Getting a British Phantom

[alertken]

This is the forum's most stimulating thread. No-one can say "I knew that" to every post.

M.52: PM 15/1/45 limited Munitions work to that capable of “substantial opnl. status by Autumn,'46” W.Brown/D.Bancroft, M.52-Gateway to Supersonic Flight,Spellmount,12,P85, so much was canx, more after 26/7/45 by new Ministers bereft of Lend/Lease $. Red revisionist historians trace Stalin's paranoia of encirclement, so the Cold War, to US failure to stop production of weapons of no evident purpose than to reach from Alaska deep into Mother Russia - AW, B-36, B-29D/B-50, more.

PM's Directive overlapped retirement as CE/MAP of ACM W.Freeman, replacement by an Administrator, E.Plowden (as in 1965 Report), disposed more to saving £ than to spendiing for vague reward, so distant payoff Research was for the chop. MAP Dir.Scientific Res. (Air) was Ben Lockspeiser, who after MAP RS Cripps Works visit to Woodley, 9/43 had been told to find an outlet for Miles' “enterprising designs (solving) fantastic problems” D.Wood,Project Cancelled,P29: So 2/46 chop must harm neither his reputation (now a DG and Knight of the Realm), nor that of BoTrade Pres. RS Cripps, nor that of Miles, building Brabazon Type 5A Marathon.. So: pilot safety.

We had no enemy. We had no money.

 

[Hood]

If the American industry was like the British, then they tended to view the RAE with suspicion in certain matters (indeed it was the RAE who forced the Bristol Type 188's configuration and they considered this to be the only practical layout for a Mach 2+ interceptor.... despite the entreaties of the industry).

Quoting myself to add that, I don't know enough about how much input NACA had into USAF requirements and the selection process - but in the UK the Ministry of Supply/Ministry of Aviation handled all the technical evaluations, subbing out some of that work out to the Royal Aeronautical Establishment - who of course had ample opportunity to interject with their thoughts and biases in their assessments. Generally the RAE/MoS always added to weight estimates and subtracted from performance figures. They were perhaps right to be pessimists while the aircraft designers were ever optimists. The end results tended to balance themselves out, but if the RAE and a designer both backed a cludge of a design then things could go downhill fast.

 

[red admiral]

They were perhaps right to be pessimists while the aircraft designers were ever optimists. The end results tended to balance themselves out, but if the RAE and a designer both backed a cludge of a design then things could go downhill fast.

I'm not really sure it's true to say it balanced out. From some of the later studies done then say for mass estimation then the Industry estimates were generally out by about 20% on average, which has significant impacts on performance.

There was even more uncertainty in transonic and supersonic aerodynamics and aerostructures (e.g. flutter). Lot's of RAE's work was on the methods side - it was much easier (possible) to develop and use analytical methods for simple geometries e.g. Delta Wing or Straight Wing than for more niche examples like the notched delta on Lightning with varying LE sweep.

We also shouldn't forget the work done on propulsion by NGTE.

It was a very different time to today.

We shouldn't forget that super priority on both Swift and Hunter from the UK's leading fighter developers gave us two duffers to begin with! At least these could be fixed (to an extent).

 

[Rule of cool]

This is the forum's most stimulating thread. No-one can say "I knew that" to every post.

100%. These threads tease out the why of things, which I find fascinating.

 

[Scott Kenny]

100%. These threads tease out the why of things, which I find fascinating.

Agreed, I love these threads!

[...], but if the RAE and a designer both backed a cludge of a design then things could go downhill fast.

And that's kinda the problem, yall did that with Lightning and the Naval fighters!

 

[alertken]

Taking 1945-50 as UK Aero's locust years (but watch this space), we must look at a UK experiment, 1945-2008: the Scientific Civil Service (SCS).

In Defence Pure or Basic Research was done in SCS Research Establishments run by graduate Scientists (Theory, collar and tie) assisted by Engineer Officers (ex-craft Apprentices, greasy paws) and Experimental Officers (grease to the armpits) (see ZT #278). RN had its own Scientific Service, which collapsed in scandal over controlled torpedoes (Hood here has them as the most challenging Defence kit). MoS handled Aero in RAE et al, now dismantled, some competence 2/7/01 into QQ/Boscombe Down, some (largely NBC) into DSTL, State-owned. All that was because Reviews identified a silo culture remote from...greasy paws reality.

