Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

[uk 75]

The UK might have been in a better place in the 1950s if the only carriers that it had in service were the four Centaur class.
By 1960 it would either have had to lay down a new larger carrier able to take F4 sized aircraft or developed the P1127 Kestrel VSTOL to operate from Hermes and Centaur.
Victorious, Eagle and Ark Royal allowef the RN to kick the procurement can down the road until 1966 became inevitable.
Once Polaris SSBNs and the hunter killer SSN peogramme arrive the carrier replacement becomes impossible.
The reverse has happened with QE and POW. Astute construction and Vanguard SSBN replacement has been delayed to the detriment of these capabilities.

 

[zen]

Astute construction and Vanguard SSBN replacement has been delayed to the detriment of these capabilities

Strictly not true, since it was involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq without a commensurate rise in defence allocation that sapped the RN of funds. In fact funding was progressively cut.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Parts of the Opening Post with the last two questions emboldened and underlined.

With the benefit of hindsight there have been lots of suggestions in threads here as to how the UK should have shaped its carrier airpower from1945 to the present day? But in reality could they have worked?
The background is well known The limitations of a feeble economy and industrial weakness.
The first decisions that could have been different were the choices of carrier to be retained or built postwar?
The next opportunity comes between 1957 and 1962 with the need to buy replacement ships.
Finally, the replacements for those ships in the period after the Cold War.
The aircraft for these carriers can either be limited to real world types or paper projects if you prefer.
I have looked again at the choices that were made.
Were Ark Royal and Eagle the best choice for fleet carrier construction instead of the larger Malta and New Zealand?
Could the Illustrious Victorious rebuild fiasco have been avoided?

Yes and yes.

Yes, Ark Royal and Eagle were the best choice for fleet carrier construction instead of the larger Malta and New Zealand. The latter were better on paper but the former had been laid down before the Point of Departure and the latter hadn't. I don't see the Atlee Government agreeing to the the cancellation of 2 partially completed ships in favour of starting 2 new ships even if the latter were much better designs.

Yes the Illustrious Victorious rebuild fiasco could have been avoided. One ways to do (for there are several) was to complete the other Eagle instead of rebuilding Victorious, by launching her, laying her up and then completing her at Portsmouth instead of rebuilding Victorious.

In common with Victorious she would have had two BS.4 steam catapults (but they'd have a stroke of 151ft instead of 145ft), a fully angled flight deck, a Type 984 radar, CDS, DPT and an AC electrical system. Her 4in armoured deck would have been replaced with 1½in NC armour (in common with Eagle in her 1959-64 refit) and instead of being fitted with six twin 3in gun mountings (like Victorious 1950-58) she might had her original armament of 8 twin 4.5in reduced to 4 twin 4.5in (like Eagle 1959-64). It was too early to have her completed with 6 Sea Cat systems (like Eagle in her 1959-64) refit so she was probably completed with a number of Bofors guns in twin Mk V mountings.

I thought that Eagle's 1959-64 refit was to have had her 4in armoured deck replaced with 1½in NC armour and the conversion of her DC electrical system to AC, but neither was done to save money. However, when I checked Brown's "Rebuilding the Royal Navy" it said that the armoured deck was replaced and made no mention of plans to make her an all AC ship, only that she now had a complicated DC/AC arrangement that was barely adequate for modern demands. However, I think the DC system should have been replace by AC as part of her 1959-64 refit even if it did make the refit more expensive. For the benefit of the people (like @Scott Kenny) who'll say the Treasury won't pay for it I'm prepared to sacrifice the 4 Battle class that at around the same time were being converted to fleet pickets at a cost of (if I remember correctly) £2.5 million each.

@uk 75 will you allow Ark Royal's problems to be avoided by having her preserved properly when she was laid up? Hermes was on the slipway for longer than Ark Royal and remained in commission with the Indian Navy until 2017 (as far as I know) without any of the defects that plagued Ark Royal. What did Harland & Wolff do that Cammell Laird didn't?

The Spey-Phantom cost so much to build that it would have probably been no more expensive (and possibly cheaper) to build it under licence. Paying for them in Pounds instead of Dollars would have helped the balance of payments and the cost wouldn't have increased as a result of the Sterling devaluation of November 1967, possibly avoiding the cancellation of 53 of the 223 aircraft originally ordered.

I'll go a step further than that and avoid the "P.1154 interlude" of 1962-65 in the "Real World" by having the Government decide to buy a developed Hawker P.1127 (i.e. the Real-Harrier) to replace the Hunter and build Phantoms under licence to replace the RN's Sea Vixens & then RAF's Lightnings in 1962. This saves the £21 million spent on the P.1154 and we might get the Spey-Phantom and Harrier in service 2 years earlier as a bonus. In which case Eagle would have been "Phantomised" as part of her 1959-64 refit and paid for with some of the £10 million saved from not converting 4 Battle class destroyers to fleet pickets.

@zen the UK doesn't abandon is ability to design advanced combat aircraft by doing this, because the UK cancelled P.1154 & TSR.2 in 1965 in the "Real World" and was still able to do Harrier, Jaguar, Tornado & Typhoon. In this "Version of History" P.1154 isn't cancelled in 1965 because it isn't started in the first place, TSR.2 is still cancelled in 1965, Harrier is started 2-and-a-bit years sooner and it still does Jaguar, Tornado & Typhoon. All I've done is saved 2-and-a-bit years of time & £21 million by avoiding the "P.1154 interlude" of 1962-65, improved the balance of payments because the US-built Spey-Phantoms of the "Real World" were paid for in Dollars and the UK-built Spey-Phantoms were paid for in Pounds Sterling in this "Version of History" and put more money into the British economy (by not putting it into the American economy) some of which is recovered through increased taxation.

In the "Real World" the first operational F-4K squadron was formed in 1969 but wasn't able to operate from a RN strike carrier until the next year because Ark Royal didn't complete her Phantomisation refit until 1970. The first operational F-4K squadron was formed in 1967 in this "Version of History" and embarked on a RN strike carrier in the same year because Eagle was Phantomised as part of her 1959-64 refit.

The other Eagle might have been able to launch Spey-Phantoms with her BS.4 catapults and may have had her blast deflectors & arrestor gear "Phantomised" during one of her refits between 1962 and 1967 in the "Real World". However, to be sure, she's fitted with two BS.5 steam catapults (one 151ft stroke in the bow & one 199ft stroke in the waist like Eagle in 1964 & Ark Royal in 1970), new blast deflectors and new arrestor gear in a refit that lasted from 1964 to 1966 (in place of the "Special Refit" that Hermes had 1964-66 in the "Real World") which enabled the second operational F-4K squadron to embark on her in 1967. (It would have been simpler to have had her completed with one catapult in the bow and another in the waist instead of two bow catapults, but I thought that was a step too far.)

Ark Royal was still Phantomised 1967-70 in this "Version of History" and to the same standard as her Real-1967-70 refit. This meant that she had 2 Type 965 radars instead of one Type 965 and one Type 984 like both Eagles and she didn't have ADA or CDS like Eagle & the other Eagle respectively. Furthermore, a third operational F-4K squadron wasn't formed to operate from her because one of the three remaining strike carriers was always in refit or reserve from 1970 so the RN maintained 2 air groups for them instead of 3. Fortunately, she was in much better material condition due to being preserved properly when she was laid up in the late 1940s.

The Real-1966 Defence Review cancelled the CVA.01 class, but Ark Royal & Eagle were to be "Phantomised" and remain in service until 1975 when the tasks performed by the fighter, strike & AEW aircraft aboard the strike carriers would be performed by RAF fighter, strike & AEW aircraft operating from shore bases at what was claimed to be less expense. The decision to withdraw from "East of Suez" was made in 1967 but Ark Royal & Eagle were still to remain in service until 1975. However, the Sterling Crisis later that year resulted in the completion of the East of Suez withdrawal being brought forward from 1975 to by the end of 1971, which resulted the withdrawal of Ark Royal & Eagle being brought forward to 1972 and the cancellation of Eagle's Phantomisation because she wouldn't be in service for long enough to make it cost-effective. The Labour Party under Harold Wilson lost the 1970 General Election and was replaced by the Conservatives under Edward Heath. They promised to reverse the decision to scrap the strike carriers whilst in opposition, but when in Government all they did was give Ark Royal a reprieve until 1978 when the first of what would become the Invincible class was planned to be ready.

However, in this "Version of History" Ark Royal, Eagle and the other Eagle were to be retained until 1975 under the 1966 Defence Review and only Ark Royal was to be Phantomised because the two Eagles had already been Phantomised. The 1968 cuts still brought the withdrawal from "East of Suez" forward from 1975 to the end of 1971 and the withdrawal of the 3 strike carriers forward from 1975 to 1972 but Eagle's Phantomisation couldn't be cancelled because she'd already been Phantomised as part of her 1959-64 refit. The Heath Government (which came to power in 1970) was able to reprieve the 3 ships until the late 1970s (because all 3 ships had been "Phantomised" 1959-70) when they would be replaced by 3 new strike carriers which were built instead of the Real-Invincible class.

One of the Eagles had a SLEP refit 1971-73 that cost at £25 million. That was done instead of converting Hermes to a commando carrier 1971-73 and keeping Albion in service until the 1980s. Hermes (which still paid off as a strike carrier in 1970) was sold or scrapped.

Before anyone asks ... "Where does the personnel to man 3 Audacious class strike carriers until at least 1978 come from?" ... This is the answer.

