Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

[NOMISYRRUC]

The nub of the problem is the increase in size of carrier aircraft. Seahawks and Sea Venoms are tiny compared with Sea Vixens and Scimitars let alone F4 and Bucs.

They're also a lot less capable and for what it's worth the Buccaneer, Sea Vixen & Scimitar folded into smaller packages than their USN equivalents.

Could smaller aircraft have been designed and built for the RN?

We see the F.177 chosen and remains on the books just past the 1957 Sandystorm. Only to then fall.

It appears to have had non-folding wings (27ft 1in v 27ft 7in of a folded Phantom) and was nearly as long as a folded Phantom too, so it would have consumed the same floor space as a Phantom and more floor space than a Sea Vixen whose wings folded to 22ft 6in.

And finally the P.1154 "Harrier".

Indeed it was because the wings folded to 22ft 0in instead of 27ft 7in on the Phantom and the lengths with their noses folded were about the same.

 

[zen]

It appears to have had non-folding wings (27ft 1in v 27ft 7in of a folded Phantom) and was nearly as long as a folded Phantom too, so it would have consumed the same floor space as a Phantom and more floor space than a Sea Vixen whose wings folded to 22ft 6in.

It's reasonable to assume that a wingfold and folding nose would be applied to the F.177. Exactly what results is debatable.

However F.177 is not the weight of an F4 of any variety.

Indeed it was because the wings folded to 22ft 0in instead of 27ft 7in on the Phantom and the lengths with their noses folded were about the same.

Which neatly avoids the point about weight and it's relationship with launch and recovery.
F4 weighs a lot relative to everything in contention bar the likely figures for Type 556 FAW, and Buccaneer.

 

[orlovsky]

I skimmed through the copy of "British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories" by David Hobbs on Scribd and couldn't find an estimate for the Through Deck Cruiser

I'm not sure if you're supporting me or you haven't understood me, because my argument has been that "steel is cheap and air is free" throughout this thread. Hopefully, we're in violent agreement.

The 15 F-4Js cost £33 million which worked out at £2.2 million per aircraft according to my source which is "Aircraft Illustrated Special RAF Phantom" by Peter R. Foster. It's in the top right paragraph of Page 31. What's your source? I'm not being funny-peculiar because my source may be wrong and your source may be correct.

Hobbes, British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, Chapter 17 Small carriers and Vertical Landing: Work under Healey, from a 8300 ton Heli Carrier for L 20 million to a 18750 ton "cruiser", room for nine Sea Kings, sea dart, for L 36 Million. 1971 estimate for the design L 44.2 million.

F-4J: 50 million$ for the mothballed aircraft. Total cost: "The overall total for the entire project was £125 million, which also included some extra funding for British Aerospace, Ferranti and Westinghouse for the part they would play in the programme." https://bpag.co.uk/the-day-of-the-j/ I think that was originally from a question on Hansard.

I'm just adding information - whether that is in support or not is then up to debate...

 

[Scott Kenny]

Finding crews for the new submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers & frigates also became harder because they usually had larger crews than the ships they replaced. Furthermore, their sophisticated equipment required their crews to be better trained than the crews of the ships that replaced so a larger proportion of the RN's personnel were ashore in the training schools than previously. These factors were probably more important than the reduction in total numbers after National Service ended.

Very much this!

IIRC, my buddy Steve's training pipeline as a submarine Interior Communications Electrician ended up being almost as long as the nuclear power pipeline's 2 years. All the alarm systems. All the electronic controls for the hydraulics, and the valve position indicators. The entire Ballast Control Panel. Central Atmosphere Monitoring System. Electrostatic Precipitators to take dust out of the air. The enormous 450VDC battery arrays found down forward in the bilge. Digital Depth Detectors. (I forget if he was also responsible for maintaining the scrubbers and burners, pretty sure those weren't part of his pain.) Then he shows up on a sub for a few years.

Rotates to shore after about 3-4 years at sea as an instructor, spends ~3 years teaching, then gets hit with the "Undocumented Troubleshooter" school, for when you've gone through all the references and it's still messed up. That's digging into the component level circuit diagrams and looking for spots that voltage could cross over, etc. Back to a sub for ~3 years. Back to teaching for ~3 years. Back to a sub for the final sea tour. Last shore duty is at the shipyard.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The RN has to find the sweet spot between the quantity of the aircraft and the quality of the aircraft.

It's reasonable to assume that a wingfold and folding nose would be applied to the F.177. Exactly what results is debatable.

I've got a copy of the Putnams on Saunders Roe aircraft.

None of the drawings show the wings folding and there's nothing in the text about the wings folding. Also is has a much shorter nose than the Phantom & Buccaneer therefore it looks like it could not be folded back very far (if at all) and it's already short enough to fit the 54ft long lifts on contemporary RN aircraft carriers.

However F.177 is not the weight of an F4 of any variety.

Fair enough, but it's not in the capability category of an F-4 either. Could the SR.177 carry four Sidewinders & four Sparrow/Sky Flash for interception duties or 10,000lbs of external stores? Were its combat radius, endurance and ferry rage comparable? Would its radar have been as good?

We may actually be trading more aircraft for a total reduction in capability.

Which neatly avoids the point about weight and it's relationship with launch and recovery.
F4 weighs a lot relative to everything in contention bar the likely figures for Type 556 FAW, and Buccaneer.

Who said I was avoiding that? I'd not thought of it.

One of the things I've thought about the two-Spey version of the P.1154RN is what if it had been designed as a CATOBAR fighter powered by two Speys in the first place instead of a modification of the CATOVL BS.100 version? It might have been possible to make it as capable as the Phantom and at the same time give it a slower landing speed than the Phantom due to the technological advances that had been made since the Phantom had been designed.

That is the Hawker Siddeley Spectre in this.

Re the Medium Aircraft Carrier. I wrote this thread on Alternatehistory.com before I became a believer in the theory that "steel is cheap and air is free".

Argus class Aircraft Carrier HMS Glorious

It became so big that I'm spinning it off Alternative Warships of Nations into its own thread...

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And finally the P.1154 "Harrier".

Which neatly avoids the point about weight and it's relationship with launch and recovery.
F4 weighs a lot relative to everything in contention bar the likely figures for Type 556 FAW, and Buccaneer.

Re weight & its relationship to launch & recovery and because you mentioned the P.1154 ...

My understanding is that the P.1154RN was so heavy that it had to be catapult launched which is why it had a tricycle undercarriage & the P.1154RAF had a bicycle undercarriage with outriggers.

Was it to land conventionally (making it a CATOBAR aircraft) or land vertically? And is CATOVL the acronym for an aircraft that is launched by a catapult and lands vertically?

Therefore, if it was to have landed vertically could P.1154RN have operated from aircraft carriers that the F-4K couldn't? I.e. Ark Royal before she was Phantomised, Eagle in her 1964 configuration, Hermes in her 1966 configuration and Victorious?

According to https://hushkit.net/2012/07/20/the-hawker-p-1154-britains-supersonic-jumpjet

If the first major problem facing the P.1154 was inter-service differences, the second set were technical. The P.1154 would be firing hot, after-burning exhaust from its front nozzles down onto runways or carrier decks. The temperature was great enough to melt asphalt or distort steel- this was a big problem (the Yak-141 would later encounter similar problems). It would also churn up a potentially dangerous cloud of any present dirt.

Added to this was hot gas re-ingestion (HGR). The aircraft would be ‘breathing in’ its own hot exhausts on landing. This re-circulating hot air would raise the temperature in the engine to more than it liked, a very serious problem.