That was not an Aero-peculiar issue: see Issigonis' Mini in the Design Museum as a gamechanger, where the placard does not tell you that its lube points were inaccessible to the User, but must be accessed at 1,000mile intervals. Govt. Scientists similarly did not demean themselves with time, money, greasy matters.

So, MoA/DGSR(A) Aircraft Research budget (1963 £25Mn. in total Defence £1,750Mn) was to industry support to Intramural exercises, so included the one-offs ZT#266, where he makes the point that good things did come from them, invisibly and despite lethargic time management causing them to have little input to operational types.

Can anyone comment on current UK MoD Integrated (=interdisciplinary) Project Mangt Teams: is silo-worship dead?

 

[red admiral]

Can anyone comment on current UK MoD Integrated (=interdisciplinary) Project Mangt Teams: is silo-worship dead?

Nowadays then Basic research is massively scaled back to near zero on the military side. Both Basic and Applied research mostly moves to be state funded but delivered by Industry, who also kept the IP with a view to exploiting this into products. In practice this means that air research simply doesn't get exploited as BAES is a monopoly supplier for product, and the different companies doing the research don't share / sell on the IP. Even for research funded within BAES then almost nothing is exploited because new technology= risk = bad. And there's very few new products because they are so expensive, and the reduced number leads to reducing risk etc. etc.

There's still plenty of silos, even within the same company. This seems to just be a function of Basic Research being Basic Research. If clearer and quicker exploitation is desired then increase Applied Research funding in exchange for less Basic Research. Probably worse in the long term - or just accept reduced technology advantage and more exploitation across from the civil air sector.

we must look at a UK experiment, 1945-2008: the Scientific Civil Service (SCS).

This has been far from a UK only experiment. The equivalent scientific civil servants and state owned infrastructure is still going strong in USA, France, Germany, Netherlands etc. The UK is the outlier in stopping this.

 

[alertken]

1945-50 as UK Aero's Locust Years: So: the proposition is that UK missed the bus of marginally supersonic combat types (“Century Series”) by not continuing military R&D between VJ Day and the cascade of military effort 7/50, Korea and dollops of $: e.g: Swift/Hunter far behind Sabre.

Well, no enemy so no urge to spend. Leckies like Cossor - who had done the Chain Home radars - were put by Govt to $-earning on consumer radio brown goods. Until 14/4/48.

Prescient, maybe, of Berlin Blockade 23/6/48 ForSec Bevin uttered a Cabinet Memo 3/3/48:The Threat To Western Civilisation: devastating, convincing Cabinet Lefties. Chiefs, 14/4/48 were Tasked to stop Sov armour on the Hannover autobahn. We needed US warmware in Bavaria, but Truman was bound to lose 2/11/48. So Sir W.Penney acquired resources to copy Fat Man and R&D was funded on 5 platforms (Yes, 5: 3 would be deployed, Short Sperrin and AW.52, not).

But HST won 2/11/48. Vandenberg Res'n 11/6/48 to “seek US & free world security” led 4/4/49 to Washington Treaty founding NATO, Congress lifting Defense FY49 by 30%, funding US Mutual Defense Assistance Prog (6/10/49-10/10/51, then MSP): PM leapt in to seek loan B-47A/Mark 5, offered 1/11/49 after Joe One Test, but that “was not to be (due to 1/50 arrest of Fuchs in AWRE. US/UK talks) returned (to) a deep freezer”. K.Harris, Attlee, P290; AJ Pierre, Nuclear Politics, OUP, 72, P133. We settled for 72 B-29/iron and built AWA Abe Lincolns - 5/4/51.

AH PoD 1:Would PM Attlee-with-B-47 not order 25 Valiant, 9/2/51? Would he reassign the actual V-Bomber/Bomb resources elsewhere in Defence, such as to plug various holes, inc RN, discussed in SPF?

AH PoD 2.ChurchillPM 10/51tried again to extract AW Articles from HST. Failed. Orders some V-Bombers but defers funding ROF to build Blue Danube till trying with Pres-Elect Ike, good mate,11/52. Fails, funds BD production. His man at MoS, son-in-law Sandys, tried for MSP $ for Vulcan/Victor. Fails (though we had 50% for 104 Valiants). If...
Ike had invented Loan Bombs Project E, 11/52, so UK exited kT, so MT warhead production, would those resources have been assigned to (the thrust of this thread -) exploit Korea Defence bonanza to do one or more UKCentury Series? If McAir could bounce from useless Voodoo to Phantom II, surely V-S could slip the surly bond of Swift?