• One out of 3 ships would always be in refit or reserve, Ark Royal was in commission until 1978 anyway and Eagle was in commission until 1972 anyway, so we only need to find the personnel to man one strike carrier until 1978.
• It will be necessary to pay off other ships If the Treasury can't find the money to pay the extra sailors required to man the second strike carrier.
  • My solution is to pay Blake off in 1972 and abandon the reconstruction of Tiger in 1970. Although I'd prefer it if both ships weren't converted into a helicopter carriers in the first place.
  • That provides 1,770 men.
  • It also provides 8 Sea Kings to the second strike carrier's helicopter squadron.
• The remaining personnel would be provided by not forming the RAF's Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations (TASMO ) force, which in the 1970s consisted of one maritime fighter squadron of F-4Ks formed in 1969 with the aircraft that would have formed Eagle's Phantom squadron, one Buccaneer maritime strike squadron formed in 1969 with the aircraft that formerly equipped the Buccaneer squadron on Victorious and the Shackleton AEW squadron formed in 1972 to replace the flights of Gannet AEW.3s aboard the strike carriers.
  • So the personnel required for the one Phantom squadron, one Buccaneer squadron and a flight of Gannets in the RN for the second strike carrier would come from not having one Phantom maritime fighter squadron, one Buccaneer maritime strike squadron and one Shackleton AEW squadron in the RAF.
  • So HM Forces have exactly the same number of men, but a few hundred less would have been wearing light blue uniforms and a few hundred more would have been wearing dark blue uniforms.

I'll have to write another post about what happens after 1978 because that's really about how the UK affords to build and operate 3 strike carriers instead of the Invincible class.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to the opening post.

Is inventing the angled flight deck earlier allowed? Say someone thinks of it in time for the concept to be tested by Warrior in 1948 instead of the flexible deck trials she conducted in the "Real World". If it is allowed that would have been 4 years before the real trials aboard Triumph in 1952.

The head start of 4 years probably allows:

• Eagle to be completed with an interim angled flight deck, instead of an axial flight deck.
• Ark Royal to be completed with a fully angled flight deck instead of an interim angled flight deck, which in addition to making her a better ship 1955-67 may have reduced the cost of her 1967-70 refit.
• The rebuild of Victorious to have included a fully angled flight deck from the start. However, I doubt that the refit would have taken less time to complete or been less expensive as a result.
• Bonaventure & Melbourne to be completed with a fully angled flight deck along the lines of Karel Doorman & Minas Gerais when they were rebuilt in the "Real World".
• Some of the Colossus & Majestic class ships retained by the RN to be fitted with angled flight decks. Warrior was the only ship to have one fitted in the "Real World".
• Albion, Bulwark & Centaur to be completed with an interim angled flight deck, deck edge lift & a different hangar, like Hermes. Although I'm less confident about this one because the ships may have been too far advanced in 1948 for it to be done.
• In the USN all 15 Essex class that had the SCB.27 refit to have received angled flight decks in concurrent SCB.125 refits instead of only the last 3 having combined SCB.27 & SCB.125 refits, 11 of the remainder having separate SCB.27 & SCB.125 refits and Lake Champlain not receiving an angled flight deck at all.
• The Clemenceau and Forrestal classes to be completed with their port side deck edge lifts positioned further aft so they didn't interfere with their angled flight decks.

 

[Archibald]

Often think one big missed opportunity was the third Audacious. Since only those ships (with perfect hindsight, of course) had the right size and growth potential to go from Seafire to Spey Phantom in merely 15 years, 1945-1960. The extended Illustrious family was a red herring / lure (Victorious rebuild, plus five different rebuilds or close) and the Centaurs were probably too slow and too small.

In a rationale world, the RN would have three Audacious plus the 4 Centaurs, and nothing else (scrap the Vanguard, the Tigers, and the Illustrious: nine ships total, not worth rebuild).

Screw the Illustrious and sell all the Colossus / Majestic to other navies from 1955 onwards (even more than OTL)

So a seven carrier "baseline fleet", that would gradually and methodically be "deflated": only a few selected rebuilds, spread of three decades.
Of the three Audacious, Ark Royal would have to go early since it was in a very poor shape. Not worth Phantomizing, so screw it before 1965.

Eagle should be able to last until 1980, and - with enough pampering, the third one maybe to the end of the Cold War ? (perfect hindsight again !)

As for the Centaurs... the best they can do is Buccaneer but not Phantom. Yet they must have been extremely durable, if Hermes is to be considered.
My own take: keep the four as attack carriers as long as possible : up to Buccaneer S-2. Then two of them (Centaur and Albion) go to the OTL "commando carriers" (LPH) to replace the last Majestic / Colossus: so around 1960.

The other two go Hermes upgrade (Hermes and Bulwark), and at least keep Buccaneers for attack. Maybe Sea Vixens could be stretched a bit if no Phantom. Earlier SHAR could also happen.

So by 1965 the British fleet is still at 4 attack carriers plus two commandos. Usually one Audacious is paired with an attack Centaur
(Hermes and Bulwark) and the Audacious' Phantoms bring air cover for the two decks.
The Commando carriers live their lives of commando carrier. Also ASW with helicopters and Gannets. Gannet AEW soldiers on, better than nothing.

Then - if CVA-01 still fails, and considering economic hardships 1961-1981, that carrier fleet will have to shrink very quickly.

The solution: three or two Invincibles with Sea Harriers, to replace all the Centaurs. Screw all Centaurs by 1975.

This leaves the pair of Audacious. Again - time to retire good old Eagle, probably by 1975.

This leaves the last Audacious in service past 1980. Excess Phantoms and Buccaneers are dumped to the RAF, but in exchange the RN receives more SHARs than OTL. Or RAF Harriers, as done in the Falklands (even if RAF commanders would probably lose an arm and a testicle, rather than cross decking their Harriers with the Navy)

And this bring us to the end of Cold War...

Wanted to ask a question. If the number of Invincibles is cut to two (that SOB Nott intended to that in '81, before Falklands) could a last one Audacious [in acceptable shape], be afforded past 1980 ?

 

[EwenS]

Eagle (the original one from 1942) was only 26% complete when cancelled in Dec 1945. £1.95m spent. Cancellation was estimated to save £5.5m to complete to original design. Then add extra costs for completion to Eagle (ex Audacious) Standard, or more to Ark Royal standards. Where will money come from?

And why should it be in any better state to survive beyond 1980? After all it was laid down only 14 months after Audacious & 7 months after Ark Royal using the same poor quality WW2 era steel. How long does it spend on the slip and under what maintenance conditions?

And by the 1970s the standard of habitability in these ships was no where near the standard of new ships entering service. A problem for recruitment.

Colossus / Majestic. What was left in RN ownership at end of 1958 (Glory, Ocean, Theseus, Magnificent, & incomplete Leviathan) were offered for sale but no one wanted them. Everything that could be sold was in 1957/58. Warrior, partially modernised, to Argentina 1958. Vengeance to Brazil & Hercules sold 1957 and modernised to 1960/61.

Of the Centaurs only the much delayed and modernised Hermes could operate Buccaneer. Bulwark & Albion ended their fixed wing carrier days in 1958-60 with Sea Venom & Sea Hawk and hydraulic catapults. Centaur was partially modernised and ended with Scimitar & Sea Vixen. A lot of money required to bring them up to Hermes standard, and 5 year delay getting them into service. Or how long to modernis especially given structural work required for side lift? What does RN fill the gap with in the mid-1950s if these are not in service?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Before anyone asks ... "Where does the personnel to man 3 Audacious class strike carriers until at least 1978 come from?" ... This is the answer.

• One out of 3 ships would always be in refit or reserve, Ark Royal was in commission until 1978 anyway and Eagle was in commission until 1972 anyway, so we only need to find the personnel to man one strike carrier until 1978.
• It will be necessary to pay off other ships If the Treasury can't find the money to pay the extra sailors required to man the second strike carrier.
  • My solution is to pay Blake off in 1972 and abandon the reconstruction of Tiger in 1970. Although I'd prefer it if both ships weren't converted into a helicopter carriers in the first place.
  • That provides 1,770 men.
  • It also provides 8 Sea Kings to the second strike carrier's helicopter squadron.
• The remaining personnel would be provided by not forming the RAF's Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations (TASMO ) force, which in the 1970s consisted of one maritime fighter squadron of F-4Ks formed in 1969 with the aircraft that would have formed Eagle's Phantom squadron, one Buccaneer maritime strike squadron formed in 1969 with the aircraft that formerly equipped the Buccaneer squadron on Victorious and the Shackleton AEW squadron formed in 1972 to replace the flights of Gannet AEW.3s aboard the strike carriers.
  • So the personnel required for the one Phantom squadron, one Buccaneer squadron and a flight of Gannets in the RN for the second strike carrier would come from not having one Phantom maritime fighter squadron, one Buccaneer maritime strike squadron and one Shackleton AEW squadron in the RAF.
  • So HM Forces have exactly the same number of men, but a few hundred less would have been wearing light blue uniforms and a few hundred more would have been wearing dark blue uniforms.

I'll have to write another post about what happens after 1978 because that's really about how the UK affords to build and operate 3 strike carriers instead of the Invincible class.

Does the UK do things that differently from the US? When a US ship is in refit, it still has most, if not all, of the crew assigned. They're doing a lot of the maintenance work, and things like fire watch for when the Welders are going at it.

(...)
So by 1965 the British fleet is still at 4 attack carriers plus two commandos. Usually one Audacious is paired with an attack Centaur
(Hermes and Bulwark) and the Audacious' Phantoms bring air cover for the two decks.
The Commando carriers live their lives of commando carrier. Also ASW with helicopters and Gannets. Gannet AEW soldiers on, better than nothing.

