Royal Navy Type 26 Frigate

[Triton]

Inside the Type 26 Frigate

Published on Jul 20, 2017

https://youtu.be/J59zrs1Uj0M

 

[FighterJock]

Inside the Type 26 Frigate

Published on Jul 20, 2017

https://youtu.be/J59zrs1Uj0M

Highly interesting videos Triton, thanks for posting. B)

 

[DWG]

The build sequence is interesting to watch. The clearances with yard infrastructure look like they may have caused a few headaches: "Bay 2 door must be open".

 

[Ron5]

It was the Treasury that nixxed the "frigate factory" plan and insisted on minimum investment in infrastructure. Not Bae.

 

[DWG]

Video showing a model of the ammunition handling system for the Mark 45 installation on the Type 26. Looks like 192 rounds ready to fire on the assumption the cutaway portside racks match starboard.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=w9ecDozRIbI

 

[Ron5]

The Treasury would have to pay for any infrastructure improvements. Bae asked for 200 million for the "frigate factory" noting that the monies would be more than paid back by savings over the lifetime of the program. The Treasury declined.

I'm sure you would like to deny these facts by saying Bae should fund themselves. Right now, all Bae has guaranteed is an order for 3 ships at the tiny profit margin the Treasury allows for military contracts. Financially that does not warrant a major infrastructure investment. Only an order for the 8 would do that and the Treasury will not commit that much. The Treasury lives year to year, they are constitutionally averse to spending now to save later. Despite that being a main plank of Smart Procurement.

 

[Ron5]

Previously Bae had stated that the automated magazine contained 196 rounds. Later, they said the number was classified.

 

[sferrin]

No denial at all, BAE is a private sector company with a freehold on Scotstoun, it could fund the frigate factory if it wanted but chose not to and blame the government instead. I am fed up of the whining from a company that expects endless dollops of taxpayer cash without taking any risk itself.

Why should it? Granted, the companies that take some risk may reap significant rewards (see Lockheed and stealth), but there's nothing that says they HAVE to. (They'll just croak in the end because others took risk to bring new technology to market.)

 

[Foo Fighter]

The demands made by BAe are a result of the privatisation policies of one Margaret Thatcher and as a privatised company they are required by their shareholders to make ever increasing profit which is an untenable position in the long term. NOTHING can continue to grow year on year at the rates required to keep the stock exchange happy, it is illogical.

These policies of privatisation have led to BAe removing it's ability to fabricate heavy armoured units and we do not even produce out own tank main gun ammunition any more off the back of government policy. Both government AND BAe are just as wrong, just for different reasons.

 

[Hood]

As Ron5 says, there is no incentive. Who actually backs the government stumping up the cash for all the remaining five ships in 3-5 year's time? I foresee the second order being trimmed.
Even if some exports were achieved they would be built locally in the export nation, so that removes another potential source of funds to recoup the capital costs.

I agree on the madness of the procurement system and the short-term-ism inherent in it, but there's no hope of that ever being fixed and its endemic across all sectors the government has any involvement with.

 

[DWG]

I think the criticism of BAE Systems is ignoring the reality that its investment decisions have been incredibly smart. I still have mixed feelings over the Airbus divestiture and exiting civil aerospace, but the fact is it then used that cash to pivot from being the major player in the UK and a minor player in the U.S., to the major player in the UK, and a major player in the U.S. in everything but being an airframe and naval prime (including the below the waterline growth in support, C4ISR and cyber security), while turning a local UK missile capability into joint ownership of the second largest missile prime in the world and making major acquisitions in Sweden (Bofors and Hagglunds) and Australia (Tenix) along the way. If FCS had happened as intended the ROI would have been even greater.

Compared to that, UK shipbuilding is an albatross around its neck it picked up in the 1999 MES acquisition that turned BAe into BAE Systems and which it would likely sell in a moment if it could get both a decent offer and UK government agreement. The problem is the UK drip feeds armament programmes rather than being strategically smart enough to use them to pump-prime wider success that would flow back to the government in long term tax revenues, and the low volume nature of Naval programmes makes that doubly so for shipbuilding. UK shipbuilding essentially operates on a shoe string and the smartest thing BAE Systems has been able to do with it, short of selling it, is to tilt the business balance into through life support. Major investment in shipbuilding infrastructure just doesn't have any likelihood of a decent ROI under the current and foreseeable political conditions, both national and international. So building the Type 26s the way they propose may not be the locally optimal way of doing it, but is strategically smart.