Could the technical problems be solved in time to put the aircraft into service around the same time as the British Phantoms?

Re the service difficulties, they could have been avoided by having the RAF buy the developed P.1127 in 1962 (something it did 3 years later anyway) instead of the P.1154 which would make the P.1154 a RN only project whose R&D costs would have been paid with the money spent on the R&D of the Spey-Phantom and considering how expensive the Spey-Phantom was to build 170 P.1154RN for the RN & RAF (to replace the Sea Vixen and Lightning respectively) may not have been prohibitively expensive. The problem with that is what equips the 7 RAF GR squadrons that operated the Phantom before they were replaced by the Jaguar? Do the Hunter FGA.9 and FR.10 remain in front-line service for another half-a-decade?

 

[Yellow Palace]

Means you need much more employment in the shipyard, however, since you can't use the crew as apprentice-level workers.

That's not necessarily a bad thing, when you have a political commitment to providing employment for skilled trades, who are in turn likely to be cheaper than military personnel...

 

[zen]

My understanding is that the P.1154RN was so heavy that it had to be catapult launched which is why it had a tricycle undercarriage & the P.1154RAF had a bicycle undercarriage with outriggers.

My understanding is the RN insisted it was catapult launched, to presumably avoid long take off runs on the deck. Similarly with recovery with ordinance and a stout refusal to accept VL of any kind, arrestor strengthening had to be added.

Don't ask acronym questions, I have a alphabet soup of acronyms swimming through my brain!

Therefore, if it was to have landed vertically could P.1154RN have operated from aircraft carriers that the F-4K couldn't?

Yes, if the RN accepted rolling VL recovery would both easier and more certain.

Re the service difficulties, they could have been avoided by having the RAF buy the developed P.1127 in 1962 (something it did 3 years later anyway) instead of the P.1154

The prime problem there is trying to make a common aircraft for both services. When the components might permit an easier task with two different airframes.
I'm not sure IOC with P1127 is going to be faster than then projected P1154.

P.1154RN however would have to fly with AI.23 variant to meet IOC, as AI.24 (not foxhunting but earlier FMICW) was expected 1972 if not later.

Twin Spey solutions for RN requirements where produced for OR.346. A reduction in radius of action back to previous 300nm to 500nm would ease design within weight parameters.

 

[uk 75]

Just to clear up the P1127/P1154 saga.
The RAF only take P1127RAF as part of a package with Phantom and later Jaguar meeting the P1154 requirement. They never really see much use for VSTOL and P1154 RAF would probably have mainly used conventional take off and landing as Harriers did later on.

The P1154RN is deliberately turned into an F4 lookalike. I doubt whether the RN ever wanted it. Hence my suggestion that F8 for Hermes would have had to be forced on them.

Sea Harrier only emerges after the RAF are willing to provide Harriers for the Invincible class cruiser carriers. Early artists impressions show RAF markings on Harriers.

Though P1154RN and the various BAC/Vickers swing wing VSTOL fighter-attackers make nice models (I have some) the RN had enough bad experience with British aircraft to go for F4 and probably F111B.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Sea Harrier only emerges after the RAF are willing to provide Harriers for the Invincible class cruiser carriers. Early artists impressions show RAF markings on Harriers.

How did the RAF provide Harries to the RN? It didn't control the factory that made them. Hawker Siddeley and then the Government did. It didn't pay for them. The Government did. It didn't order the first batch of Sea Harries in 1975. The Ministry of Defence headed by Roy Mason did.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

A different version of this.

Argus class Aircraft Carrier HMS Glorious

It became so big that I'm spinning it off Alternative Warships of Nations into its own thread...

www.alternatehistory.com

The POD is still January 1946.

An even more austere Austerity Era forced the cancellation of the entire Audacious class, the entire Centaur class and the entire Tiger class. However, as a sop the Admiralty was allowed to complete Hercules and Leviathan by 1948.

Plans to fully modernise the Illustrious class were abandoned by 1948 in favour of 6 new carriers that would be ready in time for the "Year of Maximum Danger". However, the Illustrious & Colossus/Majestic classes would be refitted to operate 30,000lb aircraft. This looked affordable to the Admiralty of 1948 because the economy was on the mend. For example the personnel cuts of the late 1940s were avoided so there was no need to lay up the King George V class battleships 1949-50 and downgrade Vanguard to a training ship in 1949.

Four 35,000 ton carriers were built in the HMS Glorious thread and five or six 1952 Carriers were laid down from 1950 in this timeline and completed 1955-61. They would take the names of the first 5 or 6 RN aircraft carriers. That is Argus, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and the sixth if built would be called Hermes.

All would be built with a pair of BS.4 steam catapults with a stroke of at least 199ft (and preferably 250ft) and a fully angled flight deck. It might not be possible to complete the first ships with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT and if that was the case they were fitted with the Type 984M radar, ADA & DPT during their first major refits. The reason why they were all completed with fully angled flight decks was that that someone had the idea four years earlier.

They also had a modern torpedo defence system, AC electrical systems (which Ark Royal, Centaur & Eagle didn't) and modern accommodation for the crew. The latter may have helped the RN recruit and retain more men over the coming years.

Due to the theory that "steel is cheap and air is free" they don't cost 50% more to build than the 35,000ton design and some of the money used to build the fifth ship came from what was spent on Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle 1950-55 in the "Real World".

The 5 or 6 ships built form a homogenous class with hulls and machinery that should have had at least 20 years of life in them & even more if they had SLEP refits like the contemporary American super carriers. Therefore, a replacement class wasn't required until 1975 at the earliest. Furthermore, unlike the 5 strike carriers that the RN had in 1960 in the "Real World" these ships were capable of being made to operate the Buccaneer and Phantom at a price the British taxpayer could afford.

However, the other defence cuts of 1965-70 still happen and so the number of ships is reduced from 5 or 6 to 3 between 1965 and 1975 with one of the 3 surviving ships always in refit or reserve. Personnel constraints also mean that they couldn't be given full strength air groups either. The two active ships only had 1970s Ark Royal size air groups in peace which would be enlarged in war by breaking up the training squadrons.

There weren't any Centaur class ships to convert into commando carriers in this "Version of History" so Hercules, Leviathan and possibly Magnificent were converted in their place.

 

[uk 75]

The RAF were tasked with air defence of the fleet after the decision to cancel the carriers in 1966.
Between 1966 and 1970 the evolution of the new Command Cruisers allowed for the operation of RAF Harriers.
As you say it was the Government that took the decision but in this period it still opposed equipping the ships with anything other than Seakings.
The Conservative government in 1970 reprieves Ark Royal and development of the Sea Harrier is allowed.
But again as you say it is Roy Mason in 1975 who places the order.
Neither the RAF nor the RN see the Harrier as more than an inferior substitute for the Phantom.

 

[Archibald]

A different version of this.

Argus class Aircraft Carrier HMS Glorious

It became so big that I'm spinning it off Alternative Warships of Nations into its own thread...

www.alternatehistory.com

The POD is still January 1946.

An even more austere Austerity Era forced the cancellation of the entire Audacious class, the entire Centaur class and the entire Tiger class. However, as a sop the Admiralty was allowed to complete Hercules and Leviathan by 1948.

Plans to fully modernise the Illustrious class were abandoned by 1948 in favour of 6 new carriers that would be ready in time for the "Year of Maximum Danger". However, the Illustrious & Colossus/Majestic classes would be refitted to operate 30,000lb aircraft. This looked affordable to the Admiralty of 1948 because the economy was on the mend. For example the personnel cuts of the late 1940s were avoided so there was no need to lay the King George V class battleships 1949-50 and downgrade Vanguard to a training ship in 1949.

