UK Thermonuclear Warheads.

[bri21]

"Independent" UK design work. Moore threads through most complex records in the 1960-64 period, addressing Skybolt, Polaris and WE177B. ...........
..............
It's intermingled.
I settle for brian's point of 2-Way Street: inspiration, components/materials.
Subsequent to YS Mk.1 our weapons drew upon/were influenced by US data: neither copies nor conceived immaculately.

Thank you Ken.

However, a rider to the above. We as yet have no firm knowledge of the differences between the W-76 warhead on some USN Trident and the RN Trident equivalent.

 

[bri21]

Re: WE177C

That 4-boat + spares policy continued largely un-noticed by others for some years until serious planning started for Chevaline, when it was discovered that there was to be a serious shortage of fissile material. The Navy then commissioned a staff study that concluded that the 4-boat policy was no longer realistic in the light of actual operating history. The study recommended that the Navy should adopt a 3-boat policy that was then approved.


I'll try to find some time to dig out the archives refs for the 4-boat to 3-boat study and others from my own files.

Sincere apologies chaps for taking so long to dig out the source for this from my files. Truthfully, I forgot. What my chiropractor refers to as a senior moment. Anyhow it's here as a PDF.

 

[bri21]

The old 40-city targeting plans for Bomber Command - the national, as opposed to NATO's strike plan are not so difficult to find. Two colleagues did some work on this recently and came up with most of the 40-city list combined with a map of the Galosh ABM footprint that I'd located. I'll inquire if it's OK to upload the list here. I still have the Galosh footprint, although I see that it's since been removed from the archives. Censored after the horse has bolted with a copy.

Found the Galosh footprint along with another from the same file. Both have since been censored and removed from the National Archives copy in DEFE 25/335 a file concerned only with Chevaline. However no one asked me to return my copy. So here they are, if they upload.

Both were originally black and white only. They've been 'painted' with colour only to make them more suitable for viewing on my own website, and the originals in b+w are still available.

Sincerely hope that intelligence on Iraqi WMDs was better than this.

BTW chaps, the numbers on the map are closely correlated to a 1982 atlas that lists Soviet cities by population. Moscow being 1 obviously. So my guess is that the numbers on this chart are the cities that featured on the 40-city target list. Although not all of them are visible.

On a slightly different topic, - the UK Polaris upgrade to Chevaline, a document from the National Archives has turned up recently. It's very large in its original format so it's transcribed verbatim into a PDF and uploaded here. You have to be logged on to see it. It's a briefing minute with technical annexes for the PM Edward Heath from Lord Carrington, Sec of State @ MoD in 1970. It's dated less than one month after the General Election of 1970 that installed Heath in his new government. It's clear from this minute and the two technical annexes that this is the true origin of the Chevaline program, and the technical reasons for it. Very detailed about Russian ABM developments and how they were neutralising Polaris. Enjoy!

Note that much of the two technical annexes had received attention from the censor. However, following parts of the file directly quoted the censored material and the censor missed that. He's not always fully awake. I've added these to the PDF and reloaded it.

 

[alertken]

brian: invaluable and many thanks. Healey's Memoirs have his failure to terminate (Super Antelope) Chevaline as his Govt.'s only nuclear error. £85Mn. became >£1,000Mn. and 7 years from 1970 became 12.

How cogent these papers are to today's discussions on Trident renewal.

Your find of RN releasing 60 Polaris A3T warheads "by 1976": could you revert to my point re WE177C, which your site has as rebuilt from the (64) 3rd. warheads displaced by Chevaline (at sea from 10/82, but WE177C was deployed from 11/75). Try this:
Jaguar GR.1: Brüggen 14 Sqdn: 11/75 - 30/9/85, 8 WE.177C;
17 Sqdn. 12/75 - 1/3/85: 8 WE.177C;
31 Sqdn. 1/7/76 - 6/84: 8 WE.177C;
20 Sqdn: 1/3/77 - 28/6/84, 8 WE.177C. (balance of each Sqdn's U/E: iron/attrited before nuclear escalation).
Detached to Bruggen from Coltishall: 6 Sqdn. 11/75 - 6/84: 8 WE.177C, and: 54 Sqdn. 11/75 - 6/84: 8 WE.177C (there was no SSA at Colt);
Detached to Bruggen from Lossiemouth: 226 OCU: 11/75 - 6/84 12 WE.177C (I doubt storage of scarce nukes on a Reserve/shadow base). These reinforcements offset attrition, to restore the Force to 4x15: that's 60, from I suggest, the realisation that 3 shipsets of A3T would suffice to sometimes put 2 at sea.

