West German Bundesmarine Naval Projects

Just got "Die Bundesmarine 1950 bis 1972 - Konzeption und Aufbau" today from the library, and I'm far from reading it completely, but due to moins good references, I already found the mention about the nuclear Sea Mauler.
But from what I got from that quick skimming, I have the impression, that this may have been just an idea, or a wish, expressed by the then Vice Admiral Heinrich Gerlach for the then available FAC, which were intended to be modernised until 1969/1970. Those older boats were reagrded as too small to be fitted with Tartar, so a smaller missile would have been needed. And to give it sufficient punch, the idea of a nuclear warhead probably seemed logical. But maybe he disregarded political realities back then ?
The Bundeswehr was founded as a non-nuclear army, written down in the Paris treaty from 1954. The fact, that German aircraft became possible carriers for nuclear bombs was only possible with the nuclear sharing, but those warheads
still were undisputed US possession ! Using them always depended on US approval, probably hard to seek during an engagement of small attack craft in the Baltic ! And undermining those regulations for "small" nuclear weapons may
have opened a can of worms, even back then, when German governments still were more decisive.

As said at the start, I didn't really start, not to mention finished reading that book, but the mention of the nuclear
tipped Sea Mauler on that page is in context with Heinrich Gerlach, his plans and opinions.
 
Much appreciated.

Sea Mauler was certainly considered to arm the FACs. And it probably could have had a secondary antisurface role (as did Sea Sparrow). Adding a nuke seems improbable, but as you say, speculative.

My initial reflex was that even a low-yield nuke would be very dangerous to the shooter at Sea Mauler ranges, but monkeying with Nukemap and other calculators suggests that really low-yield warheads (20-100 tons) would have damage radii of 1km or less. So, technically it might have worked, if a small enough warhead was possible. Politically, it's another matter, of course.
 
Dear Jemiba, if you can find the info about the projects of nuclear-powered submarines and destroyers in the book and share it here, I'm sure it would be very appreciated. :) Many thanks in advance. :)
 
Your wish is my command ! ;)
But as I don't like to type those passages out, please wait until I've finished scanning. Will probably take until
the end of the weekend.
 
Let's start with the nuclear submarines for the German Navy (I've put the relevant original text from the book first, and the translation in brackets):

“Als sich die Marine Ende 1960 schließlich erneut mit zum Teil recht massiv gesteigerten Forderungen der NATO konfrontiert sah, war davon zwar die Zahl ihrer Uboote nicht betroffen. Da aber nun sechs SSK gefordert wurden, bedeutete dies, wie FüB der Standing Group mitteilte, »gegenüber den bisherigen 350 ts U-Booten die Entwicklung eines neuen vergrösserten Typs«. Angesichts der eher schlechten Erfahrungen, die die Marine inzwischen mit der Konstruktion, Auftragserteilung und den Verhandlungen um Verbesserungen und den Bau eines neuen Uboottyps gemacht hatte, musste es zweifelhaft erscheinen, ob der nun von der NATO geforderte Typ eines JagdUbootes
bis 1966 würde zur Verfügung stehen können. Dabei handelte es sich nämlich normalerweise nicht nur um größere als die von der Bundesmarine geplanten Typen. Für Jagd-Uboote war auch ein nicht-konventioneller, also nuklearer Antrieb nötig, was sowohl technisch als auch politisch brisantes Neuland für die Marine bedeutet hätte. Dabei war es durchaus nicht so, dass sie auf diesem Gebiet vollständig passiv geblieben wäre“

(When, at the end of 1960, the navy was again confronted with what were in part quite massive increases in NATO requirements, the number of its submarines was not affected. But since six SSKs were now required, this meant, as FüB (Führungsstab der Bundeswehr = High Command of the Bundeswehr) informed the Standing Group, "the development of a new enlarged type compared to the previous 350 ts submarines". In view of the rather bad experiences that the navy had with the design, commissioning and negotiation of improvements and construction of a new type of, it must have seemed doubtful whether the type of fighter submarine now demanded by NATO would be available by 1966. These not only would have been larger types than those planned by the Bundesmarine, but for attack submarines, a non-conventional, i.e. nuclear propulsion was also necessary, which would have meant both technically and politically explosive new territory for the navy. But it was by no means the case, that the navy remained completely passive in this area)

