UK Thermonuclear Warheads.

[bri21]

Well after the strategic warheads (Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Yellow Sun Stage 2), the tactical weapon was the next in line. One assumes an all British answer to the original O.1176/1177. With my very limited knowledge of nuclear physics perhaps something along the lines of Una / Ulysses but with something like Pixie (in an evolved form?) as a primary instead of Tony??? Brian, please feel free to shoot me down!

Not PIXIE. That's a certainty. It was a very crude lash-up, and never intended as a warhead. It started as a NON-NUCLEAR HE test rig. A scaled-down spherical copy of the Blue Danube and Red Beard implosion design. It was to be used to test implosion techniques on a small-scale without a full-scale nuclear test so that tests could be more manageable. Only as an afterthought waa a fissile core added. It was never intended as a weapon. But its small dimensions proved irresistible to the military staffs, especially the Navy, who eyed it up for Seaslug. The Army similarly for their SAM. But it was in essence a device in the same mould as Blue Danube, with a crude URCHIN type of impact neutron generator, and that would make it a logistical nightmare for the military, as Blue Danube and Red Beard were. I'll get back to this later after my short break.

 

[zen]

So IF memory serves, its 2240lb per ton, and consequently if their looking at 600lb per warhead there is some scope for Polaris to go ahead as in Real Life, even if the bomb itself is some variant of GRANIT? Of course theres a lot of 'IF' bound up in that on whether a UK warhead and RV will fit a US missile if their not working on a US-UK device at its heart but seperate designs. A lot of scope for the effort fall apart and produce a weapon that does'nt fit the SLBM.

A third of 2240lb is over 746lb. So theres quite a bit of scope there to fail to meet the 600lb target they where thinking of and still be 1 megaton per ton.

If its a 600lb warhead, how much heavier is the tactical bomb they'd design around it?

Presumably we'd see it also in the Blue Water missile?

Alternatively, the IRBM needs replacing with a SLBM, and if we presume a UK warhead one path forward is a UK missile to go with it. That opens up all sorts of questions thats best left to another thread IMO but does show the scale of the effort for a true independant deterrent from warhead to missile and beyond. France being the closest example we have of a middileweight Power doing this sort of thing.
Similarly with the Air-launched missiles, whether thats Skybolt of some UK design instead.

 

[bri21]

So IF memory serves, its 2240lb per ton, and consequently if their looking at 600lb per warhead there is some scope for Polaris to go ahead as in Real Life, even if the bomb itself is some variant of GRANIT? Of course theres a lot of 'IF' bound up in that on whether a UK warhead and RV will fit a US missile if their not working on a US-UK device at its heart but seperate designs. A lot of scope for the effort fall apart and produce a weapon that does'nt fit the SLBM.

A third of 2240lb is over 746lb. So theres quite a bit of scope there to fail to meet the 600lb target they where thinking of and still be 1 megaton per ton.

If its a 600lb warhead, how much heavier is the tactical bomb they'd design around it?

Presumably we'd see it also in the Blue Water missile?

Alternatively, the IRBM needs replacing with a SLBM, and if we presume a UK warhead one path forward is a UK missile to go with it. That opens up all sorts of questions thats best left to another thread IMO but does show the scale of the effort for a true independant deterrent from warhead to missile and beyond. France being the closest example we have of a middileweight Power doing this sort of thing.
Similarly with the Air-launched missiles, whether thats Skybolt of some UK design instead.

600 lb was achievable. The anglicised W-47 for Polaris weighed approx 700 lb and eventually yielded about 800 kt. The W-56 likewise at about 700 lb and 1 MT. The W-50 XI was another contender for Skybolt at 700 lb and about the same yield. And the final contender for the UK Skybolt warhad was ACORN. It was expected to weigh approx 700 lb and yield around 1 MT. of course, that dosen't include the weight of the missile nor the casing weight. The WE.177B strategic bomb weighed just over 1000 lbs including casing weight, so (without access just now to my files) it's a reasonable guess that the warhead weighed in at a lot less than that. The warhead was a derivative of the W-56 secondary mentioned above, and the all British pre-1958 Bilateral CLEO fission trigger.

As for your ref to the "independent deterrent" .... well ... better leave that for now .... and with the sharing of data after 1958 it's doubtful if their ever was one truly independent. And it's possible to say that about the US programme too. IMO, "independent" is not a real life issue; ... just a political construct for domestic political purposes.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Of course, Octopus, Super Octpus and Cleo. As I understand it this programme was started sometime around 1957, which suggests, potentially, some sort of intended association with the Granite design series in an all British scenario???

 

[zen]

The only independance that counts is the one where you press he button and the missile launches, travels the progamed course to the target and the warhead initiates as expected to produce the desired result.

In that sense, it is no different from a pistol or a knife, where it does not matter who made it, only that it works.
It certainly does help to know how to make them, and thus to examine your purchase in order to evaluate whether you have been sold a dud or not. The ultimate test being to actualy use one. If you have (been sold a dud), then you'd better fork out for some other supplier, as theres no point buying from that supplier again and theres no right of return and reimbursement.
Now if one does actualy make the weapon, one can be able to assess every stage of the process of its manufacture and certification, greatly assuring one of its functionality while giving a comprehensive perspective on its limitations.