From 10/83 84 RAFG Tornados/WE177C replaced the Jaguars and 24 Laarbruch Buccs, which I have as WE177A: the extra 24 were either ex-Vulcan 2 WE177B (withdrawn by 12/82) or ex-A3T Nos.3 displaced by Chevaline.

What do you think?

 

[bri21]

Your find of RN releasing 60 Polaris A3T warheads "by 1976": could you revert to my point re WE177C, which your site has as rebuilt from the (64) 3rd. warheads displaced by Chevaline (at sea from 10/82, but WE177C was deployed from 11/75).

It's more complex than that Ken, and the dates are not relevant, because there were more than 60 WE.177C built, with many of these being completely new-build, and not dependent on the 60 warheads released by the Navy. Added to that, recently found files (DEFE 69/768) show that the fissile material shortage at that time was so acute that the incoming Thatcher govt did a deal with Pres Jimmy Carter to 'borrow' plutonium from US stocks. UK production would eventually build up, and presumably the borrowed material was returned.

And altho' (as you state) Chevaline was not at sea until '82, warhead production began much earlier, and lasted over a long period. As I recollect from RAF Plan R, WE.177 production peaked at 2 per month, altho' I believe 2.5 per month was possible. Ergo: 36 per year.

 

[bri21]

Numbers.

There has been an update to the WE.177 numbers saga

http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/vw.htm#WE.177 Quantities
at here.
http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/John.R.Walker-data.png

These numbers are well-referenced and as authoritative as we are likely to get IMO.

 

[alertken]

The opacity of UK numbers may be due to what Moore/2010 discusses - a gap between policy and execution. Plan v. practice.

Can you or anyone reconcile Buccaneer numbers? Yr John.R.Walker link's Notes have: 4. 5/69: 44xWE.177A ordered for deployment to RAFG; 12. 10/76: 12xUK + 24xRAFG Buccs, one B or C p a/c (suggesting the trial dual-carriage was not deployed). WE.177C in Service date is "1971" (a TNA page), "1973" (Minister Spellar in Hansard) or "mid-1970s" (you). The Healey/Schroder Agreement to constrain detonations over Germany <200KT, thus creating WE.177C, was early-1970 *. 15 Sqdn moved from Honington to Laarbruch early-1971 and 16 Sqdn converted from Canberra B(I)8 there 6/6/72. I doubt either that they started with WE.177B (cos there were none available), nor can I see Saceur happy to rollover dual carriage B-43 (variable 70KT-1MT) for single or dual carriage of WE.177A (10KT). I suggest single-carriage RAFG WE.177C soon after early-1971.

A blog has an RN Bucc pilot stating he was one ot the 4 nuclear crews on Ark. I have 5 Red Beard vaults on each UK Strike carrier (Source lost: maybe the Bullletin's article "Where Her Majesty's weapons were"). (So: only 5 WE.177A(N) on board?) Maybe very few WE.177A(N) were deployed?

One other relevant data point for input please: source lost, but a book, not a greeny eco-nut site: production at AWRE suspended 1968-70 due to contamination. Revenge on patrol 9/70 with ex-Resolution load. Your Note 19 where RN 21/2/75 accepts 3-and-a-partial. Hence availability of secondaries to become WE.177C; and Note 10: 7/6/74, WE.177C production to complete,76/77.

{*: corrected 31/10: 11/69 NATO Council of Ministers' “Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 4/85,P.47: Who Controls NATO’s Nuclear Weapons?)}.

 

[bri21]

A blog has an RN Bucc pilot stating he was one ot the 4 nuclear crews on Ark. I have 5 Red Beard vaults on each UK Strike carrier (Source lost: maybe the Bullletin's article "Where Her Majesty's weapons were"). (So: only 5 WE.177A(N) on board?) Maybe very few WE.177A(N) were deployed?

The Ark Royal referred to here was the older Ark Royal not the present one. The older Ark Royal was fitted for 5 Red Beard stowage as you say. However, it was refitted several times, and it's not safe to assume that stowage for WE.177 remained the same. It's Bucc strike aircraft were each assigned a weapon as far as is known. 14 aircraft I believe.

