Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

Re the Medium Aircraft Carrier. I wrote this thread on Alternatehistory.com before I became a believer in the theory that "steel is cheap and air is free".

How could I miss that ? It's amazing ! Kind of RN building 4 Clemenceaus... better to have smaller but brand new ships than a collection of cranky WWII carriers (Audacious Illustrious Centaurs) impossible to modernize at a reasonable expanse...
 
@NOMISYRRUC When you say
They were built to the 35,000 ton aircraft carrier design which IOTL was proposed after the 1952 Carrier was abandoned.

Do you mean that one (Rebuilding the RN, page 56) ?


Because, you see, that's the one I've long identified as a possible join design with France - and the Clems. "1952 carrier" is too early and too big. CVA-01 is a mess, post 1960, too big and too late - even for PA58 Verdun.

But that one had the right tonnage and the right moment. 35 000 tons starting in 1954 ? this looks like PA54, better known as Clemenceau (Foch was PA55)

Give them the same BS-4 or BS-5 catapults (happened OTL, although I had the BS-5 story the wrong way - Ark didn't got it until 1960 - after Clem' and Foch)
 
NARC met to discuss sketch designs of Medium Fleet Carriers at Bath in 1956. Would be lovely to see what they were thinking by then.

It's highly likely everything went on the back burner during Suez and then the Defence White Paper of '57. Hence why things lost impetuous, especially after F.177 was cut. It was back to the drawing board, and while notional Carriers and hybrid GWS/CV carried on on the Admiralty's long term books. These placeholders likely stayed vague until the effect of new requirements on aircraft fed back what the future of aircraft looked like.

The future looked like A5 Vigilante and TFX. The feedback ftom OR.346 had designers sketching 90ft long lifts and deeming 225ft stroke catapults as the minimum for aircraft weighing over 60,000lb and potentially over 80,000lb.

One must a smidgen of pity for them going from Scimitar, Sea Vixen and the new N/A.39 Buccaneer to such monstrous beasts.
 
The Wikipedia entry on Mirage G & G8 doesn’t have the dimensions for the former, but according to it the latter was 61ft 8in long and 17ft 7in high.

The Mirage G dimensions were:
Length: 16.8m / 55ft
Span (wings swept): 7m / 22ft
Height: 5.35m / 17.5ft

Seems like it would just have fit on Eagle/Ark Royal’s lifts and in the hangar.

See this thread here for details:
 
The Mirage G dimensions were:
Length: 16.8m / 55ft
Span (wings swept): 7m / 22ft
Height: 5.35m / 17.5ft

Seems like it would just have fitted on Eagle/Ark Royal’s lifts and in the hangar.

See this thread here for details:
The F-4K Phantom, Scimitar & Buccaneer had folding noses that enabled them to fit the lifts of Centaur, Hermes & Victorious as well as Ark Royal & Eagle and my guess is that the nose of the Mirage G could have been made to fold too.

The swept wingspan of the Mirage G is less than the folded wingspan of the Phantom (27ft 7in) and Sea Vixen (22ft 3in) so a one-to-one substitution of Sea Vixens with Mirage Gs looks possible.
 
@NOMISYRRUC When you say
They were built to the 35,000 ton aircraft carrier design which IOTL was proposed after the 1952 Carrier was abandoned.

Do you mean that one (Rebuilding the RN, page 56) ?


Because, you see, that's the one I've long identified as a possible join design with France - and the Clems. "1952 carrier" is too early and too big. CVA-01 is a mess, post 1960, too big and too late - even for PA58 Verdun.

But that one had the right tonnage and the right moment. 35 000 tons starting in 1954 ? this looks like PA54, better known as Clemenceau (Foch was PA55)

Give them the same BS-4 or BS-5 catapults (happened OTL, although I had the BS-5 story the wrong way - Ark didn't got it until 1960 - after Clem' and Foch).
Yes, I do. It's also on Pages 336 & 337 of "British Carrier Aviation" by Norman Friedman, which is where I first heard of it.
 