 

[JFC Fuller]

This appears to be the latest configuration for the Australian competition, note the 32 cell VLS forward and the Harpoon launchers immediately aft of the main stack in addition to the mast for the CEAFAR radars.

 

[fredymac]

This appears to be the latest configuration for the Australian competition, note the 32 cell VLS forward and the Harpoon launchers immediately aft of the main stack in addition to the mast for the CEAFAR radars.

Not sure if they mean ballistic missiles as there is no mention of SM3 missiles.
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/joint-media-release-new-approach-naval-combat-systems?linkId=100000001262822
"Under the plan, the combat management system for Australia’s fleet of nine Future Frigates will be provided by the Aegis Combat Management System, together with an Australian tactical interface, which will be developed by SAAB Australia.

This decision will maximize the Future Frigate’s air warfare capabilities, enabling these ships to engage threat missiles at long range, which is vital given rogue states are developing missiles with advanced range and speed."

 

[TomS]

Since they refer only to air warfare and not missile defense, it sounds more like SM-6 than SM-3. And SM-6 is just now being offered for export, so having a version of AEGIS Baseline 9 that supports it would make sense. (It would likely also be needed to support Standard Active, which might be a more economical alternative when it becomes available.)

https://news.usni.org/2017/01/10/sm-6-cleared-international-sale-australia-japan-korea-early-customers

 

[NeilChapman]

Additional pitch to land Australian Future Frigate (SEA5000) Program.

http://www.janes.com/article/75901/bae-systems-proposes-unprecedented-technology-transfer-for-australia

 

[NeilChapman]

It would seem as though the Type-26 has been written out of the running for the USN FFG(X) program.

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44972.pdf

“Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)) Conceptual Design, Solicitation Number: N0002418R2300,” October 16, 2017, updated October 20, 2017, posted at https://www.fbo.gov, accessed October 26, 2017
Emphasis below mine.

"
The purpose of this update is to provide clarification with respect to the parent design definition and prime contractor requirements noted within the original synopsis posting as follows:

The parent design, from which an offeror's FFG(X) solution would be developed, must have been constructed and demonstrated at sea. A “clean sheet”, “paper”, or developmental parent design would not qualify under this definition and would not be accepted for consideration under the Conceptual Design solicitation.

There is no requirement for the prime contractor to be a US shipyard for purposes of Conceptual Design. A US shipyard may participate as a part of multiple teams consistent with the prime and subcontractor restrictions outlined within the original synopsis.
"

That's a shame. It would be nice to see a push to have an exception made for the Type-26. There are only a few ships being built that are good candidates for the FFG(X) program.

It would have been good for the US to have a common platform w/the UK for myriad reasons.

1. Forward basing
2. Crewing/training flexibility
3. Worldwide logistical support
4. Design cost mitigation
5. ...

Imagine a common platform shared by UK, US, Australia, and potentially, several other countries. Costs would be shared over 75-100 ships rather than 10-20.

 

[Foo Fighter]

That would be a sensible solution. Sadly.

 

[Moose]

Well its not without precedent.

 

[NeilChapman]

Well its not without precedent.

Thanks for that Moose. I wasn't aware. It seems they learned something from this since the model's been used for the F-35.

e.g. F-35 final assembly is happening in US, Italy and Japan.
e.g. F-35 receives 300k parts from 1500 international suppliers.

 

[TomS]

Well its not without precedent.

NFR highlights the massive problems with trying to standardize on ship design. Trying to come up with a common standard ship between the US and UK would run into all the same basic issues. The two navies use different anti-aircraft missiles, different launchers, different radars, different combat systems (and even combat system philosophies). Approaches to propulsion systems are different (the US does not like combined plants, for instance, especially after LCS). Standards for damage control are different. Even basic things like accommodation and habitability standards differ.

 

[NeilChapman]

Well its not without precedent.

NFR highlights the massive problems with trying to standardize on ship design. Trying to come up with a common standard ship between the US and UK would run into all the same basic issues. The two navies use different anti-aircraft missiles, different launchers, different radars, different combat systems (and even combat system philosophies). Approaches to propulsion systems are different (the US does not like combined plants, for instance, especially after LCS). Standards for damage control are different. Even basic things like accommodation and habitability standards differ.