Also ... Red Beard was a difficult stowage proposition. It required specially built accommodation for its own very large palletised diesel-powered air-conditioned storage boxes that had to run continuously. WE.177 didn't need air-conditioning and could be stored in gun magazines at ambient temperature. Informants tell me that they were commonly stored in Leander frigates above the waterline in torpedo storage racks in the helio hangar. See http://www.nuclear-weapons.info/vw.htm#WE.155

 

[alertken]

Moore/2010,P.199: UK HEU production terminated 3/63. P.219: 53 WE.177B approved 3/63 for TSR.2 and V-bombers. P.232: SSBN No. 5 approved 2/64. So, when Wilson came in, 10/64, we were intending to build:
(5x16x3: )240 A3T warheads plus 53 interim RAF WE.177B to be deleted after they lost "strategic", 1970 (so maybe to be consumed into the Polaris pool as "operationally available" spares, plus sub-assembly parts which on other kit we may term "modules");
plus a moving number of RAF "tactical" WE.177A (your Note 4 has 44);
plus your Note 8, 63 RN WE.177A for ASW and for strike, ordered in 1966 (after CVA.01 was cancelled, but before we decided to quit East of Suez).
WE.177C was not thought of until late-1969.
Your Note 19 has RN, 21/2/75 settling for 3{144}+a-partial A3T ship sets {you surmise in all:
160 A3T}.
Your Macklen note is of c.400 warheads in all (presumably inc. NDBs and "operationally available" spares, excl. bits and pieces). So, upto 240 WE.177-various. I think we deployed 192 plus "operationally available" spares, and that AWE had more bits and pieces.

You, so everyone since, take the m/s note that the NDB was for 43 warships, so 43 NDB were built. Maybe OBRussell can tell us how many ASW-helo-ships were ever crewed, at sea, not on Caribbean station (nuclear-free Zone by Treaty), concurrently. Freedman's Falklands History has 40% of RN's total on Hermes and 25% on Invincible: 11+7: I suggest we had 28 NDBs. I suggest 20 WE.177A(N) anti-port, 10 for each of 2 Buccaneer CV Air Groups. Victorious' thwarted and straight to 12 Sqdn, 1971; 809NAS Ark 14/6/70-15/12/78, then 216 Sqdn, 2/79. (On to LM Tornado). (Eagle to 23/1/72, Hermes to 14/6/70, lumbered with Red Beard). I suggest SHAR carried them only as NDB: CVS' role was ASW.
28 WE.177A(NDB);
20 WE.177A(N);
48 WE.177B: 24, Vulcan/Cottesmore from 9/66, 24 Vulcan/Waddington from 10/66, of which 16 were on Akrotiri, 15/1/69-15/1/75. Onto Marham Tornado.

Between early-1971 and 6/6/72 15 and 16 Sqdns/RAFG Bucc stood up with 24 a/c. Your Note 10 has 25 WE.177C by 9/74 (so maybe earlier) of an order for 125 to complete (Note 13) by 1976/77. 60 RAFG Jaguars stood up 11/75-1/3/77. These 84 a/c replaced a Canberra/F-4M Force that had carried between 64 and 128 Bombs. Your Note 12 "by 10/76 RAF committed 24 RAFG Buccs (and) 60 RAFG Jaguars each allotted one sortie with a few weapons spare". And "12 UK-based" Buccs: 208 Sqdn/Honington stood up 7/74; 6 Sqdn from 11/74 and 54 Sqdn, 8/8/74 were at Coltishall with Jaguars: they, plus crews and some aircraft from type OCUs, were to forward deploy to take up available weapons in RAFG to meet the U/E "commitment" of (60+24+12):
96 WE.177C:
192 genus WE.177. Wilson chopped SSBN No. 5 12/64 but its warheads were in UK's fissile pool, so (most) WE.177C came from (No. 5+a-partial). No "new" nuclear weapons.

 

[alertken]

Re: UK Thermonuclear Warheads. Red Beard

(RB not thermo-, but still a Big Bang). Mismatch between numbers ordered/(part-)built, and deployed.
Initiated 1952 to overcome the bulk of Blue Danube. In build by 1957 for TBF/RAFG Canberras and for Valiant back-up to MT Vulcan/Victor; and for RN.

27/5/57: UK/US MoU: Project 'E' rendered nugatory Beard/Sacuer (TBF and RAFG): Wynn,P.267: 16/6/60: "we see no need to produce Br. bombs to replace American bombs for the forces assigned to NATO" {ak: 48 TBF Canberra B.6 from 2/7/59, Valiants from 1/10/60; 64 RAFG Canberra B(I)6/8 from 5/5/58}. Production therefore suspended, even dismantled, fissile material back to pool.

3/7/58: US/UK MoU: warhead data. Leads on to UK's Improved Kiloton Bomb {to be WE.177A). Beard evidently fraught (Moore/RN, P.140: "danger of an unplanned event": maybe 3 weapons at sea 1960, 5 in 1962 with Scimitar, "emergency use only").

