Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

Re the issue of Buccaneer S.2, could they not order more S2s instead of Sea Harrier which doesn't exist in this TL? How much each type costs?
The last Buccaneers were ordered in August 1975 and the first Sea Harriers were ordered in September 1975 so yes more Buccaneer S.2s could have been ordered instead of the Sea Harrier. However, I don't know how much each type cost.
Also can some development money be saved by cancelling P.1154 earlier? How much did it cost to cancellation? Can even say the same for TSR.2 being cancelled earlier, though the RAF would be furious, though they ended using Buccaneers anyway. And there is the F-111K too how much money was sunk into that program?
According to Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled".
£21.0 million P.1154 cancelled February 1965.​
£21.0 million HS.681 cancelled February 1965.​
£195.0 million TSR.2 cancelled February 1965.​
£2.5 million AFVG cancelled July 1967.​
£46.4 million F.111K cancelled January 1968.​

He doesn't quote the cost of the BS.100 engine, which therefore may have been included in the costs of P.1154 and HS.681. But if TSR.2 is cancelled earlier that might increase the cost of developing the Olympus engines for Concorde. So to reverse the proverb, "What we gain on the roundabouts, we loose on the swings".

For what it's worth one of the reasons why I asked whether an earlier Spey-Buccaneer was possible (and it looks like it isn't) was for HMG to force the RAF to buy it in 1959 instead of the TSR.2 and therefore saving all of the £195.0 million that was spent of the project in the "Real World". However, the RAF would have wanted better avionics on its Buccaneers which would have increased the R&D & production costs and therefore reduced the difference between the cost of RAF-Buccaneer S.2 & TSR.2.
 
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Plus there is the issue of the manhours and factory floor space required. If it required Brough to do the conversion then it may have diverted resources from the S.2 production line so you end up causing production delays.
Possibly, but I think not, because the 49 Buccaneer S.2Bs built for the RAF & RAE were built at a slower rate than the 84 S.2s built for the RN, which makes me think that Brough had enough factory space and if fewer workers were laid off after 1968 enough manhours.

Also the conversions might have been done at a MoD facility, i.e. one of the RAF's maintenance units or one of the RN's aircraft repair yards.
 
The last Buccaneers were ordered in August 1975 and the first Sea Harriers were ordered in September 1975 so yes more Buccaneer S.2s could have been ordered instead of the Sea Harrier. However, I don't know how much each type cost.

According to Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled".
£21.0 million P.1154 cancelled February 1965.​
£21.0 million HS.681 cancelled February 1965.​
£195.0 million TSR.2 cancelled February 1965.​
£2.5 million AFVG cancelled July 1967.​
£46.4 million F.111K cancelled January 1968.​

He doesn't quote the cost of the BS.100 engine, which therefore may have been included in the costs of P.1154 and HS.681. But if TSR.2 is cancelled earlier that might increase the cost of developing the Olympus engines for Concorde. So to reverse the proverb, "What we gain on the roundabouts, we loose on the swings".

For what it's worth one of the reasons why I asked whether an earlier Spey-Buccaneer was possible (and it looks like it isn't) was for HMG to force the RAF to buy it in 1959 instead of the TSR.2 and therefore saving all of the £195.0 million that was spent of the project in the "Real World". However, the RAF would have wanted better avionics on its Buccaneers which would have increased the R&D & production costs and therefore reduced the difference between the cost of RAF-Buccaneer S.2 & TSR.2.
Hm, strange something as basic as the cost of an aircraft can't be found on the ww. FWIW, seems the unit cost before cancellation for F-111K was about 3 million GBP, and same for the TSR.2 projectet at 9.5 million. Of course there are different years different inflation and all that. You'd think a Buccaneer would be cheaper than an F-111?

So between cancelling the Sea Harrier and better managing of those cancelled program by saving some millions here and there, you'd think they would have enough money to at least buy enough Buccaneer S2 attrition replacements? How many extra they need at a minimum, maybe couple dozens?
 
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Pre-production S.1 airframe XK526 was taken in hand for conversion to S.2 Standard in Nov 1962 and first engine ground runs were in April 1963 with first flight on 17 May 1963 (delayed from the initially planned March-Dec 1961).

As well as the new engines the following work was required:-
1. Fitting of an improved electrical system with uprated alternators and modified gearbox.
2. Fitting Honeywell INS and other improved avionics
3. Reworked jet pipes canted slightly outwards. The shape was changed during testing when excessive drag was discovered.
4. Complete revamp of the air ducting system to cope with the greater output of the Spey. The Spey utilised two tappings (on 7th and 12th compressor stages) compared to one on the Gyron Junior.
5. New micro switches were fitted as existing ones were unreliable and prone to failure at inopportune moments.
6. New intakes and engine covers to cope with 80% increase in mass flow. There were initially some aerodynamic problems to sort before the shape could be finalised (RR had worries a “buzzing” would cause fatigue failures in the engines)
7. New wingtips to improve speed (which were later removed in RAF service due to overstress of wings)
8. Additional soundproofing around the cockpit (but it remained a noisy aircraft)

Despite the Spey already having civilian applications there were problems adapting it for use in the S.2. This version ran hotter. The bleed air system had to be modified after test bed engines failed when compressor blades became overloaded.