And from the footnotes:

“Im August desselben Jahres wurde das Thema atomgetriebener Boote, einschließlich eines möglichen Einsatzes in der Ostsee, aber auch im Nordmeer, in Ruges Gegenwart bei einer Sitzung der Abteilung T besprochen. Für die Entwicklung eines geeigneten Nuklearantriebes wurden hierbei 5 Jahre veranschlagt.
…
Es war dies ein Vorfühlen für den Fall, dass der Atomantrieb wesentlich leichter gebaut werden konnte. Es lag in der technischen Entwicklung, dass das einmal kommen musste. Es war aber nötig, dass die Marinen mit den Hauptaufgaben im Küstenvorfeld es anstießen
…
Ruge konnte sich durchaus eine neue, kleinere Generation von Atom-Ubooten vorstellen,
deren Entwicklung nicht zuletzt von der Bundesmarine angestoßen worden wäre
…
In meiner Unterabteilung werden z.Z. gewisse Uberlegungen über den operativen Ostsee-Einsatz von Ubooten einschließlich solcher mit nuklearem Antrieb angestellt. Es wäre für uns von großem Interesse zu wissen, wie weit der derzeitige Stand ihrer Studien betreffend eines nuklear angetriebenen 1000 ts Ubootes fortgeschritten ist und wie Sie in dieser Beziehung das Verhältnis des realen Kampfwertes eines solchen Bootes zum Aufwand für seinen nuklearen Antrieb beurteilen


(In August of the same year, the subject of nuclear-powered boats, including possible use in the Baltic Sea, but also in the North Sea, was discussed in Ruge's presence at a meeting of the Department T. The development of a suitable nuclear propulsion system was estimated to take 5 years.
….
This principally was sending out our feelers for the eventuality that the nuclear drive could be built much lighter. It was part of the technical development that this would happen one day. But it was necessary for the navies with their main tasks in the coastal forefield to initiate it.
…
Ruge could well imagine a new, smaller generation of nuclear submarines, the development of which would have been initiated not least by the German Navy.
…
In my (Ruge's) subdivision, certain considerations are currently being made about the operational use of submarines in the Baltic Sea, including those with nuclear propulsion. It would be great to know the present state of your studies concerning a nuclear powered 1000 ts submarine and how you assess the relation of the real combat value of such a vessel to the cost of its nuclear propulsion.)


To me that means, yes, the German Navy prinipally was interested in nuclear submarines, but there were only first thoughts, if such subs would have been feasible and useful at all, with regards to the fact, that a nuclear propulsion for such a small sub still wasn't developed. There seem to have been information requests to the industry about the developmental status, so there probably were such thoughts in the industry, too. But I cannot find a mention of any kind of order.
 
... and the next two points:

