Earlier and different Western naval anti ship missiles

[Bruno Anthony]

Why did the USN lose interest in AShM,

And which parts? The “USN” is a big abbreviation.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Even the AGM 12 Bullpup probably could have been used on a Buccaneer given that de Havilland was license manufacturing it.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

And which parts? The “USN” is a big abbreviation.

One reason is up through to the 70's there was no other nation that had a useful navy that was at odds with the US. Why research and build a weapon when there's barely any targets to use it on?

 

[Bruno Anthony]

One reason is up through to the 70's there was no other nation that had a useful navy that was at odds with the US. Why research and build a weapon when there's barely any targets to use it on?

Really?

GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE-LAUNCH PLATFORMS
MAJOR MISSILE WARSHIPS
MISSILE PATROL BOATS
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES RECONNAISSANCE AND MISSILE AIRCRAFT TOTAL
1960 1970 6 49 6 158 0 62
215 454 227 723

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=newport-papers

Pp. 8,9

 

[Rule of cool]

“Reporting
to Attack Squadron 66 in late October of 1973 while it was deployed aboard USS
Independence. Independence was then operating in the Eastern Mediterranean
during the US/Soviet crisis associated with the Yom Kippur War. I quickly
discerned that the Navy had neither the weapons nor the doctrine to effectively
counter the anti-ship missile-armed Soviet Fifth Eskadra.1 The best we could do at
the time was to “birddog” Soviet ships – orbit overhead of their formations waiting
for smoke to appear on deck indicating a missile launch. We started working on
anti-ship tactics after that cruise, but we were limited by only having freefall
bombs. In my view at the time, even with optimally executed tactics, we would
likely lose 2-4 aircraft per single ship attack. The air wing could be effectively put
out of commission attacking a six ship formation. It took four years to get
Harpoon to the fleet, which gave us at least a fighting chance against well-armed”

Firstly, why didn't VA66 have any guided ordnance, like Walleyes or Bullpups, in 1973?

Those Soviet warships were trailing the USN TFs very closely, maybe even within visual range, as it was in peacetime. The USN TFs were metaphorically 'anchored' to small operating area due to the politically mandated task to be on hand to support Israel, rather than being free to seek sea-room to avoid the Soviet warships. As such they were uniquely vulnerable to the Soviet CG firing AShMs at the Forrestal class carrier (I forget which one) and the Sverdlov cruiser firing 6" broadsides at USS Coral Sea as the opening shots of a hot USSR-USA war in the area. That said the USS Little Rock was ready to go with its Talos SAMs in the surface-to-surface role and IIRC so too were the other USN missile armed warships, not to mention that the range was close enough for immediate gunfire attacks from the escorts.

As for the attack sqns, they'd just come off 7 years of land attack in Vietnam. While the Vietnam war had sharpened the USN fighter sqns into extremely effective MiG killers it would not have sharpened the attack sqns into ship killers. In any case, even if they were the Soviets shadowing the carriers at gun range wouldn't leave many other options that birddogging Soviet ships and dropping ordnance when the missile launchers or guns start to turn from fore-aft toward the carriers.

That said, 1973 was a real-world scenario and having heaps of Harpoons available would have been extremely useful as an instant reaction, but I doubt it would have stopped the carriers from being hit if the Soviets fired first.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Firstly, why didn't VA66 have any guided ordnance, like Walleyes or Bullpups, in 1973?

Good question and crappy ordnance if that’s the best they could have had for AS work.

 

[Rule of cool]

Good question and crappy ordnance if that’s the best they could have had for AS work.

They might have had other stuff in 1973, but those 2 had been around for years and should have been widely available in suitable sqns.

This is the result of 7 years of land attack in Vietnam, the development priority had been for that mission rather than general Cold War anti-ship. In any case the Soviet ship threat pretty much appeared in that time frame.

In the particular circumstance of the Soviet-USN in 1973, where USN and Soviet warship were within gun range of each other, you wouldn't want to be flinging around fire and forget weapons in case you hit your own ships.

 

[CV12Hornet]

One major difference between 1973 carrier strike and 1982 carrier strike is that in the interim Walleye got a new datalink that allowed launch from beyond visual range, greatly improving its standoff range. Datalink-equipped Walleyes had a 60-km maximum range at high altitudes because of this, which at minimum meant Navy attack aircraft now didn't have to worry about guns or short-range SAMs like Osa and Volna. So unless the Soviets had Shtorm on hand, or one of their few Buk or S-300F-armed vessels around, Walleye IIs would be a major pain for them to deal with.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I mean... Walleye (and thence Condor) were doing good work with electro-optical (and in-flight datalink / Operator-In-The-Loop), with demo drops in '63 and combat use by '67. Condor seems to have worked pretty well, though a bit iffy on the datalink.