Can't find a way to make the US Tracker/Tracer/Trader family work? Replace the nasty old radial engines with RR Dart turboprops.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Does the UK do things that differently from the US? When a US ship is in refit, it still has most, if not all, of the crew assigned. They're doing a lot of the maintenance work, and things like fire watch for when the Welders are going at it.

As far as I know, yes they do things that differently from the US, or at least they do when it's a long refit like Victorious 1950-58, Centaur 1956-58, Eagle 1959-64, Hermes 1964-66, Ark Royal 1967-70 and Hermes 1971-73.

 

[orlovsky]

I'll go a step further than that and avoid the "P.1154 interlude" of 1962-65 in the "Real World" by having the Government decide to buy a developed Hawker P.1127 (i.e. the Real-Harrier) to replace the Hunter and build Phantoms under licence to replace the RN's Sea Vixens & then RAF's Lightnings in 1962. This saves the £21 million spent on the P.1154 and we might get the Spey-Phantom and Harrier in service 2 years earlier as a bonus. In which case Eagle would have been "Phantomised" as part of her 1959-64 refit and paid for with some of the £10 million saved from not converting 4 Battle class destroyers to fleet pickets.

One problem with a 1962 UK F-4 - RN in 1964 , as quoted here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...order-of-battle-1975.20517/page-2#post-420283 :

#

Why were the drooped ailerons essential? 3 kts less for catapulting is nice, but even more important, the F-4J with them had a much lower landing speed, about 5-8 kts.
The original F-4B had a single engine approach speed of 150+ kts in hot conditions, the original mk13 arrestor could only take ~105 kts at that weight. An uprated version maybe 110-115 kts, but still no way to compensate with ship speed. With the F-4J, the gap would just shrink enough to get it into the 30 kts region.
The solution would be the mk14/dax2 arrester gear as in Ark Royal, but that was still several years away - Eagle trials in 1967?
Btw, I think that landing speed also eliminated the Phantom for the Clemenceau class at the time of the F-8 decision, along with the lack of money.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to the opening post.

Is taking less time to develop the steam catapult allowed? It's harder to do than invent the angled flight deck sooner (because all that required was for someone to have the "eureka moment" sooner) but it it had been I can see the following happening.

• The trials of BXS.1 aboard Perseus were brought forward from 1951 to 1947.
• Eagle was completed with a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4 catapults and an interim angled flight deck (like Ark Royal in 1955 in the "Real World") which made her a Standard C ship instead of a Standard D ship.
• Ark Royal was completed with a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4 catapults and a fully angled flight deck, which made he a Standard B ship instead of a Standard C ship.
• I've already suggested that the other Eagle be suspended in 1946 and then completed 1950-58 instead of rebuilding Victorious. See Post 243 for full details. However, in this "Version of History" she might have been completed with a 151ft steam catapult in the bow & a 199ft steam catapult in the waist instead of a pair of 151ft stroke steam catapults in the bow and they might have been BS.5s instead of BS.4s.
• Albion, Bulwark & Centaur (as suggested in Post 244) would be completed with an interim angled flight deck, deck edge lift & a different hangar, like Hermes, but they would also have a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4 steam catapults, which made them Standard B-Star ships instead of Standard D ships.
• In the "Real World" Centaur had a pair of 139ft stroke BS.4 steam catapults fitted in a refit that lasted from 1956 to 1958 which upgraded her from Standard D to Standard C. In this "Version of History" the refit upgraded her from Standard B-Star to Standard A-Star because she was fitted with the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT, but she also had the stroke of one of her BS.4 steam catapults upgraded from 151ft to 175ft, which was effectively the same standard as Hermes after her 1964-66 refit.
• In common with the "Real World" Hermes was completed to Standard A-Star in 1959. However, with one 175ft stroke BS.4 and one 151ft stroke BS.4 instead of a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4s, which apart from the pair of Sea Cat launchers, means she was completed to the same standard
• Melbourne & Bonaventure might have been completed in 1951 & 1953 respectively, instead of 1955 & 1957 and Sydney might have been refitted to the same standard as Melbourne 1951-55.
• The 1951 Rearmament Programme included 2 Colossus/Majestic class as first-line carriers and another 4 serving in second-line roles. The earlier availability of steam catapults might result in the 2 ships earmarked for service as first-line carriers being refitted to the same standard as Melbourne.
• In the "Real World" 9 Essex class were fitted with hydraulic catapults in SCB.27A refits, 6 received steam catapults in SCB.27C refits and one of the SCB.27A ships received steam catapults (and an angled flight deck) in an SCB.125A refit. In this "Version of History" all 15 ships were fitted with steam catapults and angled flight decks in combined SCB.27C & SCB.125 refits.

According to Freidman steam catapults were first suggested in 1936, but nothing was done at the time because at the time really powerful steam catapults weren't required. However, in 1944 the person that suggested it heard that the Germans were using slotted-cylinder steam catapults similar to the type that he proposed and in November of that year went to France and brought back enough German material to construct an experimental slotted-cylinder steam catapult as Shoeburyness.

Therefore, bringing the BXS.1 trials forward to 1947 is probably going too far, which is unfortunate, because it (in combination with completing the other Eagle instead of modernising Victorious and the earlier development of the angled flight deck) would have improved the quality of the RN's strike carrier force in the 1950s & 1960s.

E.g. Centaur as completed would have been able to operate the Sea Vixen & Scimitar and after the 1956-58 refit would have been able to operate Buccaneers. She'd also have been able to carry as many aircraft as Hermes. The 1956-58 refit also gave her the same standard electronics as Hermes and Victorious so the RN would have had 3 ships with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT in the first half of the 1960s instead of 2. This may have resulted in her remaining in service until the end of the 1960s instead of being paid off at the end of 1965.

 

[Archibald]

Btw, I think that landing speed also eliminated the Phantom for the Clemenceau class at the time of the F-8 decision, along with the lack of money.

Spot on. The Aéronavale badly wanted the Phantom, but it was marginal if not dangerous on Clems (just like A-7s, Hornets and Rafales).
Considering that, out of 42 Crusaders procured in 1963, barely 18 were left thirty years later for one last modernization: the Aéronavale had made the right choice... I shudder to think about Phantom loss rates on Clems. They were just too big.

 

[Archibald]

Eagle (the original one from 1942) was only 26% complete when cancelled in Dec 1945. £1.95m spent. Cancellation was estimated to save £5.5m to complete to original design. Then add extra costs for completion to Eagle (ex Audacious) Standard, or more to Ark Royal standards. Where will money come from?

Would it be feasible to scrap a) Vanguard b) the six Illustrious and c) the three Tigers - as soon as possible, starting from 1945 ? I consider those 10 ships as WWII relics, impossible to modernize in any satisfying way.

@NOMISYRRUC do you think it might have been feasible to get ride of all those lemons, and pour all the money wasted on them, into something useful for the RN ?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

One problem with a 1962 UK F-4 - RN in 1964 , as quoted here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...order-of-battle-1975.20517/page-2#post-420283 :

View attachment 712966#

Why were the drooped ailerons essential? 3 kts less for catapulting is nice, but even more important, the F-4J with them had a much lower landing speed, about 5-8 kts.
The original F-4B had a single engine approach speed of 150+ kts in hot conditions, the original mk13 arrestor could only take ~105 kts at that weight. An uprated version maybe 110-115 kts, but still no way to compensate with ship speed. With the F-4J, the gap would just shrink enough to get it into the 30 kts region.
The solution would be the mk14/dax2 arrester gear as in Ark Royal, but that was still several years away - Eagle trials in 1967?
Btw, I think that landing speed also eliminated the Phantom for the Clemenceau class at the time of the F-8 decision, along with the lack of money.

By one small problem do you really mean one very important problem? And does that make my proposal impossible?

The first flight of the F-4J was 27.05.66 with the first flight of the F-4K prototype was exactly one month later (27.06.66) and the first 3 production FG.1s arrived at Yeovilton on 29.04.68.

However, the first flight of the F-4K prototype was behind schedule because the reheated Spey took longer than expected to develop. This is why I expected the main objection to getting the F-4K in service in 1967 instead of 1969 to have been getting the reheated Spey engine ready by 1967 and that's despite starting development of the engine in 1962 instead of 1964.

I thought that the Spey-Phantoms had boundary layer control and the standard-Phantoms with J79 engines didn't. However, when I checked my copy of Roy Boot's "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" it said.

Both aircraft used boundary-layer control by blowing engine bleed over the flaps and leading edge.

And the next sentence is.

On the later F-4J variant the Phantom went for drooped ailerons, as was the case on the Buccaneer from the outset.

The rest of the paragraph was.

MACAIR then also discovered that the tailplane maximum lift was inadequate. They added a fixed slat to the tailplane leading edge, and were very interested to find that we had applied leading-edge blow to the Buccaneer tailplane to achieve the same objective. At a later date MACAIR introduced a wing leading-edge slat to improve combat manoeuvrability, reminding us of our original proposal for the Buccaneer wing.

Does that mean that the cause and effect was the opposite. That is Hawker Siddeley Brough (the sister design firm for the British Phantoms) used their experience on the Buccaneer to add drooped ailerons to the F-4K which MACAIR thought were such a good idea that they added them to the F-4J.

