Posture Review supports keeping part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at sea, noted Representative Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), whose district encompasses a production site for Virginia-class submarines.

“It would be illogical to say that the program should be eliminated or scaled back,” he said. “The solution obviously is to figure out a way to increase the shipbuilding budget or put funding for that program in its own national security account" (Jen DiMascio, Politico, April 29).
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Maybe it is time for a National Deterrent Agency with its own budget for all things nuclear from warheads to SSBN's to ICBM's to guidance to re-entry vehicles. It was done this way with the Missile Defense Agency because of the uniqueness of the mission, well arguably the nuclear mission is about as unique a mission as there is.
 
Maybe it is time for a National Deterrent Agency with its own budget for all things nuclear from warheads to SSBN's to ICBM's to guidance to re-entry vehicles. It was done this way with the Missile Defense Agency because of the uniqueness of the mission, well arguably the nuclear mission is about as unique a mission as there is.
Sounds like a good idea to me.
 
Link to Air Force Space Command's "High Frontier" magazine issue with articles almost exclusively about ICBMs.

www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-060912-044.pdf
 
Air Force Weighing PGS Options As Part Of ICBM Follow-On Strategy
______________________________________________

Date: June 11, 2010

The proposed development of a future prompt global strike weapon will factor into the Air Force’s work on a follow-on strategy for its arsenal of land-based ballistic weapons, according to the outgoing chief of the service’s nuclear directorate.

Development of a land-based PGS weapon or conventionally-armed intercontinental ballistic missile would have to be part of any discussion concerning the future of the air service’s Minuteman III ICBM, Maj. Gen. Don Alston, outgoing assistant chief of staff of the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration shop (A10) said.

“I think that would be all part of it, but I do not think we have gone far enough down the road” on the Minuteman III future roadmap, Alston told reporters during a June 2 briefing at the Pentagon.

Mandated by the Defense Department’s new Nuclear Posture Review, ongoing evaluations of the Minuteman III ICBM will focus on weapon viability beyond 2030, and potential future basing options in the continental United States.
 
Just picked up a used copy of "Politics and Force Levels" and it is like reading about a time that never existed. How may Minutemen missiles do we want 1000, 2000, 3000? Plus 275 Titan II's, hundreds of B-52s and 48 Boomers, incredible.

It is quite depressing to read my previous post that basically says "It will be 2030 before we get a new ICBM". I am wondering how we preserve our solid rocket, guidance, re-entry vehicle, etc. industrial base? I know this has been discussed but it is disconcerting.
 
GTX said:
bobbymike said:
It is quite depressing to read my previous post that basically says "It will be 2030 before we get a new ICBM". I am wondering how we preserve our solid rocket, guidance, re-entry vehicle, etc. industrial base? I know this has been discussed but it is disconcerting.

I find it quite depressing that it is even being considered.

Greg

Yeah, ICBMs don't mix well with lollipops and unicorns do they? ::)
 
Please remind me what the benefits of having ICBM's are, except for allowing a triad if you also have SLBM's and bombers. I'm pretty certain someone here has already explained it to me, but I've forgotten.

BTW, while it's OT I find it connected to the discussion: when will the B-52 be put to rest? Wouldn't the retirement of it allow the purchase of new weapons (may it be new ICBM's, more B-2 Spirits or the F-22)?

???
 
sferrin said:
GTX said:
bobbymike said:
It is quite depressing to read my previous post that basically says "It will be 2030 before we get a new ICBM". I am wondering how we preserve our solid rocket, guidance, re-entry vehicle, etc. industrial base? I know this has been discussed but it is disconcerting.

I find it quite depressing that it is even being considered.

Greg

Yeah, ICBMs don't mix well with lollipops and unicorns do they? ::)
It's hard to convince people in general that threats unknown to us today will arise that will make weapons development needed. Sure, you can tell them about North Korea and Iran, but then the sceptics will argue that current weapons will work against those countries for decades ahead. Those countries that might be able to develop new weapons that could compete with NATO- and ANZUS-technology, China and Russia, aren't seen as (immediate) threats, and if you say you do see them as (possible) threats, you are then seen as Sino- and Russophobic.

It's a bit like trying to convince people why we need to develop new types of nuclear reactors... or why we need to build lunar bases and land on Mars. I tried to convince one of my friends that any problem with the environment should be solved with new technology, for example 4th generation nuclear powerplants, but he's convinced that the solution is people living in low-energy, low-tech, self-sufficient collectives (but he still use computers and play video games...).
 