Four 35,000 ton carriers were built in the HMS Glorious thread and five or six 1952 Carriers were laid down from 1950 in this timeline and completed 1955-61. They would take the names of the first 5 or 6 RN aircraft carriers. That is Argus, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and the sixth if built would be called Hermes.

All would be built with a pair of BS.4 steam catapults with a stroke of at least 199ft (and preferably 250ft) and a fully angled flight deck. It might not be possible to complete the first ships with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT and if that was the case they were fitted with the Type 984M radar, ADA & DPT during their first major units. The reason why they were all completed with fully angled flight decks was that that someone had the idea four years earlier.

They also had a modern torpedo defence system, AC electrical systems (which Ark Royal, Centaur & Eagle didn't) and modern accommodation for the crew. The latter may have helped the RN recruit and retain more men over the coming years.

Due to the theory that "steel is cheap and air is free" they don't cost 50% more to build than the 35,000ton design and some of the money used to build the fifth ship came from what was spent on Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle 1950-55 in the "Real World".

The 5 or 6 ships built form a homogenous class with hulls and machinery that should have had at least 20 years of life in them & even more if they had SLEP refits like the contemporary American super carriers. Therefore, a replacement class wasn't required until 1975 at the earliest. Furthermore, unlike the 5 strike carriers that the RN had in 1960 in the "Real World" these ships were capable of being made to operate the Buccaneer and Phantom at a price the British taxpayer could afford.

However, the other defence cuts of 1965-70 still happen and so the number of ships is reduced from 5 or 6 to 3 between 1965 and 1975 with one of the 3 surviving ships always in refit or reserve. Personnel constraints also mean that they couldn't be given full strength air groups either. The two active ships only had 1970s Ark Royal size air groups in peace which would be enlarged in war by breaking up the training squadrons.

There weren't any Centaur class ships to convert into commando carriers in this "Version of History" so Hercules, Leviathan and possibly Magnificent were converted in their place.

Brilliant !

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usfiAsWR4qU

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Brilliant !

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usfiAsWR4qU

Zadok the priest
And Nathan the prophet
Anointed Solomon king
And all the people
Rejoiced, rejoiced, rejoiced
And all the people
Rejoiced, rejoiced, rejoiced
Rejoiced, rejoiced, rejoiced
And all the people
Rejoiced, rejoiced, rejoiced and said

 

[uk 75]

An impressive alt force.

name builder laid down trials com decom

Argus 195? 58? 61? 70
Crgus 195? 60? 62? 74
Eagle 195? 60? 62? 74
Furis 195? 61? 63? 83
Glrus 195? 61? 63? 85
Herms 195? 61? 63? 85


The Commando ships Leviathan and Hercules are converted (instead of Bulwark and Albion) in 1958 but fall victim to the 1974 Defence cuts with Courageous and Eagle.

Furious, Glorious and Hermes remain in service with one ship in service plus a second available at short notice.

The Nott Review in 1981 puts Furious and Glorious up for sale and converts Hermes to an ASW CVS but with cats retained.

The performance of Glorious and Furious in the 1982 Falklands crisis led to their retention but a new financial crisis in 1983 saw them sold to Brazil and India.

The Heseltine Review of 1984 reflects the impact of the Trident procurement decision and the need to replace the ageing Valiant and C class hunter killers. 8 T class SSN are ordered.

Hermes is withdrawn from service in 1985 but remains at Portsmouth until 1990 as an Accommodation and Training ship.

The question of new carriers becomes a major row in the Thatcher cabinet. Labour relations in the shipyards have been bad for years but come to a head after her 1987 election victory.

The decision to order 12 Burke class destroyers from the US leads to Heseltine walking out but ....

 

[Scott Kenny]

That's not necessarily a bad thing, when you have a political commitment to providing employment for skilled trades, who are in turn likely to be cheaper than military personnel...

At least in the US, E1-E3 are paid less than apprentices.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Following recent discussions with my father (ex-Nimrod) and a colleague (ex-RN submariner), I'm coming to think that the RN didn't, and possibly still doesn't, appreciate what an aircraft carrier brings to the party. It's not air defence or strike. It's the specialist enabling capabilities.

A lot of what's on the deck of a USN carrier fits in that box, and the RN either wasn't interested in developing the capability, or binned it to keep a semblance of fast jet capability around.

But really, you can do air defence and strike warfare tolerably well with missiles. Strike less so in the 1970-1990 era that's key. But carrierborne aircraft can do a lot of things that can't be done by shipboard systems:

• Airborne early warning - the Sea King AEW isn't in the same league as the E-2, and the Sea King only came along after it was demonstrated that something was needed
• Electronic countermeasures - the USN had the EA-6B, now replaced by the EA-18G. The RN wasn't interested in anything of the kind.
• ASW - the RN abandoned fixed-wing ASW aircraft as soon as helicopters were available. The USN kept the S-2, and later S-3, alongside helicopters, giving longer range and higher payload integral to the task force.
• Reconnaissance - the USN operated a range of dedicated reconnaissance platforms. The RN only ever used fighters or strike aircraft fitted with pods,, which couldn't match the capability of the RA-5 , and never fielded anything comparable to the USN's carrierborne ELINT platforms.
• Air refuelling - the RN only ever operated buddy refuelling, which is fine as far as it goes, and doesn't require dedicated airframes, but is less efficient so more airframes are needed for the same level of refuelling. The KA-3B, and even the KA-6D, offered more capability to USN carrier air wings.

Yes, the USN has partly abandoned a lot of these enabling capabilities since the Cold War. It's worth noting that this is often seen as a mistake, and the USN is looking at ways of bringing some of them back. If the RN had put more emphasis on carriers providing enabling capabilities, it might have been an easier sell.

 

[zen]

The conditions of a all new carrier fleet designed and built during the 50's effectively allows the RN to look to the USN and US aircraft.
With 199ft stroke catapults and uprated mk14 arrestor gear, they should be able to operate the majority of USN types.
This leaves domestic sourcing for crucial 'national interest' systems and those which deliver more affordable capabilities.
So we can envision N/A.39 still happening. But the issues around FAW are now resolvable by opting for the Demon and later F4. While Interceptor can either still resolve on Scimitar or be ditched for the Crusader.
This makes Scimitar numbers limited to an 'interim' nuclear delivery and potentially even fewer airframes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

An impressive alt force.

name builder laid down trials com decom

Argus 195? 58? 61? 70
Crgus 195? 60? 62? 74
Eagle 195? 60? 62? 74
Furis 195? 61? 63? 83
Glrus 195? 61? 63? 85
Herms 195? 61? 63? 85

No.

Four 35,000 ton carriers were built in the HMS Glorious thread and five or six 1952 Carriers were laid down from 1950 in this timeline and completed 1955-61. They would take the names of the first 5 or 6 RN aircraft carriers. That is Argus, Courageous, Eagle, Furious, Glorious and the sixth if built would be called Hermes.

In the HMS Glorious thread she was the last of 4 Argus class aircraft carriers ordered in 1951 and completed 1958-61. Her sister ships were Argus, Courageous and Furious. Some of the money required to build them was the money spent on completing Blake, Hermes, Lion & Tiger and rebuilding Victorious.