The first 3 S.2 (ordered as S.1 but built as S.2 as I previously noted) joined the flight test programme on 5 June, 30 June & Aug 1964.

Information from Kev Darling’s “ Blackburn Buccaneer” published by Crowood.
 
I love the Buccaneer S.2. Wonder if they would have fit on Clems carriers ? with BS.5 catapults, truncated to 171 ft (Ark & Eagle cats were 199 ft)
It wouldn't be too hard to switch SNECMA OTL military turbofan licence from Pratt JTF10 / TF30 to Spey. By the way, they did worked with RR... for Concorde's Olympus.
 
Hm, strange something as basic as the cost of an aircraft can't be found on the ww. FWIW, seems the unit cost before cancellation for F-111K was about 3 million GBP, and same for the TSR.2 projected at 9.5 million. Of course there are different years different inflation and all that. You'd think a Buccaneer would be cheaper than an F-111?
According to Charles Gardner's history of BAC the estimated costs of TSR.2 when it was cancelled were:
  • £270 million R&D
    • £210 million airframe R&D including the 9 development aircraft.
    • £60 million for the engines & electronics.
  • £510 million for the production of 150 aircraft (including the 11 pre-production aircraft) at £3.4 million each.
    • £315 million for the airframes at £2.1 million each.
    • £195 million for the engines and electronics.
  • £780 million total for 150 aircraft (including the 11 pre-production aircraft & excluding the 9 development aircraft) at £5.2 million each.
The equivalent costs of 50 F-111K and 100 AFVG were:
  • £125 million for 50 F-111K which by 1968 had escalated to £425 million.
  • £150 million for the UK share of AFVG's R&D costs.
  • £170 million for 100 AFGV at £1.7 million each.
  • £445 million sub-total.
  • £50 million for the extra training and ground equipment costs of using two types instead of one.
  • £495 million Grand Total.
Which saved £285 million, except it was reduced to £90 million after the £125 million spent on TSR.2 to cancellation & £70 million cancellation charges were added. But £90 million was a huge amount of money in 1965. It would have paid for CVA.01 and a second Type 82 destroyer at contemporary prices.

Except, its likely that TSR.2 would have cost a lot more than £780 million even if we only allow for inflation.
So between cancelling the Sea Harrier and better managing of those cancelled program by saving some millions here and there, you'd think they would have enough money to at least buy enough Buccaneer S2 attrition replacements? How many extra they need at a minimum, maybe couple dozens?
Don't know. Plus my plan was to spend the money that bought the first 34 Sea Harriers on some Hawkeye's and Greyhounds to replace the FAA's Gannets.
 
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£21.0 million P.1154 cancelled February 1965.
£21.0 million HS.681 cancelled February 1965.
£195.0 million TSR.2 cancelled February 1965.
£2.5 million AFVG cancelled July 1967.
£46.4 million F.111K cancelled January 1968.

Is it just me, or does the HS.681 looks like a bargain compared to all the others ? How far from its first flight, was it - when canned
?
 
As an aside to this, running concurrent design of Medway and Spey allowing Buccaneer S.1 to be powered by it.
The substantial increase in range and other performance figures would make Buccaneer derivatives more attractive to meet 'interim' requirements of GOR.339.
Essentially less new work needed to partially meet TSR.2 requirements.

This could see the winning TSR.2 design powered by such as an affordable option. Several companies favoured the Medway for weight reasons.

Spey Sea Vixen derivatives for interim GOR.339 and for a potential mkII FAW would rapidly emerge.
As would variations if the Scimitar.
It might have been that the last Scimitar variant the 576 would use reheated Speys rather than Avons.

It's even possible the T.188 would fly with them

Furthermore, Medway was looked at by the French for the Mirage IV, so had the Spey been on the books it's possible this would be looked at.

And of course Spey Hunters......a very cheap option for MRI Strike.
 
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Is it just me, or does the HS.681 looks like a bargain compared to all the others?
My guess is that it would have been a lot more expensive than the 66 C-130K Hercules transports purchased in their place and IIRC from "On Atlas' Shoulders" it's short field performance wasn't needed because the RAF had done its sums wrong and there were more airstrips in the Middle East that were long enough for a Hercules than originally thought.
How far from its first flight, was it - when canned?
I don't know, but it was probably well ahead of the P.1154 because 6 HS.681s were ordered on 05.05.64 and no P.1154s were ordered before it was cancelled. Incidentally the HS.681s were ordered on the same day as as the second batch of Buccaneer S.2s.
 