 

[Rule of cool]

I think by 1951 it's already too late, the British had cancelled the M52 in 1946 and decided to go supersonic with the EE P1 in 1949, which basically commits Britain to the Lightning.

I think there isn't really a rational path to set Britain up to get a Phantom analogue, decisions such as cancelling the M52 and setting down the path to the Lightning were made rationally enough. I think getting a Phantom analogue would have to start with an irrational decision like retaining the M52 despite arguments against it, and a Phantom anaolgue could then evolve rationally from there.

 

[zen]

Heretical question I know, but is the Phantom really the ideal from the UK perspective?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Heretical question I know, but is the Phantom really the ideal from the UK perspective?

Something that capable is.

IMO the UK would want something with significantly more range.

 

[zen]

Something that capable is.

IMO the UK would want something with significantly more range.

Yes, which is why the whole TSR.2 saga is such a letdown. Especially when fighter variants were proposed.
Some of those designs, like Avro, DH or EE had potential. Even Hawkers....
But of course the whole process was a mess.

Ironically, it might have been easier to first develope the Fighter/Attack versions and then once the technology caught up, the Strike and Reconnaissance could have followed.

But Fighters.....after '57

And then of course had the whole process been held back a year or two, it would have been OR.346 instead.

 

[H_K]

IMO the UK would want something with significantly more range.

Single engined fighter with a big RB.177 Medway turbofan might have been the ticket for the UK.

Either a delta canard like the Viggen or more likely (assuming a late 50s design / early 60s service entry) a traditional Crusader-style high lift variable incidence wing. The Crusader III with a J75 had incredible range... a Medway carrier-capable fighter would likely have been even better.

Maybe go for 2 variants - a 2 seater multirole (like the F-4) and single seater day fighter.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Single engined fighter with a big RB.177 Medway turbofan might have been the ticket for the UK.

Either a delta canard like the Viggen or more likely (assuming a late 50s design / early 60s service entry) a traditional Crusader-style high lift variable incidence wing. The Crusader III with a J75 had incredible range... a Medway carrier-capable fighter would likely have been even better.

Yes, something like a Crusader II or III would be the most likely, IMO. Been a long discussion about a Spey Twosader, but IIRC Big Medway was better for fuel economy than Spey.

Maybe go for 2 variants - a 2 seater multirole (like the F-4) and single seater day fighter.

I think they'd start out that way and then realize that their carriers weren't big enough to have a day fighter and a night/adverse weather fighter. And I'm not sure how long the RAF would keep a day fighter around, either.

 

[zen]

Crusader III, likely with the side-by-side seating option looks, with a UK engine like a decent option. If we're constraining the selection to naval compatibility.
This could mesh with RAF Olympus for TSR.2 and arguably pre-57 Gyron to RB.122 plan.

The missing aircraft is surely a twin J79 or Avon version of the Crusader type conflagration.

 

[Archibald]

That's another frustrating side of the British supersonic fighter business. You british in the mid-1950's had plenty of very advanced military turbojets and even early turbofans like Medway. Most of them as good if not better than the US "classics" J57 / J75 / J58 and beyond. But you failed to wrap a proper Mach 2 airframe around them (the Lightning with its stacked Avons is kind of an oddball).

France was in the exact opposite situation - Dassault, Breguet and the SNCAs had plenty good fighter designs and airframe, but SNECMA Atar sucked - and it sucked way too long (Atar 9K50 was started as late as 1967 for the coming Mirage F1, at a time when the M53 turbofan was also in the making !)

An airframe like the P.1121 could have had Gyron, Olympus, Conway, Medway - plus RB.168 Spey in the next decade. But the RAF and government never wanted the P.1121 simply because it did not fit their requirements : F155T first, later GOR-339.

A- Fundamentally : in the UK the relationship between the government that hold the purse; the RAF and its often flawed OR / GOR requirements; and the aircraft industry - was deeply disfunctional.