The main problem with those was cost. Condor was particularly expensive.

The tactical problem with those was needing to drop Walleyes at high altitude to give them a good range, and then having to remain above the datalink horizon if you wanted to provide operator-in-the-loop.

Condor needed to be flown to within TV range of the target before drop, so any medium-range SAM would be a threat to the launching aircraft

It would also seem to me that AAM-N-10, AGM-76 Falcon ARM, and AGM-78 Standard ARM would have all been reasonable lightweight anti-ship missiles (though AAM-N-10's 110lbs warhead is a bit small). Falcon ARM and Standard ARM rocking ~200-250lbs warheads isn't nothing (especially as in the 60s something like a W45 / W72 would also be on the table, and a couple kilotons will fix almost any lethality issue).

Standards definitely work well enough as an antiship missile, just ask the Iranians.

Going back a bit further you've got stuff like Corvus, which is pretty on the money for big AShM.

I would not want to be the pilot told to "fly closer to the non-radiating target to guide your 10kt nuclear missile."

But if they stuck a ~400lb HE warhead in there it'd be pretty solid.

I think the better question is Why did the USN lose interest in AShM, and I think there the answer has more to do with the over-emphasis on SLOC in the period before The Maritime Strategy of the 80s and probably some programmatic dysfunction, given how obvious an idea Skipper (AGM-123) seems, and how long it took to get in service (1985).

Don't forget that there basically wasn't any competing fleet until the 1970s, so there was no rush to acquire any dedicated AShMs.

It'd require the Russians to develop and deploy their fleet in the 1950s for the USN to make a priority of getting AShMs.

Good question and crappy ordnance if that’s the best they could have had for AS work.

They should have had Walleyes, Bullpups, and early LGBs like GBU-8s.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The USN didn't like Paveway Is and didn't use them very often. This is because of how often they had to jettison munitions over water; losing some dumb bombs wasn't a big deal, but Paveway Is were expensive, and even with cheaper Paveway IIs the desire to not have to jettison them before landing was a significant factor in the development of the Super Hornet.

 

[Rule of cool]

The USN didn't like Paveway Is and didn't use them very often. This is because of how often they had to jettison munitions over water; losing some dumb bombs wasn't a big deal, but Paveway Is were expensive, and even with cheaper Paveway IIs the desire to not have to jettison them before landing was a significant factor in the development of the Super Hornet.

It's driven the RN to develop rolling vertical landing for its F35s so it's a problem 50 years later.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Don't forget that there basically wasn't any competing fleet until the 1970s, so there was no rush to acquire any dedicated AShMs.

Uh, hmm

Post in thread 'Earlier and different Western naval anti ship missiles'
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...rn-naval-anti-ship-missiles.39167/post-797218

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Really?

GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE-LAUNCH PLATFORMS
MAJOR MISSILE WARSHIPS
MISSILE PATROL BOATS
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES RECONNAISSANCE AND MISSILE AIRCRAFT TOTAL
1960 1970 6 49 6 158 0 62
215 454 227 723

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=newport-papers

Pp. 8,9

Missile patrol boats are useless except in littoral waters and even there, only worthwhile if they have some degree of air cover or the opposition has no real air force to use against them. Outside of the occasional--very occasional--stroke of luck, they're basically worthless.

Cruise missile subs of that era had to surface, like the Soviet Juliett class, that had to surface, then take 5 to 10 minutes to try and acquire the target (forget trying to coordinate with a patrol plane) for a launch range of about 20 to 30 NM at most. Against a US carrier group that's not asleep, it's a death wish.

Missile armed maritime patrol planes, like the Tu 95 or Tu 16 are toast without serious fighter escort or getting very damn lucky. Even back then, the F-4 was designed specifically by the USN to shoot those planes down. Talos could down either at up to about 75 NM, while either would have to go active with radar to locate the target for firing information. AS-1 or -2 are pretty crappy as AshM's go. They have very easily jammed conical scan radars based largely on US and British WW 2 technology.

Major warships? Like the Kynda class "cruisers?" The ships so poorly designed that if carrying a full load of SS-3 Shaddock missiles was in danger of capsizing in moderate seas? Given the $h!+ performance of the Russian Navy since 1905--at least--I wouldn't put any stock in their capability to anything at sea other than be targets.