And yet, we have the F-35. Evidently massive problems can be overcome when there is a common objective and the will to see it through. The US and UK work "very" closely on the submarine front as well.

There needs to be another push for commonality where it can be found. Lord knows the Americans don't know what's best. It's always messy. Look at the CF of the LCS program.

This needs to be tried again. Perhaps not via NATO but between countries such as the UK, Australia, Japan and the US. Or perhaps there can be work between Commonwealth countries.

As an aside, there's a chance that the T26 will be disqualified from the Canadian program as well since a ship has not yet been built.

 

[TomS]

Aircraft are easier, honestly.

F-35 is a terrible example. It's a US design that everyone else is being allowed to buy and do some work on. But the other partners have nearly zero input on the core design, which was set before any of them joined in. What little non-US input there is is either weapon integration or swapping one electronic system for another.

Joint shipbuilding is closer to Eurofighter or Tornado development, where competing national preferences led to noticable performance compromises. Imagine trying to do a joint aircraft program where one partner preferred turbojets and the other wanted props. One wants a single crew and the other wants two.

US-UK submarine cooperation will never lead to a common ship design. Just standardizing the missile compartment is a heroic effort, and it's only happening because the USN is desperately short of cash to design the Columbia and the RN can't possibly afford new Trident without some cost sharing.

 

[NeilChapman]

Aircraft are easier, honestly.

F-35 is a terrible example. It's a US design that everyone else is being allowed to buy and do some work on. But the other partners have nearly zero input on the core design, which was set before any of them joined in. What little non-US input there is is either weapon integration or swapping one electronic system for another.

Joint shipbuilding is closer to Eurofighter or Tornado development, where competing national preferences led to noticable performance compromises. Imagine trying to do a joint aircraft program where one partner preferred turbojets and the other wanted props. One wants a single crew and the other wants two.

My point had more to do with the changing climate (financial pressure, perceived threats, etc) and the willingness to cooperate. In this case it is agreement to purchase a system toward which the participants had zero input.

The difficulties surround the political ramifications of purchasing billion dollar ships from another country. Even if building locally costs 25-50% more. Canada, Australia, the UK, European and Scandinavian countries are prime examples of those needing/wanting capable heavy frigates/destroyers but their scale of purchase is too small to get past the labor learning curve.

At some point, the threat and financial pressure will escalate such that the decision is made for them.

US-UK submarine cooperation will never lead to a common ship design. Just standardizing the missile compartment is a heroic effort, and it's only happening because the USN is desperately short of cash to design the Columbia and the RN can't possibly afford new Trident without some cost sharing.

Perhaps. My perception is that they've started with a common ballistic missile. This make sharing the dev cost by standardizing the compartment a no brainer.

 

[sferrin]

Aircraft are easier, honestly.

F-35 is a terrible example.

Joint shipbuilding is closer to Eurofighter or Tornado development, where competing national preferences led to noticable performance compromises. Imagine trying to do a joint aircraft program where one partner preferred turbojets and the other wanted props. One wants a single crew and the other wants two.

Or one wants to operate off a runway, another guy wants to trap on a CVN, and the last guy wants to do vertical landings? The F-35 was worse than the Typhoon or Tornado. At least they all wanted to land on a runway, and generally had the same concept of operation.

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/type-26-final-proposal-submitted-for-the-canadian-surface-combatant-project/

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/08/naval-row-mod-chooses-plymouth-home-next-generation-frigates/

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-importance-of-not-being-quite-so.html#!/2019/01/the-importance-of-not-being-quite-so.html

 

[kitnut617]

It would seem that the Canadian Government didn't get that article

https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/08/canadian-surface-combatant-contract-officially-awarded-to-type-26-team/

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/sts-defence-finish-first-type-26-frigate-communications-masts/

 

[Hood]

An interesting development that could affect the Type 26 design that I was previously unaware of. GE are thinking of shutting their factory at Rugby that makes the Advanced Induction Motors for the Type 45s, Queen Elizabeths and the Type 26s and moving it to France. It's not just the issues around the factory but the IP involved and security issues.

https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/closure-of-ge-rugby-electric-motor-plant-threatens-supply-of-royal-navy-propulsion-systems/

 

[Grey Havoc]

Yes, I saw that article yesterday. I was going to post it over in the 'Successor' thread but forgot. I'll copy over your post instead.