 

[orlovsky]

Spot on. The Aéronavale badly wanted the Phantom, but it was marginal if not dangerous on Clems (just like A-7s, Hornets and Rafales).
Considering that, out of 42 Crusaders procured in 1963, barely 18 were left thirty years later for one last modernization: the Aéronavale had made the right choice... I shudder to think about Phantom loss rates on Clems. They were just too big.

The F-8E(FN) turned out pretty reliable. Around 1980, the Aeronavale still had 30 of them. The reduced landing speed as with the F-8J was a good investment.
The high loss rates came later, but by then, the crusaders were way beyond their best before date...

As for the Phantom, hard to tell. I have not seen numbers for the loss rate of USN F-4J/retrofitted F-B models.

 

[orlovsky]

Does that mean that the cause and effect was the opposite. That is Hawker Siddeley Brough (the sister design firm for the British Phantoms) used their experience on the Buccaneer to add drooped ailerons to the F-4K which MACAIR thought were such a good idea that they added them to the F-4J.

Good question. They were mentioned in the RAN Melbourne replacement study. I think this goes before the official F-4K study, but there may well have been informal contacts,




Another reduction in approach speed with the F-4J came through an "Approach power compensator". Not much information available on this one.

The problem with the scenario is that the RN would have to risk a Phantom license production in 1962 knowing that their carriers could not handle landing until the aircraft modification or dax2 solution were available. Dax2 would probably be needed anyway as the weights and approach speeds of the F-4K, especially single engine, increased a good deal. If dax2 fails the RN would have to wait for US mk7-2 on CVA-1.
The RAF would jump all over this situation....

 

[zen]

Context of 1947, discussion of a new carrier estimated to cost 7 million.
Launching the 1952 new carrier effort earlier assists propulsion and hull design and long lead items.
It doesn't help with angled decks, steam catapults or the Type 984 and CDS.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Would it be feasible to scrap a) Vanguard b) the six Illustrious and c) the three Tigers - as soon as possible, starting from 1945 ? I consider those 10 ships as WWII relics, impossible to modernize in any satisfying way.

@NOMISYRRUC do you think it might have been feasible to get ride of all those lemons, and pour all the money wasted on them, into something useful for the RN ?

In reverse order.

c) Yes.

With hindsight the Blake, Lion & Tiger should have been cancelled on 15.10.45 along with their sister ship Hawke which had been laid down September 1943, but hadn't been launched. Plus the aborted modernisation of Swiftsure shouldn't have been begun and maybe Belfast shouldn't have been modernised either.

However, the RN needed modern cruisers and therefore the money spend on completing them 1954-61 should have been used to build some new ships with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT as well as some automatic 6" and 3" guns. They'd cost more to build than the Tigers and cost more to run on account of having a larger crew (which before anyone replies makes them harder to keep in service) but they would have been much more useful in the 1960s that the Tigers on account of their superior electronics.

b) Yes.

With hindsight plans to modernise the Illustrious class should have been abandoned in 1950 instead of 1954. Then Victorious is scrapped in the first half of the 1950s along with Formidable. However, they the other ships have to be kept in service until 1953-54 until they can be relieved by new construction so they'll still be scrapped 1955-56.

a) No! No! No! No! No! No! No! Galileo! Galileo!

Scrapping Vanguard in 1945 instead of completing her in 1946 and scrapping her in 1960 deprives the RN of one of its 5 sure fire Sverdlov class cruiser killers (the other 4 were the surviving King George Vs). If I remember correctly the choice in 1955 was to return her to service (she'd been refitting since 1954) or pay off 2 cruisers and they decided to keep the 2 cruisers & make Vanguard flagship of the Reserve Feet. Drachinifel or Dr Clarke or both think the Admiralty made the wrong choice. I agree and think that she should have been kept in service until the end of the 1950s.

For what it's worth No. 1

The 4 King George V's remained in service until 1949-50. King George V & Duke of York were operational battleships while Anson & Howe were training ships in the Home Fleet's Training Squadron. I don't know why they were paid off then, but I suspect it was due to the 1949 Defence cuts.

For what it's worth No. 2

• The Home Fleet's Training Squadron had Nelson, Anson & Howe at the end of 1946.
• Victorious recommissioned in October 1947 to replace Neslon which paid off in February 1948.
• Anson was paid off in February 1949 and was replaced by Vanguard.
• Victorious paid off in March 1950 to commence her "Great Rebuild" of 1950-58.
• Indefatigable (which had been in reserve since December 1946) recommissioned in 1950 to replace Victorious.
• Howe was paid off in 1950 which reduced the squadron from 3 ships to 2 because she wasn't replaced.
• Vanguard relieved Implacable as flagship of the Home Fleet in 1950 and wasn't immediately replaced, which reduced the squadron from 2 ships to one.
• Implacable was an operational aircraft carrier at the end of 1946 and from 1949 was also the Home Fleet's flagship until she was relieved by Vanguard in 1950 (see above) and was paid off in September 1950.
• Implacable recommissioned in 1951 and joined the Training Squadron doubling its strength to 2 ships.
• Both ships were relieved by Ocean & Theseus which had in turn been replaced as operational aircraft carriers by Albion & Bulwark.
• Theseus paid off at the end of 1956 and Ocean paid off at the end of 1957.

Based on that.

• Nelson & Anson could have been kept in service until 1949 & 1950 respectively by paying Victorious off in 1948 instead of 1950.
• Howe could have been kept in service from 1950 until 1954 instead of brining Indefatigable back into service.
• Anson could have been recommissioned in 1951 & paid off in 1954 instead of bringing Implacable back into service.

That allows you to scrap Implacable & Indefatigable several years earlier, but Indomitable still remains in service as an operational aircraft carrier until 1953 and Illustrious still remains in service as the trials & deck landing training carrier until 1954.

 

[Archibald]

All the above, because the RN needed Sverdlovsk - killer ships ? So a) battleships b) large carriers and c) new cruisers or Tigers. Is that correct ?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The problem with the scenario is that the RN would have to risk a Phantom license production in 1962 knowing that their carriers could not handle landing until the aircraft modification or dax2 solution were available. Dax2 would probably be needed anyway as the weights and approach speeds of the F-4K, especially single engine, increased a good deal.

Do you have any information on DAX2? Could it have been developed sooner? After all necessity is the mother of invention. I think it's been mentioned here or on alternatehistory.com that development had been underway for some time before the decision to buy F-4K was made because it was designed for what became the CVA.01 class.

Or I'll go to Plan C which is start the development of the Harrier in 1962 instead of 1965 (as per Plan B in Post 243) but still start the development of the Spey-Phantom in 1964. However, that's too late to incorporate Phantomisation into Eagle's 1959-64 refit which I very much want to have done because it makes it easier to keep her in service after 1972.

 

[EwenS]

Would it be feasible to scrap a) Vanguard b) the six Illustrious and c) the three Tigers - as soon as possible, starting from 1945 ? I consider those 10 ships as WWII relics, impossible to modernize in any satisfying way.

@NOMISYRRUC do you think it might have been feasible to get ride of all those lemons, and pour all the money wasted on them, into something useful for the RN ?

Imagine the political fallout if the newest and best battleship in the fleet, only commissioned in 1946, was scrapped more or less immediately. The waste!! Add to that that in 1946 there were still battleship admirals proposing a 10 ship battlefleet and new replacements. Admiral AB Cunningham the First Sea Lord to May 1946 was one of those advocates. As late as 1948 there were still some sketch design work going on.

What seems to forgotten is the role that the battleships and Illustrious / Implacable carriers filled into the early 1950s. Many were used as training ships, swinging round a buoy in harbour only going to sea a couple of times a year. If you are not using these ships for that where do you train the next generation of sailors.

Implacable & Indomitable served as flagship of the Home Fleet in succession to one another. Illustrious was the RN trials and training carrier whose activities included trials of many of the post war generation of Aircraft, as well as development of the mirror landing sight. How are all these activities carried out?

As for the cruisers, all 3 were launched between 9/44 & 12/45. All were then laid up, sealed and dehumidified pending a decision on what to do with them. It was 1948 before redesign work started and 1954 before money was available to physically start any work. Throughout that period the cruiser was still thought to have a place in the fleet with several fresh designs proposed. The Tigers became a fall back for not getting new vessels.

Scrapping them gives you steel for other projects but does not necessarily save much money as the gaps these ships occupied still need to be filled somehow.

 

[orlovsky]

As for dax2: Not much. It was under development in 1962, maybe 1961. In december 1964, McD used the mk14 characteristics. First actual ship trials on Eagle in 1967. The system adapted a method used on airfields to ship use if I understand that correctly, so you could argue it's a low risk development.

Capacity is pretty steady, the F-4K was extra strengthened to 4.8g:

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

All the above, because the RN needed Sverdlov - killer ships ? So a) battleships b) large carriers and c) new cruisers or Tigers. Is that correct ?

If that's in reply to Post 257 ...

a) and c) yes that's correct. They need surface warships capable of killing the Soviet cruisers when the aircraft carriers can't operate their aircraft such as at night or in bad weather. Also I think that the RN carriers couldn't carry enough strike aircraft to sink a Sverdlov (hence Green Cheese & Red Beard) and the battleships & cruisers were needed to sink ships that the aircraft carriers had only been able to damage. I know of at least one exercise where a British cruiser playing a Soviet cruiser was damaged by an air strike and then sunk by Vanguard.

b) no because the RN needs to keep some Illustrious class in service so it had something to train on and maintain its institutional memory (if that's the right expression) of operating large aircraft carriers until Eagle, Ark Royal & the Centaur class were ready. But that being written they did need to keep the Illustrious class until the Audacious & Centaur classes were ready in case World War III broke out before the Year of Maximum Danger.