I love the Buccaneer S.2. Wonder if they would have fit on Clems carriers ? with BS.5 catapults, truncated to 171 ft (Ark & Eagle cats were 199 ft)
It wouldn't be too hard to switch SNECMA OTL military turbofan licence from Pratt JTF10 / TF30 to Spey. By the way, they did worked with RR... for Concorde's Olympus.
When this was discussed before (here or alternatehistory.com) the conclusion was that the catapults were powerful enough to launch a Buccaneer. However, the lifts & flight deck weren't strong enough and couldn't be strengthened because I & some others thought the ships were lightly built, but none of us could remember where we read it, so that may be a case of false memory syndrome.
 
Plus there is the issue of the manhours and factory floor space required. If it required Brough to do the conversion then it may have diverted resources from the S.2 production line so you end up causing production delays.
Based on this list:
Pre-production S.1 airframe XK526 was taken in hand for conversion to S.2 Standard in Nov 1962 and first engine ground runs were in April 1963 with first flight on 17 May 1963 (delayed from the initially planned March-Dec 1961).

As well as the new engines the following work was required:-
1. Fitting of an improved electrical system with uprated alternators and modified gearbox.
2. Fitting Honeywell INS and other improved avionics
3. Reworked jet pipes canted slightly outwards. The shape was changed during testing when excessive drag was discovered.
4. Complete revamp of the air ducting system to cope with the greater output of the Spey. The Spey utilised two tappings (on 7th and 12th compressor stages) compared to one on the Gyron Junior.
5. New micro switches were fitted as existing ones were unreliable and prone to failure at inopportune moments.
6. New intakes and engine covers to cope with 80% increase in mass flow. There were initially some aerodynamic problems to sort before the shape could be finalised (RR had worries a “buzzing” would cause fatigue failures in the engines)
7. New wingtips to improve speed (which were later removed in RAF service due to overstress of wings)
8. Additional soundproofing around the cockpit (but it remained a noisy aircraft)

Despite the Spey already having civilian applications there were problems adapting it for use in the S.2. This version ran hotter. The bleed air system had to be modified after test bed engines failed when compressor blades became overloaded.

The first 3 S.2 (ordered as S.1 but built as S.2 as I previously noted) joined the flight test programme on 5 June, 30 June & Aug 1964.

Information from Kev Darling’s “ Blackburn Buccaneer” published by Crowood.
That's all work that can be done at a repair station, not requiring a factory assembly line. My first job out of college was working at a major repair station in the US, fixing everything Boeing. And occasionally doing other interesting things, like making the LearStang (Learjet wing on P51D).
 
Yes I think based off that list the conversion could be done by the Royal Navy's Naval Repair Organisation and/or the Civil Repair Organisation. After all both were entrusted with a portion of the Sea Vixen Mk.1 to FAW.2 conversions.
The CRO's conversions were scaled back a little to save money, worked out at £106,000 per airframe, 11 conversions and 2 trial installation conversions came out at £1.32 million. The full conversion and modification bill came to something like £3.7 million.

My gut feeling is that even with a pessimistic estimate of about £110,000 per Bucc (given the metal bashing needed as well as electronics) you're looking at about £2.75 million for the 25 S.1 production aircraft (some Sea Vixen Mk.1s were not considered for conversion as being early production airframes they needed more modification work and that meant higher cost, I suspect the pre-production Bucc S.1s would be too 'hand built' for easy modification).

But something like £2-2.5 or even 2.75 million feels like a comparative bargain - the RN already knew Sea Vixen wouldn't last much beyond 1970 with Phantom on the way, spending that amount on Buccs seems more cost effective when you consider AFVG isn't likely to be in service much before 1978.
 
I just found this thread... so I'll make my comments even though they are 4 years late. ;)

Re-check your timeline.

The 50m BS-5 catapults in Clemenceau were the first ones installed in any ship (laid down Nov. 1955, launched Dec. 1957, commissioned Nov. 1961), with the second set going into Foch (laid down Nov. 1957, launched July 1959, commissioned July 1963)!

The very first RN BS-5 50m catapult and the first BS-5A 60m catapult were installed in HMS Eagle during her Oct. 1959 - May 1964 modernization (replacing her original BH-5I hydraulic catapults)!

HMS Ark Royal got a pair of 45m BS-4A catapults in a refit in 1960 (replacing her original BH-5I catapults), then got the BS-5 50m & BS-5A 60m pair in her Mar. 1967-Feb. 1970 modernization.


Therefore, there were NO BS-5 catapults of any type aboard Eagle or Ark Royal for the French to "look at and wonder" about.

They most likely asked the UK for "your most modern catapult capable of XXXXXlb at YYY knots end speed", and the answer was the basic BS-5.

All very confusing, but if we trust Mr Moulin as I quoted him here...

... the Clems initially had a 157 ft BS4, 95 kts @ 20 metric tons/44k lbs. The length is different from the RN carriers, but the result very similar to the 151 ft BS5 (97 kts @ 44k lbs).

Later, according to Moulin, a more powerful 169 ft bs5 with 110 kts @ 20 metric tons/44k lbs replaced (or upgraded) the BS4. Very likely for the Crusaders in the mid 60s, as the bs4 would have been very marginal (for the F-8J ~35 kts WOD). Would also be in line timewise, between the installations on Eagle and Ark Royal.

