Which airliner should have been built?

[uk 75]

I love airliners but hate the whole rigmarole of flying today..So here is another typical UK 75 thread.
British Airways became one of the world's largest operators of the iconic Boeing 747 and even painted and.even painted one up in the colours of their predecessor BOAC.
Imagine if instead of those 747s BA could have had flight of VC10 Superb.
Sadly it takes a lot of imagination. BOAC hated the VC10 and loved its Boeings.
But it's a nice dream.

 

[Hobbes]

Build thread here

 

[Foo Fighter]

Getting in on the ground flooor for certain, would it have taken off then? Possibly, great idea.

 

[Archibald]

VC-7, for a start. Then full-size Trident with Medways, beating the 727 into a pulp.

 

[riggerrob]

Avro Canada C102 Jetliner, the second jet-powered airliner to fly.
Sure the original engines were fuel hogs, but second and third generation engines might have been efficient enough to turn a profit on the short to medium range flights envisioned.
To make Jetliner a success, hand-wave away the USAF's meddling.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Most definitely the Boeing 747. Had Boeing built that, rather than betting the entire corporation on the 2707, it might have survived the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Now all that's left of Boeing is a small metals parts fabrication shop in the outskirts of Seattle, the rest of the company having been split up and sold off to Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas in 1980.

 

[Archibald]

Avro Canada C102 Jetliner, the second jet-powered airliner to fly.
Sure the original engines were fuel hogs, but second and third generation engines might have been efficient enough to turn a profit on the short to medium range flights envisioned.
To make Jetliner a success, hand-wave away the USAF's meddling.

Howard Hughes wanted it badly for TWA, and Convair was ready to get a licence, but they were told F-102s had absolute priority. Ok, but then why were CV-240 allowed to happen ? ditch that one, make room for the Jetliner and TWA.

 

[taildragger]

The Boeing 797 circa 2020. The Max is pretty clearly a stretch too far for the old girl. Boeing didn't really want to build it, preferring to hold off for about 3 years until a clean sheet could be launched with sufficient technology advances over the A320 to make it worthwhile. It caved to pressure from Southwest Airlines and American Airlines (AA forced their hand by placing 50% of a large order with Airbus, then telling Boeing that rest of the order could go to them if a reengined 737 were available.)

 

[Archibald]

A twin jet DC-10 seemingly could have beaten the A300 into a pulp and prevented the rise of Airbus. Wondering if a twin jet Tristar could have been done too.

 

[alertken]

Twin variants were explored for L-1011 and DC-10 but were declined by airlines seized with the notion that good designs can be stretched (DC-3, DC-6, L-1049), but not shrunk (720, 747SP, L-1011/500.

I have offered Bristol Connies. UK Cabinet was asked in 6/47 to assign dollars for licenced L-749 with (Centaurus, then) turboprop Theseus. Declined as other claims had higher priority (food, timber for blitz damage repair). Understandable... But: dump T. 167 Brabazon, forget T. 175 Britannia, learn how to build large structure that does not leak or explode. Ah, me.

 

[EthelredTheUnsteady]

VC-7, for a start. Then full-size Trident with Medways, beating the 727 into a pulp.

VC7 was a lovely plane and stood a very good chance of giving Britain a much larger piece of the global airliner market. The only downside of the design was the engines buried in the wingroots, the very feature which gave a better drag regime than hanging them under the wing or even putting them on the rear fuselage like the VC10, created two large constraints. Firstly, engine maintenance was more difficult because of constricted access and secondly, and more importantly, the development of high-bypass turbofans could not be readily accommodated. The third downside is that there is a strong possibility that if the VC7 had gone into production, the VC10 might not have. Of course, that might have been reliant on how much revenue VC7 sales brought in, who knows?

 

[EthelredTheUnsteady]

The Fairey/Westland Rotodyne, the only airliner that could have given Pitcairn Island an airline.

By the time Westland took over the project, the rotor tipjet noise issue was virtually solved and if the Ministry had been willing to fund the larger Dart-powered, beaver-tailed version it would have been a world-beater. Both civil and military versions would have been astonishingly capable.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I love airliners but hate the whole rigmarole of flying today..So here is another typical UK 75 thread.
British Airways became one of the world's largest operators of the iconic Boeing 747 and even painted and.even painted one up in the colours of their predecessor BOAC.
Imagine if instead of those 747s BA could have had flight of VC10 Superb.
Sadly it takes a lot of imagination. BOAC hated the VC10 and loved its Boeings.
But it's a nice dream.