In this "Version of History" the long-lead items the first trio of ships (Argus, Eagle & Hermes) were ordered in 1948, the ships themselves were ordered in 1949 and laid down in 1950. Argus & Eagle (which took the place of the Real-Ark Royal & Eagle) were completed in 1955 to Standard B and Hermes (which takes the place of the rebuilt Victorious) was completed to Standard A in 1958. The second trio (Courageous, Furious & Glorious) were ordered in 1951 as part of the Rearmament Programme, but they weren't laid down until 1954 and were completed 1959-61 to Standard A. The completion of Furious in 1960 allowed Argus to be brought to Standard A in a refit that began in 1960 and the completion of Hermes in 1961 allowed Eagle to be brought to Standard A in a refit that began in 1961.

In the 1960s a pair of ships was usually having long refits, another pair was "West of Suez" and the third pair was "East of Suez".

The quartet of ships in commission operate air groups of about 40 aircraft which consisted of 12 fighters, 14 strike aircraft, 5 Gannets for AEW & COD and 9 helicopters for ASW, SAR & Vetrep. These were considerably less than the capacity of the ships but it was more than the 3 or 4 ships that were operational in the "Real World" carried. Furthermore, in an emergency they could be reinforced by transferring aircraft from between carriers or by breaking up the training squadrons.

The Commando ships Leviathan and Hercules are converted (instead of Bulwark and Albion) in 1958 but fall victim to the 1974 Defence cuts with Courageous and Eagle.

Furious, Glorious and Hermes remain in service with one ship in service plus a second available at short notice.

The Nott Review in 1981 puts Furious and Glorious up for sale and converts Hermes to an ASW CVS but with cats retained.

The performance of Glorious and Furious in the 1982 Falklands crisis led to their retention but a new financial crisis in 1983 saw them sold to Brazil and India.

The Heseltine Review of 1984 reflects the impact of the Trident procurement decision and the need to replace the ageing Valiant and C class hunter killers. 8 T class SSN are ordered.

Hermes is withdrawn from service in 1985 but remains at Portsmouth until 1990 as an Accommodation and Training ship.

The question of new carriers becomes a major row in the Thatcher cabinet. Labour relations in the shipyards have been bad for years but come to a head after her 1987 election victory.

The decision to order 12 Burke class destroyers from the US leads to Heseltine walking out but ....

No.

In the other thread.

It was still decided to withdraw from "East of Suez" by 1975 in 1967 and to bring it's completion forward to the end of 1971 in 1968. Ark Royal & Eagle decommissioned & scrapped in 1972 and Argus was transferred to the RAN in 1973 who renamed her HMS Australia to replace Melbourne & Sydney. The 1973 Oil Crisis forced the Government to pay off and scrap the 3 Centaur class commando carriers (because Centaur was converted too) but Courageous, Furious & Glorious were replaced by 3 new strike carriers called Indomitable, Implacable and Indefatigable, which were laid down 1973-78 and completed in 1980, 1982 & 1985 respectively. I.e. they were built instead of the Invincible class through deck cruisers.

In this thread.

The "East of Suez" withdrawal was also completed at the end of 1971 and as a result Argus, Eagle & Hermes were paid off in 1972, but they might have been retained as a source of spare parts for Courageous, Furious & Glorious. Argus may still have been transferred to the RAN to replace Melbourne & Sydney.

The 1973 Oil Crisis still forced the Government to pay off and scrap the commando carriers, but in this "Version of History" they were the Majestic class ships Hercules, Leviathan & Magnificent.

However, Courageous, Furious & Glorious are still replaced 1978-85 by 3 strike carriers named Indomitable, Implacable and Indefatigable, but they were 53,000 ton ships instead of 35,000 ton ships, that is the ALT-CVA.01 class that I've proposed that was powered by gas turbines instead of steam turbines.

They remain in service (with 2 ships operational and the third in refit/reserve) until replaced by 3 CATOBAR versions of the "Real World" Queen Elisabeth class.

 

[uk 75]

The numbers of new build carriers in your plan are difficult to reconcile with the resources available.
Three new build ships (your Argus, Eagle and Hermes) would take most of the 1950s to get into service.
I am not sure how many of the next three could get built as well.
The big problem which you rather gloss over is the three strike carriers you programme to replace them.
Leaving aside the opposition to carriers in the 1964 to 70 period not just amongst politicians but also senior naval officers, the design of a gas turbine ship able to use cats was beyond the state of the art in the UK at the time.

 

[uk 75]

Three core aircraft carriers able to operate Phantoms and Buccaneers built in the 1950s could have served into the 1980s as a credible force. France kept Clem. and Foch in service for about the same length of time.

Replacing them in the 1980s would have been tricky to say the least. With Trident and the SSN force to pay for as well as the ASW force NATO needed the RN would have faced hard choices.

A nuclear powered carrier was out of the question so a gas turbine carrier would be needed.

 

[Hood]

Airborne early warning - the Sea King AEW isn't in the same league as the E-2, and the Sea King only came along after it was demonstrated that something was needed

That's not entirely fair, a lot of work was put into AEW aircraft during the 1960s with some quite ambitious radar technology and cooperation with France too. It never came off - France not that enthusiastic, CVA01 cancelled and the radar tech needing a lot of cash and time (in hindsight with the Nimrod AEW saga it was probably a non-starter). But the idea was certainly there.
That the RAF took over seemed logically when NATO support came first as defence priorities changed and it seemed like land-based long-range cover could take over. It was a bad fudge but given the money issues it made sense - putting old radars on even older Shacks less so.

Electronic countermeasures - the USN had the EA-6B, now replaced by the EA-18G. The RN wasn't interested in anything of the kind.

Well there were ECM equipped Avengers and Gannets but they were in small numbers and didn't last long. The RN and RAF had a joint training unit with Canberras. The Admiralty seem to have thought that ship-based defensive ECM was the way to go. Saying that, the EW threat at sea was less during the 60s and 70s and even the RAF didn't really take ECM seriously until the late 70s.

Reconnaissance - the USN operated a range of dedicated reconnaissance platforms. The RN only ever used fighters or strike aircraft fitted with pods,, which couldn't match the capability of the RA-5 , and never fielded anything comparable to the USN's carrierborne ELINT platforms.

True, the RN didn't do well at recon it seems, though even the RAF relied on conversions rather than bespoke types. I guess Coastal Command handled most of the long-range task.

Air refuelling - the RN only ever operated buddy refuelling, which is fine as far as it goes, and doesn't require dedicated airframes, but is less efficient so more airframes are needed for the same level of refuelling. The KA-3B, and even the KA-6D, offered more capability to USN carrier air wings.

Lack of anything bigger sadly, though again, even the RAF took its eye off the ball on tanking. A P.139 based tanker would have been cool.

 

[Yellow Palace]

@Hood, I'm glossing slightly - the big buildup in specialist capabilities wasn't until after the RN's big decks went away, and budgets weren't on their side. But even in discussions around what became the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, there doesn't seem to have been much recognition that new aircraft carriers could offer more than fast jets.

 

[Hood]

That very true for the 1990s onwards, not really much emphasis on being anything other than a platform for strike aircraft against land targets. This of course made amalgamation and take over by the RAF much easier and was a risk perhaps the RN didn't foresee (or maybe one they did foresee and gave away as part of quid pro quo for RAF support in getting the funding). And of course without recon and AEW and EW any air power projection against a peer nation is unfeasible - even its own air defence is threadbare without NATO/US escorts. At the moment the carriers are a good training tool, enables a lot of flag waving and gives USMC pilots a chance to gorge themselves on curry and chips every other mealtime but it's not a realistic sovereign national combat capability.

Plus of course once they were out of fixed-wing they had no expertise to fall back on to. So rekindling more niche areas is harder. Plus the MoD can't afford to operate two air forces and "jointery" rules these days (hence why the first FAA F-35 squadron has only just appeared and why its largely a fig leaf designation).