I always loved the Vickers 581- series of VG designs. A pity they (and the Mirage G) were kind of wasted by AFVG.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
Re the Medium Aircraft Carrier. I wrote this thread on Alternatehistory.com before I became a believer in the theory that "steel is cheap and air is free".

Argus class Aircraft Carrier HMS Glorious

It became so big that I'm spinning it off Alternative Warships of Nations into its own thread...
www.alternatehistory.com
How could I miss that ? It's amazing ! Kind of RN building 4 Clemenceaus... better to have smaller but brand new ships than a collection of cranky WWII carriers (Audacious Illustrious Centaurs) impossible to modernize at a reasonable expanse...
It's kind of the RN 4 building PA58s and until the late 1960s it was the smaller but brand new ships and the cranky WWII carriers Ark Royal & Eagle impossible to modernise at a reasonable price.
 
Yes, they are a touch bigger than the Clems', which were 33 000 tons. As I mentionned many times, France wanted a third carrier - either PA58 Verdun or - out of despair the following year - a third Clemenceau, unmodified, called PA59. But from 1960 onwards the Force de Frappe started eating the french military budget like an interstellar black hole. Conventional forces had to go on a diet, although a booming economy lessened the shock. Until 1973 at least...

By the way, Arromanches soldiered on until 1974, so perhaps we could have bought one of your carriers for PA59...
 
Yes, they are a touch bigger than the Clems', which were 33 000 tons. As I mentionned many times, France wanted a third carrier - either PA58 Verdun or - out of despair the following year - a third Clemenceau, unmodified, called PA59. But from 1960 onwards the Force de Frappe started eating the French military budget like an interstellar black hole.

By the way, Arromanches soldiered on until 1974, so perhaps we could have bought one of your carriers for PA59...
Where does the 33,000 tons come from?

As far as I know the standard displacement of Clememceau and Foch as built was 22,000 tons which by the early 1980s had increased to 27,000 tons.

35,000 tons was the standard displacement of PA58.
 
The Mirage G dimensions were:
Length: 16.8m / 55ft
Span (wings swept): 7m / 22ft
Height: 5.35m / 17.5ft

Seems like it would just have fit on Eagle/Ark Royal’s lifts and in the hangar.

See this thread here for details:
Those dimensions are nearly the same as the F-8 Crusader's, which was 54ft 6in long and had a folded wingspan of 22ft 6in, so a one-to-one substitution of the Crusader with the Mirage G should have been possible as well
 
Yes, they are a touch bigger than the Clems', which were 33 000 tons. As I mentionned many times, France wanted a third carrier - either PA58 Verdun or - out of despair the following year - a third Clemenceau, unmodified, called PA59. But from 1960 onwards the Force de Frappe started eating the french military budget like an interstellar black hole. Conventional forces had to go on a diet, although a booming economy lessened the shock. Until 1973 at least...

By the way, Arromanches soldiered on until 1974, so perhaps we could have bought one of your carriers for PA59...
See Post 186 on Page 10 of this thread.
However, the numbers in the following paragraph are wrong.
Each ship operated 20 F-8E(FN) Crusaders and 40 Etendard IVM/P plus a mix of up to 20 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters for AEW, ASW, SAR and VERTREP or a smaller number of more capable aircraft. If it was the former the Aeronavale purchased 252 F-8E(FN), 582 Etendard IVM/P and 192 Zephyr trainers, but not necessarily 480 Alizes.
The last sentence should have read.
If it was the former the Aeronalvale purchased 126 F-8E(FN), 291 Etendard IVM/P and 96 Zephyr trainers, but not necessarily 240 Alizes.
That is 50% more ships and each ship carriers double the number of aircraft so 3 times as many aircraft were required. Except, that I multiplied the OTL numbers by 6 instead of 3.