 

[Hood]

In regards to the Sverdlov threat: the Admiralty was worried about the threat from those cruisers, especially in relation to the Soviet expansion of its submarine fleet with modern 'fast' conventional subs. Certainly they seem to have been quite worried about having sufficient firepower to cripple or sink them - everything from the rapid-fire Cruiser-Destroyer to Green Cheese instant sunshine.
However, when you look at the history of Germany's commerce raiding cruises, actually very few of the RN's efforts to stop them paid off. Graf Spee was an early success but it was never repeated again in the war except for Bismarck (and she was a battleship and not a heavy cruiser) and even then Prinz Eugen slipped away unharmed. The Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper, S&G all made cruises and got away with it and met their deaths mostly from bombing in harbour.
Therefore while the Admiralty might have thought it possible to bottle up the Baltic, and possibly the Med at Gib, the main threat would be the Northern Fleet's Sverdlovs, which could easily slip into the Atlantic via the Barents with scant NATO air cover there. Ship numbers were key, any one cruiser would need 2-3 RN/NATO cruisers arranged against it. And as powerful as Vanguard was, she couldn't be everywhere.

Of course we know now that the Soviets were not that interested in surface raiding, but at the time it must have seemed a tough target to beat, especially if Soviet submarines were making life difficult at the same time.

 

[Archibald]

Thank you all. Very interesting.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Eagle (the original one from 1942) was only 26% complete when cancelled in Dec 1945. £1.95m spent. Cancellation was estimated to save £5.5m to complete to original design. Then add extra costs for completion to Eagle (ex Audacious) Standard, or more to Ark Royal standards. Where will money come from?

My suggestion is by not rebuilding Victorious.

And in the scheme of things were not talking about huge sums of money. Eagle cost £15 million spread over 9 years, Ark Royal cost £21 million spread over 12 years, the first 3 Centaurs cost about £10 million each spread over over an average of 10 years each. The average British Government revenue in the 13 financial years 1946-47 to 1958-59 was £4,650 million and the average expenditure for those years was £4,294 million. The National Debt increased from £25,631 million at 31.03.46 to £27,269 million at 31.03.59. Another £21 million on the National Debt if the other Eagle was completed to the same standard as Ark Royal is neither here nor there.

However, a lack of money wasn't necessarily the problem. As I understand it the long construction times for the Audacious and Centaur classes were mainly because the Government gave priority to the export drive so the shipbuilding industry was ordered to concentrate on merchant ships to earn foreign currency, that is directly, by building them for foreign customers and indirectly by expanding the Merchant Navy so it could increase the UK's invisible earnings.

And why should it be in any better state to survive beyond 1980? After all it was laid down only 14 months after Audacious & 7 months after Ark Royal using the same poor quality WW2 era steel. How long does it spend on the slip and under what maintenance conditions?

Ark Royal was on the slipway for 7 years and Hermes for 8½ but as far as I know suffered from none of the problems that afflicted Ark Royal and remained in service with the Indian Navy until 2017.

What did Vickers-Armstrong, Barrow do right and Cammell Laird do wrong? The other Eagle was being built by Vickers-Armstrong, Tyne. Was it as good at preserving incomplete warships as its sister yard? I'm not being sarcastic, it's very strange to me that one ship gave good service for 2 navies for nearly 60 years, but the other was worn out after less than 25.

And by the 1970s the standard of habitability in these ships was no where near the standard of new ships entering service. A problem for recruitment.

Good point.

Colossus / Majestic. What was left in RN ownership at end of 1958 (Glory, Ocean, Theseus, Magnificent, & incomplete Leviathan) were offered for sale but no one wanted them. Everything that could be sold was in 1957/58. Warrior, partially modernised, to Argentina 1958. Vengeance to Brazil & Hercules sold 1957 and modernised to 1960/61.

Of the Centaurs only the much delayed and modernised Hermes could operate Buccaneer. Bulwark & Albion ended their fixed wing carrier days in 1958-60 with Sea Venom & Sea Hawk and hydraulic catapults. Centaur was partially modernised and ended with Scimitar & Sea Vixen. A lot of money required to bring them up to Hermes standard, and 5 year delay getting them into service. Or how long to modernise especially given structural work required for side lift? What does RN fill the gap with in the mid-1950s if these are not in service?

It would cost an additional £24 million 1953-59 to complete Albion, Bulwark & Centaur to the same standard as Hermes as they cost about £10 million each to build and Hermes cost about £18 million to build. However, @Archibald want's Blake, Lion & Tiger cancelled in 1945 so the money spent on them after construction resumed in 1954 could be spent on completing Albion, Bulwark & Centaur to the same standard as Hermes.

But, as you wrote what they'll have to make do with 3 Colossus class ships for another 5 years. IIRC from Friedman some of the RN's Colossus class ships were refitted to operate 20,000lb aircraft, which if correct means they could have operated Sea Hawks, Sea Venoms & Gannets. However, in smaller numbers because Melbourne carried 22 aircraft in 1955 (8 Sea Venoms, 12 Gannets & 2 SAR helicopters) in 1955 but the Centaurs could operate 38 aircraft (16 Sea Hawks, 8 Sea Venoms, 8 Gannets, 4 Skyraiders & 2 SAR helicopters). On the other hand that might not make any difference in practice, because if I remember correctly, the Centaurs seldom carried full-strength air groups.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Imagine the political fallout if the newest and best battleship in the fleet, only commissioned in 1946, was scrapped more or less immediately. The waste!! Add to that that in 1946 there were still battleship admirals proposing a 10 ship battlefleet and new replacements. Admiral AB Cunningham the First Sea Lord to May 1946 was one of those advocates. As late as 1948 there were still some sketch design work going on.

What seems to forgotten is the role that the battleships and Illustrious / Implacable carriers filled into the early 1950s. Many were used as training ships, swinging round a buoy in harbour only going to sea a couple of times a year. If you are not using these ships for that where do you train the next generation of sailors.

Implacable & Indomitable served as flagship of the Home Fleet in succession to one another. Illustrious was the RN trials and training carrier whose activities included trials of many of the post war generation of Aircraft, as well as development of the mirror landing sight. How are all these activities carried out?

As for the cruisers, all 3 were launched between 9/44 & 12/45. All were then laid up, sealed and dehumidified pending a decision on what to do with them. It was 1948 before redesign work started and 1954 before money was available to physically start any work. Throughout that period the cruiser was still thought to have a place in the fleet with several fresh designs proposed. The Tigers became a fall back for not getting new vessels.

Scrapping them gives you steel for other projects but does not necessarily save much money as the gaps these ships occupied still need to be filled somehow.

What he said.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In regards to the Sverdlov threat: the Admiralty was worried about the threat from those cruisers, especially in relation to the Soviet expansion of its submarine fleet with modern 'fast' conventional subs. Certainly they seem to have been quite worried about having sufficient firepower to cripple or sink them - everything from the rapid-fire Cruiser-Destroyer to Green Cheese instant sunshine.
However, when you look at the history of Germany's commerce raiding cruises, actually very few of the RN's efforts to stop them paid off. Graf Spee was an early success but it was never repeated again in the war except for Bismarck (and she was a battleship and not a heavy cruiser) and even then Prinz Eugen slipped away unharmed. The Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper, S&G all made cruises and got away with it and met their deaths mostly from bombing in harbour.
Therefore while the Admiralty might have thought it possible to bottle up the Baltic, and possibly the Med at Gib, the main threat would be the Northern Fleet's Sverdlovs, which could easily slip into the Atlantic via the Barents with scant NATO air cover there. Ship numbers were key, any one cruiser would need 2-3 RN/NATO cruisers arranged against it. And as powerful as Vanguard was, she couldn't be everywhere.

Of course we know now that the Soviets were not that interested in surface raiding, but at the time it must have seemed a tough target to beat, especially if Soviet submarines were making life difficult at the same time.

And what he said too.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 243 of which this is a variation.

In the above the other Eagle wasn't cancelled in 1946. Instead she was launched and in common with what @EwenS wrote in Post 260 about Blake, Lion & Tiger was then laid up, sealed & dehumidified pending a decision on what to do with her. The decision was to complete her at Portsmouth instead of modernising Victorious. Full details are given in Post 243. Except, that I've since decided that she should have been completed with a 151ft steam catapult in the bow and a 199ft steam catapult in the waist.

According to Marriott, when she was launched in May 1950, the fitting out of Ark Royal was planned to take 2½ years and the ship was expected to enter service towards the end of 1952. However, the decision to fit her with a pair of 151ft stroke steam catapults and a 5½ degree interim angled flight deck delayed this until February 1955.

In this "Version of History" her completion was delayed until November 1959 so she could be built to the same standard as the other Eagle. That is one 151ft stroke steam catapult in the bow, a 199ft steam catapult in the waist, a 8½ degree fully angled flight deck, a Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT and an AC electrical system instead of DC. The fixed armament was reduced from sixteen 4.5" in eight twin turrets to eight 4.5" in four twin turrets & six twin 40mm Bofors gun mountings pending their replacement with Sea Cat.

To compensate the completion of Hermes was brought forward from November 1959 to February 1955. However, she had to be built to the same design as Albion, Bulwark & Centaur. So no deck edge lift, a 5½ angled flight deck instead of a 6½ angled flight deck, no Type 984 radar, no CDS, no DPT, a DC electrical system instead of AC and a smaller air group. She was still completed with a pair of BS.4 steam catapults, but they had a stroke of 139ft instead of 151ft and she couldn't be upgraded to operate the Buccaneer. She remained in service as a strike carrier until 1970 but wasn't converted to a commando carrier 1971-73 because Albion was kept in service instead.