BTW and not just related to nukes, and perhaps a bit OT, I suspect that last bit is why we see osilations in perspective over other nations weaponry. Between assumed superiority of our efforts through knowledge and a sense of 'the grass is always greener' assumed superiority of theirs through a lack of knowledge. Familierity breeds contempt.

There might be a secondary level, where one talks about the perception of its functionality in the minds of any enemy r enemies. If they percieve it not to work, even if it does in reality, they will act according to that perception.
So talk of our weapons not working without US permission, risks convincing some enemy of that and consequently raises the risks to the UK.

Lawrence askes a good question there I think, how much does GRANIT influence later anglo-american designs? I doubt we can answer that.

 

[bri21]

There might be a secondary level, where one talks about the perception of its functionality in the minds of any enemy r enemies. If they percieve it not to work, even if it does in reality, they will act according to that perception.

We were very lucky that the Russians were rational people, who did what rational people do, act always in their own best interests. I've never understood why they were expected to believe that the UK was so crazy and suicidal as to commit suicide if we were attacked. Not that it matters much any more with the Russians, although I seriously doubt that some of today's enemies would be deterred in that way. These people are the very opposite of 'rational' and acting in their best interests isn't a factor. So for these enemies we need a new business model.

Lawrence askes a good question there I think, how much does GRANIT influence later anglo-american designs? I doubt we can answer that.

Agreed.

In the current climate it's unlikely that the Granite papers will ever be declassified.

 

[JFC Fuller]

So would it be fair to say that the trajectory of British nuclear weapons development, prior to the Anglo-American deal, was centered around Octopus / Super Octopus and the Granite designs and that any all British replacement for Red Beard would have been based on these efforts? The Strategic weapons programme appears to have actually transitioned to Granite but would it have been early enough for Octopus.......whatever it actually is!?

 

[bri21]

So would it be fair to say that the trajectory of British nuclear weapons development, prior to the Anglo-American deal, was centered around Octopus / Super Octopus and the Granite designs and that any all British replacement for Red Beard would have been based on these efforts? The Strategic weapons programme appears to have actually transitioned to Granite but would it have been early enough for Octopus.......whatever it actually is!?

Yes Lawrence, it would. However, while Granite didn't progress further, as far as we know, the Octopus, Super Octopus and Cleo lineage did progress. Although that lineage didn't have any direct relationship to the Granite lineage. One was a fission device implosion system. The other was a thermonuclear design that could (in theory) use one of several fission primaries. One Granite used Red Beard, another an enlarged Red Beard, another a variant of Indigo Hammer. It's not known what the later more successful Granites used, but it could never be Red Beard. Explanation below in following post.

As far as is known, Octopus was based on a concept of 'Air Lenses'. These are sometimes referred to as 'Flying Plates'. A useful explanation of how this technique works is found at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-1.html#Nfaq4.1.6|Carey Sublette's nuclearweaponarchive FAQs at 4.1.6.2.2.4 Use of these implosion methods permits designers to produce non-spherical implosion systems, i.e. in the shape of a cylinder or a rugby ball. This permits warheads to be squeezed down to fit into an artillery shell, to give one example. Although there is no hard evidence available from the archives to positively link Octopus etc to these concepts. Red Beard is known to have used an early variant of this technique.

Octupus evolved into Cleo, which in turn evolved via the Pampas UGT into a primary for Skybolt, WE.177B & C, a stand-alone fission warhead for WE.177A, and a primary named Jennie for the UK Polaris A3T. This last primary proved to be vulnerable to Soviet exo-atmospheric ABMs, and had to be replaced by a new primary for Chevaline. That vulnerability was the principal reason for the Chevaline programme, which was less an upgrade, rather more a salvage operation to extend Polaris lifespan. The existing Polaris secondary was retained, recycled into Chevaline, with a slight improvement in yield to 225 kt - up from 200 kt.

There were other British designs after Granite. Peanut, Gypsum, and the curiously named Football Pool Bomb. Nothing is known of these still classified files. Only the file titles are declassified.

 

[bri21]

It's not known what the later more successful Granites used, but it could never be Red Beard. Explanation below in following post.

The early Granites using Red Beard and Indigo Hammer as primaries were unsuccessful because the British had not understood fully how X-rays emitted by the fission trigger were the primary means of heating, compression and ignition of the thermonuclear fusion fuel. As any fule noes, a barium meal is eaten because it blocks X-rays and shows up as dark areas on film. Blue Danube, Red Beard and Indigo Hammer used in their HE implosion spheres two different TNT compositions, - one was a fast-burning composition, - the other slow-burning HE had barium in its composition. The barium reduced the ability of the emitted X-rays to do their stuff and ignite the fusion fuel of the secondary. Appears simple with 20-20 hindsight. But in 1957 the scientists were operating on the edge of scientific knowledge.

 

[zen]

Fascenating, I had always heard that the UK provided some knowledge on explosives during Manhatten, so its nice to see that confirmed.

Hang....."Silicone oil filled capacitors using Kraft paper"......Kraft paper?

Just a little extra question. In reading some slidepresentation, possibly to the Scotish Parliament, they mentioned a 'high surety weapon' or it might have been 'enhanced surety warhead' or somesuch and this struck me as somewhat odd language.
I say this because its more like a term used by the US military than one we'd use, and wonder whether that was the redesignation of the RRW.