You're talking a force that is about 99% conscripts with 3-year terms at that time with a professional officer corps that learns mostly by rote. Ships and missile boats use a "second captain" to coordinate fires where the overall commander of the force decides on what will be targeted and fired on. It's a cumbersome, inflexible, system that is highly prone to jamming and disabling.

The whole is poor quality and that is made worse by having crews that are poorly trained. One reason many Russian warships have duplicate radars onboard is so if one goes down, a common occurrence, and cannot be repaired due to lack of crew skill or parts, they have a backup to use.

Of course, none of that was going to be made public at the time but much of it is now.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA119812.pdf

CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79-01194a000400070001-5: CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES JULY 1970 : CIA Reading Room : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :...

archive.org

THE SOVIET NAVAL CRUISE MISSILE FORCE: DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT | CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)

www.cia.gov

Kynda-class - War History

Despite the inclusion of ASW weapons, the vessels of the Kynda-class were designed primarily for offensive operations against Western warships, particularly...

warhistory.org

Basically, what you see with the Red Navy in the 60's to 80's is quite a bit of smoke and mirrors, illusion, not reality if all you look at is the surface of their weapons systems.

 

[Rule of cool]

What's the go with Soviet AShMs coordinating with each other? It seems super advanced, but the Soviet were doing it from 1970 so surely it can't be too difficult. Then again, the threat the Soviets were trying to counter is much greater than the West, so required much more sophistication to counter.

IIUC the Otomat Mk2 was the first Western AShM to use a datalink in the late 70s, so perhaps it's a candidate for cooperative operation.

 

[whatismoo]

Firstly, why didn't VA66 have any guided ordnance, like Walleyes or Bullpups, in 1973?

Those Soviet warships were trailing the USN TFs very closely, maybe even within visual range, as it was in peacetime. The USN TFs were metaphorically 'anchored' to small operating area due to the politically mandated task to be on hand to support Israel, rather than being free to seek sea-room to avoid the Soviet warships. As such they were uniquely vulnerable to the Soviet CG firing AShMs at the Forrestal class carrier (I forget which one) and the Sverdlov cruiser firing 6" broadsides at USS Coral Sea as the opening shots of a hot USSR-USA war in the area. That said the USS Little Rock was ready to go with its Talos SAMs in the surface-to-surface role and IIRC so too were the other USN missile armed warships, not to mention that the range was close enough for immediate gunfire attacks from the escorts.

As for the attack sqns, they'd just come off 7 years of land attack in Vietnam. While the Vietnam war had sharpened the USN fighter sqns into extremely effective MiG killers it would not have sharpened the attack sqns into ship killers. In any case, even if they were the Soviets shadowing the carriers at gun range wouldn't leave many other options that birddogging Soviet ships and dropping ordnance when the missile launchers or guns start to turn from fore-aft toward the carriers.

That said, 1973 was a real-world scenario and having heaps of Harpoons available would have been extremely useful as an instant reaction, but I doubt it would have stopped the carriers from being hit if the Soviets fired first.

In '73 the what if missile would be Condor, not Harpoon? Or idiot-looping a B43 at them (which is a decent part of why no AShM — in a nuclear war these things become simpler)

 

[whatismoo]

The main problem with those was cost. Condor was particularly expensive.

The tactical problem with those was needing to drop Walleyes at high altitude to give them a good range, and then having to remain above the datalink horizon if you wanted to provide operator-in-the-loop.

Condor needed to be flown to within TV range of the target before drop, so any medium-range SAM would be a threat to the launching aircraft



Standards definitely work well enough as an antiship missile, just ask the Iranians.




I would not want to be the pilot told to "fly closer to the non-radiating target to guide your 10kt nuclear missile."

But if they stuck a ~400lb HE warhead in there it'd be pretty solid.



Don't forget that there basically wasn't any competing fleet until the 1970s, so there was no rush to acquire any dedicated AShMs.

It'd require the Russians to develop and deploy their fleet in the 1950s for the USN to make a priority of getting AShMs.






They should have had Walleyes, Bullpups, and early LGBs like GBU-8s.

Condor got the Walleye ERDL, no? The China Lake documentary seems to imply so. Obviously a biased source, but Condor seems pretty capable. IIRC it made it's way into SLAM?

Running in high presents some issues, but it pairs quite well with low level Skipper attacks (which raises the question of why it took until 1985 to bolt a shrike motor to a paveway).