Make no mistake, it was also pretty disfunctional in France. The AdA RFPs of the 1960's (VSTOL... no, we want STOL... oh wait, VG is hype and cool ... nope, AFVG... RAGEL G4... G8 twin-jets... ACF...) were just pie-in-the-sky, albeit more on the budget rather than the technical front.
Basically Dassault (and a few others like Breguet and the public companies before 1965) were good enough to built the prototypes requested by the AdA. But then it failed at the budget level : they ended unaffordable.

On the british side I would say that the failures were
1- BAC & HS restructurations did not helped they were done wrong just like the french ones in 1936 - except 25 years later, in 1961. At a time when fighters had moved from biplanes to Mach 2, so perhaps consolidation should have been done before.

2- Companies like Hawker had failed to grasp the "weapon system" concept for the P.1121

3- Perhaps because of 1- and A-, british companies did not dared to pull a Dassault. That is : fly prototypes even if they did not matched the RAF OR and GOR. Too often, potentially good prototypes like the Supermarine 545, Hawker P.1083, SR.177 or P.1121 were scrapped even if close from completion. Then again, Dassault could do that only because they had funding outside the AdA and french government, that is from massive exportations. But Hawker exported a shit ton of Hunters, so maybe I'm wrong here.

Crucially, the government and Armée de l'Air accepted to drop their stupid and flawed RFPs and programs if Dassault proposed a more affordable option. When the RAF desperately clung to its GOR-339 to the very end of the TSR-2 program, driving it into the wall.

-----------------

Case in point: the December 18, 1975 meeting between Marcel Dassault and President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing.

The AdA wanted a high-low mix of the Mirage F1-M53 and ACF. But the former was doomed by the F-16 and because it had lost the Deal of the Century competion. As for the ACF, it was doomed by its cost.

So Dassault proposed another, more advanced high-low mix: the Mirage 2000 and 4000.

Knowing that the AdA still wanted a twin jet Mirage above all (AFVG / G4 / G8 / ACF) Dassault proposed to switch from ACF to 4000.

Giscard however was a former budget minister and new that the 4000 would be as unaffordable as the ACF, since they were almost identical except for wing shape. Instead, Giscard reverted the proposal and picked the Mirage 2000 for the AdA - and the 4000 for exportations, which doomed it.

With perfect hindsight (50 years next month !) this was the correct move as the AdA was able to afford 315 Mirage 2000s with Dassault exporting 300 more, so win-win. Plus, the 2000 proved good enough the 2000D lasted until 2035 !

Overall, Dassault accepted Giscard "2000 first" policy, even if himself and the AdA certainly prefered the Mirage 4000. Which proved very formidable but also way too expensive, with Iraq, then Saudia Arabia called to the rescue proving unable to fund it, because Iran war and because moar F-15s...

Bottom line: Dassault knew how to circumvent the AdA flawed RFPs and go straight to the political level.

‐----------

This brings an interesting question. With all the Hunters they exported, Hawker should have had some kind of treasure chest, perhaps enough to finish and fly a P.1121 prototype. What did go wrong then ? Did they ran out of money or did just just dropped the ball, discouraged by the RAF clinging to GOR-339 and nothing else, post Sandystorm ? Plus the Lightning being the one and only annointed RAF Mach 2 fighter, taking the role of the Mirage III...

 

[Archibald]

Sweden was able to afford a few hundred (329 ?) Viggens : 42 000 pound MTOW with a single turbofan - foreign, which sunk exports.
UK should have been able to afford a similar MTOW P.1121, also with a turbofan: called Medway. Which almost was Viggen engine btw, how about that.
A british engine means P.1121 unlike Viggen has full control over its potential exports.

 

[red admiral]

AH PoD 1:Would PM Attlee-with-B-47 not order 25 Valiant, 9/2/51? Would he reassign the actual V-Bomber/Bomb resources elsewhere in Defence, such as to plug various holes, inc RN, discussed in SPF?

This is quite a different AH PoD as the nuclear sharing/independence/sharing dominated ao much of the strategy at this time and funding and resourcing with it. RAF operating B-47 "Washingtons" as their interim type whilst waiting for Victor/Vulcan and binning Valiant/Sperrin early. In particular for Vickers as it gives them more resources to put into Viscount/Vanguard on the commercial side, and Vickers-Supermarine for Swift and 545, Scimitar family and GW.

