Worth remembering that in the early 1960s the F-4 would have struggled to compete against contemporary fighters such as the Lightning or Mirage III. No gun, no maneuvering slats, unreliable missiles, and smoky J79s which made it visible for miles...

What the early Phantom DID offer was a very good bomber interceptor that could also act as a bomb truck when needed. But hardly the "best" in any absolute way... in fact in the multirole air/ground interdiction role the outstanding fighter of the decade was probably the Mirage III, which Israel used during the Six Day War to achieve extremely high sortie rates and dominate both in the sky and destroy ground targets with ease.

In the late 60s the Phantom design branched off into 2 excellent fighters: the Doppler-equipped F-4J (from 1967) and gun-equipped F-4E (from 1968 - but especially from 1972 once it was properly equipped with maneuvering slats and smokeless J79s). However you couldn't get both... you had to choose either the Doppler radar or the internal gun. And before 1967/68 without either one of those, you probably wouldn't want to go up against other fighters in a fair fight (i.e. equal training and numbers).

The F4B/C Phantom did offer good combat persistence, with more fuel than the Mirage IIIC and Lightning F2 (small belly tank) and 8 missiles compared to 1 or 2. It was also powerful, not as much as F2 but more than the IIIC.

The F4B/C Phantom's big advantage over the contemporaries is the battery of Sparrows, which might decide the engagement head on at a dozen miles. Once inside that initial barrage the contest becomes much more even, indeed it might even swing to the Lightning F2 or Mirage IIIC favour given they have guns.
 
The F4B/C Phantom's big advantage over the contemporaries is the battery of Sparrows, which might decide the engagement head on at a dozen miles.
I'm not aware of many head-on Sparrow kills in Vietnam (aside from the first 2 F-4B kills in 1965, which were launched within visual range due to uncertain ID).

AFAIK it was quite hard to get into the right tactical position and achieve the correct parameters for a head-on shot against other fighters. Especially true for F-4s escorting strike packages - they'd often get jumped from unexpected directions.
 
I'm not aware of many head-on Sparrow kills in Vietnam (aside from the first 2 F-4B kills in 1965, which were launched within visual range due to uncertain ID).

AFAIK it was quite hard to get into the right tactical position and achieve the correct parameters for a head-on shot against other fighters. Especially true for F-4s escorting strike packages - they'd often get jumped from unexpected directions.

In a generic fighter v fighter engagement F4B/C Phantoms would at least have the chance to take Sparrow shots head-on during the merge. Maybe a Mirage IIIC could take a head-on shot with an R530, but the Lightning F2 has no such opportunity and would just have to see if the Phantoms were able to engage and if the shots were successful. Maybe the Sparrow barrage would get a kill 1 in 10 BVR merges, but I wouldn't want to be that 10th pilot.
 
Maybe the Sparrow barrage would get a kill 1 in 10 BVR merges, but I wouldn't want to be that 10th pilot.
Based on Vietnam experience the odds appear to have been considerably less than 1 in 10 for head on engagements. And that's against Mig 17s and Mig 21s with uneven pilot training and without any chaff countermeasures...

The other problem with that argument is that you could easily flip it around and say the same for the other 9 in 10 merges. i.e. I wouldn't want to be those 9 Phantom pilots who have to maneuver against a well flown Mig 21 or Mirage III in a close-in dogfight. Or those 1 or 2 Phantom pilots who are jumped from behind because those smoky J79s allowed the enemy to get "eyes on" first! ;)
 
Based on Vietnam experience the odds appear to have been considerably less than 1 in 10 for head on engagements. And that's against Mig 17s and Mig 21s with uneven pilot training and without any chaff countermeasures...

The other problem with that argument is that you could easily flip it around and say the same for the other 9 in 10 merges. i.e. I wouldn't want to be those 9 Phantom pilots who have to maneuver against a well flown Mig 21 or Mirage III in a close-in dogfight. Or those 1 or 2 Phantom pilots who are jumped from behind because those smoky J79s allowed the enemy to get "eyes on" first! ;)

IIUC it was very difficult to use the Sparrow's head-on, BVR capability in Vietnam due to the RoE that required visual ID, remove that restriction and Phantoms can lob Sparrows based on their radar contact.

I'm not expecting miracles from the Sparrow in terms of kills, but at the very least a Sparrow barrage fired during the merge will require the opposing fighters to react, to manoeuvre to evade the Sparrow. If this is the case, where does it leave the opposing fighters once the Sparrows are evaded? Are they out of position and down on energy compared to the Phantoms, or ready to dance?
 
I think getting a Phantom analogue would have to start with an irrational decision like retaining the M52 despite arguments against it,
Some would argue that the irrational decision was Ben Lockspeiser's decision to cancel.

IMHO the Phantom analogue is a CTOL, twin-Spey version of the P.1154. If the VTOL craze hadn't happened, that's arguably what the Royal Navy would have got. If you get that, you can justify pushing Radar Red Top to completion as you have enough room in the nose that it isn't as difficult to add CW illumination to AIRPASS.
 
IMHO the Phantom analogue is a CTOL, twin-Spey version of the P.1154.
In other words, for HSA to have run a 'back up' design process for STOL/CTOL and navalised platform, like they later did over the 'Harrier' at Brough (Blackburn). Which led to very attractive designs for the job.