Not to restart the whole "cats versus VTOL" thing, but not having them denied them access to the only fixed-wing solutions available from the USA. Arguably F-35 should bring a lot of inherent radar coverage and EW by itself, but of course AEW and ASW was always going to rotary-winged in the absence of any alternatives - especially once V-22-based dreams became unfeasible. Now that UAVs are getting closer to providing that kind of capability, things like Project Vixen and some form of catapultery for the carriers is higher on the agenda.

Whether having a few UAVs gives enough USP to fend off the RAF saying "we have xyz capabilities" is open to question (though with only a handful of Poseidons and a pair of Wedgies they don't have much spare capacity to brag about).

(And I still find the whole "we're a fast jet CVA and an LHA" combo unsettling)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The numbers of new build carriers in your plan are difficult to reconcile with the resources available.

Difficult, maybe. Implausible, certainly not. I've spent a lot of time thinking about how it could have been done and then writing the posts explaining how it was done.

Three new build ships (your Argus, Eagle and Hermes) would take most of the 1950s to get into service.

As I have already written the long-lead items for the ships were ordered in 1948, the ships themselves were ordered in 1949 and laid down in 1950. Argus & Eagle were completed in 1955 to Standard B. However, it was decided to complete Hermes to Standard A (i.e. the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT) which delayed her completion to 1958.

Therefore, my Hermes did take most of the 1950s to complete while my Argus & Eagle took half of the 1950s to complete.

I am not sure how many of the next three could get built as well.

You may not be sure, but I am. I've spent a lot of time thinking about how it could have been done and then writing the posts explaining how it was done.

The big problem which you rather gloss over is the three strike carriers you programme to replace them.

Gloss over! Rubbish! I've explained how a force of three strike carriers could have been maintained after 1972 at considerable length and after hours of work in this thread and others.

Leaving aside the opposition to carriers in the 1964 to 70 period not just amongst politicians but also senior naval officers, the design of a gas turbine ship able to use cats was beyond the state of the art in the UK at the time.

You started the thread and asked the question.

"Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?"​

I've spent a considerable amount of time providing plausible answers to that question.​

Which you dismiss in a few sentences.​

@Riain on alternatehistory.com who had the original idea of CVA.01 Mk2 with gas turbines instead of steam turbines provided an acceptable answer to the question "Where does the steam for the catapults come from?" (which if I remember correctly was asked by yours truly) in his thread "A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?" which I won't repeat here because to be brutally honest I'm wondering why I bother.

Instead read the thread yourself. To make it easier for you, here's the link.

A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?

“All modern aircraft have four dimensions: span, length, height and politics………..” – Sir Sydney Camm. Objectives - Prevention of Global War Winning the Cold War Maintenance of Britain's ability to fight limited war Chief of Staff guidelines for military policy 1956 UK war plans of the...

www.alternatehistory.com

There's also been a detailed discussion about how a CVA.01 size strike carrier powered by gas turbines could have had steam catapults on this forum, but I don't remember the name of the thread.

 

[uk 75]

I am always grateful for and always thank everyone who comes up with as much information as you have done. I normally try to make this clear and apologise if my responses have been rather short (I use a phone not a PC to surf).
I did say you have come up with a fine alt force.
You have answered most of my points.
I think your alt carrier force is a very reasonable approach.
I am a history educated former civil servant so my technical knowledge is limited at best.
Your three batches of carriers would have been a much better solution than what happened in reality. I am sure you would agree that getting them built and operated would have taken better political and industrial management than the UK had in the period. But yes, you have answered the question posed in the thread.

 

[uk 75]

I recall someone describing the new QE/PoW carriers as giving UK commanders a "golf bag" which could operate both fast jets and Chinook helicopters.
The change in role of carriers between 1991 and 2011 or so was caused by the disappearance of the Soviet Navy.
US carriers lost their S3 Vikings and the F18 Hornet replaced the F14 and A6. The strike role of carriers against targets in Iraq and the Balkans became their main role.
The new RN carriers were ordered following NATO operations over the former Yugoslavia.
The emphasis on their role working with the US Marines seemed reasonable in the era of the "War on Terror".
While the need for such operations has not gone away the aggressive stance of Russia and the building of a large Chinese Navy has made the need for improved ASW and area air defence real again.

 

[uk 75]

The difference in aircraft carried by US and UK carriers becomes stark when the Forrestal class enter service. There is no question of the British getting similar.ships. CVA01 (even the designation) is the closest they can get.
So the UK has no equivalent of the Skywarrior or the Vigilante. Purpose built Recce aircraft also require space on deck.
Once it overcomes its reservations about operating helicopters and fast jets together the RN is happy to stick to the Seaking as its ASW platform.
AEW planes require a catapult launcher so the RN has to put its systems on the Seaking/Merlin.
The RN is now showing interest in UAVs to solve its deficit of capabilities.

 

[orlovsky]

Following recent discussions with my father (ex-Nimrod) and a colleague (ex-RN submariner), I'm coming to think that the RN didn't, and possibly still doesn't, appreciate what an aircraft carrier brings to the party. It's not air defence or strike. It's the specialist enabling capabilities.

A lot of what's on the deck of a USN carrier fits in that box, and the RN either wasn't interested in developing the capability, or binned it to keep a semblance of fast jet capability around.

But really, you can do air defence and strike warfare tolerably well with missiles. Strike less so in the 1970-1990 era that's key. But carrierborne aircraft can do a lot of things that can't be done by shipboard systems:

• Airborne early warning - the Sea King AEW isn't in the same league as the E-2, and the Sea King only came along after it was demonstrated that something was needed
• Electronic countermeasures - the USN had the EA-6B, now replaced by the EA-18G. The RN wasn't interested in anything of the kind.
• ASW - the RN abandoned fixed-wing ASW aircraft as soon as helicopters were available. The USN kept the S-2, and later S-3, alongside helicopters, giving longer range and higher payload integral to the task force.
• Reconnaissance - the USN operated a range of dedicated reconnaissance platforms. The RN only ever used fighters or strike aircraft fitted with pods,, which couldn't match the capability of the RA-5 , and never fielded anything comparable to the USN's carrierborne ELINT platforms.
• Air refuelling - the RN only ever operated buddy refuelling, which is fine as far as it goes, and doesn't require dedicated airframes, but is less efficient so more airframes are needed for the same level of refuelling. The KA-3B, and even the KA-6D, offered more capability to USN carrier air wings.

Yes, the USN has partly abandoned a lot of these enabling capabilities since the Cold War. It's worth noting that this is often seen as a mistake, and the USN is looking at ways of bringing some of them back. If the RN had put more emphasis on carriers providing enabling capabilities, it might have been an easier sell.

Those are very good points. But let me put on the hat of the treasury.

Capabilities are nice to have, but do we really need them and what do they cost? What is the carrier mission?

The USN needed those capabilities for a mission to operate far from their own land based aircraft against the heavily defended bases and naval assets of a peer rival. It is no coincidence that many of them disappeared after the soviet collapse and are looked at again with the rise of China.

Does the RN want to play along? Or settle for ASW helos in the nato area? Or something inbetween?

AEW: The "something inbetween" became the Falklands, and there it was sorely missed.
ECM: Expensive, special aircraft take up a lot of place and require specialized technicians. Needed in the ASW role or in a Falkland scenario?
ASW: Fixed wing ASW, same as above. Nimrods, Orions or Atlantics have long range and endurance. Do we need them on the carrier where space is at a premium? In the nato area? In a Falkland scenario against a few SSK?
Recce/Elint dedicated aircraft, same as above.
Refueling dedicated aircraft, same as above.