The Clems had higher steam pressure available which resulted in a performance for the 169ft Clem BS5 similar to the 199ft BS5 on Ark Royal (111 kts @ 44k lbs). It is about 12 kts short of the 211 ft C-11 catapult of the USN, again a very plausible fit with roughly the same steam pressure (~1kt per 3ft, the difference between the 151 ft and 199 ft bs5 being about 14 kts).
 
According to my copy of "Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990" by Leo Marriott.
  • £184,500,000 million for Invincible completed in 1980.
  • £220,000,000 million for Ark Royal completed in 1985.
It didn't have a cost for Illustrious.

Using the Bank of England inflation calculator.
  • £184,500,000 million in 1980 was worth £255,600,000 million in 1985.
  • £220,000,000 million in 1985 was worth £158,800,000 million in 1980.
As far as I know the major differences between Invincible and Ark Royal when they were completed were that:
  • Invincible had a smaller ski-jump than Ark Royal.
  • Invincible (and Illustrious) had ADAWS Mk 6 and Ark Royal had ADAWS Mk 10.
  • Invincible didn't have any Phalanx CIWS, but (Illustrious had 2 and) Ark Royal had 3.
My guess is that they made a negligible difference to the costs and the differences were all due to inflation.

Illustrious was completed in 1982 and according to the Bank of England inflation calculator:
  • £184,500,000 in 1980 was worth £220,200,000 in 1985.
  • £220,000,000 in 1985 was worth £191,100,000 in 1982.
And now a bit of fun.
  • The total cost of the Invincible class was £624,500,000 if we assume that Illustrious cost the same as Ark Royal.
  • Marriot wrote that the estimated cost of CVA.01 in 1966 was £70 million, which according to the Bank of England inflation calculator was worth.
    • £265,400,000 in 1980.
    • £319,400,000 in 1982.
    • £367,600,000 in 1985.
    • Total £924,400,000.
  • On that basis 3 CVA.01s built instead of the 3 Invincibles would have cost £331,900,000 or 50% more.
  • In the region of £1,000,000,000 was spent on the Nimrod AEW project between 1977 and 1986. That aircraft would not have been needed if 3 CVA.01s had been built instead of the Invincible class.
However, I repeat it's only a bit of fun, but it does support my theory that the building cost of 3 CVA.01s would have been no more than double the building costs of the 3 Invincibles and that the money spent on the Nimrod AEW would have made up the difference.

The cost for the Through Deck Cruiser was estimated at about 40 Million vs the 70 Million for CVA1 IIRC from Hobbs. The need for all the command and control, electronics etc made them very expensive. So with your calculation, the UK could have 2 CVAs for the cost of 3 Invincibles; from the numbers I gave throw in Ark's refit and you are there.

But then, what to fly from them? Can you wrestle the 50 F-4K and the 70 or so Buccaneer from the RAF? You have money from the Harrier Program, but that won't allow for many new airframes, maybe 20? Even the second hand F-4Js cost about 8 Million pounds per Frame in 1983/84.

And we need a crew. Let's say 2 Invincible crews (~2500) may get us one CVA (~3000) almost manned. The second would need maybe half a crew. So we are 2000 short. With a 3rd CVA, assuming 2 crews, we need 3500 extra.

With just 2 carriers with AEW and fighters, you could cut back on the Type42, but that's about it...
 
Had the earlier Medium Fleet Carrier gone ahead it's about 2400 personnel.
 
... the Clems initially had a 157 ft BS4, 95 kts @ 20 metric tons/44k lbs. The length is different from the RN carriers, but the result very similar to the 151 ft BS5 (97 kts @ 44k lbs).

Later, according to Moulin, a more powerful 169 ft bs5 with 110 kts @ 20 metric tons/44k lbs replaced (or upgraded) the BS4. Very likely for the Crusaders in the mid 60s, as the bs4 would have been very marginal (for the F-8J ~35 kts WOD). Would also be in line timewise, between the installations on Eagle and Ark Royal.

The Clems had higher steam pressure available which resulted in a performance for the 169ft Clem BS5 similar to the 199ft BS5 on Ark Royal (111 kts @ 44k lbs).

It is about 12 kts short of the 211 ft C-11 catapult of the USN, again a very plausible fit with roughly the same steam pressure (~1kt per 3ft, the difference between the 151 ft and 199 ft bs5 being about 14 kts).

Excellent, now we have a solid basis to compare RN, MN, and USN medium size carriers (broadly speaking), around, say, 1969.
C-11 variants vs BS-5 variants ?

C-11 and C-11-1225 feet (69 m)211 feet (64 m)39,000 pounds (18 t) at 136 knots; 70,000 pounds (32 t) at 108 knotsSCB-27C Essex-class conversions, USS Coral Sea, bow installations on USS Midway and USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, waist installations on USS Forrestal and USS Saratoga
C-11-2162 feet (49 m)150 feet (46 m)Waist catapults on USS Midway and USS Franklin D. Roosevelt
 
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So, let me try a direct comparison...