I'm still struggling to see that continuing M.52 would make much difference on the research side and exploitation across companies. Miles still goes bankrupt due to the commercial side which puts a massive spanner into any long term flying programme. We still get a bunch of other prototyping activity based on different wing geometries, companies, and routes to a combat aircraft.

Heretical question I know, but is the Phantom really the ideal from the UK perspective?

It's probably still too big and expensive from a fleet numbers side. And the priority RAF role was really air-to-surface for which Jaguar was better. Air Defence is all very nice but in the early 60s it's all about slinging your nukes the other way asap. Its not until the late 60s / 70s with flexible response that an air defence interceptor really comes back into it - but still very much grounded in a ground battlefield over Germany.

Single engined fighter with a big RB.177 Medway turbofan might have been the ticket for the UK.

Mid 60s it's looking like an engine upgrade for P.1121(ish) Mk 4 or 5 I think, with the Medway trying to eke out more range. Still like an F-105 with a bigger wing. Would the "fighter" version operate from a carrier? It's still only carrying 2 x Red Top and Guns around.

Late 60s/70s and you're into something like the single engined Vickers 583 as a UK MiG-23alike airframe.

This brings an interesting question. With all the Hunters they exported, Hawker should have had some kind of treasure chest, perhaps enough to finish and fly a P.1121 prototype. What did go wrong then ? Did they ran out of money

Yes they ran out of money. I'm not sure they made that much money from exporting second and third hand Hunters.

 

[alertken]

HAL recorded PV spend on P.1121/P.1129 >£1Mn., dribbling on after Sandys declined it, 4/57. (^Its Gyron retained MoS R&D funds until 8/57 when Saro P.177N died). Neither DH, nor the other Big Axial houses cared to dribble speculatively for exports...because RAF was clearly to take free low/no time Hunter F.6 and turn them into (to be) FGA.9/FR.10 - the Khormaksar armed JP and Gnat fly-before-buy was a sham.

PV was never UK Aero's addiction, but after 4/57 HS Group, owning HAL, did Launch Avro 748 and AW.650 Argosy: Camm kept a Whif model long on his desk: it had been open to him to present a PV Case to prototype, scamming an engine: he could cite Saye's Law of Economics, that Supply creates Demand - Build it and They Will Come to our Field of Dreams. See Northrop, T-38 into the Light Fighter.

(*corrected by zen below: Gy.Jr/P.177)

 

[zen]

Gyron lost funding when the axe fell on F.155T as it was the short-term powerplant. With RB.122 or RB.128 as the long-term upgrade. Still hoped for short-term solution to power private venture P.1121.
Which had Camm strung along by a mixture of pragmatic ideas of what's achievable with certain RAF figures egging him on.
All shot down by official position.

Gyron Junior had been funded as the low cost short-term new small turbojet called for new twin engined fighter attack and strike platforms.
This is why it was chosen for N/A.39 Buccaneer, used for T.188 research and F.177 light fighter. Also why a single Javelin had been so fitted and why various Supermarine schemes of Scimitar offered this.
Though no long-term successor seems to have favour.

 

[Archibald]

Check this

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/a-british-dassault.31847/#post-851110

 

[Hood]

Fundamentally : in the UK the relationship between the government that hold the purse; the RAF and its often flawed OR / GOR requirements; and the aircraft industry - was deeply disfunctional.

Generally both the Air Ministry and the industry hated the MoS/MoA and what they perceived as the Ministry's failings and inefficiencies and interference. In truth though the Air Min was incapable of providing the kind of R&D support and the contracting and financial side that the MoS/MoA could - despite all their flaws in this area.
Not to mention all the material concerns - getting hold of supplies of certain alloys for example, let alone liaising with dozens of electronics and systems suppliers. The Air Ministry could never have dealt with that and I doubt the manufacturers were keen to add to their already high supply chain management workload issues.
Truth is there never was a shortcut, although today with Tempest the state-user-manufacturer lines have seemingly blurred into one giant blob.

At a time when fighters had moved from biplanes to Mach 2, so perhaps consolidation should have been done before.

I suspect this should have been done during WW2 or shortly thereafter.

Dassault knew how to circumvent the AdA flawed RFPs and go straight to the political level.