Then when NMBR.3 turns into a farce (HSA joint winners with Dassault) and tactical nukes get constrained to airfields for security's sake. Which kills the supersonic V/STOL platform.
HMG have an option to ditch P.1154 (which they otherwise stuck to in hopes of NATO orders/exports), but keep a domestic program going that might attract orders.
HSA switch over seamlessly and we get an F4 analogue.
 
In other words, for HSA to have run a 'back up' design process for STOL/CTOL and navalised platform, like they later did over the 'Harrier' at Brough (Blackburn). Which led to very attractive designs for the job.

Then when NMBR.3 turns into a farce (HSA joint winners with Dassault) and tactical nukes get constrained to airfields for security's sake. Which kills the supersonic V/STOL platform.
HMG have an option to ditch P.1154 (which they otherwise stuck to in hopes of NATO orders/exports), but keep a domestic program going that might attract orders.
HSA switch over seamlessly and we get an F4 analogue.

The timing of that process means such an aircraft enters service in the late 60s or early 70s, much like the P1154, making it too late to be an F4 analogue.

It's the timing that makes the F4 so special, 'Gen 3' capabilities in the 'Gen 2' era.
 
The timing of that process means such an aircraft enters service in the late 60s or early 70s, much like the P1154, making it too late to be an F4 analogue.

It's the timing that makes the F4 so special, 'Gen 3' capabilities in the 'Gen 2' era.
The timing can make it by the same period as F4K deliveries.

Though obviously not going V/STOL NMBR.3 would help.
 
The timing can make it by the same period as F4K deliveries.

Sure, but every year that passes from 1962 the Phantom becomes less special. By the time the F4K was delivered the 'special' plane was the F111, undertaking early combat operations and deck trials. Granted the B was cancelled and the A/C were troubled, but in terms of emerging capability in 1968 they far exceeded the Phantom.
 
Buy Sparrows until you get the SARH missiles developed.
I have grown a tendency to agree with such an analogy tomo pauk.
Just as I've come to appreciate that Britain loss of the export market of itd weaponry to the insatiable geopolitical and economic power of the U.S. Post-WW2. Makes me think that Britain psychologically couldnt/didn't/hasn't come to terms that it's statis as a global power was/is no more.
So, perhaps if Britain decided to concentrate on:
- airframes and engines, whilst incorporating foreign radar and missiles.
- or radar and missile incorporated into a foreign airframe/engines.

Although, in truth, I personally support the notion of the airframe and engine focus, complementing one another in both military and civilian aircraft manufacturing......

Someone mentioned earlier in this thread the Sweds ability to seemingly focus on airframes initial to derive some very capable combat aircraft, which backboned on foreign engines/radar/weapons.......

One would hope that Britain might have made a Phantom II-like design far more aerodynamic efficient than the F-4 Phantom II [nicknamed 'the flying brick' for good reason] so as to give it better, more efficiency/performance and hence a potentially better export edge over the F-4 Phantom II.

Regards
Pioneer
 
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So, perhaps if Britain decided to concentrate on:
[...]
The problem with this is that with the F-4 and with TSR2 you're looking at the "weapons system" concept of construction, not the "airframe" or "airframe+engine" concepts with whatever radar and weapons HMGovernment cares to give them.

With a "weapons system" design, you need to have a good enough radar plus good enough weapons plus good enough airframe plus good enough engines. All of them, designed together in toto.
 
Sure, but every year that passes from 1962 the Phantom becomes less special. By the time the F4K was delivered the 'special' plane was the F111, undertaking early combat operations and deck trials. Granted the B was cancelled and the A/C were troubled, but in terms of emerging capability in 1968 they far exceeded the Phantom.
We've gone round and round this one now.
Within the gamut of options domestically, this boils down to Lightning and Scimitar developments.
Of these it's the 'failures' in the process that led from twin engined day fighter to Scimitar to cancelled Type 556 to never ordered Type 576 by Vickers Supermarine, that held the only path to near F4 capability in a similar timescale.

If Vickers had taken Supermarine's design team in hand more firmly, and much earlier. Inorporated it fully into their main office. Then maybe the mid-50's to late 50's might have resulted in the desired outcome.

This would eat up the Buccaneer role, the Sea Vixen and later production Javelin. 'Interim' tactical nuclear strike until Jaguar....if Jaguar even happens under such a scenario.
 
We've gone round and round this one now.
Within the gamut of options domestically, this boils down to Lightning and Scimitar developments.
Of these it's the 'failures' in the process that led from twin engined day fighter to Scimitar to cancelled Type 556 to never ordered Type 576 by Vickers Supermarine, that held the only path to near F4 capability in a similar timescale.

If Vickers had taken Supermarine's design team in hand more firmly, and much earlier. Inorporated it fully into their main office. Then maybe the mid-50's to late 50's might have resulted in the desired outcome.

This would eat up the Buccaneer role, the Sea Vixen and later production Javelin. 'Interim' tactical nuclear strike until Jaguar....if Jaguar even happens under such a scenario.

Yeah, Britain just isn't going to initiate a program that will produce a Phantom analogue in the requisite timeframe without a major departure from history.

Perhaps its useful to look at what analogues the British did develop or almost develop: F106, A6, F111, C133. Or what successful aircraft the British developed that didn't spawn US analogues like the Canberra, Harrier and Hawk. A lack of a Phantom analogue doesn't seem like that great a loss with those aircraft.
 
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