So unless you want to play with the USN, the "medium" carrier needs ASW Helos, fighter and light attack aircraft with buddy refueling, and a solution for AEW. Otherwise, you need something like CVA-1 as a minimum, E-2, F-14, A-6, S-2, recce, tankers, ecm... and a really big budget.

Btw, even the USN had a tough sale budget wise with all the special aircraft types, nuclear super carriers and F-14/phoenix program.

 

[zen]

On a side technical.
The potential for UK RN EW kit on a variant aircraft operating from a CV deck does allow a 'random' and roaming snooping element in the gamut of intelligence collection for UK 'product' vis-a-vis Five Eyes etc...

An addition that would be desired in some corridors irrespective of any 'independent' capability.

As was UK snooping was of use in such matters.

In war it opens potential for further complication of defender's sensory systems.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Those are very good points. But let me put on the hat of the treasury.

Capabilities are nice to have, but do we really need them and what do they cost? What is the carrier mission?

The USN needed those capabilities for a mission to operate far from their own land based aircraft against the heavily defended bases and naval assets of a peer rival. It is no coincidence that many of them disappeared after the soviet collapse and are looked at again with the rise of China.

Does the RN want to play along? Or settle for ASW helos in the nato area? Or something inbetween?

AEW: The "something inbetween" became the Falklands, and there it was sorely missed.
ECM: Expensive, special aircraft take up a lot of place and require specialized technicians. Needed in the ASW role or in a Falkland scenario?
ASW: Fixed wing ASW, same as above. Nimrods, Orions or Atlantics have long range and endurance. Do we need them on the carrier where space is at a premium? In the nato area? In a Falkland scenario against a few SSK?
Recce/Elint dedicated aircraft, same as above.
Refueling dedicated aircraft, same as above.

So unless you want to play with the USN, the "medium" carrier needs ASW Helos, fighter and light attack aircraft with buddy refueling, and a solution for AEW. Otherwise, you need something like CVA-1 as a minimum, E-2, F-14, A-6, S-2, recce, tankers, ecm... and a really big budget.

Btw, even the USN had a tough sale budget wise with all the special aircraft types, nuclear super carriers and F-14/phoenix program.

The use case for strike carriers I've seen others talk about is supporting the Royal Marine mission in Norway - a mission clearly slotting into broader NATO strategy, that required a unique capability the UK was able to provide (large scale amphibious ops), and which clearly required full-capability strike carriers (both to support troops ashore and to fend off the expected Soviet air attacks).

For this use case:

AEW: Absolutely, yes.
ECM: A nice to have but not required
ASW: Within MPA range, so not needed beyond helos.
Recce/Elint: Even the USN was moving away from dedicated recon aircraft, so no. Buy TARPS.
Refueling: Again, not excessive ranges going on here, so buddy-tanking Buccs will be fine.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 291.

Link to Post 299.

I wrote those from memory. Since then I've checked my copies of Brown and Friedman.

Dimensions of British and French Aircraft Carriers

​

The lengths of PA54 and PA58 are their lengths between perpendiculars. However, I have been informed that France measures it differently and the between perpendiculars length is the same as the waterline length. I haven't included the 1954 Medium Fleet Aircraft Carrier because I don't know it's dimensions. However, it was intended to have boilers producing 135,000shp driving 3 shafts so my guess is that it would have had 3 sets of the Y.300 machinery projected for the 1952 Ship.

The 1952 Aircraft Carrier was smaller that I expected.

• It's length was nearly half way between the Audacious class and CVA.01.
• It was only 2ft 3in wider than the Audacious class and 7ft narrower than CVA.01.
• Most surprising of all was that it was 45ft shorted than PA58 and only 3ft beamier.

Friedman wrote that 3 BS.4 steam catapults and 3 lifts were wanted but the DNC said the choice was 3 catapults or 3 lifts not both. So they went for 2 catapults one of which was given a stroke of 200ft. However, all the drawings that I've seen of the ship show it with 2 lifts not 3. My version of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier would have had a pair of 199ft BS.4s arranged like the BS.5s on Eagle in 1964 and Ark Royal in 1970.

Friedman wrote that the Staff Requirement at December 1952 was:

30,000 at 154 knots​

40,000 at 136 knots​

60,000 at 113 knots​

Brown and Friedman wrote:

60,000lb maximum take-off weight.​

45,000lb maximum landing weight.​

Friedman also wrote that the deck (but, not the arrester gear) could have taken 60,000lb.​

The machinery that was estimated to weigh 3,800 tons which wasn't significantly heavier than Eagle's 3,660 tons despite producing 180,000shp instead of 152,00shp and there was sufficient boiler power for 240,000shp for catapult operation without loosing speed. However, he also wrote that the E-in-C was later asked to develop figures for an alternative plant with matched boiler and turbine power, so some loss of speed while catapulting would have to be accepted and that the estimated weight of the machinery increased to 4,125 tons in December 1952.

Friedman wrote that the requirement was for two (one if it could obtain all-round coverage) Type 984 radars feeding a 96-track CDS in a two-deck AIO with 10 intercept positions (as in Ark Royal) with DPT. However, he also wrote that this was reduced to a 48-track CDS and 8 intercept positions in February 1953. Both authors say that the original fixed armament of sixteen 3in/70 guns in 8 twin mountings was reduced to twelve 3in/70 guns in six twin mountings.

Brown wrote that the projected air group was 53 aircraft comprising 33 fighters, 12 strike aircraft & 8 ASW aircraft. Friedman (in Table 16-3 on Page 333) wrote that it was 82 in December 1953 comprising:

• 24 interceptors (Scimitars).
• 24 all-weather fighters (F3D Skyrays or F10F Jaguars).
• 12 strike aircraft (folding Canberras or A3D Skywarriors).
• 8 ASW aircraft (Gannets or S2F Trackers).
• 4 AEW aircraft (Skywarriors)
• 2 helicopters

However, it's likely that the ships would have been fitted for but not with an air group of that size had they been built and would normally have carried air groups that were the same size as Eagle after 1964 and Ark Royal after 1971.

Friedman wrote that as the ship was not much larger than Eagle and would probably have had much the same compliment (2,550 officers & ratings) hence the same weight of equipment. That's not much more than the 1954 Medium Carrier's crew which according to Brown was 2,400. That helps because it makes it easier to keep 4 out of 6 ships in commission in the 1960s and 2 out of 3 ships in commission in the 1970s.

Both say that the hangars were to have had a clearance of 17½ft but only Brown says that the beam of the ship was increased to 116ft by the time it was abandoned in favour of the Medium Fleet Aircraft Carrier.

Friedman didn't give any estimated costs. Brown says the estimated cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier was £26 million in 1953 and that the estimated cost of the 1954 Medium Carrier was £18 million. However, as these are British estimates be prepared for cost overruns and inflation. When I wrote the HMS Glorious thread I though that £72 million for 4 ships of the 1954 type was more cost effective than £78 million for 3 ships of the 1952 type. However, that was before I became a convert of the theory that steel is cheap and air is free and that the difference between the 1954 and 1952 ships would have been less than estimated.

 

[zen]

The 1952 effort started out with ambitions towards a Forrestal scale carrier.
But military drydock limitations forced a significant reduction in length and beam.
My understanding is compared to say a Essex class upgraded, the 1952 design is essentially a beefier beast in hullform.

The Medium Fleet efforts are as much the realisation that within drydock limitations and the 'new' Y300 plant units. They might as well cut down to 2 or 3 sets than effectively waste volume, crew, cost and resources trying to squeeze the 4 in for not much gain.
Consider if you can build three sets for 135 000shp to 150,000shp you get enough power to drive something Audacious sized at a reasonable speed.