Plus instead of 3 OTL-Charles de Gaulle class I'd have built 3 ALT-CdG class based on the PA58 hull, because of what @Palantir wrote in Post 198 of the thread.
4. Charles de Gaulle :
OTL CdG's hull was based on the Clemenceau's because the dry dock in Toulon couldn't support anything larger without an expensive reconstruction. As far as I'm aware, Brest has similar problems but to a lesser extent (the growth potential of the dry dock is less constraint). ITTL, the MN has already made the infrastructure investment to support the 3 P58 carriers, so wouldn't the ITTL CdG be based on their hulls?
 
As far as I know the standard displacement of Clememceau and Foch as built was 22,000 tons which by the early 1980s had increased to 27,000 tons.

Not quite. As designed, Clemenceau’s light displacement was 22,000 tons (Washington), with a standard displacement of 27,000 tons and full load of 30,000-31,000 tons.

After trials it was discovered that bulges were needed to reduce rolling. Foch got those while still building and Clemenceau had bulges added during its 1966 refit, following which displacement grew to ~24,000 tons light and ~32,500 tons full load.

By the way on another topic Clemenceau & Foch both had BS.4 catapults originally. Apparently the catapults were brought to BS.5 standard in the mid 60s to facilitate F-8 Crusader operations. It’s not clear what changes were required to go from BS.4 to BS.5… the length was unchanged.
 
Never heard about this, then again, carriers are not my area of expertise. All I can say is that the same Crusaders got blown flaps (adopted later by the USN).
Crusader on Clemenceaus more and more looks like a tight fit. Very tight. Out of 42 procured, more than 20 crashed or went to the drink. To the point that, by the late 80's, only 18 were left to agonize... pardon, modernize, waiting for the Rafale.

The Aviation Safety Database has a list of Crusader crashes (725 entries - frack) https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/type/F8/8

Got 16 entries for the Aeronavale on that page alone. Plus: 1+1+1+4 = 7 more on the previous pages, total 23 out of 42. A 55% loss rate - pretty atrocious.
Then again, USN Crusader attrition was pretty horrible too.
 
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Not quite. As designed, Clemenceau’s light displacement was 22,000 tons (Washington), with a standard displacement of 27,000 tons and full load of 30,000-31,000 tons.

After trials it was discovered that bulges were needed to reduce rolling. Foch got those while still building and Clemenceau had bulges added during its 1966 refit, following which displacement grew to ~24,000 tons light and ~32,500 tons full load.
The figures I quote were according to Roger Chesneau's aircraft carriers book.
 
The logical way forward looks like post-Suez Anglo-French collaborative efforts in carriers and aircraft. Just as it seems so on nuclear weapons, missiles and Submarines.
 
Alright then , if I can't have an improved Hermes for the RCN , would one of those the alt. History 40, 000 ton medium carrier's be workable for either the RCN or RAN ?
The problem with either an Essex or CVA 01 among other things is the manning issue.
Never mind A/C in the RCN manpower shortages have historically been one the major issues.
 
Alright then , if I can't have an improved Hermes for the RCN , would one of those the alt. History 40,000 ton medium carrier's be workable for either the RCN or RAN ?
The problem with either an Essex or CVA 01 among other things is the manning issue.
Never mind A/C in the RCN manpower shortages have historically been one the major issues.
Was your improved Hermes for the RCN instead of HMCS Bonaventure?
 
I stand corrected on Clems' tonnage and, accordingly, I'd say that PA58 Verdun would be a better match for @NOMISYRRUC carriers & TL.

If France had that third carrier, the plan was to go Vigilante, that is: supersonic nuclear strike, off a carrier deck: with a "compact", naval Mirage IV (IVM, closer in size and weight from a Phantom than a Vigilante).
Just like Polaris screwed Vigilante, however, so would Redoutable class SLBMs, down the road. Or land-based Mirage IVA.
 
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I would have loved to have seen the carrier based Mirage IV Archibald, pity it did not happen. We can dream I suppose.
 