 

[T. A. Gardner]

What's the go with Soviet AShMs coordinating with each other? It seems super advanced, but the Soviet were doing it from 1970 so surely it can't be too difficult. Then again, the threat the Soviets were trying to counter is much greater than the West, so required much more sophistication to counter.

IIUC the Otomat Mk2 was the first Western AShM to use a datalink in the late 70s, so perhaps it's a candidate for cooperative operation.

The Soviets were trying it at the time. There is ZERO evidence that it would actually work in battle, and nobody since has been able to make that work. So, I'd say using some coordinated AShM strike from multiple platforms, and worse trying to use intermediate platforms to increase the launch range, is a total no-go up through at least the 90's.

 

[Sferrin]

In '73 the what if missile would be Condor, not Harpoon? Or idiot-looping a B43 at them (which is a decent part of why no AShM — in a nuclear war these things become simpler)

Condor was basically Brahmos in speed and warhead size. (Mach 2.9 & 290kg linear shaped charge warhead.)

 

[Rule of cool]

In '73 the what if missile would be Condor, not Harpoon?

The Condor is an air launch AShM, I meant surface ships firing the Harpoon or some earlier surface launched AShM in the 1973 YKW scenario. No point in having air launched AShMs when the war starts with Soviet cruisers launching their surface launched AShMs (and 15 x 6"-gun broadsides) from within visual range into the carriers. In that scenario you need the rapid response of escort ships firing their own AShMs.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Soviets were trying it at the time. There is ZERO evidence that it would actually work in battle, and nobody since has been able to make that work. So, I'd say using some coordinated AShM strike from multiple platforms, and worse trying to use intermediate platforms to increase the launch range, is a total no-go up through at least the 90's.

My immediate thought was the high-flyer would be detected reasonably early both the ship's radar and by its own radar and electronic emissions. Even without shooting the high-flyer down its early detection gives warning to the TF that the attack is incoming, if it can be shot down that starts throwing a spanner in the works.

That said, it's a very cool concept.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The Condor is an air launch AShM, I meant surface ships firing the Harpoon or some earlier surface launched AShM in the 1973 YKW scenario. No point in having air launched AShMs when the war starts with Soviet cruisers launching their surface launched AShMs (and 15 x 6"-gun broadsides) from within visual range into the carriers. In that scenario you need the rapid response of escort ships firing their own AShMs.

Which is why the USN SAMs have a secondary AShM capability. And why even Sea Sparrows and ESSMs have a secondary AShM capability.

If someone is within 30km and starts throwing 6" HE at your carrier, they're going to eat 2-4 Talos, 8x Standards, and whatever Sea Sparrows want to cooperate. Each Talos is approximately 6x the ouch of a 16" HE shell, 50% more boom and impacting at twice the velocity, with a couple thousand pounds of magnesium that will burn your ship to the waterline.

Honestly, just packing a bigger warhead into a Talos is probably the USN's best bet for early AShMs. One tailored to getting the entire airframe ignited at that.

 

[Rule of cool]

Which is why the USN SAMs have a secondary AShM capability. And why even Sea Sparrows and ESSMs have a secondary AShM capability.

If someone is within 30km and starts throwing 6" HE at your carrier, they're going to eat 2-4 Talos, 8x Standards, and whatever Sea Sparrows want to cooperate. Each Talos is approximately 6x the ouch of a 16" HE shell, 50% more boom and impacting at twice the velocity, with a couple thousand pounds of magnesium that will burn your ship to the waterline.

Honestly, just packing a bigger warhead into a Talos is probably the USN's best bet for early AShMs. One tailored to getting the entire airframe ignited at that.

I agree, indeed IIUC the Soviets believed opening fire would be committing suicide.

The problem is that if given the order to fire first the USN wouldn't be able to stop the Soviets firing their first salvo of missiles (& guns), and at that range little hope of stopping them from hitting ships, probably even carriers. These wouldn't sink the carriers, but fires on Oriskany, Enterprise and worst of all Forrestal show how vulnerable the aircraft are when the carrier is in trouble. The Soviet hits might have decimated their air-groups and put them out of action for some time.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Which is why the USN SAMs have a secondary AShM capability. And why even Sea Sparrows and ESSMs have a secondary AShM capability.

If someone is within 30km and starts throwing 6" HE at your carrier, they're going to eat 2-4 Talos, 8x Standards, and whatever Sea Sparrows want to cooperate. Each Talos is approximately 6x the ouch of a 16" HE shell, 50% more boom and impacting at twice the velocity, with a couple thousand pounds of magnesium that will burn your ship to the waterline.