Hammer Birchgrove said:
Please remind me what the benefits of having ICBM's are, except for allowing a triad if you also have SLBM's and bombers. I'm pretty certain someone here has already explained it to me, but I've forgotten.

The benefits of ICBMs? Well you can deliver a nuke pretty much anywhere you want in a short period of time and accurately and everybody knows it. Of course some might wonder why that would be useful but I doubt explaining it to them would make any difference. Some might argue that SLBMs would work just as well but there's the whole "don't put all your eggs in one basket" problem there. And no I won't explain that to those who don't know what that means.
 
sferrin said:
Hammer Birchgrove said:
Please remind me what the benefits of having ICBM's are, except for allowing a triad if you also have SLBM's and bombers. I'm pretty certain someone here has already explained it to me, but I've forgotten.

The benefits of ICBMs? Well you can deliver a nuke pretty much anywhere you want in a short period of time and accurately and everybody knows it. Of course some might wonder why that would be useful but I doubt explaining it to them would make any difference. Some might argue that SLBMs would work just as well but there's the whole "don't put all your eggs in one basket" problem there. And no I won't explain that to those who don't know what that means.
Very well.
 
Hammer Birchgrove said:
sferrin said:
Hammer Birchgrove said:
Please remind me what the benefits of having ICBM's are, except for allowing a triad if you also have SLBM's and bombers. I'm pretty certain someone here has already explained it to me, but I've forgotten.

The benefits of ICBMs? Well you can deliver a nuke pretty much anywhere you want in a short period of time and accurately and everybody knows it. Of course some might wonder why that would be useful but I doubt explaining it to them would make any difference. Some might argue that SLBMs would work just as well but there's the whole "don't put all your eggs in one basket" problem there. And no I won't explain that to those who don't know what that means.
Very well.

Just to clarify, when I say "everybody knows it" I mean other countries, not necessarily your average Joe. As a deterrent, ICBMs are tough to beat.
 
sferrin is correct the ICBM has a unique place in the Triad due to its accuracy and responsiveness. Bombers take too long to get to the target and subs are more difficult to communicate with (responsiveness we all saw what happened in Crimson Tide ;D) Yet having all three gives the President a host of options.

My concern has been how do we sustain the industrial base for all things nuclear when it appears we won't be fielding new systems for the foreseeable future.
 
Some missile news from the Air Force Association

Ballistic, Yes, Non-Ballistic, No: Conventionally armed ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles will fall under the counting rules for launchers under the New START Treaty with Russia, James Miller, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Wednesday. However, since the US has already concluded they "should be limited to a niche capability," the US will still be able to retain "a robust nuclear triad" even with conventional missiles counting toward the treaty's limits, he said. The Obama Administration submitted the treaty to the Senate in May for ratification. New START would allow the US and Russia each up to 800 nuclear launchers (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers), 700 of which may be deployed. Miller said DOD is also exploring conventionally-armed, long-range systems not associated with ICBMs or SLBMs that fly non-ballistic trajectories, such as boost-glide systems. He said the US would not consider such systems to be accountable under the treaty.

Air Force Stages Minuteman Test Launch: The Air Force on Wednesday conducted a Minuteman III ICBM flight test from Vandenberg AFB, Calif., over the Pacific Ocean. According to officials with Vandenberg’s 30th Space Wing, the missile's single unarmed re-entry test vehicle traveled approximately 4,190 miles before hitting its pre-determined impact point near the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This flight test was one of several that the Air Force holds annually to ensure the readiness and reliability of the Minuteman III fleet. This mission was also the first flight test for the 576th Flight Test Squadron since its realignment under Air Force Global Strike Command late last year. "Our team is dedicated to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective combat-ready ICBM force," said Col. Carl DeKemper, the 576th FLTS commander.
 
Well, if every boost-glide vehicle doesn't compute like a ballistic weapon, then EVERY MaRV with a decently long gliding path is a non-ballistic weapon (BTW, where is the boundary ?). Consequently, just arm an ICBM with a gliding MaRV, and voilà, it doesn't compute anymore. Interesting interpretation. Does this apply to the Topol-M MaRV warhead, too ? And what about an hypothetical two-stage boost-glide vehicle, with a terminal warhead with a high-G evading capability ? Seems to me more an attempt from the Obama supporters side to persuade the Senate to ratify quickly. If nevertheless this interpretation is pursued, it is almost too good to be true (and I doubt the Russians would agree). For one, the only limit in offensive weapons would be in deployed warheads, which are enormously more difficult to verify then launchers and vehicles. So, build, say, 5000 ICBM (ooops, booster), arm them with boost-glide conventional vehicles. Perfectly legal under the treaty. Then, in crisis, substitute the warheads with ballistic nuclear ones held in reserve.
 