Was your improved Hermes for the RCN instead of HMCS Bonaventure?
Not really sort as a replacement for Bonaventure. Although apparently there were people in the RCN who when discussion began on replacing Magnificent pushed for Hermes. As she was considered better able to handle the growth in aircraft size and weight .
 
Not really sort as a replacement for Bonaventure. Although apparently there were people in the RCN who when discussion began on replacing Magnificent pushed for Hermes. As she was considered better able to handle the growth in aircraft size and weight .
If you can increase Canadian defence spending by 50 to 100% from circa 1970 then you can have one.
 
Alright then , if I can't have an improved Hermes for the RCN , would one of those the alt. History 40, 000 ton medium carrier's be workable for either the RCN or RAN ?
The problem with either an Essex or CVA 01 among other things is the manning issue.
Never mind A/C in the RCN manpower shortages have historically been one the major issues.
Were the manpower shortages because there weren't enough Canadian males or because the Politicians/Department of Finance/Voters wouldn't spend enough money?
 
if I can't have an improved Hermes for the RCN , would one of those the alt. History 40, 000 ton medium carrier's be workable for either the RCN or RAN ?
The problem with either an Essex or CVA 01 among other things is the manning issue.
Would a Clemenceau have been an option? Either new build or maybe France would have been willing to flog one off to help pay for PA-58 Verdun.

If not, then I doubt something bigger and only a paper design would have much of a chance.
 
Is there a plausible way to have some or all of the 40 Buccaneer S.1s built as S.2s? In the "Real World" 50 S.1s were ordered, but the last 10 were completed as S.2s. Can the development of the Military Spey engine be accelerated to allow all 50 aircraft to be built as S.2s?

Earlier in the thread it was suggested that the RN would run out of Buccaneer S.2s before they could be replaced due to attrition and the airframes wearing out. Having 40 extra S.2s instead of the 40 S.1s would help, especially if the change of engines reduced the loss rate. Plus, in this "Version of History", it increases the potency of the RN's strike squadrons between July 1962 and August 1965 because those dates were when the first S.1 squadron and the first S.2 squadron commissioned in the "Real World"

Another way to keep the Buccaneer in service for longer is to build more of them. There were the (depending upon whom you believe) the 8, 10 or 12 backing aircraft for the RN that Dennis Healey cancelled in 1967. Plus the Buccaneer remained in production for the RAF until 1977 and the last batch (of 3 aircraft) was ordered in August 1975. Therefore, attrition batches (to keep the RN squadrons at full strength) could have been ordered until at least 1975.
 
Is there a plausible way to have some or all of the 40 Buccaneer S.1s built as S.2s? In the "Real World" 50 S.1s were ordered, but the last 10 were completed as S.2s. Can the development of the Military Spey engine be accelerated to allow all 50 aircraft to be built as S.2s?
Depends on how much rework it'd take to put the Spey engines in. Part of that was new nacelles, and I'm not sure how much of the nacelle structure was part of the milled frames.

If turning a completed S1 into an S2 involves replacing more than a couple of those milled frames, it's almost certainly not going to be cost effective. Cheaper to just build more birds as S2s from the beginning.


Another way to keep the Buccaneer in service for longer is to build more of them. There were the (depending upon whom you believe) the 8, 10 or 12 backing aircraft for the RN that Dennis Healey cancelled in 1967. Plus the Buccaneer remained in production for the RAF until 1977 and the last batch (of 3 aircraft) was ordered in August 1975. Therefore, attrition batches (to keep the RN squadrons at full strength) could have been ordered until at least 1975.
This is definitely the easier way.
 
I would have loved to have seen the carrier based Mirage IV Archibald, pity it did not happen. We can dream I suppose.


Hail this forum. Mirage IVA would have shrunk from Vigilante to Phantom size or a bit smaller.