 

[Michel Van]

from wiki

Kraft paper is paper produced from the chemical pulp of softwood processed by the kraft process. It is strong and relatively coarse. The grammage is normally from 50 - 135 g/cm2.
Kraft paper is usually a brown colour but can be bleached to produce white paper. It is used for paper grocery bags, multiwall sacks, envelopes and other packaging.

in this case its a Kraft Paper capacitor.

Impregnated paper was extensively used for older capacitors, using wax, oil, or epoxy as an impregnant.
Oil-Kraft paper capacitors are still used in certain high voltage applications.
Has mostly been replaced by plastic film capacitors.

 

[zen]

Yes its just the thought of brown paper used in a nuclear weapon thats somewhat disconcerting.
Is this the same Kraft as in processed cheese and chocolate bars?

Which makes for another little "you could'nt make it up" sort of thing, processed cheese and nuclear weapon components.

Almost as good as the Chicken warmed bomb.

 

[Spark]

Yes its just the thought of brown paper used in a nuclear weapon thats somewhat disconcerting.
Is this the same Kraft as in processed cheese and chocolate bars?

Which makes for another little "you could'nt make it up" sort of thing, processed cheese and nuclear weapon components.

Almost as good as the Chicken warmed bomb.

Agreed, Try, Roy Dommet, "The Blue Streak Weapon". ''Prospero'', refereed journal of the BROHP, Spring 2005. He was a topman with the weapon and round, it might help.

Note the charge for the first UK H bomb was stuck together after it broke on its way to the Pacific, real life is stranger than fiction

 

[bri21]

Yes its just the thought of brown paper used in a nuclear weapon thats somewhat disconcerting.
Is this the same Kraft as in processed cheese and chocolate bars?

Which makes for another little "you could'nt make it up" sort of thing, processed cheese and nuclear weapon components.

Almost as good as the Chicken warmed bomb.

Yes really amusing! Almost as amusing as the accounts in the UK official history of the Grapple trials of the liberal use of children's Plasticine in the HE implosion system. I didn't think that added much to a serious thread either.

Fascenating, I had always heard that the UK provided some knowledge on explosives during Manhatten, so its nice to see that confirmed.

Its a common misconception that Britain became dependent on US warhead designs, and that the gains from the 1958 Anglo-US Bilateral were all one-way in benefiting the British. Not so!

The Americans are not naive fools. They don't give anything away for nothing in return. The history of WW2 and Lend-Lease should be enough to convince disbelievers.

The exchange of nuclear data was a two-way process, and before agreeing to it the US weighed up very carefully the gains they hoped to make from British know-how. A good account of that is found in Chuck Hansen's Swords of Armageddon vol 4 pps 254-65. A pdf verbatim transcription is attached here. (65 kb) I hope. If it uploads.

 

[igor-mich]

I read here I'm your bullshit. I want to ask who are you to judge the Russian, you are that the participants of that war, its journalists have been reading and 1% did not write the truth about Russia. And have the courage to judge Russian. We have a saying "In someone else's eye mote see, but its not notice the log. Animals that you live on animal law. It is your money reared Hitler. Those are your leaders sent it, but did not consider that it unmanageable. Wake up gentlemen and enjoy a view where you are pros and did not climb to where you are incompetent.

 

[bri21]

I read here I'm your bullshit. I want to ask who are you to judge the Russian, you are that the participants of that war, its journalists have been reading and 1% did not write the truth about Russia. And have the courage to judge Russian. We have a saying "In someone else's eye mote see, but its not notice the log. Animals that you live on animal law. It is your money reared Hitler. Those are your leaders sent it, but did not consider that it unmanageable. Wake up gentlemen and enjoy a view where you are pros and did not climb to where you are incompetent.

Can you translate that for us into Russian Cyrillic? B)

 

[igor-mich]

Прочитал весь ваш бред. Хочется спросить кто вы такие чтобы судить о русских в той войне. Вы что участники той войны, видели все своими глазами. вашими журналистами не написано 1% процента правды о России в той войне. У нас есть поговорка "В чужом глазу замечаем соринку, в своём не замечаем бревна". Это вы животные и живёте по звериным законам. Это на ваши деньги был вскормлен Гитлер, это ваши политики направляли его, только не учли, что он неуправляемый. Опомнитесь господа, и займитесь тем делом где вы профессионалы, и не лезьте туда где вы некомпетентны.
И добавлю ещё: по опросам американцев самими американцами 10% считают что Россия воевала вместе с Германией против американцев "Ну о чём можно говорить дальше?".

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The early Granites using Red Beard and Indigo Hammer as primaries were unsuccessful because the British had not understood fully how X-rays emitted by the fission trigger were the primary means of heating, compression and ignition of the thermonuclear fusion fuel. As any fule noes, a barium meal is eaten because it blocks X-rays and shows up as dark areas on film. Blue Danube, Red Beard and Indigo Hammer used in their HE implosion spheres two different TNT compositions, - one was a fast-burning composition, - the other slow-burning HE had barium in its composition. The barium reduced the ability of the emitted X-rays to do their stuff and ignite the fusion fuel of the secondary. Appears simple with 20-20 hindsight. But in 1957 the scientists were operating on the edge of scientific knowledge.