As chummy as the Old Boy network was and even with minor politicians having aviation industry roles, there was never anyone with enough political clout to enable this. Camm had the kudos but lacked the personality, Wallis was a tinkerer and while George Edwards was respected, probably hardly anybody in the Commons Lobby could point him out in a crowd.

With all the Hunters they exported, Hawker should have had some kind of treasure chest, perhaps enough to finish and fly a P.1121 prototype.

Most of the 1950s Hunter exports had US Dollars behind them for NATO orders and most 60-70s sales were second-hand refurbs.

 

[alertken]

Aero chums, Old Boy network. Retiree Senior military and political folk still try to peddle their little black book of contacts. Through TSR.2's death throes BAC relied on Vice Chairman ex-CAS MRAF Sir Dermot Boyle and ex-DCAS Sir G,Tuttle (GM/Weybridge), all nugatory: 1/64 ACAS(OR)-DCAS: "(Only) man who can make anything of the mediocrity at his disposal (inc Tuttle) is (GRE)
but he has no time". RAFHS 17B, P38

 

[Hood]

Old Boys Network reprise:
I dug out my Masters dissertation as I'd looked into this area.

During the mid-1960s only four Members of Parliament (all Conservative) were connected to the aircraft industry: Stephen Hastings (Director at Handley Page Limited and Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party’s Aviation Committee), Robert Sowter (a Sales Manager at Handley Page), Geoffrey Ripon (Director at Bristol and Fairey) and Robert-Maxwell Hyslop (executive at Rolls-Royce Aero Engine Division 1954-1960). Hastings usually openly declared his business interests when discussing aviation matters to avoid any allegations of lobbying on behalf of Handley Page.

Given the fate of HP at the hands of Macmillan's government and the fact that both Bristol and Fairey were subsumed and their names erased to history it doesn't feel like any of these MPs had any input into policy.
There were of course MPs who had factories in their constituencies and they tended to only get involved when job cuts loomed. One of these was Tony Benn who was very anti-aviation industry and anti-Concorde yet still managed to support the Filton workers in his constituency at the same time.

 

[Archibald]

Dassault befriended Mitterrand (left) and Chirac (right) altogether, who were president 1981-1995 (Mitterrand) and PM 1974-1976, then 1986-1988 and President 1995-2007 for Chirac.

As a private weapon merchant Dassault (ex- Bloch) might be considered right-wing conservative, but he was a bit more subtle than that. Early in his career (1936) he was radical-socialist so on the left. Ten years later as a deported jew in Buchenwald he was saved by communists and accordingly, respected them for the rest of his life : even if they were theoretically ennemies because USSR.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Most of the designs that have been considered in this thread and others fall into one of two camps, either too early such that they are a very long way away from being able to give anything close to Phantomesque performance (Javelin and the various attempts to enhance it spring to mind) or so late that they they would be well after the Phantom in terms of first flight (various derivations of F.155 designs). The Lightning falls between these two positions. In another thread I mused on what could have been had the larger fuselaged P.6 been chosen in early 1953:

Having read Tony Wilson's English Electric Lightning, Genesis & Projects, the answer to this might be simpler. The P.6 of February 1953 had a larger fuselage, English Electric stated that the increased fuselage volume would allow for a fuselage mounted undercarriage, more fuel stowage and improved weapons carriage. The book doesn't contain specific details but Dan Sharp's RAF, Secret Jets of Cold War Britain has a diagram of the slightly later P.6/2. Whilst the P.6/2 used the standard Lightning wing and undercarriage configuration it did have a larger volume fuselage and a 120 imp. gallon fuel tank is shown in the fuselage in addition to the standard Lightning wing tanks. In the P.6 with the relocated undercarriage, the undercarriage would presumably have folded into the sides of the rear fuselage between the engines (as on the P.8) so freeing up more wing space for fuel, a total load of approximately 1,000 imp. gallons seems reasonable - coincidentally the overload capacity of the P.8.

At around the same time, RAF officers visiting Warton had shown interest in the P.6 carrying four Blue Jays. If we make some assumptions about the P.6:

1. It retains the forward fuselage pylons
2. It has four underwing pylons
3. The ventral pack is still viable with the relocated undercarriage

Then we can get to an aircraft with approximately 1,600 gallons of fuel (including 610 imp. gallons in the ventral pack), able to carry six 1,000lb bombs (one under each of the outer wing pylons and two under each inner wing pylon) and a pair of Red Tops for the tactical fighter role, or 4 Red Tops for the interception role to which a pair of 260 gallon under wing tanks could be added for CAP or ferry.