-Clemenceaus BS-5 catapults : ----44 000 pounds to 110 kts ------------------------------------------(out of 169 ft length)
-Audacious BS-5 catapults: --------44 0000 pounds to 111 kts ----------------------------------------(out of 199 ft length)
-Essex SBC-125 C-11 catapults: ---39 000 pounds, but to 136 kts (or 108 kts, but 70 000 pounds !)--(out of 225 ft length)

Am I correct ?

I can see why some Essexs could operate A-3 Skywarriors, something truly unthinkable on a Clemenceau or even an Audacious.

Also a "middleground" between 39 000 and 44 000 pounds - 42 000 pounds is exactly 19 metric tons. This is approximately the weight of a lightly loaded Hornet and Rafale; a heavily loaded A-7; and a bit more than either the Mirage G or Crusader. A Mirage F1 with some armement and fuel is also in that ballpark. Etendards are much lighter than that.

From memory, a 16 tons Mirage G touched down at 108 kt during its extensive flight program: November 1967 to January 1971 when it unfortunately crashed.
 
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The BS and C-11 series all go back to the original british steam catapult, the main differences are length and steam pressure.

For complete curves:
Long and short RN BS5 are here; subtract 32 kts shipspeed+engine power to get cat end speed. Clem BS5 should be very close to the long BS5.
1700651577896.png


And one c-11 version:

1700654854452-png.712285


~123 kts @ 44k lbs, 128 kts @ 39k lbs, 103 @ 70k lbs. This is given as "minimum end speed". How that relates to mean or maximum end speed is a complete mystery. And whether the bs5 numbers are mean or something else is unclear, too. Which version is used in the SACs is also not specified.

All that fuzziness is driving a numbercruncher by profession mad.

The c-11-2 should be about 20 kts less than the c-11(-1), but I have no numbers for it. Some SACs use it, but there may be airframe limits involved.
 

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Had the earlier Medium Fleet Carrier gone ahead it's about 2400 personnel.
That would be a doable number I think .
It's the same as Victorious in the 1960s, a bit more than Hermes in the 1960s and a bit less than Ark Royal in the 1970s.

According to Marriott in "Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990":
2,100 Hermes in 1959.​
2,400 Victorious in 1958.​
2,640 Ark Royal as flagship in 1971.​

According to the same source Eagle's crew was 2,250 in peace and 2,750 in wartime when completed in 1951. Unfortunately, it doesn't have her crew after the 1959-64 refit and 1960s editions of Jane's quote her crew when completed in 1951. However, my guess is that it would have been about the same as Ark Royal in 1971. I say about because Eagle had eight 4.5in guns & 6 Sea Cat Systems and Ark Royal had no fixed armament plus Eagle had different electronics including one Type 965 & Type 984M radar instead of 2 Type 965s and ADA which Ark Royal didn't have.

According to the same source Centaur's crew was 1,400 when completed in 1953, which doesn't seem right when Hermes had a crew that was 50% larger. Yes, Hermes had different electronics and in the 1960s a slightly larger air group (c. 28 v c. 24), but did that really require another 700 men? Jane's is of no help because 1960s editions continue to quote her complement when she was completed which was:
1,028 ship's company, including ship's air complement.​
1,330 to 1,390 including attached air squadron personnel.​

For completeness the crews for the following classes (according to Marriott) were:
582 (plus embarked troops) Fearless & Intrepid.​
885 Tiger & Blake as helicopter cruisers.​
980 (plus embarked troops) Albion & Bulwark as Commando Carriers.​
1,000 (approximately) the Invincible class.​

However, in "Modern Combat Ships 2: Invincible class" by Paul Beaver the Invincible class had a crew of 1,200 of which 1,000 was the ship's company and 200 was the air group.

According to Marriott CVA.01 had a crew of 2,750 to 3,200 (in 1966) and my guess is that the difference of 450 men depended upon the size of the air group.
 
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Well on the then Medium Fleet Carrier, it was like Victorious, powered by 3 sets of steam plant, had full CDS and Type 984, swapped six twin 3"/L50 for four twin 3"/L70. Only the airgroup was larger.
So crew numbers ought to similar.
 
Well on the then Medium Fleet Carrier, it was like Victorious, powered by 3 sets of steam plant, had full CDS and Type 984, swapped six twin 3"/L50 for four twin 3"/L70. Only the air group was larger.
So crew numbers ought to similar.
Specifications for the 30,500 ton Victorious in 1958 in Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990.
  • Machinery 111,000shp driving e shafts.
  • Fixed armament: six twin 3in.
  • Type 984 radar.
  • CDS.
  • Two lifts.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 38 aircraft - 12 Sea Vixens, 12 Scimitars, 4 AEW Gannets, 8 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew 2,400.
Specifications for the 35,000 ton Medium Fleet Carrier of 1954 from Rebuilding the Royal Navy.
  • Machinery 135,000shp driving 3 shafts.
  • Fixed armament: four twin 3"/L70
  • Type 984 radar.
  • CDS.
  • Two lifts.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 47 aircraft - 12 Sea Vixens, 12 Scimitars, 9 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 8 ASW Gannets, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew 2,400.
Specifications for the 53,000 ton CVA.01 of 1966 from Rebuilding the Royal Navy.
  • Machinery 135,000shp driving 3 shafts.
  • Fixed Armament: One GWS.30 Sea Dart SAM system.
  • Type 988 radar.
  • ADAWS.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 47 aircraft - 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 5 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew not stated, but Marriott who I quoted in Post 220 said 2,750 to 3,200.
So as you wrote Victorious and the 1954 Medium Fleet Carrier have similar machinery (3 shafts but the 1954 ship had 22% more horsepower), similar fixed armaments and similar electronics, but the 1954 ship has about 25% more aircraft.