Interesting;- Now I thought the Ivy Mike instrumentation recorded that the X-ray compression pressure were well below theoretical expectation, indeed well below that required for fusion. For nearly two decades arguments continued as to if the instrumentation was falsely reading. Weapon development continued using empirical theory derived from testing but the lack of a definitely understood theory lead to some problems i.e. the significant under-prediction of Castle Bravo (the unexpected "Tritium Bonus"). However in the late 70 early 80 advanced modeling and testing proved the majority of the required fusion pressure is in fact generated by ablation compression when the surface of the secondary sublimes.

Also I have heard comments in the public domain that the early granite devices under yielded because they employed non optimal fusion fuel fractions.

Please feel free to correct if you have more accurate data.

Great thread BTW........hope it remains more Tech than Politic

I think the US would certainly have benefited from the 1958 agreement in some areas where their regulation were stricter than the UK e.g. Cobalt seeding in the Antler Round 1 device......I understand such work was banned in the US and even if this was officially, an unsuccessful yield tracking test, I'm sure there would have been some very interesting data.

 

[zen]

Yes really amusing! Almost as amusing as the accounts in the UK official history of the Grapple trials of the liberal use of children's Plasticine in the HE implosion system. I didn't think that added much to a serious thread either.

Well a little light relief from the serious stuff where we agree to disagree. Besides which I rather did think Mylar was the norm for modern capacitors, but I'm not that up on the electronics side. Its always remarkable to me how often modern wonders of technology are supported by some rather old fashioned component or two that would'nt have been out of date a hundred years ago. Still what works and all that.....

Your link seems not to exist or work, though I may not be grasping where its supposed to be on the post, I must admit.

Nice Cartoon BTW B).

Rickshaw, it would pay to learn about both the effort for any landwar on the continent and then learn about the sort of effort required to invade a well defended island like Britain. Add the two together and grasp just how much the Russians will suffer before they can march in parades past Whitehall. The closest parallel is the planned invasion of Japan, where the scale of deaths dawrf that of Nagaskai and Hiroshima.
The circumstances of an easy invasion are those of post nuclear exchange. Though why anyone would bother when they'd have other more pressing issuues to deal with is another matter.

As for the rest, I shall leave for the mo' as its not really ideal to argue over this on this thread. Start one in the bar if you want and I will ahppiuly argueall sorts of things.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Yes Lawrence, it would. However, while Granite didn't progress further, as far as we know, the Octopus, Super Octopus and Cleo lineage did progress. Although that lineage didn't have any direct relationship to the Granite lineage. One was a fission device implosion system. The other was a thermonuclear design that could (in theory) use one of several fission primaries. One Granite used Red Beard, another an enlarged Red Beard, another a variant of Indigo Hammer. It's not known what the later more successful Granites used, but it could never be Red Beard. Explanation below in following post.

As far as is known, Octopus was based on a concept of 'Air Lenses'. These are sometimes referred to as 'Flying Plates'. A useful explanation of how this technique works is found at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-1.html#Nfaq4.1.6|Carey Sublette's nuclearweaponarchive FAQs at 4.1.6.2.2.4 Use of these implosion methods permits designers to produce non-spherical implosion systems, i.e. in the shape of a cylinder or a rugby ball. This permits warheads to be squeezed down to fit into an artillery shell, to give one example. Although there is no hard evidence available from the archives to positively link Octopus etc to these concepts. Red Beard is known to have used an early variant of this technique.

Octupus evolved into Cleo, which in turn evolved via the Pampas UGT into a primary for Skybolt, WE.177B & C, a stand-alone fission warhead for WE.177A, and a primary named Jennie for the UK Polaris A3T. This last primary proved to be vulnerable to Soviet exo-atmospheric ABMs, and had to be replaced by a new primary for Chevaline. That vulnerability was the principal reason for the Chevaline programme, which was less an upgrade, rather more a salvage operation to extend Polaris lifespan. The existing Polaris secondary was retained, recycled into Chevaline, with a slight improvement in yield to 225 kt - up from 200 kt.

There were other British designs after Granite. Peanut, Gypsum, and the curiously named Football Pool Bomb. Nothing is known of these still classified files. Only the file titles are declassified.

Interesting, so we dont actually know much, if anything, about the later Granite weapons that were tested in 58. It is interesting that the 'Football Pool Bomb file' appears to date from 1962 putting it well after the end of the Granite programme. Otherwise I would surmise that it Gypsum and peanut were associated with the Grapple trials scheduled for 59, 60 and 61???

 

[zen]

Well found the link and read the piece. The more I read the more interesting this subject becomes.
Many thanks Bri21.

 

[bri21]

However in the late 70 early 80 advanced modeling and testing proved the majority of the required fusion pressure is in fact generated by ablation compression when the surface of the secondary sublimes.

I stand corrected! Up to a point!

The big question though is: what comes first, the chicken or the egg?

While it's true that ablation is the mechanism that generates significant compression of the fusion fuel, the big question here is what causes or triggers ablation of the secondary containment. The clue is in the word 'trigger' as in fission trigger, or fission primary.

For it is X-ray emission from the fission primary that triggers all else. Without it there could be no ablation of the secondary containment, and no compression of the fusion fuel.

So not wishing to be labelled as pedantic, (and this is a site read mainly by laypeople) I took a shortcut and carelessly said X-ray emissions create the compression. As indeed they do in a roundabout sorta way.