Eagle is still completed in 1951 and the only change to her 1959-64 refit is that her existing DC electrical system replaced by a AC system.

Then the other Eagle has a Phantomisation refit 1964-67 which took the place of the special refit that Hermes had 1964-66. The BS.4 steam catapults were replaced by 2 BS.5s, (subject to what @orlovsky has written) DAX.2 arrester gear was fitted and blast deflectors were fitted/upgraded. She also had her six twin Bofors mountings replaced by 6 Sea Cat systems, the Type 984 radar upgraded to Type 984M standard and ADA replaced the CDS.

Then in common with the "Real World" Ark Royal had a Phantomisation refit 1967-70, which included keeping the eight 4.5in guns in four twin mountings that she was completed with in this "Version of History", fitting six Sea Cat systems, upgrading her Type 984 radar to Type 984P standard and replacing the CDS with ADA.

Then Eagle had a SLEP refit 1970-73 which was paid for with the money that in the "Real World" was spent on converting Blake to a helicopter cruiser 1968-72 and Hermes to a commando carrier 1971-73. She had her ADA system replaced by ADAWS Mk 3, Type 984M radar upgraded to Type 984Q standard and was Phantomised.

There isn't a Hawker P.1154 project in this "Version of History" because the Government decides to develop what became the Harrier 3 years earlier, but unlike in Post 243, development of the Spey-Phantom still began in 1964 (but like that "Version of History" the whole aircraft was built in the UK under licence by Hawker Siddeley) so it still entered service with the RN in 1969. But because the other Eagle was Phantomised 1964-67 the first squadron went to sea aboard a RN aircraft carrier in 1969 instead of 1970.

The second 800-series squadron went to sea aboard Ark Royal in 1970. However, a third 800-series squadron wasn't formed for Eagle because she embarked the other Eagle's Phantom squadron in 1973 and the other Eagle went into refit or reserve.

 

[Scott Kenny]

As far as I know, yes they do things that differently from the US, or at least they do when it's a long refit like Victorious 1950-58, Centaur 1956-58, Eagle 1959-64, Hermes 1964-66, Ark Royal 1967-70 and Hermes 1971-73.

Interesting. Definitely helps with your manning numbers if you don't have to provide a full crew when in long refits. I'd still keep a few there, however, like the Captain, to maintain responsibility for the ship.

Means you need much more employment in the shipyard, however, since you can't use the crew as apprentice-level workers.

 

[zen]

During the 50's and early 60’s the idea of a limited fleet of 3 Audacious class carriers would not fit RN planning.
Either other extent carriers would be retained almost as per history or new carriers built.

The plan for modernisation was approved in November 1947, starting with HMS Formidable.
The decision process that led to Victorious's modernisation was intended to be rolled out over the majority of the Illustrious class, and the Implacables.
Indomitable was scheduled for limited modernisation as a training carrier.

This started to fall apart in 1948 on examination of Formidable's condition. She was dropped from the plans in '49 and Victorious took first place instead. Starting modernisation in 1950.

As we reach the realisation that this plan is flawed in 1052, as Victorious's modernisation drags on. It is abandoned and we see first the 1952 effort and then in 1954 Medium Fleet Carrier Studies.
1955 had the revised intention of sustaining 3 modern Fleet Carriers and 3 Light Fleet Carriers.

By 1957 the White paper had approved the existing force of 5 modern carriers. So by '59-'60 the board was thinking of a one for one replacement.

Between '56 and '60 the long term plan had 3 hybrid GWS/CV ships (almost certainly NIGS armed) and on abandonment the requirements forced up carrier numbers back to 5.

Although First Sea Lord had noted the Government of the day would be only willing to fund 4.

Civil Lord warned that replacing a 35,000ton ship with a 53,000ton one was going to be hard to get past the civilian Cabinet and suggested a compromise of a 40,000ton adaptable ship.

Arguably had a third Audacious gone ahead, the likely key to retention of a desired number would be the more limited modernisation of Victorious, and the longer term development of 2 new carriers to start a steady rate of build. But this assumes a minimum of 2 discrete departures from history.

1. Retention of the third Audacious and her completion.
2. Realisation of the state of Victorious's boilers and machinery.

However if the concept of completion of the third Audacious is part of the 1947 plan, it forces a more limited modernisation of Formidable and her sisters and planning for new carriers as was actually mooted during meetings at that time.

This would initiate the process we know as the 1952 Carrier around 1948. 4 years earlier than history which is if anything a boon. The 1952 process was tight with a intended completion by 1958.
E-in-C would thus have additional 4 years to get new plant designed and even possibly a trial set built.
Potentially this earlier the Admiralty might be able to book No.14 slip at Harland & Wolf available June 1953....or just commit No.4 slip at John Brown for January 1955 or Cammel Laird No.4/5 for June 1955.

Better the work on hullform and machinery doesn't impede a transition to the angled deck concept or the development of steam catapults.

Better yet the costs and a desire for exploring the cheaper options of 2 and 3 shaft and plant designs is also accelerated. The Medium Fleet studies initiated say in 1950 and long before wild ideas associated with NIGS....
Such might envision ships building in 5 years for a 1960-61 completion. With 4 years to move from preliminary studies to ordering the ship and it being laid down. In time for the Audaciouses to be then taken in hand and refitted.

In reality the process would slow down with the new technologies and see such a new carrier complete just in time for Ark Royal to be taken out of service due to her poor state in 1963.
Assuming a second new carrier is also under construction from 1956 or even 1958 this opens up a 1965 rationalisation option for Harold Wilson's Labour Cabinet. Scrapping the older limited carriers, running the two of the Audaciouses by cannibalising Ark Royal, and retaining the two new carriers.
This would further rationalise in 1966 bringing forward the Out of Service dates for the Audaciouses. Possibly never phantomised

The irony of this is it avoids the madness of the late 50's and early 60’s. In the forms of OR.346, TFX and CVA-01.
But said new carriers ought to better be adaptable to the likes of F4K.
It also allows for a potential foreign purchase of the two Audaciouses sometime in the 1970's.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Civil Lord warned that replacing a 35,000ton ship with a 53,000ton one was going to be hard to get past the civilian Cabinet and suggested a compromise of a 40,000ton adaptable ship.

I believe that the argument there would have to be: "The newer aircraft are so much larger that a 53,000ton ship is required. That size ship also requires little more crew than the 35,000ton carrier. Steel is cheap and air is free, Lord. It's the systems inside that cost real money."

 

[zen]

Yes but do you really need an aircraft 80ft long weighing 70,000lbs?
Doesn't this cry out for that upper limit 68,000ton sketch?
Which means all new facilities to handle a 1004ft long aircraft carrier....?
Even your 53,000ton ship is going to have to use commercial drydocks.....unless you intend to build a new dedicated drydock?

Didn't previous studies conclude you didn't need an RoA of 1,000nm and 500nm to even 300nm would do?

Didn't you just throw the OR.339 together with a CAP of 4 hours to produce OR.346 and even if we assume the new electronics fit, do we really need a navalised TSR.2?
Or are you just holding out hope for TFX?
What do you think we have a magic Dollar tree!

Why would you need new carriers if we're funding a new Area Defence SAM and Tactical Nuclear Missiles?
Couldn't your hybrid do the job?
All you really need is Recce and AEW.

How about compromising on something just 60ft long and no more than 60,000lbs fully loaded?

Didn't one of your studies look at a 42,000ton ship?

In fact why not merge your requirements with the RAF for their tactical strike/attack platform. I hear NATO is formulating an NMBR. You already have a short range attack requirement.....
Couldn't these wizzo modern electronics allow it to perform the fighter mission as well?

 

[starviking]

Eagle is still completed in 1951 and the only change to her 1959-64 refit is that her existing DC electrical system replaced by a DC system.

Replaced by AC?

There isn't a Hawker P.1154 project in this "Version of History" because the Government decides to develop what became the Harrier 3 years earlier, but unlike in Post 243, development of the Spey-Phantom still began in 1964 (but like that "Version of History" the whole aircraft was built in the UK under licence by Hawker Siddeley) so it still entered service with the RN in 1969. But because the other Eagle was Phantomised 1964-67 the first squadron went to sea aboard a RN aircraft carrier in 1969 instead of 1970.

I know this was referenced back in the thread, but I could have sworn there was a proposal in 1962 for a Canadian Spey-Phantom. Locating it is a different matter…

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And now a bit of fun.

• The total cost of the Invincible class was £624,500,000 if we assume that Illustrious cost the same as Ark Royal.
• Marriot wrote that the estimated cost of CVA.01 in 1966 was £70 million, which according to the Bank of England inflation calculator was worth.
  • £265,400,000 in 1980.
  • £319,400,000 in 1982.
  • £367,600,000 in 1985.
  • Total £924,400,000.
• On that basis 3 CVA.01s built instead of the 3 Invincibles would have cost £331,900,000 or 50% more.
• In the region of £1,000,000,000 was spent on the Nimrod AEW project between 1977 and 1986. That aircraft would not have been needed if 3 CVA.01s had been built instead of the Invincible class.

However, I repeat it's only a bit of fun, but it does support my theory that the building cost of 3 CVA.01s would have been no more than double the building costs of the 3 Invincibles and that the money spent on the Nimrod AEW would have made up the difference.