- nuclear powered destroyers -- Page 62- 65



“Unter Hinweis auf technische Weiterentwicklungen der nächsten Jahre, wie z.B. den Atomantrieb, wurde des Weiteren erwogen, statt der beantragten 12 zunächst nur sechs Zerstörer zu bauen, um die gewonnenen Erfahrungen und neueste Entwicklungen in den später zu bewilligenden zu berücksichtigen. Hierauf antwortete Zenker, dass der Zerstörer als Plattform gesehen werden könne, die 15 bis 20 Jahre verwendbar sei und deren Bestückung in dieser Zeit geändert werden könne.
….
Die damals gerade erfolgte Nutzung der Kernenergie für den Schiffsantrieb hatte für das betreffende Fahrzeug im Vergleich zur Ölbefeuerung den Vorteil, riesige Strecken ohne Brennstoffergänzung zurücklegen zu können. Dies, so Wagner, sei aber für die begrenzten Einsatzgebiete der deutschen Marine eher zweitrangig. Außerdem stünden dem Vorteil des Nuklearantriebs Nachteile gegenüber, die ihn für Fahrzeuge von Zerstörergröße uninteressant machten. Wegen der erforderlichen Abschirmung gegen die Strahlung und des mit dem Nuklearantrieb verbundenen Rückgriffes auf Nassdampfanlagen sei bei dieser Antriebsart eine Steigerung bei Größe und Gewicht der so ausgerüsteten Fahrzeuge zu beobachten, der keine Geschwindigkeits- oder Leistungssteigerungen gegenüberstünden34. Ihn mit einem konventionellen Antrieb zu planen, wie das bei den späteren Fahrzeugen der »Hamburg«-Klasse, von denen hier im
Prinzip die Rede war, auch geschah, sei aus diesen Gründen unproblematisch“

(With reference to further technical developments in the coming years, such as nuclear propulsion, it was also considered to build only six destroyers instead of the 12 requested, in order to take into account the experience gained and the latest developments in the destroyers to be approved later. Zenker replied, that the destroyer could be seen as a platform, that would be usable for 15 to 20 years and whose equipment could be changed during this time.

(The use of nuclear energy for ship propulsion, that had just taken place at that time, had the advantage , that the vehicle in question was able to cover huge distances without the need for refueling. However, according to Wagner, this was of secondary importance for the limited areas of operation of the German navy. In addition, the advantages of nuclear propulsion were accompanied by disadvantages, that made it unattractive for destroyer sized vehicles. Because of the necessary shielding against the radiation and the reliance on wet steam systems associated with nuclear propulsion, there was an increase in the size and weight of the vehicles equipped with this type of propulsion, which would not be offset by any increase in speed or performance. To plan it with a conventional propulsion system, as was the case with the later vehicles of the "Hamburg" class… was unproblematic for these reasons.)



From the footnotes:

„In der Tat sind Nuklearantriebe bis heute vor allem für größere Fahrzeuge, Kreuzer, Träger und große Uboote, in Gebrauch.“

(And indeed is nuclear propulsion still today mainly used for bigger ships, like cruisers, aircraft carriers or large submarines” )


To me, that means, that the German Navy regarded nuclear destroyers (as the biggest ships used) as not suitable for the needs of the German Navy.


- nuclear TARTAR missile -- Page 292

“Dieser bezweifelte nämlich grundsätzlich wirksame Einsatzmöglichkeiten des DDG gegen Seeziele, außer für den Fall, dass der »Tartar«-FK später mit einem nuklearen Gefechtskopf nachgerüstet werde. Zur Begründung verwies er auf dessen gegenwärtig für die Bekämpfung von Luftzielen ausgelegten Gefechtskopf, der lediglich gut 15 kg TNT enthalte.“

(The latter (commander of the destroyers) doubted that the DDG could be effectively used against sea targets, except in the event that the "Tartar" FK was later retrofitted with a nuclear warhead. As justification, he referred to the Tartar's warhead, which is currently designed to engage aerial targets and contained only 15 kg of TNT.)


As I understand it, the Tartar missile with conventional warhead was regarded, at least by some influential officers in the Bundesmarine, as not effective against ship targets, as long, as there wasn’t a nuclear warhead available. Such a warhead certainly had to be developed in the US, not in Germany.
 
TomS said:
Nuclear Sea Mauler?!? That sounds borderline suicidal. And technically challenging. Did anyone ever package a nuclear warhead down to 127mm?
Click to expand...
Read a thing on wiki under the nuclear artillery or US warheads that claims it's possible to make one as small as 105mm, but 155mm is the smallest made. An issue is that such as small diameter warhead is very inefficient in terms of how much fissile materials it needs per unit yield. A larger diameter warhead has more even implosion, which reduces fissile consumption.
 