Would that argument stand up in a criminal court? Possibly not.

 

[alertken]

My #39: 3/54 Sir W.Penney “we do not know how to make any form of (H)” ;
12 June,1954: US Atomic Energy Act amended to authorise limited data exchange with UK; Sandys/Wilson MoU. Ministers hope for more, soon;
16 June, 1954: PM Churchill's Approval to develop a UK fusion weapon (Cabinet,26 July,1954; White Paper, 17/2/55);
(My #39:to be Sir W.)Cook, 2/12/55: ‘does anybody (in the room) know how it’s done?’…an embarrassed silence.”
15 May,1957: an apparent UK H-device test, 300KT (1.8MT test, 8/11/57);
21 May,57: US/UK MoU, Project ‘E’ weapons (deployed from 5/5/58 mainly KT, but fr.12/58 90 Sqdn Valiant/Honington had (1.69MT) Mk.15/39);
1957: glacial progress to build (to be) 5xfission Violet Club and to define warheads for Blue Steel, Blue Streak, for (to be) Yellow Sun Mk.1 for non-ASM element of MBF and (as Blue Rosette) for bomber Avro 730. Sec.State for Defence D.Sandys in despair at overload and drift in Aero industry generally, the nuclear programme in particular: where, after spend from 5/47, was Blue Danube? after spend from 1952, was Red Beard?
4 October,1957: Sputnik: peg for Ike, 24/10 to agree repeal of McMahon Act (done, 30 June,1958);
4 August,1958: Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. Solo UK work terminates.

Margaret Gowing's Official History, Independence and Deterrence (Vols.1/2), Macmillan,1974 commends the work by Percival (to be Hunting Engineering Ltd.) on Blue Danube: it involved 2 engineers. Shoe-string budget. The scientists at AWRE, 1955-57, could think beyond the known frontiers, but the industrial task of building hundreds of fusion rounds within a few years was never funded, material priorities never assigned. The purpose of paper Granites et al was to earn our way onto a thermo-Manhattan. Halliburton, owners of AWE, know just how meagre were UK's 1957 resources, how un-independent was Macmillan's Deterrent. Wilson's 1964 jibe was, in part, right: it's not British, it's not independent. He was wrong though with: it doesn't deter: that was an operational issue: it did; it still does, and is why US persists with the partnership.

 

[Spark]

Spark, may I ask what your source for that is? It is certainly an interesting question however as to how Blue Streak warheads would have evolved had indigenous UK physics packages remained at the fore. I think the easiest answer is that Woomera would have seen a lot more use!

By 1958 we are firmly in Red Snow territory and Green Granite is effectively dead as the UK uses US derived weapons.

A document in the PRO Kew.
Photographed the document but not sure of its exact origin, hope to visit the PRO soon so will try to backtrack.
According to Ian Smith by that time BS could have reached anywere in the USSR from silos based in the UK,
so we are talking of in American terms a ICBM.
Without the '58 agreement the weapon would have been deployed as a joint Commonwealth deterrent in Australia and Canada.

 

[bri21]

BS could have reached anywere in the USSR from silos based in the UK, so we are talking of in American terms a ICBM.
Without the '58 agreement the weapon would have been deployed as a joint Commonwealth deterrent in Australia and Canada.

The warhead spec was OR.1142 found in AIR 2/13746. It called for (eventual) world-wide deployment in silos, and specifically in the Middle East and Singapore. Why not Canada and Australia also, altho' from Australia it would need a spectacular set of legs to reach the USSR or even China.

 

[bri21]

4 August,1958: Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.
Solo UK work terminates.

And the evidence for that is where?

Margaret Gowing's Official History, Independence and Deterrence (Vols.1/2), Macmillan,1974 commends the work by Percival (to be Hunting Engineering Ltd.) on Blue Danube: it involved 2 engineers.

Two engineers indeed!

So I was one of only two engineers working on Blue Danube casings? Well, well. We learn something new every day.

And definitely not at Percival in Luton, but at HCCL in Leeds (the old Blackburn Aircraft works).

And this perfectly illustrates the dangers of historians relying on secondary accounts rather than doing their research in primary sources.

As I recollect I had numerous design office colleagues working with me. Or perhaps it's just my memories being diminished by senility. Percival as I recollect, did a little work on parts of the centre section. HCCL did the rest. See Richard Moore's new book page 85. http://www.abebooks.co.uk/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=2686052770&searchurl=bt.x%3D77%26bt.y%3D13%26isbn%3D9780230230675%26sts%3Dt

Indeed when the RAF took delivery of Blue Danube (in sections) the HCCL plant in Leeds was one of only four places from where 40 Group RAF organised armed escorted road convoys direct to RAF Wittering. The others as I recollect were AWRE Aldermaston, ROF Burghfield, ROF Chorley (Lancs), and Woolwich Arsenal.

An hilarious account of the first convoy can be found in AIR 17/69 1953-1956 Transportation of special weapons: No 40 Group RAF. Written in longhand by the Group Captain commanding the convoy. There was a paragraph about the need to organise more convoys from ROF Burghfield than were necessary because there were known Soviet spies in the Burghfield area watching movements in and out, and extra convoys would inflate the Soviet perception of RAF stocks of Blue Danube.