Build thread here

Would it have evolved into a wide-body airliner with four RB.178s or four RB.207s or four RB.211s? Think of it as an enlarged BAC.311.

It would have been called BAC.411. That is unless there was a tri-jet called BAC.411 in the same class as DC-10 and Tristar. In that case it would have been the BAC.511.

 

[Siberia]

To make Jetliner a success, hand-wave away the USAF's meddling.

Meddling?

 

[riggerrob]

To make Jetliner a success, hand-wave away the USAF's meddling.

Meddling?

Yes, the USAFmeddled in AVRO Canada's production plans. Since the Cold War required plenty of long-range interceptors and the CF-100 Canuck interceptor was slow entering production, the USAF told AVRO Canada to concentrate on CF-100s and drop the airliner project.

 

[royabulgaf]

I suppose the Rutland Reindeer is out.

 

[zebedee]

It would have been called BAC.411. That is unless there was a tri-jet called BAC.411 in the same class as DC-10 and Tristar. In that case it would have been the BAC.511.

I have always thought VC Double-Ten had a nice ring to it... given the Type 1180 is a generation earlier than the 311, I think its more likely it would have been named either 211 or 311...

Zeb

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It would have been called BAC.411. That is unless there was a tri-jet called BAC.411 in the same class as DC-10 and Tristar. In that case it would have been the BAC.511.

I have always thought VC Double-Ten had a nice ring to it... given the Type 1180 is a generation earlier than the 311, I think its more likely it would have been named either 211 or 311...

Zeb

Except that we had a BAC.211 and and a BAC.311 in the "real world".

I like the idea of the British Aircraft Corporation developing a family of airliners in the 1960s and 1970s to compete with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.

• BAC.111 competing with B.737 and DC-9.
• BAC.211 competing with B.727 and B.757.
• BAC.311 competing with B.767
• BAC.411 competing with B.777, DC-10, MD-11 and Tristar.
• BAC.511 competing with B.747

"Time for bed!" said Zebedee. "Brush your teeth!" said Florence. "Boing!" said Jasper Carrott.

 

[ArtosStark]

To make Jetliner a success, hand-wave away the USAF's meddling.

Meddling?

Yes, the USAFmeddled in AVRO Canada's production plans. Since the Cold War required plenty of long-range interceptors and the CF-100 Canuck interceptor was slow entering production, the USAF told AVRO Canada to concentrate on CF-100s and drop the airliner project.

I understand that the Canadian Government (C.D Howe specifically) cancelled the project since it didn’t have immediate sales prospects at that time (Hughes came knocking a few months later) and it was perceived to be contributing to the delay of the Canuck.

Apparently the project was considered to be restarted in 1953 when the CF-100 production was in full swing, but it never happened.

 

[Siberia]

I understand that the Canadian Government (C.D Howe specifically) cancelled the project since it didn’t have immediate sales prospects at that time (Hughes came knocking a few months later) and it was perceived to be contributing to the delay of the Canuck.

Apparently the project was considered to be restarted in 1953 when the CF-100 production was in full swing, but it never happened.

That was my understanding as well – that the Canadian government ordered it suspended so the company could concentrate on military matters due to the Korean situation. Never heard anyone mention the US government, let alone the US Air Force, being blamed for the decision before this thread.

 

[Flying Sorcerer]

The HP111. It may have been too late to be profitable but it was a strikingly handsome aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've heard that in the late 1960s BEA wanted to buy some Boeing 727s and 737s. However, HM Treasury blocked the sale because it was a "Dollar Spend" and it didn't have enough Dollars. Instead the Firm was forced to buy Trident 3s & BAC.111-500s and was paid compensation by the British Government for being forced to buy British.

Is that story true?

I've also heard that BAC proposed the BAC.211 and Hawker Siddeley proposed the HS.132 & 134 (which were effectively the Boeing 757 a decade earlier than the 757) as alternatives to the 727 and Trident 3. Is that correct?

 

[riggerrob]

Dear NOMISYRRUC,
Too true.
During the 1950s, the British Treasury was severely short of foreign currency to buy airplanes.
During the 1950s, the Royal Canadian Navy traded butter for guns ... er ... HMCS Warrior and HMCS Bonavaneture along with Seafires, Se Furies and Fireflies. Meanwhile the Royal Canadian Air Force traded ?????? for a pair of Meteors and a few squadrons of Vampires.