- nuclear SEA-MAULER missile -- Page 268


“Daher war auch stets eine ausreichend starke Eskorte zum Schutz vor solchen Überwasserbedrohungen erforderlich. Diese erwartete Gerlach von den bis 1969/70 ebenfalls modernisierten Schnellbooten. Sie sollten bis dahin durch die Bewaffnung mit dem Flugkörper »Sea Mauler« selbst wesentlich zur Luftabwehr im Nahbereich beitragen können - »mit nuklearer Kleinstladung eine wirkungsvolle Waffe auch gegen kleine Überwasserfahrzeuge« (u.a. FK-Schnellboote) - und mit drahtgelenkten Torpedos verbesserter Reichweite, Geschwindigkeit und Treffsicherheit über eine deutlich gesteigerte Kampfkraft verfügen.“

(Therefore, a sufficiently strong escort was always required to protect against such surface threats. Gerlach expected this from the FAC, which were also modernised by 1969/70. By then, they were to be able to make a significant contribution to close-range air defence by being armed with the "Sea Mauler" missile - "with a small nuclear charge, an effective weapon even against small surface craft" (e.g., FAC with missiles) - and with wire-guided torpedoes with improved range, speed and marksmanship, giving significantly increased combat power.)


That’s the only mention of Sea Mauler at all, and here, too, I doubt, that a nuclear warhead would have been allowed to be developed by Germany. If at all, it could have been a US development, leading to the question, if Germany would have been allowed the use of tactical nuclear weapons on it’s own discretion.
 
- Bundesmarine midget submarines
SEEHUND, BOEING SEEPFERD, MANTA -- Page 151-153



Small/midget subs actually were built for the Bundesmarine, but the two boats class 202 with about 100 ts displacement weren’t regarded as successful, though they had proven in tests, that they were hard to detect in the Baltic conditions. But reloads for the two torpedo tubes were considered mandatory after those tests, about doubling displacement.
Types, which probably apply better to the term “midget submarines” are mentioned for example on page 135


“Als Zwischenbilanz wurde festgehalten, dass ein Boot mit den beschriebenen Eigenschaften nur schwer zu orten und noch schwerer zu vernichten war. Dies galt sinngemäß auch für Klein-Uboote, die sogar noch schwerer zu orten und zu bekämpfen waren. Diese beiläufige Feststellung belegte, dass die bundesdeutschen Marineplaner auch über den Einsatz solcher Kleinkampfmittel nachdachten, wenngleich sie nicht im Mittelpunkt der Studie standen.“

(As an interim conclusion, it was stated that a boat with the described characteristics was difficult to locate and even more difficult to destroy. This was also true for midget submarines, which were even more difficult to locate to locate and fight. This incidental observation proved that the Federal German naval naval planners were also considering the use of such small combatants, though they were not the focus of the study.)

Nevertheless, here, too, probably subs like the class 202 are meant, as mentioned on page 137:


“Zur Besetzung der so identifizierten Gebiete wurden 16 Boote von 350 ts und 10 Klein-Uboote von 100 ts als notwendig erachtet.“

(For the occupation of the areas thus identified, 16 boats of 350 ts and 10 small submarines of 100 ts were considered necessary.)

But truely midget subs are actually mentioned in more detail on page 151 - 153:


“Das bereits 1959 mit dieser Untersuchung beauftragte Marinewaffenkommando schlug jetzt die Aufstellung von Kampfschwimmerverbänden sowie die Einführung der Kleinkampfmittel »Seehund«, »Manta« und »Seepferd« vor. Während für die Kampfschwimmer mehr oder weniger traditionelle Kommandoaufgaben vorgesehen waren, sollten die »Seehunde«, bei denen es sich um verbesserte Varianten des bereits im Zweiten Weltkrieg von der Kriegsmarine eingesetzten 2-Mann-Klein-Ubootes handelte, in Gruppen eingesetzt defensive Aufgaben, besonders gegen feindliche Landungsverbände, in der westlichen Ostsee wahrnehmen.
…
Zur Lösung dieses Problems schlugen die Autoren eine »Manta« genannte »Unterwasser-Kampf- und Beobachtungsstation « vor. Hierbei sollte es sich um Unterwasserboote von linsen oder flunderförmiger Form handeln, die stationär eingesetzt sich »platt auf den Grund legen und sich wie eine Flunder teilweise einspülen« sollten, um ihre Ortbarkeit herabzusetzen. Gedacht war an Boote von 50 t Verdrängung, die, mit drei Mann besetzt, bereits in Spannungszeiten Positionen vor eigenen Minensperren einnehmen und alle acht bis 14 Tage abgelöst werden sollten. Hierzu hielt man eine Marschfahrt von bis zu fünf bis sechs Knoten für nötig, ansonsten konnten sie aber stationär eingesetzt werden. Mit ihrer Bewaffnung von acht drahtgelenkten Torpedos sollten sie Ziele bis Zerstörergröße, vor allem aber Minenräumboote bekämpfen. In kleinen Gruppen von drei bis vier Booten sollten sie hierbei zusammenwirken. Um ihre Energieversorgung sicherzustellen, waren bis zu ihren vorbestimmten Positionen landgespeiste Kabel zu verlegen, die in den Meeresgrund eingespült sein sollten.
…
Beim »Seepferd« handelte es sich um ein Projekt der Firma Boeing, ein 60 t großes Unterwasserfahrzeug mit Ingolinantrieb und drei Mann Besatzung. Die zusätzliche Ausstattung mit einziehbaren Tragflächen sollte dem Boot im aufgetauchten Zustand eine Höchstgeschwindigkeit von 66 Knoten ermöglichen. Im getauchten Zustand dagegen sollten bis zu 30 Knoten möglich sein. Bewaffnungen von wahlweise zwei Torpedos, sechs Minen oder einem Flugkörper machten dieses Fahrzeug potentiell für Einsatzrollen als Uboot einschließlich der U-Jagd und als Minenleger tauglich. Die Prüfung seiner möglichen Verwendbarkeit war als Teil der Studie angeordnet worden.“


(The Naval Weapons Command, which had already been commissioned with this study in 1959, now proposed the establishment of combat swimmer units as well as the introduction of the small combatants "Seehund", "Manta" and "Seepferd". While more or less traditional command tasks were envisaged for the combat swimmers, the "Seehunde", which were improved variants of the 2-man small submarine already used by the Kriegsmarine in the Second World War, were to perform defensive tasks in groups, especially against enemy landing units, in the western Baltic Sea.
…
To solve this problem, the authors proposed an "underwater combat and observation station" called "Manta". These were to be underwater boats of lenticular or flounder shape, which, when stationary, were to "lie flat on the bottom and partially wash in like a flounder" in order to reduce their locatability. Boats of 50 t displacement were envisaged, which, manned by three men, would take up positions in front of their own mine barriers during times of tension and be relieved every eight to 14 days. For this purpose, a cruising speed of up to five to six knots was considered necessary, but otherwise they could be deployed stationary. With their armament of eight wire-guided torpedoes, they were to engage targets up to the size of destroyers, but above all minesweepers. In small groups of three to four boats they were to work together. In order to ensure their energy supply, land-fed cables were to be laid to their predetermined positions, which were to be washed into the seabed.
….
The "Seepferd" was a project by the Boeing company, a 60-tonne underwater vehicle with ingolin propulsion and a crew of three. The additional equipment with retractable wings was supposed to enable the boat to reach a top speed of 66 knots when surfaced. When submerged, on the other hand, up to 30 knots were to be possible. Armament of either two torpedoes, six mines or one missile made this craft potentially suitable for operational roles as a submarine, including sub-hunting, and as a minelayer. Testing of its potential usability had been ordered as part of the study.")