There's a typo in that. My estimate of the total cost of 3 CVA.01s built 1973-85 is £952,400,000 not £924,400,000 and therefore the extra cost is £327,900,000 or £52½% more.

The cost for the Through Deck Cruiser was estimated at about 40 Million vs the 70 Million for CVA1 IIRC from Hobbs.

I skimmed through the copy of "British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories" by David Hobbs on Scribd and couldn't find an estimate for the Through Deck Cruiser, but his estimate for CVA.01 was £60 million. However, your estimate of £70 million is exactly the same as the estimate of £70 million in 1966 that I quoted (from Marriott in RN Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990) which is what my estimates were based upon.

I put the estimate of £60 million from Hobbs into the Bank of England inflation calculator and these were the results.

• £227,450,000 million
• £273,730,000 million
• £315,100,000 million
• Total £816,260,000 million

Which is £191,760,000 or 31% more than the £624,500,000 that the 3 Invincible cost 1973-85. It's also £136,140.000 or 14% less than my corrected estimate of £952,400,000 for 3 CVA.01s 1973-75.

The need for all the command and control, electronics etc made them very expensive.

I'm not sure if you're supporting me or you haven't understood me, because my argument has been that "steel is cheap and air is free" throughout this thread. Hopefully, we're in violent agreement.

So with your calculation, the UK could have 2 CVAs for the cost of 3 Invincibles; from the numbers I gave throw in Ark's refit and you are there.

The 3 strike carriers that I want to be built instead of the Invincible class would be built 1973-75 and the money from Ark Royal's 1967-70 refit can't be thrown for obvious reasons. Plus it was £32.5 million 1967-70 and on my calculations I want another £191,760,000 or £327,900,000 more depending upon which estimate is used.

Fortunately, there isn't an AEW Nimrod project in my "Version of History". It cost in the region of £1,000,000,000 in the period 1977-86 so the money spent on that in the "Real World" will provide the balance of £191,760,000 or £327,900,000 required to build 3 CVA.01s 1973-85 instead of 3 Invincibles 1973-85 with about £800,000,000 or £670,000,000 to spare.

But then, what to fly from them? Can you wrestle the 50 F-4K and the 70 or so Buccaneer from the RAF?

The RN gave the 50 F-4K and the 70 or so Buccaneer to the RAF because the British Government told it to. The RAF would give them back to the RN had the Government told it to. However, it's a non-issue because the 50 F-4K and the 70 or so Buccaneer aren't given to the RAF in the first place because the RN keeps them in the first place.

You have money from the Harrier Program, but that won't allow for many new airframes, maybe 20?

I'm spending the money from the Harrier programme on some Hawkeyes and Greyhounds to replace the Gannet in the AEW and COD roles.

Even the second hand F-4Js cost about 8 Million pounds per Frame in 1983/84.

The 15 F-4Js cost £33 million which worked out at £2.2 million per aircraft according to my source which is "Aircraft Illustrated Special RAF Phantom" by Peter R. Foster. It's in the top right paragraph of Page 31. What's your source? I'm not being funny-peculiar because my source may be wrong and your source may be correct.

And we need a crew. Let's say 2 Invincible crews (~2500) may get us one CVA (~3000) almost manned. The second would need maybe half a crew. So we are 2000 short. With a 3rd CVA, assuming 2 crews, we need 3500 extra.

With just 2 carriers with AEW and fighters, you could cut back on the Type42, but that's about it...

I've addressed that at great length elsewhere on this forum and on alternatehistory.com.

But, here we go again.

According to Paul Beaver in "Modern Combat Ships 2, Invincible class" they had a crew of 1,200 consisting of a ship's company of 1,000 and an air group of 200. The quotes that I've seen for CVA.01s crew are 2,700-3,200 which I think depends upon the size of the air group with 2,700 for the normal air group of 47 aircraft (18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 5 ASW helicopters & 2 SAR helicopters) and 3,200 for the full-strength air group of 62 aircraft. However, I think the CVA.01s would have carried an air group similar to Ark Royal in the 1970s i.e. 36-40 aircraft made up of 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 4-5 AEW & COD aircraft and 6-9 helicopters for ASW & SAR.

The real Knott Defence review cut the number of ASW carriers from 3 to 2. However, the sale of Invincible to Australian to Australia cancelled after the Falklands War (and the new Australian Government didn't want it anyway) but only 2 of the 3 ships would be operational because the third ship would always be refitting or in reserve. In my "Version of History" HMG decides to retain 3 strike carriers after the "East of Suez" withdrawal was completed, but one of them would always be in refit or reserve. Therefore,

• 2 x Invincible class at 1,200 per ship = 2,400.
• 2 x CVA.01 class at 2,700 per ship = 5,400.

So I have to find 3,000 extra sailors. Or do I?

The 3 CVA.01s built 1973-85 instead of the Invincible class weren't the CVA.01 design at 1966. It might be better to regard them as "Super Invincibles" with:

• Bigger, more heavily built hulls.
• 6 Olympus GTs driving 3 shafts, instead of 4 Olympus GTs driving 2 shafts.
  • One of the reasons for changing from steam turbines to gas turbines is that the latter need a smaller crew.
  • Please note that (in common with the Real-Invincibles) the radars on ALT-CVA.01 were mounted on separate masts and not mounted on macks like the Real-CVA.01. Therefore, no comments about the exhaust from the gas turbines making the Type 1022 radar useless because (in common with the Real-Invincible) it was mounted on top of the bridge.
• The same defensive armament (Sea Dart, Phalanx & ECM) as the Real-Invincibles.
• The same sensors (radars, sonar & ESM) as the Real-Invincibles.
  • The Real-CVA.01s were to have had Type 988 radars, but ALT-CVA.01s Type 1022 radars, because the the Real-Invincibles had Type 1022 radars.
  • Please not my comments above about the positioning of the radars in the ALT-CVA.01 design.
• The same ADAWS system as the Real-Invincibles.
• The same command, control & communications facilities as the Real-Invincibles.
• The same number of lifts, except that instead of both being 54ft long x 31ft 8in wide with a maximum load of 35,000lb.
  • The forward lift would be 70ft long x 35 feet wide.
  • The aft lift would be 70ft long x 32ft wide long.
  • Both lifts had a maximum load of 75,000lb
• Plus a pair of 250ft steam catapults and arrester gear.

So the ship's company would have been 1,000 plus what was required for the 50% more powerful machinery, bigger lifts, steam catapults & arrester gear.

Now I need to find the personnel for the air group, which in peacetime would have been 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 5 AEW & COD aircraft and 9 Sea Kings for ASW and SAR for a total of 40 aircraft. (The air group would have been brought to full-strength in war by breaking up 736 NAS & 767 NAS which were the Buccaneer & Phantom training squadrons in my version of history).

• The personnel for the Sea King ASW squadrons are easy because the Sea King ASW squadrons carried by the Real-Invincible class would be carried by my ALT-CVA.01 class.
• The personnel for the flight of AEW & COD aircraft comes from the personnel of the Sea Harrier squadrons, the Sea King AEW squadron and the AEW squadron in the RAF's TASMO force.
• The personnel for the Phantom & Buccaneer squadrons comes from the personnel from the 2 Phantom & 2 Buccaneer squadrons in the RAF's TASMO force.

The RAF's Tactical Support of Maritime Operations (TASMO) Force was formed in the late 1960s to do the jobs previously performed by the RN's strike carriers (i.e. air defence, strike & AEW) which ultimately had a strength of 5 squadrons consisting of one AEW squadron, 2 Phantom maritime fighter squadrons and 2 Buccaneer maritime strike squadrons which would have been under NATO's SACLANT rather than the UKADR or SCACEUR in wartime and in peacetime the 2 Buccaneer squadrons & their OCU were transferred from No 1 Group to No. 18 (Maritime) Group in the early 1980s.

In detail.