I'm somewhat sceptical about the crews being the same though. Either Victorious has too many or the 1954 ship has too few or the 2,400 for the 1954 ship is with a Victorious size air group.

The last time we had a CVA.01 or British strike carriers related thread I did some guesstimates for Eagle's crew in her post 1964 configuration from some 1960s commissioning books that I found on line. If I remember correctly her Buccaneer and Sea Vixen squadrons had around 300 personnel each, which worked out at 25 men per aircraft.

Based on that I think that Victorious and the 1954 ship would have had ship's companies of similar size, but a 1954 ship with 47 aircraft aboard would have required another 225 men for the air group. Therefore, 2,400 for Victorious and 2,600 for the 1954 ship. However, my guess is that the 1954 ships would have carried the same size air group as Victorious in practice.
 
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Well on the then Medium Fleet Carrier, it was like Victorious, powered by 3 sets of steam plant, had full CDS and Type 984, swapped six twin 3"/L50 for four twin 3"/L70. Only the air group was larger.
So crew numbers ought to similar.
Specifications for the 30,500 ton Victorious in 1958 in Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990.
  • Machinery 111,000shp driving e shafts.
  • Fixed armament: six twin 3in.
  • Type 984 radar.
  • CDS.
  • Two lifts.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 38 aircraft - 12 Sea Vixens, 12 Scimitars, 4 AEW Gannets, 8 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew 2,400.
Specifications for the 35,000 ton Medium Fleet Carrier of 1954 from Rebuilding the Royal Navy.
  • Machinery 135,000shp driving 3 shafts.
  • Fixed armament: four twin 3"/L70
  • Type 984 radar.
  • CDS.
  • Two lifts.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 47 aircraft - 12 Sea Vixens, 12 Scimitars, 9 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 8 ASW Gannets, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew 2,400.
Specifications for the 53,000 ton CVA.01 of 1966 from Rebuilding the Royal Navy.
  • Machinery 135,000shp driving 3 shafts.
  • Fixed Armament: One GWS.30 Sea Dart SAM system.
  • Type 988 radar.
  • ADAWS.
  • Two steam catapults.
  • 47 aircraft - 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 5 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters.
  • Crew not stated, but Marriott who I quoted in Post 220 said 2,750 to 3,200.
The specifications for the 1954 Medium Fleet Carrier and CVA.01 have an uncanny similarity or at least they are uncannily similar to me and that's after allowing for CVA.01 having a 50% bigger hull, bigger lifts & longer steam catapults than the 1954 ship. They had same machinery, different fixed armament, similar electronics, the same number of lifts & steam catapults and the same size number of aircraft, which were or similar types.

Yet, CVA.01 required a crew that was 350 to 800 men (14 to 33%) larger. Therefore, the crew for the 1954 ship is too low (which has already been discussed) or the crew for CVA.01 is too large.

I think the difference of 450 men in CVA.01's crew according to Marriott is according to the size of the air group because the normal air group was to have been the 47 aircraft described about, but Hobbs wrote that it could be increased by 15 aircraft to 62. Another 15 Phantoms and Buccaneers at 250 men per aircraft equals 375 which increases the crew from 2,750 to 3,125 which is within striking distance of the maximum crew of 3,200 quoted by Marriott.
 
Clemenceau and Foch the incredible shrinking aircraft carriers.

Their crews according to editions of Jane's Fighting Ships that I have access to.
2,700 in the early 1960s.​
2,150 in the late 1960s,​
2,239 the early to middle 1970s and​
1,338 from the Jane's 1978-79 to 1986-87​

A reduction of 50% but throughout that period they had an air group of 40 fixed-wing aircraft and 4 helicopters.
 
The last time we had a CVA.01 or British strike carriers related thread I did some guesstimates for Eagle's crew in her post 1964 configuration from some 1960s commissioning books that I found on line. If I remember correctly her Buccaneer and Sea Vixen squadrons had around 300 personnel each, which worked out at 25 men per aircraft.
That sounds about right for air wing numbers.


Clemenceau and Foch the incredible shrinking aircraft carriers.