The use of improved Seehund midget subs could be just a proposal made in this study, but for the “Manta”, there seem to have been some deeper thoughts into that system, not just a quick idea by a committee. So, there could well be surviving documents, but I couldn’t find mentions in the Gröner or Roessler books still yet, only for the late WWII project, which certainly wasn’t related to this one.

But perhaps the ”Seepferd/Seahorse”, as a Boeing project, should be traceable ?


BTW, as the slacker, that unfortunately I am, I did most of the translation with the help of deepl, so there still may be some awkward styles. But principally it worked surprisingly well … ;)

If someone is interested in more infos from that book, just contact me via PM.
 
Many thanks, Jemiba, for all the info from the book! Most interesting! :)

Mini nuclear warheads: There are occassional rumours about a design of a weapon called Bottle Rocket, which was to be a nuclear shell for M1A1 Abrams tank, i.e. for the 120 mm gun. In terms of diameter, such thing would be probably the smallest nuke that could be physically manufactured.
 
LVisingr said:
Many thanks, Jemiba, for all the info from the book! Most interesting! :)

Mini nuclear warheads: There are occassional rumours about a design of a weapon called Bottle Rocket, which was to be a nuclear shell for M1A1 Abrams tank, i.e. for the 120 mm gun. In terms of diameter, such thing would be probably the smallest nuke that could be physically manufactured.
Click to expand...
Came across those rumors, but the potential 105mm nuke supposedly comes straight from one of the nuclear engineers involved in the design of the 155mm shells for the US.
 
More infos about the german nuclear powered submarine.

- Ingenieurkontor Lübeck IKL
- Two studies IK 20 and IK 24
- Babcock and MAN-Wahodag Reactor

Source:
Title:
LEISER, TIEFER, SCHNELLER: Innovationen im Deutschen U-Boot-Bau
Author:
Jürgen Rohweder
 
For whatever this source is worth:

https://www.focus.de/politik/expert...-plante-atom-u-boote-zu-bauen_id_4530193.html

Principally it seconds, what for example by Eberhard Rössler has said: Nuclear subs were regarded as too big and not really useful for the confined areas, they would have been used in.
But, of course, that not necessarily excludes, that studies were made for foreign customers.

But many thanks for that clue, just found that book, and even in a library here in Berlin !
So, I think, in one or two weeks, we can have a closer look at it.
 
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Sometimes I'm tempted to say, that the great inventions in mankind were fire, the wheel ... and libraries ! ;)

Here are, what should be the relevant excerpts about German nuclear submarines from "Leiser, tiefer, schneller
-Innovationen im deutschen U-Boot-Bau" by Jürgen Rohweder:

page 69 to 73 (actually a whole chapter about this question)

"DEUTSCHE ATOM-U-BOOTE?