Margaret Gowring's 1974 book while useful in parts is very dated, and being written as the Cold War was about to heat up somewhat, she was starved of access to material that is freely accessible today. In 1974 when the book was written the latest declassified files available under the 30-year rule were dated 1944. Hardly a basis for reliability, even for an officially approved historian.

 

[fredgell]

Whilst the detail may be wrong in this case I can say from first hand experience of later work that, certainly in some cases, the resources and environment available for management and development were pretty thin - and on the whole produced some pretty amazing hardware.

Although after my time I was told that when, a not to be named, major British company took over a facility and project they drew up a plan that needed more space then the whole facility for just the project management team. The wonders of a commercial approach attuned over many years to cost plus. Increase the cost = get more plus, and never mind the outputs.

I thoroughly good technical thread, if one overlooks the odd excursions into politics. The information and links most appreciated.

Looking at the campaign issues - some might find this interesting -
http://www.allworldwars.com/Dropshot%20-%20American%20Plan%20for%20War%20with%20the%20Soviet%20Union%201957.html
putting the boot on the other foot, so to speak.

Regards

Fred

 

[alertken]

Commonwealth Blue Streak

I think this notion stems from a Prospero paper. spark #70 has Blue Streak gaining long legs. The issue is not: what schemes were being doodled in Aero Experimental Offices, but: what did Ministers actually contemplate buying? A Commonwealth Deterrent would have attracted funding only as insurance against lapse of the credibility of US' commitment to the NATO/SEATO Charters. No Minister ever sought funding on that basis for anything. There were briefly thoughts of moving Thor/Jupiter/Blue Streak around within NATO/CENTO/SEATO tasks (hence the ref. in O.R.1142): C-133A and Short Belfast's cube was exactly for that, but liquid fuels and sanity disposed of the idea.

30/7/54: to feed into RAE work on (to be) IRBM, MoS Sandys acquires US GW data inc. Sperry IN and Rocketdyne propulsion.
Spring,1955: MoS contracts with DH Props for R&D on (to be) Blue Streak. brian #38 gives AWRE/Orange Herald status.
1/57: DH/Convair license for Atlas "systems integration" data.
23/3/57: Mac/Ike Bermuda Summit: in principle agreement to place Thor in UK; MoD Sandys acquires Elliott licence for Bosch-Arma IN and for US radar for Blue Streak, then:
21/5/57: Project 'E' Weapons and RAF/SAC Target Integration Agreements: Saceur's RAFG Canberras receive Mk.7 from 5/5/58, MBF target integration is effective 1/7/58;
22/5/58: Thor basing Agreement: (these 2 Ags) “form(ed) the basis of collaboration during (MBF’s entire) existence” H.Wynn's Official History,P.260.
4/8/58: US/UK Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. All subsequent UK spend on nuclear weapons took benefit from access to US Intellectual Property - even, per brian's#32, Red Beard.

From 8/9/54 Australia's defence against USSR nukes (from 1960, China's) rested on SEATO; from 1/7/58 UK's against USSR nukes rested on Joint Agreements with US. Canada was integrated into DEW-Line and NORAD. If US nuclear data had not been made available to UK 8/58, such that AWRE must persevere solo with gravity and stand-off warheads for the MBF, Ministers would have judged that dual-manning of Thor, dual-key W-49, met any IRBM need and would have terminated the meaningless duplication involved in licencing it into glacial DH Props. The project only survived that logic by its proponents inventing silo-basing; it was then chopped, drifting and bloating expensively, after US confirmed its offer of Skybolt.

A "Commonwealth" ICBM-extension of Blue Streak is a chimera

 

[bri21]

A "Commonwealth" ICBM-extension of Blue Streak is a charisma.

Agreed!

I suspect that these stories of Australian basing of BS had much more to do with Aussie false perceptions of their vulnerability. I remember some time ago coming across documents in the Australian National Archives in Canberra that recorded Australian jitteryness when the US proposed to supply dual-key nuclear-armed SAMs to Japan, and again when JDS subs made routine courtesy visits to Sydney.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I suspect that these stories of Australian basing of BS had much more to do with Aussie false perceptions of their vulnerability. I remember some time ago coming across documents in the Australian National Archives in Canberra that recorded Australian jitteryness when the US proposed to supply dual-key nuclear-armed SAMs to Japan, and again when JDS subs made routine courtesy visits to Sydney.

What a wonderfully misplaced interpretation of another country's security dilemma based no doubt on transference of a more familiar European model. Australian post war security threat assessment focused on the Soviet Union, China, Indonesia and Japan. All with good reason.

While Japan may have been an on paper ally they were also in that position during WWI and we all know how that turned out. One of the great successes (amongst many failures) of Australian security assessment was that from the 1900s to 1940s that Japan was going to be a major threat.

To assume in the 1950s and 60s before global economic integration that Japan would never be a threat again would be the same as the British spending 1816-1914 dismissing France as a potential threat. Which of course they didn’t.

As to Blue Streak in Australia it along with the nuclear armed TFX (F-111) that was to replace it was seen as a theatre/regional asset able to defeat threats in the South East Asian archipelago, ie from the Red River south. Considering at the time (late 50s, early 60s) the only Soviet mechanism for striking (south eastern) Australia would be to stage nuclear bombers through China and Indonesia (almost the opposite of what was planned in the 70s and 80s) Blue Streak provided a system to destroy those staging bases and therefore protect Australian cities from nuclear bombing.