Their crews according to editions of Jane's Fighting Ships that I have access to.
2,700 in the early 1960s.​
2,150 in the late 1960s,​
2,239 the early to middle 1970s and​
1,338 from the Jane's 1978-79 to 1986-87​

A reduction of 50% but throughout that period they had an air group of 40 fixed-wing aircraft and 4 helicopters.
Getting rid of guns and older electronics allows a significant reduction in crews. IIRC the "Full AA" crew numbers for US battleships are a good 1000 or more over whatever the pre-war numbers were.
 
Clemenceau and Foch the incredible shrinking aircraft carriers.

Their crews according to editions of Jane's Fighting Ships that I have access to.
2,700 in the early 1960s.​
2,150 in the late 1960s,​
2,239 the early to middle 1970s and​
1,338 from the Jane's 1978-79 to 1986-87​

A reduction of 50% but throughout that period they had an air group of 40 fixed-wing aircraft and 4 helicopters.
"Honey, I Shrunk the Carriers"
The 1300 are ship only. From http://www.ffaa.net/ships/aircraft-carrier/clemenceau/caracteristiques.htm

"1338 hommes dont 64 officiers (1920 hommes avec le groupe aérien). En version porte-hélicoptère 984 hommes."

The 2700 may go back to the initial plan to carry about 60 aircraft.
 
You could lose more then a few crewman if a reasonable amount of automation could be used inside the engineering spaces .
By reasonable I wouldn't go to the lengths that civilian shipping lines went to and reduce to what seems to me to be dangerously low levels of manning. But surely there has to be some happy medium as it were.
It's always seemed to me especially British warships how the ships were operated and fought. The human factors always seemed to be an afterthought.
 
You could lose more then a few crewman if a reasonable amount of automation could be used inside the engineering spaces .
By reasonable I wouldn't go to the lengths that civilian shipping lines went to and reduce to what seems to me to be dangerously low levels of manning. But surely there has to be some happy medium as it were.
It's always seemed to me especially British warships how the ships were operated and fought. The human factors always seemed to be an afterthought.
Part of the reason to have so many "extra" bodies in a ship crew has to do with damage control. It takes a LOT of bodies to put out a fire in a surface ship that is properly subdivided like a warship.
 
I personally think the pa. 58/medium carrier solution we came up with in the £50 million thread shows pretty well that if the royal navy was willing to lower the ambition a little bit, they could have ended up as the second largest carrier force in the world for decades. Sure the carrier planes probably couldn't protect the ship against a full on blackfier strike, but anything less then that it could handle well (aka anything that happens that doesn't involve the Soviets wich in hindsight was everything) and would still probably survive in ww3, consdering the ussr dosnt have unlimited anti shipping capability and there all going to be focused on the usn. Plus they can do the anti shipping and anti shore stuff wile the usn can focus on fleet defense, an option no body else in nato can provide.
 
That's more or less where France stood with CdG 15 years ago: before the Q.E and Liaonings, it was the one country with the second-best carrier, after the USN but far ahead of Kuznetsov.
 
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Sure the carrier planes probably couldn't protect the ship against a full on blackfier strike
That's not actually a given.
Though it's more reasonable to assume effectiveness against a more limited strike by stand-off missiles.
The then CDS/984 combination proved quite effective at directing successful intercepts by Scimitars against high altitude bombers.
 
I personally think the pa. 58/medium carrier solution we came up with in the £50 million thread shows pretty well that if the royal navy was willing to lower the ambition a little bit, they could have ended up as the second largest carrier force in the world for decades. Sure the carrier planes probably couldn't protect the ship against a full on blackfier strike, but anything less then that it could handle well (aka anything that happens that doesn't involve the Soviets wich in hindsight was everything) and would still probably survive in ww3, consdering the ussr dosnt have unlimited anti shipping capability and there all going to be focused on the usn. Plus they can do the anti shipping and anti shore stuff wile the usn can focus on fleet defense, an option no body else in nato can provide.

An anglo-french alliance on carriers, done the right way at the right time (MFC + PA58), could result in a fleet of six or seven ships: 3 or 4 for the RN, no more than 3 for the MN.
Starting point could be somewhere in 1954, with the French "borrowing" BS-4 catapults for PA54 and PA55 - better known as Clemenceau and Foch.
British curiosity is picked, they suggest to grow the Clems a bit larger - to the size of their Medium Fleet Carrier, that is 35 000 tons. The French answer is two points
a) great minds think alike, we wanted to enlarge Clems to PA58 size, which matches you MFC
b) but we couldn't pay for PA58 alone; yet, if we share the cost, why not ?

OTL, PA58 came too late and ran into the Force de Frappe budget black hole. As for the british, post 1956 they dropped their MFC carrier studies.
When they returned to carriers in 1960, PA58 was toast and CVA-01 became an unstoppable train wreck.

So the gist of the idea is to look for the right juncture: probably 1954-56. By the way, Suez had the Arromanches on the French side, and his British Colossus / Majestic siblings - Ocean, Theseus - fighting side by side. Could help the case of a common fleet carrier (CFC).
 