MBF Valiant/Wittering: RB: 7 Sqdn: 1/9/60 - 30/9/62;
49 Sqdn: 9/60 - 25/6/61;
138 Sqdn: 9/60 - 31/3/62. 24 bombs. These plus 8 more to NEAF Canberra B.15/16:
32 Sqdn: 28/11/61 - 3/2/69;
249 Sqdn:28/11/61 - 24/2/69;
6 Sqdn: 2/62 - 13/1/69;
73 Sqdn: 3/62 - 3/2/69: the Wing: 32 bombs.
32 Sqdn. had a Secondary Task to FEAF, supporting 45 Sqdn./Tengah, 8 Canberra B.15, 9/62 - 2/70. I think no bombs were dedicated to Tengah, which housed RN/Buccs. when ashore. Any MBF secondment would be with its normal UK store, which was not Red Beard: Wynn,P.452: 3/5/63: MBF Standard of Preparation: Valiant: "possibly" RB; all others: YS 2/(to be) WE.177B.

Bucc was at sea with RB 14/8/63 - 23/1/72: one brief period in 1966 when 20 in Strike config. were at sea on 2 ships concurrently, more when 16 were. 5 vaults per CV, reloads on RFAs. I think RN had 26 Beards.

 

[JFC Fuller]

An interesting essay: http://www.mcintyre.plus.com/grapple/MegatonWeaponsMA.pdf

 

[Gridlock]

http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3363/britains-independent-deterent-2

Very interesting stuff, especially in the comments.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I dug out some notes made several years ago, although AFAIK still up-to-date. Nothing yet appeared to refute these conclusions based on a careful analysis of the official history and declassified archives. Of course, as always, it depends on the official historian and civil servants not telling lies and accurately setting out their stuff. Relates to the earlier posted sketch. Bear in mind though that these were only my conclusions at the time. Not Gospel.

My notes.

BLUE GRANITE

Thought to be a smaller & lighter GRANITE variant and the fourth Granite design, proposed by Penney at the end of April 1957. Not adopted, built or tested. See Arnold 2001, p141, para 2, who claims estimated 1 MT in 1 ton weight. Smaller and lighter than SHORT GRANITE (30" dia x 2 tons, and unable to match yield/weight target above) and the only GRANITE not identified by Arnold or other known sources with a colour-code + GRANITE. Clear identification from Arnold (p146) that PURPLE GRANITE was identIcal in most respects to SHORT GRANITE with minor changes to DICK (fusion secondary) only. Arnold states SHORT GRANITE was too big and heavy for BLUE STEEL/BLUE STREAK. Ergo: as was PURPLE GRANITE.

GRAPPLE test target was 1 MT in 1 ton to suit weight and size limits for MRBM BLUE STREAK. Only the fourth untested design could match that. PURPLE GRANITE couldn't. Ergo: Fourth untested design was not PURPLE, probably BLUE GRANITE. No hard data on the Chris Gibson claim that BLUE GRANITE was another incorrect name for PURPLE GRANITE, and is believed unlikely following account by Arnold, the official historian of the GRAPPLE tests.

SHORT GRANITE 30" dia x 2 tons x 0.3MT. Because It was a double spherical design it could not be less than 60" length. PURPLE GRANITE similar size and weight, yield 0.2MT.

AVIA 65/1193 E107A, 27 May 1958 (before PURPLE GRANITE was tested & after the SHORT GRANITE flop) shows a GRANITE warhead 27" dia x 52" long in a BLUE STREAK nosecone, and presumably in weight limits. See http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/greengranite.png

Contenders for the warhead in this sketch are:
BLUE GRANITE
second GREEN GRANITE II

Not a contender is:
first GREEN GRANITE II (believed renamed SHORT GRANITE)
or SHORT GRANITE variant PURPLE GRANITE.

BTW, Red Snow could not have fitted into the Blue Streak RV shown. Longer at 60" x 21.5" diameter and would jut outa da back. So ... to accommodate Red Snow, Blue Streak required a redesigned and longer RV, and more Woomera tests.

John R. Walker, in "British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-73" states that Blue Granite would have been 20 inches in diameter with a weight of 2,500lbs, it was apparently to have been the third weapon fired (only if Green Granite II was successful) at the 1957 Grapple trials. The weapon is described as "extremely radical" and as only being agreed very late in the day. Is there any further information about this? I assume that at just 20 inches in diameter it would have been a relatively long device- 60 inches plus? Expected/hoped for yield of 1 megaton?