"Mirage IV" designs (1956-1959) covered many different studies. Best way to put it is to think of the Mirage III as the F-104. And then the Mirage IV studies essentially cover F-105, Phantom, Vigilante and Hustler categories. Mirage IVC in particular was very broad: French F-105s and French Phantoms are right there. The designations are confusing and really don't help. As far as development was concerned, it was like
Mirage IVC
Mirage IVA
Mirage IVB
So alphabetic order not respected.
As for the Mirage IVM, it is a spinoff of the Mirage IVC, with the "M" standing for "Marine".
 
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Depends on how much rework it'd take to put the Spey engines in. Part of that was new nacelles, and I'm not sure how much of the nacelle structure was part of the milled frames.

If turning a completed S1 into an S2 involves replacing more than a couple of those milled frames, it's almost certainly not going to be cost effective. Cheaper to just build more [birds] aircraft as S2s from the beginning.
That's what I suggested in the first place! See below!
Is there a plausible way to have some or all of the 40 Buccaneer S.1s built as S.2s? In the "Real World" 50 S.1s were ordered, but the last 10 were completed as S.2s. Can the development of the Military Spey engine be accelerated to allow all 50 aircraft to be built as S.2s?
The key to building 40 Buccaneer S.2s instead of the S.1 is having the Military Spey engine 3 years earlier, see above.

Unfortunately, it can't because of what the copy of Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1965-66 on Internet Archive says.
  • Development of the Civil Spey engine began in September, 1959.
    • It first ran at the end of December, 1960.
    • Flight testing with 2 engines on a Vulcan bomber began on 12.10.61.
    • The first flight in a HS Trident airliner was on 09.01.62.
  • Development of the Military Spey engine began in November, 1960 - 14 months after the Civil Spey.
    • Bench testing began in December 1960 - 12 months later than the Civil Spey.
    • The first quantity production order was placed in January, 1962.
    • The first flight in a Buccaneer was on 07.05.63 - 16 months after the first flight of the Civil Spey on a Trident.
The best that can be done is start the development of the Military Spey at the same time as the civil version, i.e. September 1959, which is only 14 months earlier and bring the first quantity production order forward by 12 months from January 1962 to January 1961.

The Putnams on British Naval Aircraft (supplemented by the Aeromilitaria magazine and the UK Serials website) says:
  • 20 development aircraft (6 prototypes and 14 pre-production) with DH Gyron Junior engines were ordered in June, 1955.
    • They made their first flights between 30.04.58 and 16.12.61.
    • 6 were delivered to No. 700Z Flight, the RN's intensive flying trials unit in March, 1961.
  • 50 Buccaneer S.1 production aircraft with DH Gyron Junior engines were ordered in September, 1959.
    • The 40 S.1 aircraft that were built made their first flights between 23.01.62 and 31.12.63.
    • Deliveries commenced in February 1962 and the first operational squadron (No. 801) was formed in July, 1962.
    • No. 801 Squadron embarked in HMS Ark Royal on 20.02.63.
  • The Spey-Buccaneer was ordered by the Royal Navy in September, 1962, which is also when Jane's says the Military Spey was ordered into quantity production.
    • 2 aircraft from the pre-production batch were fitted with the engine and made their first flights with Speys on 17.05.63 and 19.08.63 respectively, which is 10 days later than the first flight date in Jane's 1965-66.
    • The first 10 production aircraft made their first flights between 06.06.64 and 08.03.65.
    • The Putnam's book says deliveries to the RN began in March 1965 and No. 700B, an intensive flying trials unit, was commissioned in April 1965. However, UK Serials says they were delivered between June 1964 and March 1965.
    • The first operational unit was No. 801 Squadron on 14.10.65 which embarked in HMS Victorious in June 1966.
    • The Buccaneer S.2 remained in production for the RN until 1968 and a total of 84 were built.
Because the development of the the Military Spey can only be advance by a year the best that can be done is to order the Buccaneer S.2 in January 1961 instead of January 1962.
  • In the "Real World" the last S.1 first flew on 31.12.63 & the first production S.2 first flew on 06.06.64.
  • So in this "Version of History" we're looking at the last production S.1 making its first flight on 31.12.62 and the first production S.2 flying on 06.06.63.
  • The closest "Real World" first flight dates to them are 24.12.62 for the 17th S.1 and 06.06.63 for the 28th S.1.
  • Therefore, either.
    • Production of the S.1 ends with the 17th aircraft in December 1962 and the first S.2 is the 18th aircraft which flies in June 1963 instead of January 1964, which increases the number of S.2s built for the RN by 23 for a total of 107.
      • Or
    • Production of the S.1 ends with the 27th aircraft which flies on 26.05.63 in both "Versions of History" and the first production S.2 is the 28th aircraft which flies on 06.06.63 in both "Versions of History" which increases the number of S.2s built for the RN by 13 for a total of 97.
  • Either way the number of Buccaneer S.1 squadrons formed is reduced from 3 to one or 2, but the first Buccaneer S.2 squadron is formed in October 1964 instead of October 1965 and embarks on an aircraft carrier in June 1965 instead of June 1966.
 