Wie das Ungeheuer von Loch Ness taucht in den Kreisen alter U-BootFahrer der Bundesmarine immer wieder das Gerücht auf, Deutschland habe Atom-U-Boote bauen wollen. Anders als das sagenhafte schottischeSee-Ungeheuer ist das deutsche Atom-U-Boot keine Schimäre, jedenfalls nicht ganz. Im August 2008 berichtete der SPIEGEL8 unter dem Titel „ Begehrliche Wünsche" vom Fund eines jungen Historikers, Alexander Lurz, im britischen Nationalarchiv. Aus dem einst geheimen Bericht des britischen Botschafters bei der NATO, Frank Roberts, nach einem Gespräch mit NATO Oberbefehlshaber in Europa, General Lauris Norstad, geht hervor, dass die Regierung Adenauer mit ihrem Verteidigungsminister Franz Josef Strauß Atom-U-Boote für die Marine wollte.
In dem Papier vom 26. April 1960 zitiert Roberts einen sehr ungehaltenen Norstadt, der sich darüber ärgerte, dass Deutschland schon seit zwei Jahren in Washington darauf drängte, ein Atom-U-Boot zu bekommen. Erst kürzlich habe Außenminister Brentano wieder nachgefragt. Dem müsse man, so Norstadt, den Deutschen ein sehr festes „ Nein" entgegensetzen. Ein ozeantaugliches deutsches Atom-U-Boot mit unbegrenzter Ausdauer sei das Letzte, was die NATO von Deutschland wolle. Dafür gebe es auch keinen militärischen Grund. Das hätte das amerikanische Außenministerium der deutschen Regierung längst klarmachen müssen. Das aber habe ihn konsultiert, und er sei es leid, dass die Last politischer Entscheidungen auf seine Schultern abgewälzt werde.
...
Aus den Papieren des Auswärtigen Amtes geht eindeutig hervor, dass das Verteidigungsministerium mit derartigen Plänen befasst war. Allerdings sagen die Schiffbauexperten jener Zeit übereinstimmend, dass es ein konkretes U-Boot-Projekt nicht gegeben habe und dass man technisch auch gar in der Lage gewesen sei, ein Atom-U-Boot zu bauen. HDW begann gerade mit den Planungen für den Bau der U-Boot Klasse 201 und beschäftigte sich intensiv mit Walter-Antrieben." Und Prof.Dr. Fritz Abels, Geschäftsführer des IKL, sagte, dass das IKL ,,ein deutsches Atom-U-Boot nie zu Papier gebracht habe" ... ,,Das konnten wir auch nicht."12 So habe das IKL auch in den 80er Jahren eine Anfrage aus Brasilien zur kompletten Konstruktion eines atomgetriebenen U-Boots abgelehnt. ,,Darin hatten wir keine Erfahrung.")
"

(Like the Loch Ness monster, the rumour that Germany wanted to build nuclear submarines keeps cropping up in the circles of old submariners in the German Navy. Unlike the legendary Scottish sea monster, the German nuclear submarine is not a chimera, at least not entirely. In August 2008, SPIEGEL reported under the title " Desirous Wishes" of the discovery of a young historian, Alexander Lurz, in the British National Archives. From the once secret report of the British Ambassador to NATO, Frank Roberts, following a conversation with NATO Commander-in-Chief in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, it emerges that the Adenauer government, with its Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss, wanted nuclear submarines for the navy. In the paper of 26 April 1960, Roberts quotes a very displeased Norstadt, who was annoyed that Germany had been pressing Washington for two years to get a nuclear submarine. Only recently did Foreign Minister Brentano ask again. According to Norstadt, the Germans had to be told a very firm "no". An ocean-going German nuclear submarine with unlimited endurance is the last thing NATO wants from Germany. And there is no military reason for it. The American State Department should have made that clear to the German government long ago. But it had consulted him and he was tired of the burden of political decisions being shifted onto his shoulders
...
The papers of the Foreign Office clearly show that the Ministry of Defence was involved in such plans. However, shipbuilding experts of the time agree that there was no concrete submarine project and that it was technically possible to build a nuclear submarine. HDW had just begun planning the construction of the Class 201 submarine and was working intensively on Walter propulsion systems. And Prof. Dr. Fritz Abels, managing director of the IKL, said that the IKL had "never put a German nuclear submarine on paper".... In the 1980s, the IKL rejected a request from Brazil for the complete construction of a nuclear-powered submarine. We had no experience in that.”)

Principally, that's what we had before, but with a more in-depth analysis of the political background, and a paragraph about the wish of the then German government to get nuclear weapons, not just nuclear powered subs. Interesting especially to me, the mention of the rejection of the Brazilian request.

The civil nuclear powered freighter "Otto Hahn" and its connection to the development of a nuclear sub is mentioned, too, but with the phrase "Daneben gibt es abenteuerliche Spekulationen" (Besides there are adventurous speculations) at the very beginning.