• No. 43 Squadron reformed on 01.09.69 as a maritime fighter squadron with the F-4Ks that would have equipped Eagle's Phantom squadron and was placed under the command of SACLANT in 1970.
  • In my "Version of History" No. 43 Squadron didn't reform on 01.09.69.
  • Instead 899 NAS converted to F-4Ks in 1969 and didn't decommission on 26.01.72.
• No. 12 Squadron reformed on 01.10.69 as a maritime strike squadron with Buccaneers taken from the RN. I don't know, but suspect that it (in common with No. 43 Squadron) was placed under the command of SACLANT in 1970.
  • In my "Version of History" No. 12 Squadron didn't reform on 01.10.69.
  • Instead 800 NAS (Eagle's Buccaneer squadron) didn't decommission on 23.02.72.
• No. 8 Squadron reformed on 01.01.72 as a maritime AEW squadron with 12 Shackleton AEW.2s which were Shackleton MR.2s fitted with AEW radars taken from RN Gannet AEW.3s. The squadron was to have re-equipped with 11 Nimrod AEW.3s (converted MR.1s) in 1982, but the project went way over time & cost and was cancelled in 1986.
  • In my "Version of History" No. 8 Squadron didn't reform on 01.01.72, because:
    • 849D Flight (Eagle's AEW flight) didn't decommission on 26.01.72.
    • 849B Flight (Ark Royal's AEW flight) the squadron headquarters of 849 NAS didn't decommission on 15.12.78
    • Some Hawkeyes & Greyhounds were ordered on 17.09.75 & 24.05.78 (instead of the first 34 Sea Harriers) to replace the Gannets and enough aircraft were delivered by 31.03.82 for the AEW flights aboard the one Audacious class & one ALT-CVA.01 class strike carries sent to the Falklands (in place of Invincible & Hermes) to be equipped with Hawkeyes.
    • Furthermore, the personnel of the "Real World's" Sea Harrier squadrons and 849 NAS after it re-commissioned as a Sea King AEW squadron were some of the personnel of the 849 NAS in my "Version of History".
    • As there wasn't a No. 8 squadron there weren't 12 Shackleton AEW.2s to replace and therefore no Nimrod AEW.3 debacle and the money spent on it 1977-86 in the "Real World" was spent elsewhere in my "Version of History" and first priority was given to the 3 ALT-CVA.01 class strike carriers built 1973-85 instead of the 3 Real-Invincible class 1973-85.
• No. 29 Squadron (which had converted from Lightings to F-4M Phantoms on 01.01.75) became a maritime fighter squadron on 01.03.80. It took the place of Ark Royal's Phantom squadron which decommissioned on 15.12.78.
  • The plan had been to form a second F-4K squadron with Ark Royal's Phantoms. However, No. 111 Squadron (which served alongside No. 43 at Leuchars) converted from to F-4Ks instead and its F-4Ms were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.
  • In my version of history 892 NAS didn't decommission on 15.12.78, No. 111 Squadron didn't convert to F-4Ks and No. 29 Squadron disbanded on 01.03.80.
• No. 216 Squadron reformed on 01.07.79 with the aircraft that had formerly equipped Ark Royal's Buccaneer squadron. However, the aircraft's metal fatigue problems resulted in the number of Buccaneer squadrons being reduced from 5 & the OCU to 4 and the OCU. The short straw was drawn by No. 216 which disbanded on 04.08.80.
  • The reformation of Nos. 9, 27 & 617 Squadrons 1982-83 in No. 1 Group on the Tornado IDS allowed No. 208 Squadron (which reformed on 01.07.74 as an overland strike squadron in No. 1 Group) to become a maritime strike squadron in July 1983. It took the place of No. 208 squadron which in turn had taken the place of 809 NAS.
  • In my version of No. 216 Squadron didn't reform on 01.07.79 & didn't disband on 04.08.80 and No. 208 Squadron disbanded in July 1983 instead of becoming a maritime strike squadron, which is because 809 NAS didn't decommission on 15.12.78.
• In the "Real World" Nos. 29 & 43 Squadrons converted from Phantoms to the Tornado ADV in the late 1980s. They don't exist in my "Version of History" so the money saved by not buying 2 squadrons worth of Tornado ADVs could be spent on buying some Hornets to replace the Phantoms in 890 & 899 NAS.

So HM Forces had the same number of personnel in my "Version of History" as the "Real World". However, there were more of men wearing dark blue uniforms and less men wearing light blue uniforms in my "Version of History".

Not exactly Quite Easily Done (QED) but with what we know with hindsight it was doable without reducing the number of destroyers & frigates.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Replaced by AC?

Yes. The typo has been corrected.

I know this was referenced back in the thread, but I could have sworn there was a proposal in 1962 for a Canadian Spey-Phantom. Locating it is a different matter…

I originally suggested starting development of the Spey Phantom in 1962 instead of 1964 so it could enter service with the RN in 1967 instead of 1969. However, it looks as if the DAX.2 arrester gear can't be put into service earlier than 1969 so there's no point in starting development of the Spey Phantom 2 years earlier so that it can enter service with the RN in 1967 instead of 1969.

However, when the DAX.2 arrester gear became available would have been irrelevant to the RAF. So development of the Spey Phantom could have been begun in 1962 instead of 1964 with the F-4M entering RAF service in the ground attack role with No. 6 Squadron in May 1969 and the F-4K still entering RN service with 892 NAS in March 1969. But, it doesn't automatically follow that starting development of the reheated Spey in 1962 instead of 1964 results in the F-4M being ready in 1967 instead of 1969.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

During the 50's and early 60’s the idea of a limited fleet of 3 Audacious class carriers would not fit RN planning.
Either other extent carriers would be retained almost as per history or new carriers built.

The plan for modernisation was approved in November 1947, starting with HMS Formidable.
The decision process that led to Victorious's modernisation was intended to be rolled out over the majority of the Illustrious class, and the Implacables.
Indomitable was scheduled for limited modernisation as a training carrier.

This started to fall apart in 1948 on examination of Formidable's condition. She was dropped from the plans in '49 and Victorious took first place instead. Starting modernisation in 1950.

As we reach the realisation that this plan is flawed in 1952, as Victorious's modernisation drags on. It is abandoned and we see first the 1952 effort and then in 1954 Medium Fleet Carrier Studies.
1955 had the revised intention of sustaining 3 modern Fleet Carriers and 3 Light Fleet Carriers.
By 1957 the White paper had approved the existing force of 5 modern carriers. So by '59-'60 the board was thinking of a one for one replacement.

For what it's worth.

The Real Revised Restricted Fleet of 1949 and Real 1951 Rearmament Programme were for 6 Fleet Carriers consisting of 2 Audacious class (Ark Royal & Eagle), 3 modernised Illustrious class (Implacable, Indefatigable & Victorious) and one Illustrious (which I thought was Illustrious rather than Indomitable but I may be wrong) given a limited modernisation as a training carrier.

I think the Alternative version of those plans would still have been for 6 Fleet Carriers but that they would have consisted of 3 Audacious class (Ark Royal, Eagle & the other Eagle) and 3 modernised Illustrious class (Implacable, Indefatigable & Victorious) with one of them serving as the deck landing training ship.

I was to have had plans to modernise the Illustrious class abandoned in the late 1940s and the other Eagle completed at Portsmouth 1950-58 to Standard A instead of modernising Victorious there 1950-58. However, here Victorious would still be modernised at Portsmouth 1950-58 while the other Eagle was completed at Vickers-Armstrong, Tyne in 1955 to Standard C in 1955 or to Standard A, preferably the latter, but the former would have been cheaper.

Therefore, the 1955 Plan would still have been for 5 ships, but with 4 modern Fleet Carriers & 2 modern Light Fleet Carriers and the 1957 White Paper would still have approved 5 Strike Carriers, but the other Eagle would have taken the place of Centaur, which might have been converted into a Commando Carrier.

Having the other Eagle in service in place of Centaur would allowed the RN to put a fourth strike squadron to sea in the first half of the 1960s, which would have a great improvement (and it would have been an even greater improvement if she had been a Standard A ship) although she would have required a larger crew. All other things being equal the other Eagle would have paid off at the end of 1965, but she'd have been better than Hermes in the second half of the 1960s on account of her larger air group had she been kept in service until 1970 instead of recommissioning Hermes in 1966.

 

[uk 75]

It is worth remembering that the RN becomes a volunteer force in the 1960s with the end of National Service.
Finding crews for carriers and submarines became harder than for the new frigates and destroyers entering service.

 

[uk 75]

The nub of the problem is the increase in size of carrier aircraft. Seahawks and Sea Venoms are tiny compared with Sea Vixens and Scimitars let alone F4 and Bucs.

Could smaller aircraft have been designed and built for the RN? Ironically it ends up in the 1980s with Sea Harriers closer to a Seahawk in size. India replaces its Seahawks with Sea Harriers.

 

[zen]

Could smaller aircraft have been designed and built for the RN?

Yes.
We know so.
The swept wing Sea Hawk that evolved into ultimately the Hunter was seriously looked at. If nothing else it was bring developed for Australia.
The order for 'minimal' navalised Swifts to trial out such. Potentially a stepping stone to a order for full navalised versions (with reheat).

The preference for DH.116 For FAW successor to Vampire.

And to cap it off we can see a plethora of designs that effectively stay below the scale of Sea Vixen and Scimitar.
Most notably the Westlands W.37 Striker Fighter.

Westlands again with it's quite interesting N/A.39 offering.

We see the F.177 chosen and remains on the books just past the 1957 Sandystorm. Only to then fall.

And finally the P.1154 "Harrier".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It is worth remembering that the RN becomes a volunteer force in the 1960s with the end of National Service.

It is also worth remembering that RN manned more ships with less men.

This was because massive reductions in the size of the Reserve Fleet under the Sandys Defence Review reduced the number of men required for care & maintenance parties and the end of National Service meant that the thousands of regulars that had trained the conscripts could instead be used to man more ships.

The following may be wrong (because I haven't checked my notes) but if I remember correctly, the number of conscripts was never more than 10% of the RN's total strength and that their purpose was to provide a reserve of trained personnel to man the Reserve Fleet when it was mobilised rather than increase the number of ships in peacetime and the ships they manned when they were with the colours were training ships.

I am certain that it was quite hard in to do National Service in the RN because I've been told so by several people including my father who wanted to do his National Service in the RN, but there was a waiting list, so joined the RAF instead and did his 2 years as an electrician in a Valiant squadron.

One that I'm confident is true that paying off most of the cruisers as a result of the Sandys Defence Review allowed the Royal Marines form more commandos increasing the total to 5 in spite of the reduction in its total numbers. Furthermore, recruiting was so strong that it could have formed a sixth commando in the 1960s, but this couldn't be done without cutting an infantry battalion in the Army.

Finding crews for carriers and submarines became harder than for the new frigates and destroyers entering service.

Finding crews for the new submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers & frigates also became harder because they usually had larger crews than the ships they replaced. Furthermore, their sophisticated equipment required their crews to be better trained than the crews of the ships that replaced so a larger proportion of the RN's personnel were ashore in the training schools than previously. These factors were probably more important than the reduction in total numbers after National Service ended.