Honestly, just packing a bigger warhead into a Talos is probably the USN's best bet for early AShMs. One tailored to getting the entire airframe ignited at that.

One Talos hitting any Russian surface combatant of that era and it's all she wrote. That ship is going to be wrecked.

That's one Talos v. a WW 2 US DE without a live warhead! If one Talos no warhead and virtually tear a 1000-to-1500-ton warship in half, the Soviets have a problem.

 

[Dilandu]

Cruise missile subs of that era had to surface, like the Soviet Juliett class, that had to surface, then take 5 to 10 minutes to try and acquire the target (forget trying to coordinate with a patrol plane) for a launch range of about 20 to 30 NM at most. Against a US carrier group that's not asleep, it's a death wish.

Erm, they were supposed to get targeting from coastal radio detection network. The USN in early 1960s was pretty careless about radar emissions, and only realized that something is wrong after observing Soviet ships and planes perfectly homing on its carriers without any previous recon missions. So the situation when an unsuspecting carrier got hit with supersonic P-35 missiles launched from 150+ miles range was... pretty disturbing.

Missile armed maritime patrol planes, like the Tu 95 or Tu 16 are toast without serious fighter escort or getting very damn lucky. Even back then, the F-4 was designed specifically by the USN to shoot those planes down.

As many experts stated, it depend heavly on how much awarness carrier have about incoming strike. If the carrier got warning only when planes started to climb for launch altitude, then the best crew could do is to hit the deck & pray to die quickly. If the carrier got warning from sufficient distance, it could survive (but not for sure), and clearly the attacking regiment would be mangled. If the carrier expected attack with at least a hour warning, and have time to deploy additional air patrols & missile traps along the threat vector - then the regiment was doomed.

Talos could down either at up to about 75 NM, while either would have to go active with radar to locate the target for firing information. AS-1 or -2 are pretty crappy as AshM's go. They have very easily jammed conical scan radars based largely on US and British WW 2 technology.

There was at most one cruiser with Talos supporting the carrier (or none; there were only seven Talos-armed ships at all, not enough for all supercarriers even). The Terrier was still rather short-legged and slow to reload in early 1960s. And the CAP was limited in interception capability; there were only a few F-4s with only a few Sparrow, and they could attack only one target per time. With a full regiment of Tu-16 charging the defense perimeter - usually supported by at least some coastal fighters, and electronic warfare planes - the situation was far from safe.

 

[Dilandu]

AS-1 or -2 are pretty crappy as AshM's go. They have very easily jammed conical scan radars based largely on US and British WW 2 technology.

First of all, neither KS-1 nor KS-10C were easy to jam. Both those missiles have midcourse beam-riding guidande, flying along launcher plane target tracking radar beam - and switching to radar homing only 10-20 km from target. The midcourse guidance was pretty resistant to jamming; there was a human operator at the scope to discriminate signatures & hold the beam (if required, manually) on target. And the terminal guidance did not left much time for the ECM's to tune on. Don't forget, the 1960s jammers needed to be set manually!

Secondly - we have passive-homing ASM's specifically for the smart guys who believed that jammers would to-tal-ly save them. And its really easy to home on powerful jammer)

 

[Dilandu]

Given the $h!+ performance of the Russian Navy since 1905--at least--I

You clearly should learn WW1 history...

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

What weapons would those Buccaneers be using that wouldn’t involve almost directly overflying those ships?

RAF plans with the TASMO force was to attack at low-level, with a flight of four Buccaneers tossing proximity fused 1000lb bombs at an enemy surface combatant, followed in quick succession by a second flight delivering bombs via laydown.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Really?

GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE-LAUNCH PLATFORMS
MAJOR MISSILE WARSHIPS
MISSILE PATROL BOATS
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES RECONNAISSANCE AND MISSILE AIRCRAFT TOTAL
1960 1970 6 49 6 158 0 62
215 454 227 723

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=newport-papers

Pp. 8,9

Some of those major missile warships were Soviet Kresta-II and Kara class BPKs and Krivak class MPKs armed with SS-N-14.

 

[Dilandu]

Let's be a bit more specific, and look at typical Maritime Missile-Carrying Aviation regiment, the 570th (Pacific Fleet).