 

[CNH]

1. The Blue Streak RV design wasn't firm then, so designing one around Red Snow was no problem.

2. There is also the Halliard device, described thus in the Font of All Knowledge: '... Halliard 1 (11 September 1958) an unusual three-stage bomb with two fission components and one thermonuclear component which achieved its predicted yield of 800 kilotons and was radiologically immune despite not using boosting.' Weight not stated, but it was an immune device, which is interesting.

 

[Spark]

Hi CNH,
The referance to BS being able to carry four stores, three inert as decoys was late 58 or early 59, would this have been the device?

1. The Blue Streak RV design wasn't firm then, so designing one around Red Snow was no problem.

2. There is also the Halliard device, described thus in the Font of All Knowledge: '... Halliard 1 (11 September 1958) an unusual three-stage bomb with two fission components and one thermonuclear component which achieved its predicted yield of 800 kilotons and was radiologically immune despite not using boosting.' Weight not stated, but it was an immune device, which is interesting.

 

[Graham1973]

I've always wonderd if there were Round 'A' or Round 'B' devices developed before the device detonated in Grapple X (Round 'C')?

 

[Grey Havoc]

Via the Unwanted Blog:

View: https://youtu.be/W5Te6JvXCAM

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I've always wonderd if there were Round 'A' or Round 'B' devices developed before the device detonated in Grapple X (Round 'C')?

A bit of a late reply but there were 4 rounds planned for Grapple X. Following the under yielding of the first series, this was intended to be a parametric variation investigation whereby they varied only one parameter at a time in the secondary to understand it’s contribution to the thermo nuclear physics. Hence all rounds used the same primary, tamper stage and the secondaries were interchangeable with each one being different.

Round A was a three layer secondary Pu central, LiD middle, Ur outer.

Round B was a five layer secondary Pu central, LiD, Pu, LiD, Ur outer.

Round C was a three layer secondary Pu central, a thicker LiD middle, thinner Ur outer.

Round D had a dummy secondary to confirm the output of the primary

When Round A arrived at Christmas Island it was found to be damaged, So Round C was hastily brought forward without its secondary, Round A secondary was fitted to Round C and that was fired.

Round C (remember with Round A’s secondary) worked beyond expectations, although was judged to have given too much yield from the Ur outer tamper stage. Cook decided to cancel the remaining tests to focus on refining the results which meant changing the tamper stage....... which was a common element on all the X series devices...... Hence that was the need for the Y test.

Today they would call it Musk like entrepreneurial genius thinking.

Mostly ref Britain and the H Bomb by L Arnold

 

[Graham1973]

Here is Australia's simulated nuclear test...

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8S-HASqHHF0

 

[NMaude]

Concerning the various Grapple tests while their explosive yields have been declassified and published what about their fission yields? That is how dirty or clean were each of the tests?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The best chap to answer is Brian Burnell who has from time to time posted on here. He owns the superb website;-

nuclear-weapons.info

www.nuclear-weapons.info

What I’ve picked up comes with a health warning that it might not entirely correct. With that understanding here we go;-

Grapple A and C used a Red Beard primary of approx 25kt. Grapple X and Y used improved Red Beard with greater compression which I could mean any of the following;- more explosive lens, core levitation, or more powerful explosives. My guess is this wouldn’t get the primary much over 30-40ktT. Given the claim that Grapple Z validated the operational objective of demonstrating 1MgT per tonne of bomb mass, I’m pretty sure Flagpole and Halliard must have used a new experimental primaries, indeed a number of sources describe Halliard as a novel twin element primary for greater R squared resistance.

As for dirtiness, that mainly comes from the third stage or tamper casing. This is difficult to say from the information available. Also remember the objective of 1MgT per tonne of bomb mass was quite consuming and extra yield from tamper fission was quite an easy way of increasing the overal yield. The released information remarks Grapple X and Y were judged to have had too thick a tamper and this made precise fusion physics diagnostics more difficult. I’ve seen a reference describing Grapple Z Flagpole as Britain’s first “efficient Fusion device”. This description is normally reserved for weapons that achieve a greater than 80% fusion fraction. This is in some way validated by the Halliard anecdote;- At or around the restart of US & U.K. co-operation, the U.K. shared the details of the up coming Grapple Z devices. Flagpole was of no interest to the US as they were already well beyond that solution. However Halliard was a really innovative arrangement. It was designed for 1MgT per tonne of bomb mass with a fission consumable Ur 238 tamper. The US suggested a non consumable lead tamper to improve the post test diagnostics. The U.K. was keen to demonstrate renewed co-operation so agreed. From the most trusted information I’ve seen Halliard yielded just under 800kts.

Mostly ref Britain and the H Bomb by L Arnold

- Edit to correct primary type-

 

[NMaude]

Is there an equivalent thread to this one for US thermonuclear warheads and their tests?