This leaves the constraint imposed by the nose intake/shock-cone radar arrangement. Initially this isn't as bad as it looks, a 24" diameter is not too shabby for the 1950s and is what the Phantom was originally designed for. It became a challenge when illumination was desired for semi-active radar homing missiles later. For this we can look at the P.3, this used a NACA flush intakes design on the fuselage sides. The chosen nose intake/bullet was a superior solution to the flush intakes from a performance perspective, allowing an increase in top speed at the time from Mach 1.56 to Mach 1.68 through improved thrust. This decision occurred in early/mid 1952. Hypothetically, could better side intakes have been designed at about the same time that would have provided similar performance to the nose/bullet configuration actually chosen? E.g. could half cones have been used with side intakes? What would that have done to the aircraft's drag noting that the flush intakes as designed were effectively within the standard fuselage cross-section?

If such intakes could have been developed in early/mid-1952 and then applied to the larger P.6 design the potential is for an aircraft with similar internal fuel (if one cheats and includes the ultimate conformal belly tank), similar power and potentially a similar sized radar as the Phantom.

 

[Rule of cool]

The belly tank of the Lightning 'filled in' the area rule, putting the main landing gear in flared hips in the fuselage would also have helped with the area rule.

In any case, something has to be the best, and with early 60s fighters that's the Phantom. What I'd like to know is what's second best and how close is that to the Phantom?

 

[uk 75]

The Phantom was made possible by the US Navy operating large carriers and the US having the resources to develop missiles, radars and engines at the cutting edge.
The UK with much more limited resources had to focus on key requirements.
The first and most important were aircraft able to deliver nuclear weapons with conventional weapons a secondary role. Canberra, the V Bombers, Buccaneer and TSR2 were decent outcomes. P1154 also belonged to this category.
The second requirement was for a fighter able to defend bases in the UK and overseas. This produced Lightning and the less successful Javelin. Sandys saved the taxpayer from the hideous attempts to go further.
Third and definitely last was Army Cooperation or Close Air Support. Hunters were the latest ex fighters relegated to this role. P1154 was intended to take over in addition to its nuclear role.
So at no point could or did the UK issue a requirement or have the means to produce its own Phantom.
By 1966 it looked as if all three roles were going to be carried out in the 1970s by the US wonder machine.
Yet in 1975 things were rather different.
TSR2 was replaced not by Phantom or even 50 F111s but by a mixture of Vulcans and Buccaneers with the European MRCA Tornado on order to follow.
Lightning was joined and gradually replaced by Phantoms but continued to serve alongside.
Phantoms proved too costly for the close air support role. The 1127 RAF was joined by the Jaguar which in my view was pretty close to the 1154 except for VSTOL.

So in the end the UK did produce its own Phantom but in a different way.

 

[tomo pauk]

So at no point could or did the UK issue a requirement or have the means to produce its own Phantom.

(my emphasis)
I'd disagree with the bolded part.
British industry was managing, despite the circumstances (budget & other monetary reasons, mostly, plus the small series of 4- and some 2-engined aircraft in the 1950s and 60s that meant the lack of economy of scales), to produce basically 99% of what the Government was asking. Four separate 4-engined bombers out of whom 3 entered the service, high performance fighter with radar (plus the Javelin), a combat-capable VTOL, a host of capable and relatively simple combat aircraft, while being able to make jet engines that were more than good, like the Hunter and the Jaguar with the French. A host of other aircraft was also designed and flew, even if the Government was not buying them. Canberra, Buccaneer. Trainers. Naval aircraft in general were not great, mostly due to the timetables being too much extended, but were good enough.

tl;dr - requirement was not there, but capability was

 

[Rule of cool]

tl;dr - requirement was not there, but capability was

I agree, assuming some British quirks that don't affect capability much. Britain had the engine technology, a suitable radar and enough air-frame experience that if given the task to build a Phantom they could have done so more or less.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I agree, assuming some British quirks that don't affect capability much. Britain had the engine technology, a suitable radar and enough air-frame experience that if given the task to build a Phantom they could have done so more or less.