In 1968, was composed of:
* 1st Maritime Missile-Carrying Aviation Squadron - 10 Tu-16K-10
* 2nd Maritime Missile-Carrying Aviation Squadron - 10 Tu-16K-10
* 3rd Aviation Squadron - 4 Tu-16P (EW plane), 4 Tu-16Z (tanker), 2 Tu-16T (torpedo bombers, mainly used as patrol & rescue planes)

I.e. the regiment could deploy against enemy carrier group two squadrons of 10 bomber each, each bomber carrying two K-10 missiles (supersonic, 220 km range), each squadron covered by two Tu-16P EW planes with broadband "Buket" jammer.

In real attack, both squadrons would likely made a converging attack from two directions, each squadron divided into "high altitude" and "low altitude" attack groups, each group covered by EW plane. The aquisition range for Tu-16K-10 radar against carrier-size target was about 400 km. The "high altitude" groups would likely strike first against carrier escorts, while the "low altitude" groups would close & climb for massed attack against carrier.

The combat air patrol, protecting the carrier, would be forced to dealt with four separate attack groups, moving on different altitudes, each group having a powerful jammer plane to cover itself. The escorts would be forced to dealt with attacks on them from at least two different directions - as well as second salvo streaking right past them toward the carrier.

Could carrier strike group defeat such attack? Yes, but it's NOT certain & rely rather heavily on how accurately carrier commander was able to predict his Soviet opponent actions.

 

[pathology_doc]

TV/imaging guided (DSMAC) can be better, but now we're getting into guidance modes that are probably too fancy to do with 1950s or 60s technology.

Blue Boar (bomb) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

TV-guided bomb, development cancelled in 1954 because the best was the enemy of good enough (and it had grown too big for carrier aircraft). As with the cancellation of Red Dean, the research and development track died with it.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Erm, they were supposed to get targeting from coastal radio detection network. The USN in early 1960s was pretty careless about radar emissions, and only realized that something is wrong after observing Soviet ships and planes perfectly homing on its carriers without any previous recon missions. So the situation when an unsuspecting carrier got hit with supersonic P-35 missiles launched from 150+ miles range was... pretty disturbing.

Unless you set EMCON Delta, which was only occasionally done (I served on carriers). That was a specific plan for masking EM radiation the carrier was giving off. Just because the norm was rotate and radiate, doesn't mean when the shooting starts the carrier will continue to do so.

The Juliett class also has a serious weakness in being a diesel boat. Besides that, it had to surface, then it took about 5 to 10 minutes to ready the launchers and the sea state had to be relatively calm. In a heavier sea between waves washing over the boat and it rolling it couldn't fire.

As many experts stated, it depend heavly on how much awarness carrier have about incoming strike. If the carrier got warning only when planes started to climb for launch altitude, then the best crew could do is to hit the deck & pray to die quickly. If the carrier got warning from sufficient distance, it could survive (but not for sure), and clearly the attacking regiment would be mangled. If the carrier expected attack with at least a hour warning, and have time to deploy additional air patrols & missile traps along the threat vector - then the regiment was doomed.

Doing a "high seas Pearl Harbor" wasn't going to happen. Gaining such a level of surprise given Soviet command and control really wasn't possible. As for incoming missiles, those early, large, Soviet ones were hardly surface skimmers. They'd get picked up on radar fairly far out and were really no more difficult to engage than a jet fighter would have been given that they were nearly as big and going roughly the same sort of speed.

There was at most one cruiser with Talos supporting the carrier (or none; there were only seven Talos-armed ships at all, not enough for all supercarriers even). The Terrier was still rather short-legged and slow to reload in early 1960s. And the CAP was limited in interception capability; there were only a few F-4s with only a few Sparrow, and they could attack only one target per time. With a full regiment of Tu-16 charging the defense perimeter - usually supported by at least some coastal fighters, and electronic warfare planes - the situation was far from safe.

Terrier, even in the 60's had a nearly 40 NM range on it and a practical 30 NM engagement range. The "full regiment of Tu 16" attacking in coordination is just asking for lots of casualties. They're going to get picked up at 100+ NM from the task group by EW aircraft and that's about the end of them. Even 4 F-4's up are going to start taking them down one after the other as they are exactly the sort of target Sparrow was meant to engage.

In all my time on carriers, I never saw Tu 16 or Tu 95 bombers escorted. First, Soviet naval aviation had next to nil fighters assigned and to assign Red Air Force ones would require inter-service cooperation and likely days of planning and moving planes around. Then, given the short range of Soviet fighters and a lack of air-to-air refueling capacity, they're likely not to get too far out to sea. It wouldn't help that they aren't really equipped for overwater navigation either.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

You clearly should learn WW1 history...

You clearly should learn WW1 history...