Skybolt - I agree or what I thought about was that they define or redefine boost glide or non ballistic and make it very difficult to turn into a weapon that would NOT be counted by the treaty. Methinks they are telling the Senate what they want to hear to get ratification. Although I hope it will open the Air Force and Navy to start to develop new non ballistic weapons (wishful thinking I know)
 
The problem is that we are talking about a treaty (or so it is defined, which I doubt it is). In the old SALT and START and SORT agreements over two thirds of the text was devoted to definitions, complete with examples of real life weapons. If the interpretation put out above is not in the treaty, or what it is, or is contradicted by a definition included in the treaty, what Obamites say to the Senate is inmaterial, either for the Senate, the Russians and the whole future weapon development. If the so-called treaty has no strict definitions in it, I expect troubles in the Senate. The Topol-M MaRV is just an example of what can excape it.
 
From Inside Defense -

Donley: Air Force Not Ready To Develop 'Minuteman IV' Follow-On ICBM

DefenseAlert, June 23, 2010 -- Despite an ongoing Defense Department review of potential follow-on options for the Air Force's premiere intercontinental ballistic missile program, development of a new ICBM system will not be one of those options, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said today.
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No Ares no new ICBM might as well kiss the solid rocket industrial base good-bye along with RV and guidance technologies. How can you possibly maintain core scientific competency without researching and developing new systems.
 
bobbymike said:
From Inside Defense -

Donley: Air Force Not Ready To Develop 'Minuteman IV' Follow-On ICBM

DefenseAlert, June 23, 2010 -- Despite an ongoing Defense Department review of potential follow-on options for the Air Force's premiere intercontinental ballistic missile program, development of a new ICBM system will not be one of those options, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said today.
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No Ares no new ICBM might as well kiss the solid rocket industrial base good-bye along with RV and guidance technologies. How can you possibly maintain core scientific competency without researching and developing new systems.

No surprise there with this administration. It's all about the cheap vote and to hell with the consequences.
 
While not a fan of this administration, I'd point out that could only be a matter of language, considered what the administration is saying in Senate regarding START II: if ICBM is meant to mean a missile system with a purely ballistic re-entry vehicle, saying a follow-on not being an "ICBM" could simply mean that it could well be a boost-glide weapon, that will always need a booster.... and anyway, this administration will pass in two years, considering the development time for an ICBM system, there is plenty of time to reset things.
 
Skybolt said:
While not a fan of this administration, I'd point out that could only be a matter of language, considered what the administration is saying in Senate regarding START II: if ICBM is meant to mean a missile system with a purely ballistic re-entry vehicle, saying a follow-on not being an "ICBM" could simply mean that it could well be a boost-glide weapon, that will always need a booster.... and anyway, this administration will pass in two years, considering the development time for an ICBM system, there is plenty of time to reset things.

"Plenty of time"? ATK has already laid off thousands and is looking to ditch more.
 
Sen Thune asked whether there was enough funding in the ten year 80 billion dollar "nuclear deterrence" (my words) budget for a new ICBM. Answer from Donnelly, "There was", well of course if you're not going to build one you have enough funding.

Skybolt - While I like to be as optimistic as possible I really am afraid we will lose core scientific and technical competencies to build these very complex systems. IMHO a good example Russia/Bulava.
 
bobbymike said:
Sen Thune asked whether there was enough funding in the ten year 80 billion dollar "nuclear deterrence" (my words) budget for a new ICBM. Answer from Donnelly, "There was", well of course if you're not going to build one you have enough funding.

Skybolt - While I like to be as optimistic as possible I really am afraid we will lose core scientific and technical competencies to build these very complex systems. IMHO a good example Russia/Bulava.

Seems to me more than a few think ICBMs just grow on trees. All you have to do is say "I want one" and it'll appear. It's going to be a shocker of monumental proportions when they finally decide they want one and discover they have to reconstitute an entire industry to do it. We'll be seeing headlines of "$billion ICBMs" and people will stupidly wonder why.
 
And just in time to further depress me, from Insidedefense.com

DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT SKILL LOSS SEEN AS TOP THREAT TO INDUSTRIAL BASE

The continued atrophying of design and development skills within the aviation industrial base, prompted by the declining number of big-ticket defense procurement programs, poses the greatest risk to the continued viability of military aircraft production, according to a recent Pentagon report.
 
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