 

[PMN1]

I've heard that in the late 1960s BEA wanted to buy some Boeing 727s and 737s. However, HM Treasury blocked the sale because it was a "Dollar Spend" and it didn't have enough Dollars. Instead the Firm was forced to buy Trident 3s & BAC.111-500s and was paid compensation by the British Government for being forced to buy British.

Is that story true?

I've also heard that BAC proposed the BAC.211 and Hawker Siddeley proposed the HS.132 & 134 (which were effectively the Boeing 757 a decade earlier than the 757) as alternatives to the 727 and Trident 3. Is that correct?

HS.134 data...from Flight I think.

 

[Archibald]

I've heard that in the late 1960s BEA wanted to buy some Boeing 727s and 737s. However, HM Treasury blocked the sale because it was a "Dollar Spend" and it didn't have enough Dollars. Instead the Firm was forced to buy Trident 3s & BAC.111-500s and was paid compensation by the British Government for being forced to buy British.

Is that story true?

I've also heard that BAC proposed the BAC.211 and Hawker Siddeley proposed the HS.132 & 134 (which were effectively the Boeing 757 a decade earlier than the 757) as alternatives to the 727 and Trident 3. Is that correct?

If you wanna know, not only Air France got Concordes rammed into its... throat, by the French government (well know story). But Air Inter (the smallish similar company for interior flights) got 10 Dassault Mercure rammed, the same way, for the same reasons, by the same government only some years later.

Dassault should never have ventured into Aérospatiale-Airbus airliner business. Then again, the same Aérospatiale should never, ever have created the Corvette bizjet, as a direct competitor to the Falcons. And the Corvette failed, just like the Mercure, and just like the Concorde. One, two, three expensive failures, good airplane but commercial disasters.

Aérospatiale Corvette - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Dassault Mercure - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Concorde - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And since the A300 didn't sold much before (God bless his soul) Frank Borman and Eastern Airlines unlocked its sales potential, in April 1977...

Airbus A300 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

As a taxpayers, my parents probably paid for those many aerospace semi-disasters before I was born (they got married in 1975).

And don't start me on Peugeot, who was forced to buy Citroen in 1974 and then forced to buy Chrysler Europe's French branch, that is: Simca, also the 4th french automaker behind Renault and, well Peugeot and Citroen.
Imagine how Peugeot started the 1980's, it is a goddam miracle they didn't sunk without a trace, and French taxpayer money along it. What saved everybody sorry asses was the Peugeot 205.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Dear NOMISYRRUC,
Too true.
During the 1950s, the British Treasury was severely short of foreign currency to buy airplanes.
During the 1950s, the Royal Canadian Navy traded butter for guns ... er ... HMCS Warrior and HMCS Bonavaneture along with Seafires, Sea Furies and Fireflies. Meanwhile the Royal Canadian Air Force traded ?????? for a pair of Meteors and a few squadrons of Vampires.

In a similar vein is it true that the Saudis paid for their Tornados in oil?

I also have a very vague recollection of another arms sale being paid for in apples. If that is true I don't remember what arms were sold or the countries that were involved.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And don't start me on Peugeot, who was forced to buy Citroen in 1974 and then forced to buy Chrysler Europe's French branch, that is: Simca, also the 4th French automaker behind Renault and, well Peugeot and Citroen.

Imagine how Peugeot started the 1980's, it is a goddam miracle they didn't sunk without a trace, and French taxpayer money along it. What saved everybody sorry asses was the Peugeot 205.

Peugeot bought the whole of Chrysler Europe. The other parts were the former Rootes Group in the UK and Barreiros in Spain.

In it's defence it did produce two European Cars of the Year namely the Chrysler Alpine and Chrysler Horizon as they were known in the UK.

On the other hand Mrs Thatcher couldn't pay Peugeot to keep the Linwood plant open. That is she offered Peugeot a substantial sum of money to keep the plant open and they still closed it. Not that she wouldn't pay Peugeot to keep the plant open which was her usual modus operandi.

 

[Archibald]

Drats, I knew Chrysler Europe also had a presence in UK and Spain, but NOT that Peugeot also had to ate those. geez.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Drats, I knew Chrysler Europe also had a presence in UK and Spain, but NOT that Peugeot also had to ate those. geez.

Cheer up! Put a Chrysler Sunbeam in your life!

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RdOm7c_eweU


I've heard that Petual Clark was a huge star in France. Is that true?