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So as per other threads on the Buccaneer, had the Gyron Junior been a more successful (more of them and more effort in). Then there wouldn't need to be a need for the Spey.

That AH comes about via several paths.
1. The Saro F.177 continues beyond 1958.
2. The B.108 to OR.339 is chosen as a more affordable and achievable near term solution.
3. The T.188 progressess at a more rapid rate and DH fixes the problems.

Alternatively....
A. AS P.151 is funded instead and post Supersonic recce bomber cancellation AS piles on the effort as this would remain the only product on order.
B. RR's RB.123 (I think but memory for precise number is failing me at the moment) is funded, drawing on RB.106 technologies.
C. Bristol BE.33 is funded.

And further Alternatively....
RR Medway has scaled down variant run parallel to RB.142 effort.
This places design in competition to pure turbojet variations of designs like Type 565, 567, 576, scaled P.1121, OR.339 options etc...
 
That's what I suggested in the first place! See below!

The key to building 40 Buccaneer S.2s instead of the S.1 is having the Military Spey engine 3 years earlier, see above.
But if you could re-engine those early S.1s without a major airframe rebuild, that would have been worth it.
 
From a relevant thread that lists Buccaneer variants including....

P.148: Retrofit of Spey to Mk.1
Aaannnddd....
Another useful quote from Alertken from another thread.
12/8/59, Medway out, Spey in BEAC DH.121 Trident
25/9/59: 50 Bucc S.1 ordered with DH GyJr in default of any other in the hoped-for timescale
But then from me.
S.1 finally ordered '59 "as is" cheapest option no engine change.
More
The main wing spars had 'o' ring holes sized to Gyron Junior. Originally Blackburn had tried to keep the option of larger holes for BE.33, but with time pressing, costs rising they had focus on a solution for the prototype and it stuck for production mkI.
The Spey was chosen in part because it could just about be fitted into them and it was a very tight installation.
 
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But if you could re-engine those early S.1s without a major airframe rebuild, that would have been worth it.
From a relevant thread that lists Buccaneer variants including....
P.148: Retrofit of Spey to Mk.1
For what it's worth the list of Brough projects on the last two pages of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" by Roy Boot says.
P.148 Retrofit of Spey into Buccaneer Mk 1 1967
According to the UK Serials website 20 out of 60 Buccaneer S.1s were written off by the end of 1966.
2 out of 6 prototypes and the other 4 were struck-off-charge 1964-67.​
5 out of 14 pre-production aircraft and of the other 8.​
2 were fitted with Spey engines and served as the S.2 prototypes.​
1 was dismantled at Holme-on-Spalding Moor 02.08.1964.​
13 out of 40 production aircraft and another pair would be written off in 1970.​

So it looks like a maximum of 30 aircraft (25 production and 5 pre-production) were available for conversion if fitting new engines was cheaper than building new aircraft.
 