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Getting rid of guns and older electronics allows a significant reduction in crews. IIRC the "Full AA" crew numbers for US battleships are a good 1,000 or more over whatever the pre-war numbers were.
The fixed armament of the two ships was eight 100 mm guns from completion until the 1980s when it became four 100mm guns & 2 Crotale SAM systems in the 1980s. Yet the crew reduced from 2,700 in the early 1960s to 1,338 in the late 1970s and remained at 1,338 after four of the 100mm guns were replaced by the 2 SAM systems.

I've not done a detailed study of the changes to the electronics, but @orlovsky might have.
 
"Honey, I Shrunk the Carriers"
The 1300 are ship only. From http://www.ffaa.net/ships/aircraft-carrier/clemenceau/caracteristiques.htm

"1338 hommes dont 64 officiers (1920 hommes avec le groupe aérien). En version porte-hélicoptère 984 hommes."
Your source says it's source was Combat Fleets 2000. I have access to the copy of Combat Fleets 1986/87 on Scribd, which says:

Peacetime:
As aircraft carriers: 64 officers, 476 petty officers, 798 other enlisted. Total: 1,338 men
As helicopter carriers: 45 officers, 392 petty officers, 547 other enlisted. Total: 984

Both correspond to contemporary editions of Jane's Fighting Ships. But Combat Fleets 1986/87 makes no mention of either being the ship's company only and there being another 582 in the air group for a total of 1,920 as an aircraft carrier.

However, I think 1,920 is more plausible than, 1,338 because the entry on Charles de Gaulle (still called Richelieu) says 1,150 ship's company & 550 air group for a total of 1,700 with accommodation of 1,850. Charles de Gaulle and the Clemenceau class carried air groups of similar size and the crews for the air groups of 582 and 550 are similar.

But, if the 1,338 that I quoted as the total crew was only the ship's company why did they have a ship's company of 984 when operating as helicopter carriers? Surely, the ships company would have been exactly the same regardless of whether they were operating as aircraft carriers or helicopter carriers. And I apologise for calling you Shirley.
The 2,700 may go back to the initial plan to carry about 60 aircraft.
It may be so, but for what it's worth, I only quoted their crews from editions of Jane's that were published after Clemenceau was completed. Editions from the 1960s had different numbers for their crews.

However, the 1,920 that you quote (1,338 ship's company and 582 air group) for 40 fixed-wing aircraft (plus 4 helicopters) equals 15 men per aircraft. An air group of 60 fixed-wing aircraft (plus 4 helicopters) would need another 300 men at 15 men per aircraft for the 20 extra fixed-wing aircraft. That would increase the total crew from 1,920 to about 2,200.
 
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An anglo-french alliance on carriers, done the right way at the right time (MFC + PA58), could result in a fleet of six or seven ships: 3 or 4 for the RN, no more than 3 for the MN.
Starting point could be somewhere in 1954, with the French "borrowing" BS-4 catapults for PA54 and PA55 - better known as Clemenceau and Foch.
British curiosity is picked, they suggest to grow the Clems a bit larger - to the size of their Medium Fleet Carrier, that is 35 000 tons. The French answer is two points
a) great minds think alike, we wanted to enlarge Clems to PA58 size, which matches you MFC
b) but we couldn't pay for PA58 alone; yet, if we share the cost, why not ?
Further to this the Brits look at the steam plant of the Clemenceaus and would start pondering if this is a better option than their domestic efforts on Y300.
Questions might be asked of the MN about French facilities for development of props and shafts. Could this be the way around UK limits if 50,000shp?

The Brits might even start asking why the extraordinary high hanger on the Clemenceaus and ask if a design with a lower hanger ceiling might improve other qualities.

A grand bargin could result. With the RN prepared to even discuss Type 984 and CDS.
 
But, if the 1,338 that I quoted as the total crew was only the ship's company why did they have a ship's company of 984 when operating as helicopter carriers? Surely, the ships company would have been exactly the same regardless of whether they were operating as aircraft carriers or helicopter carriers. And I apologise for calling you Shirley.

There was a complement crew of ~350 to get from PA2 to PA1 (not counting air crews). Those were the technicians for catapults and other necessary machinery like fresh water and steam accumulators, arrestor gears and other tasks that were not or to a lesser extent needed as PA2. Probably also included the personal for the hotel component for the additional technicians and the air wing. So no, aircraft carrier and helicopter carrier require different numbers of ship's company.

Moulin has initial crew at 2239, depending on air wing and mission. So there has to be some variation. In a french Senate report, we have 1800 PA1 and 1200 PA2/PH in the late 1980s.

https://www.senat.fr/rap/1988-1989/i1988_1989_0405.pdf P 19:

1700835902701.png
 
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I have a copy of Combat Fleets of the world 2001-2001. This is from the entry for R99 Foch.

Crew: Peacetime: as aircraft carrier: 1,338 tot. (64 officers, 476 petty officers, 798 other enlisted), plus 582 air group; as helicopter carrier: 984 tot. (45 officers, 392 petty officers, 547 other enlisted), plus troops.
 
My copy of Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74 mentions a complement of 2239 (179 officers, 2060 men) for Clemenceau and Foch.
 
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