As far as I know the other Rootes plant (which was at Ryton near Coventry) & the former Barreiros plant in the Madrid suburb Villaverde re-tooled to build Peugeots in the 1980s and the Peuguet 309 was originally the Talbot Arizona.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Drats, I knew Chrysler Europe also had a presence in UK and Spain, but NOT that Peugeot also had to ate those. geez.

I didn't know about this one, but that's not surprising as I was a year old in 1968 and this advert wouldn't have been on Tyne Tees.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtaJv0cZFu8

 

[Archibald]

Yes, Petula was a familiar face. She was well connected with Aznavour and many others.

 

[zebedee]

Ryton did indeed end up building Peugeots, the 309, 306, 405 and latterly the 206 Station Wagon before being closed... The only bit of the old Rootes/Chrysler UK operations that has survived was the technical centre based at Whitley which was sold to the newly privatised Jaguar and is now part of Jaguar Land Rover... the aviation connection? It was built on the old Armstrong Whitworth factory...

The former Rootes truck factory, over the road from Bedford in Dunstable and home to Commer, Karrier and Dodge (UK) went to Renault finally closing in 1993 after the RB44 saga...

Zeb

 

[Hood]

In a similar vein is it true that the Saudis paid for their Tornados in oil?

Up to 600,000 barrels (95,000 m3) of crude oil per day apparently for the entire Al Yamamah 1 deal.

I've also heard that BAC proposed the BAC.211 and Hawker Siddeley proposed the HS.132 & 134 (which were effectively the Boeing 757 a decade earlier than the 757) as alternatives to the 727 and Trident 3. Is that correct?

BAC 2-11 began in 1966/67, a scaled up 1-11 that ended up with 2x RB.211-08 and 219 passengers. Development costs were £60mil plus RB.211 costs. BEA said they loved it (quieter, lower operating costs, better airfield performance) and wished it had of been available earlier and would not have ordered the 727s. In Early 1967 BEA wanted Treasury permission for 30 with 10 options, Laker wanted 2, Autair wanted 3. BAC reckoned they could sell 250-300. Shorts were lining up to build the rear fuselage, Sud building the wings (a 30-35% stake). But the Labour government dragged its heels until the Plowden Report came out. Then they decided not to back it given the high R&D costs and doubts over the market size.
BEA threw the toys out the pram and wanted 727s pronto, Gov't said "no" and so they got 26 Trident 3 with the booster engine set up (total production just 28 - 26 for BEA and 2 for China....).

In some defence, yes the nearly identical sized 757 sold 1,000+ a decade later but a lot can happen in a decade and, well 45 aircraft for UK carriers is about 950 short... would they really smash the US market with the 2-11? And of course the RB.211 debacle in 1970-71 might have scuppered the 2-11 entirely anyway.

HS.132 was the 'Bident', a 1964 project to fit 2x RB.178-14H to give the Trident a 144,500lb AUW with a 24ft fuselage stretch for 164 passengers. Trident parts made up 60% and HSA reckoned it would cost £30mil to develop. Later came the HS.132B, C and D for 180, 192 and 219 passengers. Basically the Trident was stretched to the max. France was approached to cooperate but BEA felt it was too small for their needs (HSA even thought about double-decker Tridents!).

HS.134 of 1966 was the result, a new wing with underwing RB.178s, 183 passengers, in 1967 this grew to 28,000lb RB.207s and 210 passengers. It was basically the 757 a decade earlier - it even looked like the 757! But without a European partner it went nowhere and BEA was keener on the 2-11.

 

[Hood]

Of course my ideal fantasy would be a massive Airbus programme
Breguet/Nord/HSA/MBB concentrate on the 300-seat A300 with US turbofans or RB.211
BAC/Sud/VFW-Fokker concentrate on a 200-seat A200 (sic 2-11) with RB.211

Politics would be rife but it would lock-in UK commitment to Airbus, would ensure RR gets RB.211 rolling without reliance on Tristar, could enable relaxation of A300 engine choice to the US suppliers like the French wanted or could strengthen choice of RB.211 - might even avoid some of the worst of the Tristar/RB.211 fiasco (or alternatively if RB.211 fails it could destroy Lockheed, BAC, Airbus and RR and result in total disaster and lead to US hegemony of the world's airliner market forever).

The A200 could then have tackled the 757/MD80 market in the 1970s with the A310 overlapping at the top end of the segment as the long-range widebody option, although its possible lack of money would prevent the A310 going ahead to focus purely on the A200.