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For what it's worth the list of Brough projects on the last two pages of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" by Roy Boot says.

According to the UK Serials website 20 out of 60 Buccaneer S.1s were written off by the end of 1966.
2 out of 6 prototypes and the other 4 were struck-off-charge 1964-67.​
5 out of 14 pre-production aircraft and of the other 8.​
2 were fitted with Spey engines and served as the S.2 prototypes.​
1 was dismantled at Holme-on-Spalding Moor 02.08.1964.​
13 out of 40 production aircraft and another pair would be written off in 1970.​

So it looks like a maximum of 30 aircraft (25 production and 5 pre-production) were available for conversion if fitting new engines was cheaper than building new aircraft.
And at least it was possible to swap engines, but your notes don't say how involved it was.

Since they didn't rebuild the rest of the S.1s, I suspect it involved some serious work.
 
And at least it was possible to swap engines, but your notes don't say how involved it was.

Since they didn't rebuild the rest of the S.1s, I suspect it involved some serious work.
I don't know the reason why the surviving S.1s weren't rebuilt. However, it might have been some or all of the following.
  • As you suggest it may have involved some serious (and therefore expensive) work. For example, the RAF wanted to convert its Vulcan B.1s to B.2s but (if I remember correctly) the cost of a converted B.1 was two-thirds the cost of a new B.2.
  • But even if no serious (and therefore expensive) work was required on the airframe there's still the cost of the 2 Spey engines.
  • New S.2s might have had different avionics and fitting them to the S.1s would have increased the cost.
  • The converted airframes would have had fewer flying hours left than a new aircraft. Therefore, it might have been more cost effective to buy new aircraft instead of converting old ones. That is, the first cost of a new Spey-Buccaneer might have been more than a converted Gyron Junior-Buccaneer but it was cheaper in the long run because the airframe would take longer to wear out and therefore would have had a longer service life.
  • The MoD thought that it had enough new Buccaneer S.2s to meet the needs of the RAF & RN and therefore there was no need to convert the surviving S.1s to S.2s.
 
Parts of Post 187.
Depends on how much rework it'd take to put the Spey engines in. Part of that was new nacelles, and I'm not sure how much of the nacelle structure was part of the milled frames.

If turning a completed S1 into an S2 involves replacing more than a couple of those milled frames, it's almost certainly not going to be cost effective. Cheaper to just build more birds as S2s from the beginning.
Post 191 in full.
But if you could re-engine those early S.1s without a major airframe rebuild, that would have been worth it.
Part of Post 194.
Since they didn't rebuild the rest of the S.1s, I suspect it involved some serious work.
According to Roy Boot on Page 155 of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter".
No major installation problems could be foeseen. In spite of an 80 per cent increase in mass flow, with careful tailoring of fire zones and ventilation, the jetpipe could be passed through the existing spar rings, and an average range increase of 80 per cent was predicted.
He was in charge of the Buccaneer S.2 project, so he should have known.

For what its worth, the next page has sectional drawings of the Gyron Junior installation in a S.1, the Spey in a S.2 and the Spey's two rivals which were a Gyron Junior derivative with an aft fan and a front-fan development of the Bristol Orpheus called the BS.55. According to Boot the aft-fan-Gyron-Junior had early availability, but had severe installation problems and the increase in range attainable was only 25%. Whereas little was known of the BS.55, its timescale was uncertain and the improvement in rage was only 30%. He ended the paragraph on the Spey proposal by writing that there was little doubt that a Spey installation was the preferred course.
 
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According to Roy Boot on Page 155 of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter".
No major installation problems could be foeseen. In spite of an 80 per cent increase in mass flow, with careful tailoring of fire zones and ventilation, the jetpipe could be passed through the existing spar rings, and an average range increase of 80 per cent was predicted.
Fascinating!

