RN Nuclear NIGS ship
- Thread starter JFC Fuller
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Err which SeaSlug mkII is that?
I'm talking about Thunderbird II to be precise as thats 'Green Flax', which actualy was considered for the Counties. Having from memory CW guidance and a range of about 50nm.
SeaSlug as is, is rather seriously shorter in range. The only mkII I know of is'nt much better, and the longest range I've heard of is mentioned on Skomer as a Bristol offering of a major upgrade to the weapon for about 26nm range.
In terms of replacing the P.177 matched to CDS and Type 984, the expected intercetion range for DLI was between 20 and 60nm. The lower figure the inner limit for fighter defences of a fleet.
This in study from May 1955 ADM 1/28006. A DND study of fleet fighter defence requirements for 1962-1970.
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This thread is producing some incredible info that is nowhere else.
I am a bit slow on following all the points made, but I still think it is useful to
use the US Navy as a reference point, because they actually deployed ships
similar to those considered by the UK.
Aircraft carriers
The US deployed Terrier and Tartar on their conventional carriers for
a while in the early 60s before deciding that it was better to have
short range missiles instead. I tend to see the Seadart fit on CVA 01
as mirroring this. If CVA 01 had gone ahead I cannot help thinking
it would have been without Seadart.
Cruisers
At the time the UK were looking at the big GW cruiser the USN had an
ambitious programme of cruiser conversions which culminated in the
awesome Albany class ships with both Talos and Tartar. Long Beach
reflected this period as well.
Destroyer Leaders/Frigates
By the time we are talking about for NIGS the USN had moved on from
cruisers to the Typhon frigates, which were large nuclear destroyer leaders.
With the demise of Typhon the USN splits its work into improving the T
family's performance and developing what eventually becomes Aegis.
I think this is relevant because the NIGS ship is essentially a task force
unit like the US ships.
A US carrier task force would have had a cruiser or two, some large
missile frigates and smaller destroyers and anti-submarine ships. The RN
would have had a carrier, a gun cruiser, one or two Countys, and ASW ships.
I assume the NIGS ship was hoped to increase the capability of the anti-aircraft screen in the way the USN was doing.
Thus I still tend to see the NIGS ship as similar to the Leahy (sorry not Belknap) and Bainbridge with its launchers looking as close to Terrier twin
arms as possible.
UK 75
I am a bit slow on following all the points made, but I still think it is useful to
use the US Navy as a reference point, because they actually deployed ships
similar to those considered by the UK.
Aircraft carriers
The US deployed Terrier and Tartar on their conventional carriers for
a while in the early 60s before deciding that it was better to have
short range missiles instead. I tend to see the Seadart fit on CVA 01
as mirroring this. If CVA 01 had gone ahead I cannot help thinking
it would have been without Seadart.
Cruisers
At the time the UK were looking at the big GW cruiser the USN had an
ambitious programme of cruiser conversions which culminated in the
awesome Albany class ships with both Talos and Tartar. Long Beach
reflected this period as well.
Destroyer Leaders/Frigates
By the time we are talking about for NIGS the USN had moved on from
cruisers to the Typhon frigates, which were large nuclear destroyer leaders.
With the demise of Typhon the USN splits its work into improving the T
family's performance and developing what eventually becomes Aegis.
I think this is relevant because the NIGS ship is essentially a task force
unit like the US ships.
A US carrier task force would have had a cruiser or two, some large
missile frigates and smaller destroyers and anti-submarine ships. The RN
would have had a carrier, a gun cruiser, one or two Countys, and ASW ships.
I assume the NIGS ship was hoped to increase the capability of the anti-aircraft screen in the way the USN was doing.
Thus I still tend to see the NIGS ship as similar to the Leahy (sorry not Belknap) and Bainbridge with its launchers looking as close to Terrier twin
arms as possible.
UK 75
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NIGS evolved over time.
At first it was a navalised Blue Envoy, a pretty hefty size compared to later naval SAMs and with those delta wings pretty bulky for anything other than the Sea Slug chain magazine system.
By 1955 it had evolved into something like Typhoon which brought about the idea of the Type 985 and by 1959 it had become the 0.64 ton dart with an 0.83 ton booster with a twin launcher and estimated to be the size of the long-range Typhoon. This was still smaller than Sea Slug and the first designs with NIGS were classified as frigates and beginning with a Type 12 hull things spiralled to a County-sized hull with a twin-launcher for 44 NIGS, two Sea Cats and some had an aft 4.5in gun. Radars were four Type 985 arrays and four guidance radars and four illuminators. The alternative 1B had Sea Slug-type stowage for 48 missiles and 1D was a double-ender with 80 missiles. 1D was 7,400 tons and shorter than the Leahy but overall comparable to Leahy.