I have. It's almost as underwhelming and horrific a defeat as WW 2 was. After all, in the latter, the Red Navy's submarine arm was the most common one engaging enemy ships and they lost more submarines than ships they sank.

 

[Dilandu]

Unless you set EMCON Delta, which was only occasionally done (I served on carriers). That was a specific plan for masking EM radiation the carrier was giving off. Just because the norm was rotate and radiate, doesn't mean when the shooting starts the carrier will continue to do so.

Yeah, one problem - it was NOT done in early 1960s, since USN underestimated the capabilities of passive tracking. Only after facing the fact, that Soviet fleet could reliably track the USN carriers in real time, USN started to took the problem seriously.

The Juliett class also has a serious weakness in being a diesel boat. Besides that, it had to surface, then it took about 5 to 10 minutes to ready the launchers and the sea state had to be relatively calm. In a heavier sea between waves washing over the boat and it rolling it couldn't fire.

It took 4.5 minutes to ready launchers for the first missile, ten second pause between launches. The missile could be launched at 4-5 Beaufort; not great, but not bad also.

Doing a "high seas Pearl Harbor" wasn't going to happen. Gaining such a level of surprise given Soviet command and control really wasn't possible.

Because of what? There were numerous times Soviet submarines & bombers were able to sneak to USN carriers. Of course, the opposite was true also.

As for incoming missiles, those early, large, Soviet ones were hardly surface skimmers.

They weren't, but they were fast fighter-size targets, flying relatively low (especially on terminal run), and USN anti-air defense wasn't exactly great against such targets.

They'd get picked up on radar fairly far out and were really no more difficult to engage than a jet fighter would have been given that they were nearly as big and going roughly the same sort of speed.

Sure. As long as you warm up all the tubes in your fire control computer, lock the radar on small, not very reflective target, run through the missile warm-up, moving, finning (manual) and loading cycle, and your prayers that seeker is actually tracking are answered. Yes, it was possible; no, it wasn't guaranteed. The Talos was good, but slow-firing, and there were too few ships with it. The 1960s Terrier was still half a beam-rider, and wasn't exactly suited for fighter-size target. And the Tartar in early 1960s was basically unworkable due to technical issues.

Terrier, even in the 60's had a nearly 40 NM range on it and a practical 30 NM engagement range.

Only the RIM-2F have a 75 km range. The majority of missiles in early 1960s were still RIM-2D (beam-rider) or RIM-2E (homing), limited by circa 40 km range.

They're going to get picked up at 100+ NM from the task group by EW aircraft and that's about the end of them.

Oh, how nice. Now a really fun thing; at 100 NM, the missiles is already flying, and it's less than 10 minutes till impact. If the carrier detected the attack at 100 NM, the carrier is very much dead.

Even 4 F-4's up are going to start taking them down one after the other as they are exactly the sort of target Sparrow was meant to engage.

For CAP to have any use, the detection must be made at least at 200-250 NM. So the F-4 would at least have time to react, not only observe in horror how their task group turns into burning hulks.

Then, four F-4 would be able to do how many attack runs with their Sparrow's? Which aren't exactly the most reliable missiles, and F-4 FCS would be forced to dealt with massive jamming, chaffs & other self defense measure.

Bear in mind, that AIM-7D/E have only about 30 km range. So in one attack run, four F-4 could destroy at most four Tu-16 (assuming that missiles would work perfectly and the FCS would actually track). After that, they would need to turn back, loop around, make a new attack pass, presumably from stern chase this time (avoiding being shredded by Tu-16 guns, if they went a bit too close).

First, Soviet naval aviation had next to nil fighters assigned and to assign Red Air Force ones would require inter-service cooperation and likely days of planning and moving planes around.

Facepalm. It was PVO Strany that were tasked with fleet support. Not Red Air Force.

Then, given the short range of Soviet fighters and a lack of air-to-air refueling capacity,

Meet Mig-23)

 

[Dilandu]

I have. It's almost as underwhelming and horrific a defeat as WW 2 was. After all, in the latter, the Red Navy's submarine arm was the most common one engaging enemy ships and they lost more submarines than ships they sank.

Yeah? So apparently you missed the whole Black Sea campaign, the actions on Baltic completely. The two battles of Riga Gulf, the battle off Sarych, the action near Bosphours 10 may 1915? Ring any bells?

 

[Bruno Anthony]

RAF plans with the TASMO force was to attack at low-level, with a flight of four Buccaneers tossing proximity fused 1000lb bombs at an enemy surface combatant, followed in quick succession by a second flight delivering bombs via laydown.

