Royal Navy mid-1980s planning

[Yellow Palace]

SSomewhere online I've seen a document from he early-mid 1980s with Royal Navy planned surface ship construction through to the mid-1990s. It had projected order dates for 24 Type 23 frigates, eight AORs, and two more CASTLE class OPVs.

I seem to recall that it was an omnibus document from the National Archives with a great deal of other content, running to a few hundred pages. It may have been on the Margaret Thatcher archive webpage.

Unfortunately I don't seem to be able to find the bookmark for it, and it's not obviously hiding out in my files. Does this ring a bell with anyone?

 

[zen]

Certainly last 4 Type 23 were originally planned as some sort of larger stretched version and logically that might have been intended to run to another 12 ships.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I have some notes from this document that specifically note 24 Type 23 planned – no mention of stretched variants. I'm looking for the original reference, though.

 

[Hood]

I haven't seen the document but it sounds like a fascinating read.

24 Type 23 were indeed planned. I have seen reference to four additional Castles, but of course none of those were ordered.
Half of the AORs would have been additional Fort Victoria-class ships.

 

[JohnR]

According to Combat Ship in 1983 and 1988 there were to be at least two more Castle Class OPV and that it was intended to build six Fort Victoria, fitted with a combat data system and Sea Wolf VLS and then to build an additional six units on the same hull but unarmed to replace the Leaf class tankers.

I can't recall ever reading a total number Type 23's but I do recall reading in the mid 80s; I think it was in Strategy and Defence, that there were proposals to fit additional Sea Wolves in the 'cut out' in the hangar structure and a stretch of the hull and fitting a third Spey.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Ah, found it - my memory was wrong in several details, but the document is PREM19/1326, pages 21-25 of the PDF document. The intent in May 1984 was for no fewer than 32 Type 23 frigates and eleven AORs; I had thought there was reference to the SRMHs, but apparently not - or else there's another similar document. No fewer than eight Type 23s were planned to be ordered in the 1992-1993 financial year, though they were generally planned in biennial batches of four. That does align with the intent that one AOR would support four Type 23s - looking at the plans, the AOR would generally be ordered the year before the associated frigates - which makes AORs 09 through 11 look a bit odd.

On the subject of AORs, PREM 19/1871 is rather interesting as it features some discussion of the justification for the ships - including their defensive armament - on pages 195-199 and 233-236. These documents date to May 1986, noting that the second document in the folder is actually dated about two weeks earlier. By that time, AOR 01 and AOR 02 were to be the first of a batch of six ships, with the other four ships to be ordered at some point in the 1990s - some slippage compared to the 1984 programme.

Also considered were a faster version of the AOR, a mixed fleet of six tankers and two stores ships, and two different unarmed commercial designs. A rather dim view was taken of the commercial designs, which were incapable of meeting the requirements. The approach taken with support ships would be considered in line with the design for the Batch 2 Type 23, which might require stretching to receive aircraft maintenance facilities and increased ammunition capacity if subsequent AORs were to be unarmed. Whether this refers to the design for AORs 03-06 or to additional ships beyond these isn't entirely clear to me.

 

[Volkodav]

Ah, found it - my memory was wrong in several details, but the document is PREM19/1326, pages 21-25 of the PDF document. The intent in May 1984 was for no fewer than 32 Type 23 frigates and eleven AORs; I had thought there was reference to the SRMHs, but apparently not - or else there's another similar document. No fewer than eight Type 23s were planned to be ordered in the 1992-1993 financial year, though they were generally planned in biennial batches of four. That does align with the intent that one AOR would support four Type 23s - looking at the plans, the AOR would generally be ordered the year before the associated frigates - which makes AORs 09 through 11 look a bit odd.

On the subject of AORs, PREM 19/1871 is rather interesting as it features some discussion of the justification for the ships - including their defensive armament - on pages 195-199 and 233-236. These documents date to May 1986, noting that the second document in the folder is actually dated about two weeks earlier. By that time, AOR 01 and AOR 02 were to be the first of a batch of six ships, with the other four ships to be ordered at some point in the 1990s - some slippage compared to the 1984 programme.

Also considered were a faster version of the AOR, a mixed fleet of six tankers and two stores ships, and two different unarmed commercial designs. A rather dim view was taken of the commercial designs, which were incapable of meeting the requirements. The approach taken with support ships would be considered in line with the design for the Batch 2 Type 23, which might require stretching to receive aircraft maintenance facilities and increased ammunition capacity if subsequent AORs were to be unarmed. Whether this refers to the design for AORs 03-06 or to additional ships beyond these isn't entirely clear to me.

Was this the Towed Array Tug version of the Type 23 or the multi role version actually built? By 84 it could be assumed the lessons of the Falklands had been absorbed but then again this numbers could have been a legacy of the original concept. Not that I would object to 32 full blown Type 23.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The documents don't make it clear, but did call for the first Type 23 to be ordered in the 1984-1985 financial year. HMS NORFOLK was ordered on 24th October 1984, which is indeed during the 1984-1985 financial year, and only about seven months later than the document was issued. It stands to reason that this is therefore the final version of the design, or something very close to it.