 

[JFC Fuller]

So can we wrap this up once and for all, was there ever a serious plan to deploy Blue Streak to Australia as a weapons system and if so how many?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

So can we wrap this up once and for all, was there ever a serious plan to deploy Blue Streak to Australia as a weapons system and if so how many?

You make it sound so simple. Back in the real world where things happen in steps and with multiple inputs there was a 'serious plan' for the RAAF to acquire Blue Streak but this was too early on it's development for there to be a detailed basing strategy. Then of course long before the UK cancelled Blue Streak 'Perfidious Albion' cancelled the joint nuclear project so they could get the US tech leaving Australia to go it alone if we really wanted the bomb. Of course without a nuclear warhead Blue Streak is useless and it would be the late 1960s before an all Australian bomb could be built which was really outside any 1955-57 planning for Blue Streak.

The best source for Australian nuclear planning and efforts in this time period is "Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb" by Wayne Reynolds.

 

[bri21]

So can we wrap this up once and for all, was there ever a serious plan to deploy Blue Streak to Australia as a weapons system and if so how many?

In a word. No.

The spec for Blue Streak never referred to Australia. Only the term 'world-wide' was used, and that was qualified by adding 'the Middle East' and 'Singapore'. Although friends, allies, and almost kissing cousins, Australian security policy was not the concern of the UK MoD, but of the Australians. The Blue Streak requirement was written with only British security concerns in mind, and that's how it should be IMO.

Then of course long before the UK cancelled Blue Streak 'Perfidious Albion' cancelled the joint nuclear project so they could get the US tech leaving Australia to go it alone if we really wanted the bomb

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

All there ever was was an agreement over test sites and test facilities for nuclear tests. Australians had no access to the test results other than the minimum required for the Australian Government to be able to honestly reassure the Australian public that the tests were not a danger to them. Australia had no input to the scientific or engineering effort to mount the tests, that were specifically restricted to fission devices. Thermonuclear weapon tests were specifically barred. Which is why the UK looked to Christmas Island. When negotiations for an atmospheric test ban treaty got under way, Australia was not interested in providing underground nuclear test facilities on Australian soil, and a global search for suitable locations got under way, (including sites in the UK) as described in Project Orpheus files in the National Archives.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

All there ever was was an agreement over test sites and test facilities for nuclear tests. Australians had no access to the test results other than the minimum required for the Australian Government to be able to honestly reassure the Australian public that the tests were not a danger to them. Australia had no input to the scientific or engineering effort to mount the tests, that were specifically restricted to fission devices.

Since the nuclear tests in Australia were not the sole sum of Australian and/or British nuclear efforts using these details to preclude anything else is a bit misguided. There was a lot of British support for Australia to develop nuclear technology and facilities as part of an Empire bomb program. The idea being once Britain had worked it all out the technology would filter down and Australia (at least) would have the skills and facilities to be provided the technical insight by the UK and capable of building bombs. That is up until the end of the 50s when the US reversed their policy and offered the British a better short term solution than the Commonwealth which was all being jettisoned anyway as the British reappraised themselves to being a second (or third) rate power.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Although friends, allies, and almost kissing cousins, Australian security policy was not the concern of the UK MoD, but of the Australians. The Blue Streak requirement was written with only British security concerns in mind, and that's how it should be IMO.

Ohh except when your country is bankrupt and starving and you need Australian, New Zealand, South African and Rhodesian imports at artificially low rates and then you will promise all sorts of things which of course you will never provide and get all upset when a contract is asked for ‘between Commonwealth countries’… and so ended the Fourth British Empire.

 

[bri21]

Ohh except when your country is bankrupt and starving and you need Australian, New Zealand, South African and Rhodesian imports at artificially low rates and then you will promise all sorts of things which of course you will never provide and get all upset when a contract is asked for ‘between Commonwealth countries’… and so ended the Fourth British Empire.

Oh deary, deary me! A hissy fit from our colonial cousin.

Get over it. The world is like it is. Not as either of us would like it to be.

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

All there ever was was an agreement over test sites and test facilities for nuclear tests. Australians had no access to the test results other than the minimum required for the Australian Government to be able to honestly reassure the Australian public that the tests were not a danger to them.

Period!

 

[zen]

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

Formaly, in writen documents that survive and memories of those who would'nt be party to any such conversations IF (and I do stress 'if' here) they took place.

On the other hand we know there was a Canadian program of sorts as it had been the orriginal location of the UKs effort prior to collaboration with the US.

 

[bri21]

There never, ever, was a 'joint nuclear project' between the UK and Australia. Some may regret that, but that is how it was.

Formaly, in writen documents that survive and memories of those who would'nt be party to any such conversations IF (and I do stress 'if' here) they took place.

On the other hand we know there was a Canadian program of sorts as it had been the orriginal location of the UKs effort prior to collaboration with the US.

If there ever was such a programme there would be documentary evidence of it. No such documents exist either in the UK archives or the Australian archives.

The Australians are a proud and independent nation, widely admired. I cannot imagine any situation where their archivists or others would conspire with the UK establishment to cleanse their history to suit the purposes of the UK. That's simply not credible. No other reliable accounts (eg. in biographies of prominent people) has ever claimed knowledge of such a deal. Unless some hard evidence emerges it's akin to a belief in flying saucers. Although I expect someone will write here that those do exist too!