 

[CNH]

Not a Blue Danube primary [way too big] but a red Beard primary.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Op’s Yes CHN you’re correct, yes Red Beard was the baseline Grapple primary.

 

[NMaude]

Op’s Yes CHN you’re correct, yes Red Beard was the baseline Grapple primary.

Didn't the Red Beard use air-lenses?

 

[NMaude]

The Atomic Tests Channel* has a couple of interesting videos from Operation Grapple:

Grapple Y shot

On another note does anyone else think that March 1st should be made Castle Bravo day (Just as there's a Hiroshima day and Nagasaki day) due to its historical significance and the profound effect it had on the public's perception of atmospheric-testing and the resulting fallout?

*The Atomic Tests Channel has a lot of interesting nuclear-test films most of them American.

Edited to add: here's an interesting paper on the UK's development of thermonuclear weapons - The Development of Britain’s Megaton Warheads

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The above clips are taken from at least one, maybe more, technical movies that were made to document Grapple. The chap who led the military element, Oulton makes reference to their production in his book Christmas Island cracker.

Has anyone a reference or source to view the whole movie? Somebody must have been authorised to view and copy clips.

 

[NMaude]

I just stumbled across this amateur home film from the first operation Grapple in 1957 which was filmed by a sailor stationed on HMNZS Pukaki:

Unfortunately there's no sound.

Edited to add: Here's this short film clip from the Imperial War Museum also to do with operation Grapple:

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Grapple X test film

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qtc6gkDt-0g


I’m told there’s a piece of film that’s never been released that shows the sea underneath the burst. Apparently the shock wave impact on the water is so powerful it dishes the water surface to the point (remember it’s a fairly shallow lagoon) you can see the sea bed. Indeed the reflected converging shock tears away a chunk of Corel which is sucked into the stem vortex.

 

[NMaude]

Indeed the reflected converging shock tears away a chunk of Corel which is sucked into the stem vortex.

I wonder how many fish were sucked into the stem vortex? Certainly the confusion from the shockwave would've killed a lot of fish, heh, I suppose in addition to dynamite fishing there's H-bomb fishing now.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Grapple Y;-

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=4BHJL0GJYfI


The film I’m looking for is the Z series. This is the one the extract is from.

 

[NMaude]

Here's another film clip to do with the 3MT Grapple Y shot and it's narrated:

 

[Vonbaron]

Considering Canada was fairly closely involved in the UK atomic bomb development project i.e. I understand the Hurricane device used a significant amount of Canadian plutonium, was Canada ever considered as a offering a suitable test location?

Not so. Canada had no weapons grade plutonium. It could then only be made artificially in a thermal reactor, and in 1952 Canada had no suitable thermal reactors. UK weapons grade Pu came from Calder Hall, specially built for that purpose.

I believe the Canadian NRX reactor came into operation in 1947 at a design power rating of 10 MW (thermal), increasing to 42 MW by 1954. A small Pu separation faclity also came into operation shortly after its commision. Its been reported in several places that this Pu supplimented Uk produced Pu in the Hurricane device.

Details of NRX can be found on wiki-

NRX - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Also reports of Canadian Pu to Uk -

Canada and weapons of mass destruction - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Section 1 Line 14

Please feel free to correct.

Thank you for the information.I was unaware of this situation and provides food for thought. My research makes me believe that much of the uranium came from Australia,given the fact that in mid-1944 they signed an agreement to supply the mother country as much as Australia could produce. I know that UK weapons-grade Pu came from Calder Hall, specially built for that purpose.
Appreciate the reply

 

[Vonbaron]

Ohh except when your country is bankrupt and starving and you need Australian, New Zealand, South African and Rhodesian imports at artificially low rates and then you will promise all sorts of things which of course you will never provide and get all upset when a contract is asked for ‘between Commonwealth countries’… and so ended the Fourth British Empire.

Oh deary, deary me! A hissy fit from our colonial cousin.

Get over it. The world is like it is. Not as either of us would like it to be.

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

All there ever was was an agreement over test sites and test facilities for nuclear tests. Australians had no access to the test results other than the minimum required for the Australian Government to be able to honestly reassure the Australian public that the tests were not a danger to them.

Period!