Of course what we know as A320 would probably be very different. Certainly the 2-11 with its origins with the 1-11 and its rear engine layout might not have cut it for the 1980s and newer generations of engines and shrinking the 2-11 to recreate the 1-11 would seem less than ideal.
June 1977 saw the Joint European Transport (JET) programme with BAe Weybridge, Aerospatiale, Dornier and Fokker looking at the 130-180 seat market with the SA1, SA2 and SA3, all with two CFM56s. In this AU things might be different, but its a pandora's box at this stage.

 

[alertken]

hood: Airbus fantasies: the wonder is that we are where we are now, the AB brand on, over and under the world's seas. Could so easily have lapsed under unsold A300B white tails, c. 1976.

nom #26 The Saudi contracts were/are paid in oil to HMG, who paid BAC/BAe./BAES in £. Barter is still common practice in Big Ticket contracts involving Govts. All those 1947/50 sales to Argentina, inc. bringing jet fighters and Heavy Bombers into S.America, were paid in corned beef. Meteors for Danish butter and bacon.

nom #22 UK 757 much earlier. The issue here is the moral maze, of cheapest Buy for the taxpayer, v. charity begins at home. If we buy everything offered cheaper than we can make (someone will undercut us on everything, to force us out), we revert to hunter/gatherer caveman. If we tax people more than they care to pay because we are seen to have bought at unnecessary premium...they don't pay.

UK's wartime Coalition Govt in 1943 feared US aerial piracy would seek to dominate Air Transport (as UK had long dominated maritime). Ministers feared US domestic scale would make their civil a/c cheaper than ours, despite our lower man-hour cost. But Air was sole Munitions sector with prospects of a flicker of life after Victory. What could we make if not civil peers of Lanc and Spit? So for a decade we extended privileged finance to Brabazon Committee (and other) transport types: to seek market supremacy our one advantage must be exploited - turbines. By 1955 all bar Viscount (and piston DH Dove) had failed.

Ministers accepted industry's excuse, of huge US domestic scale, and introduced 2 subsidies: Launch Aid to share R&D, and Direction to the parastatals BEAC/BOAC to Buy British. A Brabazon-redux suite was funded, 1957-67: VC10/BAC 1-11/HS Trident/A300. BEAC/BOAC wanted none and fought Ministers who were Directing them to operate without endless losses. The Corpns were Directed to the first 3, and extracted offset for their operating expense excess over any-and-allBoeing.

But this dismal record was nothing to do with US domestic scale. An early adopter of 727-200 was Air France; of 727-100, Lufthansa, also Launch Customer for 737-100; early adopters of 737-200 were Aer Lingus and Britannia A/W - their first-ever new-build, at a Bet-the-Company cost; 747 achieved only modest sales in US. So: why Britcraft in penny packets, US in wholesale cascades?

UK Aero fell into the chasm of CASM. Delta A/L, obscure, parochial, became one of the 3 Last Men Standing in legacy US Air Transport, stellar names dying, in part due to one Mission, 4/94, achieved within a year: Leadership 7.5: to achieve Cost per Available Seat Mile of 7.5c. The Air Vehicle must achieve its share of that Corporate Spec, just as it must meet Engineers' performance/reliability Specs.

UK Aero designers did not attend to such metrics. Nor did some other UK Engineers. Alec Issigonis should never have received Design plaudits for Mini, electrics dying in the rain, lube points to be accessed only by workshop tools, at 1,000 mile intervals.

 

[Hood]

UK Aero designers did not attend to such metrics. Nor did some other UK Engineers. Alec Issigonis should never have received Design plaudits for Mini, electrics dying in the rain, lube points to be accessed only by workshop tools, at 1,000 mile intervals.

I don't think BAe necessarily ever learned this, by all accounts the ATP of the late 1980s was a bit of shocker as an actual useable, reliable airliner. Maybe BAE Systems did itself a favour when it killed off the RJX and flogged off the corporate jets?

 

[Archibald]

Ariane was rescued by that first Intelsat VI launch contract in 1977. Same thing happened with Frank Borman Eastern Airlines for Airbus, roughly the same year if not the same month: spring 1977, too.

Between 1973 and 1977 there is no question that Ariane 1 and A300 were in serious trouble, with a derth of contracts and grumbling governments and taxpayers seeing them as "yet another aerospace money pit".

Giscard tried to cancel Ariane in 1974, while Concorde, Mercure and Corvette crippling failures cost France (and its taxpayers !) a crapload of money. And it seemed Airbus was heading the same dismal direction.