I'd rather base my beliefs on evidence.

Its true that there were Australian politicians with a rose-tinted attachment to Empire and Imperial defence who perhaps took it for granted that the UK would 'do-the-right-thing-by-them'. It's also true (on the basis of available evidence) that PM Robert Menzies and his ilk were never given any firm promises, let alone anything on paper.

 

[alertken]

OzBomb.
Canadian personnel and plant were part of the "British" contribution to Manhattan. After McMahon Act, 1/8/46 and ejection of aliens from all US AEA activity, PM Mackenzie King saw no need for Canada to spend solo on such things. When, later, a TransPolar Sov. Threat to Canada became evident, geography integrated Canadian, Alaskan and CONUS airspace. It is to the credit of the Canadian electorate that throughout the Cold War - and ongoing today - they stepped up to all aspects of Alliance defence, excepting only nuclear. So, for example, of RAF's 438 loan CL-13/F-86E, Canada paid for 370.

The reason that in January,1947 UK PM Attlee set about, ah, Anglicising Fat Man from such Intellectual Property as could be retrieved from the memories of Penney and Fuchs (yes, him) was that Truman had set a date of VE-Day+2 years for US Army withdrawal from W.Europe. It wasn't that Uncle Joe was already seen as a Threat, but rather that Statesmen judged that "you never can tell" what might lie to the other side of the hill (that's the exact logic of retaining/renewing a Deterrent today, despite no evident Formed-Power Threat. Today we are not flush: Attlee's UK was utterly skint, yet he chose to spend). After Berlin Blockade and founding of NATO he tried very hard to discontinue Blue Danube: he sought “US bombs onto Br.soil, rather than (pestering for data) to hasten (UK work…willing) to subordinate (target) planning to (US-)integration” and haul US-custodial weapons. Pace McMahon, such porterage was offered 10/49 after Joe One/First lightning. But “it was not to be (after Jan,50 arrest of Fuchs in the Blue Danube team. US/UK/Canada talks) returned (to) a deep freezer” K.Harris, Attlee, Weidenfeld,1982, P290; A.J.Pierre, Nuclear Politics, OUP, 1972, P133.

Australia, similarly, has stepped up in full to its Alliance positions (Korea, Vietnam, Malayan Emergency, Konfrontasi, E.Timor, ongoing)...again, like Canada, non-nuclear. The SEATO Charter covered any Sov, later PRC Threat: what would be in it for UK or US to "share" industrial effort to create an OzBomb? No point. UK was glacial enough trying to link Aldermaston, Ampthill and Burghfield with remote Welsh Cardiff. The notion that GAF Canberra was selected in 1949 as a nuke carrier is flat wrong: it was 1952 before UK judged it could try to do small Red Beard, and 28/11/61 before NEAF deployed it in Canberra B.15.

UK "Independence".
Blue Danube was live-dropped 11/10/56 and then slowly deployed through 1957 in 138 Sqdn Valiant/Wittering, from 21/5/57 in 83 Sqdn Vulcan 1/Waddington, from 1/5/58 in 10 Sqdn Victor 1/Honington: by 30/6/58, maybe 20 deployed rounds. MBF:SAC targeting was in harmony from May,57, “highly satisfactory” Wynn's Official History,P275, and was wholly integrated by MoU 3/7/58: 106 V-Craft (74 with Project 'E' weapons) were to address 69 Counter-Value/20 Air Defence and 17 bomber Counter-Force targets. I.Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy & the Special Relationship,OUP,94,P132. 10 Sqdn. was "independent" for 8 weeks, 83 Sqdn. for 58 weeks - if you ignore our, ah, derivation from Fat Man. 138 Sqdn. was never "independent" as US paid "about half" Valiant's procurement bill Wynn,P.55.

US Sec.Def was briefed 18/6/62, cf >1,000 US warheads, UK had 8 “certainly operational” Clark,P393 (net of attrition also eroding USAF; UK had c.100 “available”); rude to France, he decried small nuclear Forces as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility”: UK PM Macmillan,“deeply suspicious of (US)” sought a modicum of solace, but learnt “doubtful our deterrent (could be used) independently (we had no) serious operational plans (to) do so.” R.Lamb,The Macmillan Years, J.Murray, 1995, P303. RAFG/MBF/TBF Project 'E' weapons, like US weapons hung on other NATO platforms, must remain under US custody until released by the President. They could not therefore be operated in dispersal. US connived at Macmillan's political need for chimerical "independence" to avoid the need to put custodials alongside dispersed "Anglicised" Mk.28 Red Snow, in Yellow Sun Mk.2 and Blue Steel. That's why, later, RAF/MR could pop into Sigonella to pick up Lulu, but RN needed WE177A(NDB).

 

[zen]

If there ever was such a programme there would be documentary evidence of it. No such documents exist either in the UK archives or the Australian archives

Which is what I'm saying right, conversations, in private, no memo's nothing writen down. Discussions if they ever happend went no further than that I would imagine, which is why theres no record, because IF it ever happend it never got beyond that stage.

So yes as far as the records go we see no signs. But, all sorts of things get said in private that never make it to record and that sort of thng did happen, though less and less overtime.