Their missiles were questionable.

 

[Rule of cool]

Their missiles were questionable.

They weren't the lone Ranger there.

 

[tomo pauk]

Their missiles were questionable.

Buy Sparrows until you get the SARH missiles developed.

 

[uk 75]

The point I have made elsewhere too is that while the UK was excellent at airframes and engines it was not so good at radar and bizarre about missiles. But it did not understand the need to bring all these together as a weapon system until TSR2 and P1154 which unlike Phantom were too costly and behind schedule.

 

[Rule of cool]

The point I have made elsewhere too is that while the UK was excellent at airframes and engines it was not so good at radar and bizarre about missiles. But it did not understand the need to bring all these together as a weapon system until TSR2 and P1154 which unlike Phantom were too costly and behind schedule.

I don't think that not embracing the weapons system in an aircraft entering service in ~1963 is a hanging offence the way it would be for an aircraft entering service 5 years later. It's not as if the AI23 radar as fitted to the Lightning was useless, developments included being able to direct the Red Top's seeker and incorporating an S-band receiver for passive tracking. Proposed but not adopted for various reasons were a CW illuminator for SARH missiles and a hands-off interception capability.

Similarly the 1965 Red Top as deployed had an engagement envelope more comparable to the 1963 7E Sparrow than the 1965 9D Sidewinder, in large part due to being slaved to the radar. Additionally there were suggested improvements including SARH guidance and a storable liquid rocket for greater range.

 

[red admiral]

We're still very much in the land of wishful thinking and cherry picking information that reinforces established views. It's like "Empire of the Clouds" in forum form.

 

[Rule of cool]

We're still very much in the land of wishful thinking and cherry picking information that reinforces established views. It's like "Empire of the Clouds" in forum form.

Of course, the question is to see if the British can build an aircraft to an American spec. There's no British aircraft, project or requirement that readily fits the bill, so imagining a collection of existing period components is all that's left.

 

[tomo pauk]

The point I have made elsewhere too is that while the UK was excellent at airframes and engines it was not so good at radar and bizarre about missiles. But it did not understand the need to bring all these together as a weapon system until TSR2 and P1154 which unlike Phantom were too costly and behind schedule.

They can make an aircraft that is ballpark of the F-4 in size, weight, drag, range/fuel quantity, and thrust. Radar - walk before run. Missile - develop the SARH version of their big IR-guided missiles, buy Sparrows before that.
While the TSR-2 indeed cost a lot of money, the same was true for the A-5 or the F-111. A 2-men not-Lightning with side-to-side engines, a lot of fuel above the engines, racks for 4 big and two small rockets + gun puts us very close to the F-4, for the small price increase vs. the original Lighting.

Key is to have the basic aircraft figured out and designed 1st.

 

[Caryina2642]

They can make an aircraft that is ballpark of the F-4 in size, weight, drag, range/fuel quantity, and thrust. Radar - walk before run. Missile - develop the SARH version of their big IR-guided missiles, buy Sparrows before that.

so basically a twin seat version of the Hawker P.1125, for me is the closet to a "British Phantom" as your going to get

 

[H_K]

In any case, something has to be the best, and with early 60s fighters that's the Phantom. What I'd like to know is what's second best and how close is that to the Phantom?

Worth remembering that in the early 1960s the F-4 would have struggled to compete against contemporary fighters such as the Lightning or Mirage III. No gun, no maneuvering slats, unreliable missiles, and smoky J79s which made it visible for miles...

What the early Phantom DID offer was a very good bomber interceptor that could also act as a bomb truck when needed. But hardly the "best" in any absolute way... in fact in the multirole air/ground interdiction role the outstanding fighter of the decade was probably the Mirage III, which Israel used during the Six Day War to achieve extremely high sortie rates and dominate both in the sky and destroy ground targets with ease.

In the late 60s the Phantom design branched off into 2 excellent fighters: the Doppler-equipped F-4J (from 1967) and gun-equipped F-4E (from 1968 - but especially from 1972 once it was properly equipped with maneuvering slats and smokeless J79s). However you couldn't get both... you had to choose either the Doppler radar or the internal gun. And before 1967/68 without either one of those, you probably wouldn't want to go up against other fighters in a fair fight (i.e. equal training and numbers).