The bravely primitive. But not ineffective. Ask Argentina.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Some of those major missile warships were Soviet Kresta-II and Kara class BPKs and Krivak class MPKs armed with SS-N-14.

Not worth sinking?

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Missile patrol boats are useless except in littoral waters and even there, only worthwhile if they have some degree of air cover or the opposition has no real air force to use against them. Outside of the occasional--very occasional--stroke of luck, they're basically worthless.

Cruise missile subs of that era had to surface, like the Soviet Juliett class, that had to surface, then take 5 to 10 minutes to try and acquire the target (forget trying to coordinate with a patrol plane) for a launch range of about 20 to 30 NM at most. Against a US carrier group that's not asleep, it's a death wish.

Missile armed maritime patrol planes, like the Tu 95 or Tu 16 are toast without serious fighter escort or getting very damn lucky. Even back then, the F-4 was designed specifically by the USN to shoot those planes down. Talos could down either at up to about 75 NM, while either would have to go active with radar to locate the target for firing information. AS-1 or -2 are pretty crappy as AshM's go. They have very easily jammed conical scan radars based largely on US and British WW 2 technology.

Major warships? Like the Kynda class "cruisers?" The ships so poorly designed that if carrying a full load of SS-3 Shaddock missiles was in danger of capsizing in moderate seas? Given the $h!+ performance of the Russian Navy since 1905--at least--I wouldn't put any stock in their capability to anything at sea other than be targets.

You're talking a force that is about 99% conscripts with 3-year terms at that time with a professional officer corps that learns mostly by rote. Ships and missile boats use a "second captain" to coordinate fires where the overall commander of the force decides on what will be targeted and fired on. It's a cumbersome, inflexible, system that is highly prone to jamming and disabling.

The whole is poor quality and that is made worse by having crews that are poorly trained. One reason many Russian warships have duplicate radars onboard is so if one goes down, a common occurrence, and cannot be repaired due to lack of crew skill or parts, they have a backup to use.

Of course, none of that was going to be made public at the time but much of it is now.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA119812.pdf

CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79-01194a000400070001-5: CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES JULY 1970 : CIA Reading Room : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :...

archive.org

THE SOVIET NAVAL CRUISE MISSILE FORCE: DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT | CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)

www.cia.gov

Kynda-class - War History

Despite the inclusion of ASW weapons, the vessels of the Kynda-class were designed primarily for offensive operations against Western warships, particularly...

warhistory.org

Basically, what you see with the Red Navy in the 60's to 80's is quite a bit of smoke and mirrors, illusion, not reality if all you look at is the surface of their weapons systems.

Congratulations! You’ve just an amazing argument for drastically cutting the USN budget!

Was that you goal?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Meet Mig-23)

Not very long range on that one either. I'd say that until the Su-27 started entering service there wasn't much chance of escorts going out to support the bombers. I know the Soviets had dedicated interceptors with the range (Tu-128, MiG-25, MiG-31) but would they ever be used in such a way? They were generally to operate with land-based radar and command support for their interception duties, while going up against USN fighters far out over the ocean would be quite a different scenario.

 

[Dilandu]

Not very long range on that one either. I'd say that until the Su-27 started entering service there wasn't much chance of escorts going out to support the bombers. I know the Soviets had dedicated interceptors with the range (Tu-128, MiG-25, MiG-31) but would they ever be used in such a way?

They were actually used that way, at least Tu-128. I read about several exercises in 1970s (including Ocean-70, the largest Soviet naval exercise), when they specifically sortied covering naval forces in Arctic from OPFOR air force.

As far as I know, Navy didn't have any specific troubles operating with PVO Strany squadrons. The air defense of maritime borders were also amongst PVO Strany duties, so they have no objections against flying sorties for the fleet.

 

[Rule of cool]

They were actually used that way, at least Tu-128. I read about several exercises in 1970s (including Ocean-70, the largest Soviet naval exercise), when they specifically sortied covering naval forces in Arctic from OPFOR air force.

As far as I know, Navy didn't have any specific troubles operating with PVO Strany squadrons. The air defense of maritime borders were also amongst PVO Strany duties, so they have no objections against flying sorties for the fleet.

Sure, but even the longest range Cold War fighters aren't getting out to the GIUK Gap from the Kola peninsula. Once the surface chips pass out of fighter range they're on their own, and vulnerable even to the Invincible class' Sea Harriers let alone the USN and earlier RN attack carriers.