And that really changes the equation as to why the UK didn't convert the S.1s into S.2s...

I don't know the reason why the surviving S.1s weren't rebuilt. However, it might have been some or all of the following.
  • As you suggest it may have involved some serious (and therefore expensive) work. For example, the RAF wanted to convert its Vulcan B.1s to B.2s but (if I remember correctly) the cost of a converted B.1 was two-thirds the cost of a new B.2.
  • But even if no serious (and therefore expensive) work was required on the airframe there's still the cost of the 2 Spey engines.
  • New S.2s might have had different avionics and fitting them to the S.1s would have increased the cost.
  • The converted airframes would have had fewer flying hours left than a new aircraft. Therefore, it might have been more cost effective to buy new aircraft instead of converting old ones. That is, the first cost of a new Spey-Buccaneer might have been more than a converted Gyron Junior-Buccaneer but it was cheaper in the long run because the airframe would take longer to wear out and therefore would have had a longer service life.
Those all sound like Treasury being penny-wise and pound-foolish... As usual.

Spey engines and any new avionics would be just as required for new production S.2s as for rebuilt S.1s.


  • The MoD thought that it had enough new Buccaneer S.2s to meet the needs of the RAF & RN and therefore there was no need to convert the surviving S.1s to S.2s.
That makes more sense.
 
Re the issue of Buccaneer S.2, could they not order more S2s instead of Sea Harrier which doesn't exist in this TL? How much each type costs?
Also can some development money be saved by canceling P.1154 earlier? How much did it cost to cancellation? Can even say the same for TSR.2 being cancelled earlier, though the RAF would be furious, though they ended using Buccaneers anyway. And there is the F-111K too how much money was sunk into that program?
 
Fascinating!
Thank you.
And that really changes the equation as to why the UK didn't convert the S.1s into S.2s...
How?
No major installation problems could be foeseen. In spite of an 80 per cent increase in mass flow, with careful tailoring of fire zones and ventilation, the jetpipe could be passed through the existing spar rings, and an average range increase of 80 per cent was predicted.
My interpretation of the above is that no major (and therefore expensive) modifications to the S.1 airframes were required.
Those all sound like Treasury being penny-wise and pound-foolish... As usual.
They sound perfectly reasonable to me. Just because HM Treasury was wrong most of the time (which is exaggerated) doesn't mean it was wrong all of the time. "A stopped clock is right twice a day."
Spey engines and any new avionics would be just as required for new production S.2s as for rebuilt S.1s.
Which reduces the difference in cost between a new S.2 and a converted S.1.

It has been said about post World War II warships that "Steel is cheap and air is free" and I suspect that "Aluminium is cheap and air is free" can be said about post World War II aircraft, especially from 1960 onwards. Or put another way the cost of a modern aircraft is mainly its avionics and engines.

Therefore, the cost of 2 Spey engines and a set of S.2 avionics might have gone a long way towards buying a brand new S.2, which would have lasted longer than a converted S.1 and therefore been cheaper in the long term than converting S.1s to S2s. Spending more money "up front" because is cheaper in the long term is exactly the opposite of "being penny wise and pound foolish".

Earlier in the thread I gave the example of the Vulcan. The RAF wanted to convert its B.1s to B.2s but discovered that the cost of converting a B.1 to B.2 standard was two-thirds the cost of a new B.2.
That makes more sense.
Except that 46 Buccaneer S.2Bs were ordered for the RAF between 1968 & 1975 plus 4 for the RAE for a total of 50, of which 49 were built, because one of the RAE aircraft was cancelled.

However, buying more new aircraft instead of rebuilding existing aircraft was probably the cheaper option in the long term and there were only 25-30 aircraft available for conversion in any case.
 
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Plus there is the issue of the manhours and factory floor space required. If it required Brough to do the conversion then it may have diverted resources from the S.2 production line so you end up causing production delays.
 
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