Edit: And, in fact, the paper presented to the RNEC on 4th May 1984 in the Type 23 thread refers to what is clearly the final design. So I'm pretty confident in saying that 32 of this version were planned.

 

[Hood]

The final Type 23 design received Board approval in mid-1983.
I must admit that these are higher numbers than I thought. Brown and Friedman are fairly quiet on Type 23 fleet plans, certainly much of the relevant material would have been under the 25-year rule. Hopefully there may be MoD papers at Kew which are now open that might shed more light on the subject.

 

[JohnR]

Ah, found it - my memory was wrong in several details, but the document is PREM19/1326, pages 21-25 of the PDF document. The intent in May 1984 was for no fewer than 32 Type 23 frigates and eleven AORs; I had thought there was reference to the SRMHs, but apparently not - or else there's another similar document. No fewer than eight Type 23s were planned to be ordered in the 1992-1993 financial year, though they were generally planned in biennial batches of four. That does align with the intent that one AOR would support four Type 23s - looking at the plans, the AOR would generally be ordered the year before the associated frigates - which makes AORs 09 through 11 look a bit odd.

On the subject of AORs, PREM 19/1871 is rather interesting as it features some discussion of the justification for the ships - including their defensive armament - on pages 195-199 and 233-236. These documents date to May 1986, noting that the second document in the folder is actually dated about two weeks earlier. By that time, AOR 01 and AOR 02 were to be the first of a batch of six ships, with the other four ships to be ordered at some point in the 1990s - some slippage compared to the 1984 programme.

Also considered were a faster version of the AOR, a mixed fleet of six tankers and two stores ships, and two different unarmed commercial designs. A rather dim view was taken of the commercial designs, which were incapable of meeting the requirements. The approach taken with support ships would be considered in line with the design for the Batch 2 Type 23, which might require stretching to receive aircraft maintenance facilities and increased ammunition capacity if subsequent AORs were to be unarmed. Whether this refers to the design for AORs 03-06 or to additional ships beyond these isn't entirely clear to me.

Was this the Towed Array Tug version of the Type 23 or the multi role version actually built? By 84 it could be assumed the lessons of the Falklands had been absorbed but then again this numbers could have been a legacy of the original concept. Not that I would object to 32 full blown Type 23.

As I understand it the evolution of the Fort Victoria with a the VL Seawolf was to make up for the light armament on the 'Towed Array Tug' which made them unable to defend the AOR, the 'upgunning' of the Type 23's was used as the justification to abandon the AOR's armament, down to 2 Phalanx.

 

[zen]

32 would imply that a Batch III ought to be forthcoming after the Batch II ships. Even had only the Batch II's been designed and built, this would severely influence subsequent decisions.

 

[Yellow Palace]

As I understand it the evolution of the Fort Victoria with a the VL Seawolf was to make up for the light armament on the 'Towed Array Tug' which made them unable to defend the AOR, the 'upgunning' of the Type 23's was used as the justification to abandon the AOR's armament, down to 2 Phalanx.

PREM19/1871 specifically states that the FORT class were to be armed for self protection in high-threat areas, even when operating in a task force centred on an aircraft carrier. The idea that Type 23s would be able to defend a supply ship using point-defence missiles – which Seawolf was – seems distinctly optimistic, especially when the frigates would necessarily be dispersed to effectively use their towed arrays.

It's interesting to note that the expected deployment was two AORs to a task group. Three CVSs were built and and six AORs were planned. I doubt this is coincidence. It also casts doubt in my mind over the perceived CONOPS of individual frigates patrolling the gaps with AORs supporting them.

 

[zen]

As I understand it the evolution of the Fort Victoria with a the VL Seawolf was to make up for the light armament on the 'Towed Array Tug' which made them unable to defend the AOR, the 'upgunning' of the Type 23's was used as the justification to abandon the AOR's armament, down to 2 Phalanx.

PREM19/1871 specifically states that the FORT class were to be armed for self protection in high-threat areas, even when operating in a task force centred on an aircraft carrier. The idea that Type 23s would be able to defend a supply ship using point-defence missiles – which Seawolf was – seems distinctly optimistic, especially when the frigates would necessarily be dispersed to effectively use their towed arrays.

It's interesting to note that the expected deployment was two AORs to a task group. Three CVSs were built and and six AORs were planned. I doubt this is coincidence. It also casts doubt in my mind over the perceived CONOPS of individual frigates patrolling the gaps with AORs supporting them.

I think I can agree with that! Sea Wolf isn't a true Local Area Air Defence System, that would have been System C.
However had GWS.27 been funded, with ARH seekers, and a possible AESA System in place of Type 811. Or earlier SAM.72.
Then this gets close enough to being Local Area Air Defence.
The effort behind the former could thus be explained as part of an 80's drive to achieve that?

 

[JFC Fuller]

RLBH, great job on finding the documents, thanks for posting the links.