But we actually have a mention, that there actually were studies of nuclear propulsion for submarines (page 96):

"Und natürlich stand [Anfang der 60er Jahre] die Frage des künftigen U-Boot -Antriebes zur Debatte. So erhielt das IKL den Auftrag, nicht nur den Walter-Antrieb und den Kreislaufdiesel zu unter suchen, sondern auch - nur zum Vergleich - den Einsatz von Atom-Reaktoren zu prüfen. Die Studien zu denProjekten IK 20 und IK 24 sahen den Einsatz eines Babcock Reaktors beziehungsweise eines MAN-Wahodag-Reaktors vor. Dies waren allerdings nur Sandkastenspiele , denn ein echtes Schiffbauprojekt, einen fertigen U-Boot-Entwurf hat das IKL nie angefertigt. • Das hätten, wie früher schon beschrieben, die westlichen NATO-Verbündeten nicht zugelassen, einmal ganz abgesehen davon, dass es der Bundesrepublik damals ohnehin verboten war, solche Boote zu bauen. Und schließlich hätten die Entwicklung und der Bau eines deutschenAtom-U-Bootes nach Einschätzung der Schiffbauer viel zu lange gedauert. Aber auch technisch war der Nuklearantrieb für den Einsatz der kleinen Boote der Bundesmarine in Flachwassergebieten ungeeignet."

(And of course, the question of future submarine propulsion was up for debate [at the beginning of the 1960s]. So the IKL was commissioned not only to investigate the Walter propulsion system and the cycle diesel, but also - just for comparison - to examine the use of nuclear reactors. The studies for the IK 20 and IK 24 projects envisaged the use of a Babcock reactor and a MAN Wahodag reactor respectively. However, these were only sandbox games, because the ICL never produced a real shipbuilding project, a finished submarine design. - As described earlier, the western NATO allies would not have allowed this, quite apart from the fact that the Federal Republic was forbidden to build such boats at that time anyway. And finally, the development and construction of a German nuclear submarine would have taken far too long, according to the shipbuilders. But nuclear propulsion was also technically unsuitable for the use of the small boats of the German Navy in shallow water areas.)

Here, maybe, a look at this book as a whole is useful. When I ordered it, I was expecting something similar to the books of Eberhard Rössler, but it rather is a coffee-table book, full of full sized colour photos, many spreading over both pages, nice to look at, but not really informative. And the last pages aren't showing, as often in other books, excerpts from the publisher's catalogue, but adds from suppliers for the Submarine building industry. And, honestly, I got the feeling, that the whole book is more an ad for the fuel cell powered subs, built by the German industry, than a book for the ordinary shiplover.
So the tenor rather is "we and you don't need nuclear subs, as we have something better to offer !". And to my opinion, that was the reason for the inclusion of the study with the MAN-Wahodag reactor, too.
For short : No mention, that there ever was a serious proposal/project for a nuclear powered German submarine.
 
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The excellent Italian Almanacco Navale for 1968 notes that Rommel was previously going to be called Von Fritsch. It adds that 5 further ships were to be built in German yards but this has been cancelled.
Instead ten ships of a new Tartar equipped frigate class (a drawing shows the 3,500 t design based on the Koeln class frigate). Additionsl armament to be 2 76mm and 2 40mm guns of Italian manufacture plus 2 torpedo launchers.

The German Navy started with a modified Hamburg class design (possibly to get Seaslug, though this and Terrier were too big for the planned 6,000 ton ship) of 6 units.

The selection of the CF Adams class may have been influenced by one of these ships being used to test the idea of NATO crewed ships. Italy and Japan built their own designs with Tartar and France modified a destroyer. The RN looked at upgrading Darings with Tartar. Spain initially planned to build Leanders equipped with Tartar but had to build Knox class instead (Brooke class no longer being available).
 
Italy of course planned to build a nuclear submarine called the Guillemo Marconi based on a Skipjack SSN. The Dutch also had similar plans. Cost and complexity soon killed them off.
 
uk 75 said:
Italy of course planned to build a nuclear submarine called the Guillemo Marconi based on a Skipjack SSN. The Dutch also had similar plans. Cost and complexity soon killed them off.
Click to expand...
And the extreme difficulty in getting the USN to part with designs for the reactor.
 

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