Yes you are right -there was never -joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia.. However everything that was tested at Woomera 47-53 was preliminary work for testing British atomic programme-Blue Danube

 

[Vonbaron]

Re: WE177C

this for brian: your site has WE177C as comprising Cirene variant of the standard UK-solo Primary (itself as Cleo/WE177A and Jenny for Polaris A3), plus a c.200kT variant of Reggie Secondary (itself a variant of RN's Polaris A3 warhead). You have it as built from the 3rd. warhead displaced from each SSBN by the Chevaline programme, and thus WE177C production was constrained to (16x4 64 rounds. But the timing is wrong. Chevaline at sea from Oct.,'82: WE177C deployed 1975.

On the face of it that appears logical. However, it's more complex than that. The RN originally planned enough warheads and missiles for 5 boatloads, at a time when a 5th sub might, just might, have been approved. Eventually only four subs were built, but there were more warheads/missiles built than were ever deployed at sea. The Navy maintained enough for 4 tactical outloads for four subs, because they forsaw a situation where (if rising tension had given them some months warning) three subs could be got to sea; and ... if the fourth boat were not actually in pieces in the dockyard .... it might be ... was ... possible to get it to sea with a scratch crew. In that situation they'd require four tactical outloads plus the usual spares margin, plus the usual margin for warheads in the servicing and supply chain. I don't have a figure for Polaris A3T, however the figures released recently by the 2010 coalition govt for Trident are a pretty good illustration. 165 warheads operationally available (73%) and under naval control, plus a further 60 (27%) for warheads operationally available as spares and those warheads in the servicing and supply chain. 225 in total. It's unlikely that (proportionally) Polaris numbers were very different.

That 4-boat + spares policy continued largely un-noticed by others for some years until serious planning started for Chevaline, when it was discovered that there was to be a serious shortage of fissile material. The Navy then commissioned a staff study that concluded that the 4-boat policy was no longer realistic in the light of actual operating history. The study recommended that the Navy should adopt a 3-boat policy that was then approved.

The tactical outload spares (under naval control) and the warheads in the (civilian controlled) servicing and supply chain were also reassessed. The result was that 60 warheads could be released by the Navy for breaking and recovery of fissile material. Of that 60 there were 60 Jennie primaries that were dismantled, and 60 Reggie secondaries that were reused, two-thirds as the secondaries in Chevaline, married to a new-build, new primary design. Some were transferred to use as the secondary in WE.177C.

There is no hard evidence anywhere as yet, although it is thought that these recycled secondaries were then known as Circene. There were also further quantities of new-build WE.177C, both secondaries and primaries.

We do know with certainty, that some existing WE.177A warheads were refurbished and reused as the primaries in WE.177C. Others working in this area of WE.177 history are convinced that existing and undelivered RAF orders for WE.177A were converted into orders for WE.177C. I'd again recommend the recent book by Richard Moore referred to in an earlier post. ISBN 978-0-230-23067-5. There is also a forthcoming book British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-1973: by John R.Walker. Don't know publication date yet or ISBN.

Back to Chevaline again. The fissile material shortage was acute. So serious that when Margaret Thatcher took office, declassified files show that she did a deal with US Pres Jimmy Carter to 'borrow' plutonium from US stocks in order to complete Chevaline on schedule. Presumably because UK Pu production was too slow, and because recycling more Polaris warheads would degrade operational numbers further. It seems that although sales of fissile material were prohibited by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, LOANS were not. Presumably the loan was repaid as UK production rose again.

I'll try to find some time to dig out the archives refs for the 4-boat to 3-boat study and others from my own files.

I hope that answers your question. You've lost me on the rest.

BTW. Final approval to go the distance with Chevaline was given by Roy Mason in 1975. It wasn't ready to deploy until '82.

Thank you for your insights

 

[Vonbaron]

Re: WE177C

this for brian: your site has WE177C as comprising Cirene variant of the standard UK-solo Primary (itself as Cleo/WE177A and Jenny for Polaris A3), plus a c.200kT variant of Reggie Secondary (itself a variant of RN's Polaris A3 warhead). You have it as built from the 3rd. warhead displaced from each SSBN by the Chevaline programme, and thus WE177C production was constrained to (16x4 64 rounds. But the timing is wrong. Chevaline at sea from Oct.,'82: WE177C deployed 1975.

On the face of it that appears logical. However, it's more complex than that. The RN originally planned enough warheads and missiles for 5 boatloads, at a time when a 5th sub might, just might, have been approved. Eventually only four subs were built, but there were more warheads/missiles built than were ever deployed at sea. The Navy maintained enough for 4 tactical outloads for four subs, because they forsaw a situation where (if rising tension had given them some months warning) three subs could be got to sea; and ... if the fourth boat were not actually in pieces in the dockyard .... it might be ... was ... possible to get it to sea with a scratch crew. In that situation they'd require four tactical outloads plus the usual spares margin, plus the usual margin for warheads in the servicing and supply chain. I don't have a figure for Polaris A3T, however the figures released recently by the 2010 coalition govt for Trident are a pretty good illustration. 165 warheads operationally available (73%) and under naval control, plus a further 60 (27%) for warheads operationally available as spares and those warheads in the servicing and supply chain. 225 in total. It's unlikely that (proportionally) Polaris numbers were very different.