As an observation, the outlined build rate in May 1984 is for 34 frigates to be ordered over 11 years resulting in an average build rate of 3 frigates per year. This was the absolute minimum seen as necessary for maintaining the 50 strong fleet on the basis that the ships would have short service lives (15-18 years) and would not be subject to big refits, conversions or modernisations. As such, I would theorise that the later units, certainly Type 23s 25-32, proposed in PREM19/1326 were placeholders for vessels that were seen as replacements for the Batch 1 Type 42s and 22s. Note that the NFR-90 MOU was only signed in April 1984 so these numbers may well predate any decision to include NFR-90 in the formal build programme.

 

[Yellow Palace]

As such, I would theorise that the later units, certainly Type 23s 25-32, proposed in PREM19/1326 were placeholders for vessels that were seen as replacements for the Batch 1 Type 42s and 22s.

That makes sense - certainly Friedman notes the practice of using a current design as the basis for the future build programme. The first Type 42s would, on paper, need replaced from 1998 onwards, so 1992 is probably as late as they could be ordered. The big order in 1992-1993 might make more sense if it was actually the final Type 23s and the first ships of the new AAW class, not formally defined at that time.

 

[Hood]

I had much the same thought as JFC, regarding replacements of older ships.

Just to compare the plans, these are the real Type 23 order dates:
29/10/84 - 01
15/07/85 - 02, 03, 04
11/07/88 - 05, 06, 07
19/12/89 - 08, 09, 10
23/01/92 - 11, 12, 13
28/02/96 - 14, 15, 16

There was clearly some slippage even before the end of the Cold War and the orders for hulls never exceeded three per order even with two builders and, of course, after the 1989 order Swan Hunter was no longer part of the build programme and it seems from the file that the government wanted Swan out of warship construction. The planned 1992/93 order for eight ships seems a very ambitious target, although presumably with no orders planned for 93/94 the builds would have been staggered slightly, but all feels rather ambitious for Yarrow to handle alone, regardless of whether those really Type 23s or a derivative or successor.

 

[zen]

Relevant Type 23 thread.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/type-23-development-variants.7858/

 

[JohnR]

As I understand it the evolution of the Fort Victoria with a the VL Seawolf was to make up for the light armament on the 'Towed Array Tug' which made them unable to defend the AOR, the 'upgunning' of the Type 23's was used as the justification to abandon the AOR's armament, down to 2 Phalanx.

PREM19/1871 specifically states that the FORT class were to be armed for self protection in high-threat areas, even when operating in a task force centred on an aircraft carrier. The idea that Type 23s would be able to defend a supply ship using point-defence missiles – which Seawolf was – seems distinctly optimistic, especially when the frigates would necessarily be dispersed to effectively use their towed arrays.

It's interesting to note that the expected deployment was two AORs to a task group. Three CVSs were built and and six AORs were planned. I doubt this is coincidence. It also casts doubt in my mitnd over the perceived CONOPS of individual frigates patrolling the gaps with AORs supporting them.

I think I can agree with that! Sea Wolf isn't a true Local Area Air Defence System, that would have been System C.
However had GWS.27 been funded, with ARH seekers, and a possible AESA System in place of Type 811. Or earlier SAM.72.
Then this gets close enough to being Local Area Air Defence.
The effort behind the former could thus be explained as part of an 80's drive to achieve that?

During the Falklands Conflict the two Type 22 present were used as Goalkeepers to protect the carriers from sea skimming missiles.

 

[JohnR]

It would have been interesting if earlier programs had worked out - 5 Command Carriers/cruiser, 26 Type 42 (possibly one less if retaining Bristol), 26 Type 22,

How many Type 23? Possibly 26? Reduce by 12 to take into account the additional Type 22; for 20, and then add 6 to replace the Type 21 (although they could already have been allowed in the original 20.

I know, I know but I can fantasies, and while I'm at it the Moon is made of cheese, the covid crisis has been well handled and Bo Jo used to be a Versace model (the later more of an nightmare than a fantasy).

 

[TomS]

During the Falklands Conflict the two Type 22 present were used as Goalkeepers to protect the carriers from sea skimming missiles.

Sometimes. They also used the Type 22s paired with Type 42s as advanced radar pickets/SAM traps (the Type 22-42 or Type 64 combo). The results were not overwhelmingly successful: Glasgow was damaged when Brilliant's Seawolf glitched during one attack (after one successful engagement), and Coventry was destroyed in an attack in which Broadsword's Seawolf also froze up mid-attack and then was blocked by Coventry at exactly the wrong moment. Which shows that a) Seawolf wasn't quite as reliable as one might hope and b) it's better not to have to coordinate two ships in close company during an air or missile attack.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The planned 1992/93 order for eight ships seems a very ambitious target, although presumably with no orders planned for 93/94 the builds would have been staggered slightly, but all feels rather ambitious for Yarrow to handle alone, regardless of whether those really Type 23s or a derivative or successor.

Reading further in the file, it was intended that the major warship yards should be reduced from five to three by both Swan Hunter and Cammell Laird dropping out of the business. Vickers would remain the sole source for submarines, whilst Yarrow and Vosper Thornycroft would compete for destroyers, frigates and MCMVs. The Woolston yard could build reasonably large ships, and had done several of the LEANDER class, whilst Yarrow had a GRP manufacturing facility that in the event barely got used.