Only had a new drydock, such as proposed for Davenport, of 1000ft length and 130ft or more breadth been available. Then the Forrestal scale ship would result.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The conditions of an all new carrier fleet designed and built during the 50's effectively allows the RN to look to the USN and US aircraft.
With 199ft stroke catapults and uprated mk14 arrestor gear, they should be able to operate the majority of USN types.
This leaves domestic sourcing for crucial 'national interest' systems and those which deliver more affordable capabilities.
So we can envision N/A.39 still happening. But the issues around FAW are now resolvable by opting for the Demon and later F4. While Interceptor can either still resolve on Scimitar or be ditched for the Crusader.
This makes Scimitar numbers limited to an 'interim' nuclear delivery and potentially even fewer airframes.

Does the majority of USN types include the F-4B Phantom II?

If it does a considerable amount of taxpayer's money and US Dollars would have been saved. I didn't write the name of the book that the following information came from, but I think it was Francis K. Mason's.

The original estimated R&D cost for the Spey-Phantom was £25.3 million February 1964, including £12.4 million for the engines. Which rose to £45.5 million in May 1965, including £28.7million for the engines. The bill was eventually £100 million or four times the original estimate.

In February 1966 Mr Healey had put the estimated cost of the F-4K/M at £300 million with £160 million of it to be paid by April 1970. However, on 04.04.66 the costs of the American aircraft (which were to be paid for over a 10-year period) were £590 million for the F-4K/M, £280 million for the F-111K and £210 million for the C-130K. My notes don't say the number of aircraft those sums were to buy and my guess is that the book didn't either or I'd have written them down.

I don't know the originally estimated unit costs of the Spey-Phantom, but it was £1.15 million for an F-4K & £1.2 million in mid-1966 on an order of 210. This had risen to £1.4 million for a F-4K and £1.5 million for an F-4M in May 1968. With the R&D cost included the price was about £2 million an aircraft for 170 aircraft. The author claimed that the F-4 programme was not a financial success and the aircraft wasn't in service any earlier than the P.1154 would have been which invalidated a major reason for its procurement.

Another page of notes that I have (which I think comes from the same book) says that the F-4M cost twice as much as a F-4D (but nobody knew this in 1964) that the F-4M cost £100 million to develop and that by 1968 F-4Ms were costing £2 million a copy. It also says that the RAF didn't need the extra power of the Spey and that Eagle's Phantomisation would have cost £5 million.

If HMG had decided to buy the developed P.1127 & J79-Phantom in 1962 instead of the P.1154 the RAF might have got the Harrier GR.1 two or three years earlier and the first squadron of J79-Phantoms would have embarked on a RN aircraft carrier in 1965 instead of 1970. The latter was due to making the decision to buy them in 1962 instead of 1964 and because the F-4K of this "Version of History" was as close to the standard F-4B as possible because the most of the changes made IOTL (and the time it took to make them) were unnecessary.

The £100 million spent on the Spey-Phantom's development would have been saved and the production costs would have been reduced because they were standard aircraft. Reducing the Sterling cost would have reduced the Dollar cost (pleasing HM Treasury no end) and many of the aircraft built would have been delivered before the devaluation of Sterling from $2.80 to $2.40 per Pound on 18.11.67 saving a few Dollars more.

Other savings many have been the £32½ spent on Ark Royal's Phantomisation refit and the £5 million that the cancelled Phantomisation refit of Eagle was estimated to cost.

In the "Real World" the RAF acquired 15 second-hand F-4J Phantoms in which were delivered in August 1984 which in this "Version of History" would have had much more in common with the Phantoms the RAF already had. According to Wikipedia the last Phantom built by McDonald Douglas was delivered to South Korea on 20.05.81. However, it would (as far as I know) have been prohibitively expensive to buy more new Spey-Phantoms 1970-81 due to it being a non-standard aircraft which (along with the reheated Spey) was out of production. Additional batches of Phantoms would have been considerably cheaper and would have been delivered sooner in "Version of History" because the British version had more in common with the standard version.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth (and because I have the Putnams British Naval Aircraft book open) the main modifications to the British Phantoms were:

• The introduction of the Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan in place of the American J79 turbojet.
• Folding nose radome to fid RN hanagar lifts.
• Larger flaps.
• Drooping ailerons.
• Slotted tailplae with reduced adhedra.
  • And.
• A new nose landing gear extending 40 inches compared to the American F-4s 20 inches.

The net results were:

• A 10mph reduction in approach speed.
• Improved catapult performance.
• 10% increase in radius of action.
• 15% increase in ferry range.
  • And.
• Better take-off, climb and acceleration.

Much of the airframe and most of the avionics were of British manufacture.

However, the improved performance wasn't worth the extra cost.

 

[orlovsky]

Friedman didn't give any estimated costs. Brown says the estimated cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier was £26 million in 1953 and that the estimated cost of the 1954 Medium Carrier was £18 million. However, as these are British estimates be prepared for cost overruns and inflation. When I wrote the HMS Glorious thread I though that £72 million for 4 ships of the 1954 type was more cost effective than £78 million for 3 ships of the 1952 type. However, that was before I became a convert of the theory that steel is cheap and air is free and that the difference between the 1954 and 1952 ships would have been less than estimated.

As for the overruns, when you are looking at building them mid 50s to early 60s, the first Forrestals were about 200 Mio $ (70 Mio £)/80k tons. Clemenceau class maybe 100 Mio $ (35 Mio £) / 32k tons. So for a 50k tons carrier you will probably end up with something around 50 Mio £.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 314.

According to the Aeromilitaria article 148 Sea Vixens were ordered in the "Real World" as follows:

• 78 FAW.1 on 17.01.55 including 21 pre-production aircraft.
• 40 FAW.1 on 01.06.59.
• 15 FAW.1 on 29.07.60, but the last 14 were built as FAW.2s.
  • And.
• 15 FAW.2 on 15.11.62. The last aircraft was complete in 1966.

That made a total of 119 FAW.1s (including 21 pre-production) and 29 FAW.2 built to 1966 plus 67 FAW.1 converted to FAW.2 1963-66.

The dates were:

• 20.03.57 - First flight of the first pre-production FAW.1.
  • The 21 pre-production aircraft were delivered between 12.06.57 and 27.05.59.
• November 1958 - Service trials by No. 700 Squadron "Y" Flight in Victorious & Centaur.
• 01.06.59 - Delivery of the first FAW.1.
• 02.07.59 - No. 892 Squadron the first operational Sea Vixen FAW.1 unit commissioned.
• March 1960 - No. 892 Squadron embarked in H.M.S. Ark Royal.
• 01.06.62 and 17.08.62 - First flights of the FAW.2 prototypes which were taken from the batch of 40 FAW.1 ordered on 01.06.59 and completed as Mk 2s.
• 08.03.63 the first flight of the first production FAW.2.
• December 1963 - No. 899 Squadron at Yeovilton received its first FAW.2s.
• December 1964 - No. 899 Squadron embarked in H.M.S. Eagle.
• This was the first of 5 squadrons to operate the FAW.2. The others were:
  • No. 766 from July 1965.
  • No. 893 from November 1965.
  • No. 892 from 1966.
  • No. 890 from August 1967.
• The rundown of the Sea Vixen force began in October 1968 when No. 892 Squadron decommissioned (to re-commission the next year as the one and only Phantom squadron) and the last squadron to go was No. 899 which decommissioned in 1972.