That 4-boat + spares policy continued largely un-noticed by others for some years until serious planning started for Chevaline, when it was discovered that there was to be a serious shortage of fissile material. The Navy then commissioned a staff study that concluded that the 4-boat policy was no longer realistic in the light of actual operating history. The study recommended that the Navy should adopt a 3-boat policy that was then approved.

The tactical outload spares (under naval control) and the warheads in the (civilian controlled) servicing and supply chain were also reassessed. The result was that 60 warheads could be released by the Navy for breaking and recovery of fissile material. Of that 60 there were 60 Jennie primaries that were dismantled, and 60 Reggie secondaries that were reused, two-thirds as the secondaries in Chevaline, married to a new-build, new primary design. Some were transferred to use as the secondary in WE.177C.

There is no hard evidence anywhere as yet, although it is thought that these recycled secondaries were then known as Circene. There were also further quantities of new-build WE.177C, both secondaries and primaries.

We do know with certainty, that some existing WE.177A warheads were refurbished and reused as the primaries in WE.177C. Others working in this area of WE.177 history are convinced that existing and undelivered RAF orders for WE.177A were converted into orders for WE.177C. I'd again recommend the recent book by Richard Moore referred to in an earlier post. ISBN 978-0-230-23067-5. There is also a forthcoming book British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-1973: by John R.Walker. Don't know publication date yet or ISBN.

Back to Chevaline again. The fissile material shortage was acute. So serious that when Margaret Thatcher took office, declassified files show that she did a deal with US Pres Jimmy Carter to 'borrow' plutonium from US stocks in order to complete Chevaline on schedule. Presumably because UK Pu production was too slow, and because recycling more Polaris warheads would degrade operational numbers further. It seems that although sales of fissile material were prohibited by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, LOANS were not. Presumably the loan was repaid as UK production rose again.

I'll try to find some time to dig out the archives refs for the 4-boat to 3-boat study and others from my own files.

I hope that answers your question. You've lost me on the rest.

BTW. Final approval to go the distance with Chevaline was given by Roy Mason in 1975. It wasn't ready to deploy until '82.

Thank you for your insights

You would not know what role Woomera played and what else they were testing besides the PAC fom 1969-1979?

 

[Vonbaron]

Is it to cross a line to ask, what where these targets SACEUR had in mind for the RAF?

Its just I'm reminded of a certain chap I've contact with online who worked for the US in targetting scenarios and he wrote of who some targets are rather more difficult to deal with than others.

That's a subject the RAF and MoD are remarkably tight-lipped about. All the stuff on that topic that I'm aware of in the archives is still classified. For those who are less familiar with the National Archives:
a) there are files that are fully declassified.
b) there are files that are declassified, while individual pages or words are redacted by the censor.
c) there are files where only the title is declassified.
d) there are files that we do not know exist.

Targeting matters are usually in group c) and possibly in group d), however, we have no means of knowing of the latter group.

The old 40-city targeting plans for Bomber Command - the national, as opposed to NATO's strike plan are not so difficult to find. Two colleagues did some work on this recently and came up with most of the 40-city list combined with a map of the Galosh ABM footprint that I'd located. I'll inquire if it's OK to upload the list here. I still have the Galosh footprint, although I see that it's since been removed from the archives. Censored after the horse has bolted with a copy.

You are right.I am in the process of trying to get files which are 60 years old,to be opened by our NAA/Department of Defence. They are sitting on these files and the justification is that they could hurt our relationship with Britain

 

[NMaude]

They are sitting on these files and the justification is that they could hurt our relationship with Britain

That sounds like a bullshit excuse to keep them secret.

 

[Vonbaron]

What is more disconcerting is the fact that the Department of Defence has loads of Top Secret files which they will not even disclose.
our NAA archives are useless as they are in breech of their own charter by not allowing public access .
We will keep banging away
You are absolutely correct-all about secrecy to cover up ,what they were doing

 

[Download]

Does anyone have any details of the Grapple Z2 device "Flagpole"? There seems to be very few images of UK thermonuclear devices. The only one I know of is Short Granite. For that matter, does anyone know of the origin of the Short Granite image?

Do we know what test was of the Octopus device? I assume Antler Biak or Taranaki.