In both case the "miraculous" contract that saved the day wasn't that miraculous. Both Ariane 1 and A300 had valuable arguments against, say, the Space Shuttle and DC-10 / Tristar. A good case could be made the Shuttle was a huge commercial disaster by NASA, while Douglas made another mistake not shrinking their DC-10 for two engines.

Ariane and A300 filled existing and pressing capacity gaps / niches, and the market liked that. In both cases Europe took their chance intelligently and were rewarded with a much needed breakthrough. And then it snowballed, and the rest, as they say, is history.

Concorde screwing the poosh is well known, but at least that bird was politically glamourous and became an icone, albeit an expensive one. But Mercure and Corvette were not so lucky, both were insanity. Together they build a paltry (respectively) 20, 10 and 40 airframes and sold even less than that.

From 1967 Dassault tried to screw Aérospatiale over their airliner business (Caravelle, Concorde), and nearly bankrupted themselves: 10 Mercure sold to Air Inter, and that was it.

From 1967 Aérospatiale tried to screw Dassault over their Falcon 20 business, but the SN-601 Corvette only sold 40 airframes, versus 4000+ Falcons to this day and beyond.

Neither project should have been started in the first place, they were utterly stupid and redundant.

This also mean that, in the glory year 1975 French civilian aerospace was burdened by no less than 4 impeding commercial disasters: Concorde, Mercure, Corvette, A300.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In some defence, yes the nearly identical sized 757 sold 1,000+ a decade later but a lot can happen in a decade and, well 45 aircraft for UK carriers is about 950 short... would they really smash the US market with the 2-11? And of course the RB.211 debacle in 1970-71 might have scuppered the 2-11 entirely anyway.

For what it's worth 917 out of 1,832 Boeing 727s made their first flights between 1st January 1973 and 28th August 1984. Some of the BAC.211 sales would have been at the expense of them. However, Boeing would fight back and put the 757 into service sooner.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Ministers accepted industry's excuse, of huge US domestic scale, and introduced 2 subsidies: Launch Aid to share R&D, and Direction to the parastatals BEAC/BOAC to Buy British. A Brabazon-redux suite was funded, 1957-67: VC10/BAC 1-11/HS Trident/A300. BEAC/BOAC wanted none and fought Ministers who were Directing them to operate without endless losses. The Corpns were Directed to the first 3, and extracted offset for their operating expense excess over any-and-all Boeing.

For what its worth No. 1 - BAC 111 was a private venture.

The launch customer was British United Airways (BUA). The second customer Mohawk an American airline. The BAC 111-500 for BEA came later. The the first BEA aircraft was the 109th BAC 111 to fly and the 112th to be delivered.

But this dismal record was nothing to do with US domestic scale. An early adopter of 727-200 was Air France; of 727-100, Lufthansa, also Launch Customer for 737-100; early adopters of 737-200 were Aer Lingus and Britannia A/W - their first-ever new-build, at a Bet-the-Company cost; 747 achieved only modest sales in US. So: why Britcraft in penny packets, US in wholesale cascades?

For what it's worth No. 2 - It wasn't all one-way, i.e. foreign airlines being early customers of American aircraft.

As pointed out in FWIW.1 Mohawk was the aircraft's second customer.

68 out of 244 BAC 111s (28%) were sold to American airlines, including American Airlines itself which bought 30. The others that bought the type in quantity were Braniff which bought 14 and Mohawk which bought 18.

American's initial order was for 15 aircraft. At the time was the biggest Dollar export contract ever won by the UK, which with spares, totalled £14 million ($40 million).

 

[alertken]

K.Hayward,Govt &Civil Aerospace,'83,Pp.46,211, MinTech Written Answer, HoC,17/12/69: Treasury Launch Aid:​

1st. Contribution Year Govt. £Mn. Recoveries (- 12/69)
Trident 1/1E 1961 and 1964 7.25 0.505

VC10/Super VC10 1961 and 1964 10.25 0.943

BAC 1-11/200/300/400 1962 9.75 1.629

BAC 1-11/500 1967 (8.70 to 12/69} (later)
​

Trident 2E 1968 1.875 (more and later)

Trident 3B 1968 15.115 6.800 (to 12/69)

Spey family 1962 and 1967 {9.59 to 12/69} 1.800 (to 12/69)

The popular, opinionated historian Corelli Barnett: Verdict of Peace,P609: “more profitable (if the taxpayer had invested in) plastic garden gnomes.” There is an import substitution argument, of course, for domestic sales.

(This did not travel well: first number is our outlay, second is our receipts).

​