However, if the Phantom was selected in 1962 and entered service in 1965 production of the Sea Vixen would have been limited to the 133 aircraft ordered 1955-60 and the number of FAW.1s converted to FAW.2s would have been much smaller. No. 899 is likely to have been the only operational FAW.2 squadron because the others would have converted to the Phantom.

The money saved by building fewer new FAW.2s and converting fewer FAW.1s to FAW.2s would be used to cover the cost of the earlier Phantom purchase.

 

[zen]

Except ditching the WWII new builds for an all new CV fleet and just uprating the decks of a few Colossus and Majestic CVs to 30,000lb hits the decision for Sea Vixen. Especially once weight growth kicks in.
Starting in 1948 and getting worse by 1953.
Had DH abandoned the effort and refocused on the DH.116....
Or had Supermarine's Type 556 prototype been funded.....
Or the Type 576 in 1958.....

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As for the overruns, when you are looking at building them mid 50s to early 60s, the first Forrestals were about 200 Mio $ (70 Mio £)/80k tons. Clemenceau class maybe 100 Mio $ (35 Mio £) / 32k tons. So for a 50k tons carrier you will probably end up with something around 50 Mio £.

I ran the estimates through the Bank of England inflation calculator.

• £26 million in 1953 was worth:
  • £27.7 million in 1955 when I think the first pair of ships (Argus & ALT-Eagle) would have been completed.
    • These ships would have been completed to Standard B, i.e. no Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT (because I think they wouldn't have been ready in time) which would have reduced their cost somewhat.
  • £31.1 million in 1958 when I think the third ship (ALT-Hermes) would have been completed.
  • £31.2 million in 1959 when I think the fourth ship (Courageous) would have been completed.
  • £31.5 million in 1960 when I think the fifth ship (Furious) would have been completed.
  • £32.5 million in 1961 when I think the sixth ship (Glorious) would have been completed.
• £18 million in 1954 was worth:
  • £18.8 million in 1955.
  • £21.0 million in 1958
  • £21.2 million in 1959.
  • £21.4 million in 1960
  • £22.0 million in 1961.

According to Brown & Hobbs the 1950-58 rebuild of Victorious cost £30 million. However, Marriott, Jane's and Hansard say what I sometimes refer to as her "great rebuild" cost £20 million. I'm inclined to believe the lower figure. I ran that through the Bank of England Inflation Calculator too and £20 million in 1958 was worth:

• £16.8 million in 1953 which is £9.2 million less than the projected cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier in 1953.
  • And.
• £17.3 million in 1954 which is £0.7 million less than the projected cost of the 1954 Aircraft Carrier in 1954.

However, all that was left of the original Victorious after she was rebuilt was the hull and the turbines. Everything above the hangar deck was brand new and (according to Marriott) below the hangar deck virtually every compartment outside the machinery spaces was rebuilt, all wiring & piping was renewed and new auxiliary machinery was installed. Plus the boilers were replaced (but he wrote that it was as a result of the existing boilers being damaged in an accidental fire) and bulges were fitted.

Much of the above would have cost the same regardless of whether it was installed in an existing hull or a new hull.

• E.g. the Type 984 radar, CDS, DPT and the twelve 3in AA guns in six twin mountings.
• The steam catapults, arrester gear and lifts of the same capacity would have cost exactly the same too.
• But more powerful steam catapults, arrester gear and lifts of heavier capacity would have been fitted to the 1952 & 1954 Aircraft Carriers. They would have been more expensive, but the cost may not have increased in proportion to the increase in capability.
• On the other hand the 10 steam catapults fitted to Ark Royal, Centaur, Eagle, Hermes & Victorious 1955-64 in the "Real World" were 4 different lengths (2 x 139ft stroke, 2 x 145ft stroke, 5 x 151ft stroke and one x 199ft stroke) and in this "Version of History" the 6 new strike carriers that were completed 1955-61 were fitted with a total of 12 x 199ft stroke catapults which might have cost less per unit due to more being built and to the same design.
• It might be a similar story for the lifts because more units were built to fewer designs.
• And maybe the arrester gear too due to making more units to one design too, but I don't know as much about arrester gear.

Plus the cost of building a new hull might have been less (or at least the same) as rebuilding an existing hull and the cost of fitting it out might have been less (or at least the same as installing them in an existing hull) despite the new hull was larger.

This may be a false memory, but wasn't the cost of Eagle's 1959-64 refit (£31 million) the same as building a new ship with the same capability?

Therefore, my opinions are:

• That the 1952 and 1954 Aircraft Carrier projects can be regarded as the same "insides" as the rebuilt Victorious in a larger and completely new hull with new turbines.
  • The "insides" cost about the same.
  • The "outsides" (i.e. the hull) costs, more but we can can deduct the cost of rebuilding the hull of Victorious from that.
  • The cost of fitting the new boilers for Victorious can be deducted fro the cost of the machinery of the new ship.
• That a new ship built to the same standard as the 1952 and 1954 Aircraft Carriers 1950-58 might have cost less than the £20 million spent on rebuilding Victorious.

However, I'm sticking to the 1953 estimate of £26 million for the 1954 Aircraft Carrier. Therefore, the 6 ships that I want to be built would have cost a total of about £156 million at 1953 prices and £181.7 million after allowing for inflation if laid down in two batches of 3 in 1950 & 1954 respectively and completed in one group of 2 in 1955 and a second group of 4 completed 1958-61. That's not allowing for the pair of ships completed in 1955 having less expensive electronics.

Another thing that might have helped was "multi-year funding" because the Nimitz class ships Abraham Lincoln & George Washington were ordered together using this system and according to my copy of Jane's 1986-87 this reduced their cost considerably.

Originally it was estimated that a split buy of Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and George Washington (CVN 73) in two separate annual procurements would cost $8,024 million. The multiple-ship award in FY 1983 reduced the estimated cost for the two ships to $7,270 million, and it now appears that improved management practices and lower-than-estimated inflation will reduce the estimated cost still further to $6,516 million, with the prospect of even greater savings. It is also estimated that CVN 72 and 73 each will be delivered 22 months earlier than would have been the case had each ship been procured separately, and that Theodore Roosvelt (CVN 71) will be delivered in September 1986, 17 months earlier than originally scheduled.

Or put another way the original estimate was that $754 million would have been saved and the revised estimate was that $1,508 million would be saved. They were reductions of 9.4% and 18.8% respectively.

In my "Version of History" they ships were ordered in 2 batches of 3, with the long-lead items for the first 3 ordered in 1948 & the ships themselves ordered in 1949 and the second 3 were ordered in 1951. That may have been cheaper than ordering one a year 1949-54 and laying them down one a year 1950-55.

 

[JFC Fuller]

According to Brown & Hobbs the 1950-58 rebuild of Victorious cost £30 million. However, Marriott, Jane's and Hansard say what I sometimes refer to as her "great rebuild" cost £20 million. I'm inclined to believe the lower figure. I ran that through the Bank of England Inflation Calculator too and £20 million in 1958 was worth:

• £16.8 million in 1953 which is £9.2 million less than the projected cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier in 1953.
  • And.
• £17.3 million in 1954 which is £0.7 million less than the projected cost of the 1954 Aircraft Carrier in 1954.

The final settled cost for the Victorious rebuild was £19 million, the figure given in Hansard having been rounded up. The £30 million stated by Brown is erroneous.

Unfortunately, Brown's section on the medium carrier also confuses matters. In actuality, the ship estimated at £18 million is from 1953 and was almost certainly a two shaft design, probably a modernised Hermes in concept, not a three shaft medium carrier of the variety that made its way in to long-term planning in late 1954.