If for only one twin launcher the radars were four Type 985 arrays and four guidance radars and four illuminators I wonder if a double-ender needed eight guidance radars and eight illuminators? I.e. one per missile? If so then topweight would become a concern and where would you put all those radars? Getting five radars onto a frigate like a Type 12 seems impossible, nine onto a County even worse.
Other launcher schemes were Sea slug-type 13-missile horizontal loader, twin ten-missile horizontal loaders, 16-missile vertical loader, twin 12-missile vertical loaders or 10-missile vertical drum loader or 47 to 24-missile or twin 18-missile horizontal loaders. By November 1958 it was realised that frigates would be the main RN surface ships and so this greater need led to SIGS replacing NIGS. It can be seen how much flux was in these designs and Friedman mentions 17 Scheme designs ranging from County Class conversions (plus a Typhoon county with 80 missiles) to nuclear ships (7,700 tons comparable to Bainbridge but with fewer missiles) and CONAS designs.
Really given the numerous stowage and magazine and ship studies its hard to say whether any defintive design was reached before 1958 or whether any satisfactory designs were found. It's clear the RN was getting results similar to the US designs of the time but it seems SIGS was more urgent and the the RN knew that NIGS was perhaps too advanced or expensive when the numbers of NIGS-armed ships would be so small compared to frigates. I think a NIGS ship was overall still low on proabilites to be built and a nuclear-powered ship even lower.
I mentioned the US reactors becuase Bainbridge had influenced the First Sea Lord and in 1961 the D1G was tried in a County hull and a fresh double-ender design plus the CONAD schemes mentioned by Sealordlawrence earlier. I think if the Dollar situation was good buying US would remove any snags and get a ship quicker but I've no dobut a UK reactor would have been used from the SSN and SSBN programmes to reduce the costs of a brand-new design. Friedman though seems unsure about how serious these nuclear studies were and given the operating costs and logistical issues (and how few entered even US service) it seems less likely than a steam-powered NIGS destroyer despite the Type 985 power needs.
At first it was a navalised Blue Envoy, a pretty hefty size compared to later naval SAMs and with those delta wings pretty bulky for anything other than the Sea Slug chain magazine system.
By 1955 it had evolved into something like Typhoon which brought about the idea of the Type 985 and by 1959 it had become the 0.64 ton dart with an 0.83 ton booster with a twin launcher and estimated to be the size of the long-range Typhoon. This was still smaller than Sea Slug and the first designs with NIGS were classified as frigates and beginning with a Type 12 hull things spiralled to a County-sized hull with a twin-launcher for 44 NIGS, two Sea Cats and some had an aft 4.5in gun. Radars were four Type 985 arrays and four guidance radars and four illuminators. The alternative 1B had Sea Slug-type stowage for 48 missiles and 1D was a double-ender with 80 missiles. 1D was 7,400 tons and shorter than the Leahy but overall comparable to Leahy.
If for only one twin launcher the radars were four Type 985 arrays and four guidance radars and four illuminators I wonder if a double-ender needed eight guidance radars and eight illuminators? I.e. one per missile? If so then topweight would become a concern and where would you put all those radars? Getting five radars onto a frigate like a Type 12 seems impossible, nine onto a County even worse.
Other launcher schemes were Sea slug-type 13-missile horizontal loader, twin ten-missile horizontal loaders, 16-missile vertical loader, twin 12-missile vertical loaders or 10-missile vertical drum loader or 47 to 24-missile or twin 18-missile horizontal loaders. By November 1958 it was realised that frigates would be the main RN surface ships and so this greater need led to SIGS replacing NIGS. It can be seen how much flux was in these designs and Friedman mentions 17 Scheme designs ranging from County Class conversions (plus a Typhoon county with 80 missiles) to nuclear ships (7,700 tons comparable to Bainbridge but with fewer missiles) and CONAS designs.
Really given the numerous stowage and magazine and ship studies its hard to say whether any defintive design was reached before 1958 or whether any satisfactory designs were found. It's clear the RN was getting results similar to the US designs of the time but it seems SIGS was more urgent and the the RN knew that NIGS was perhaps too advanced or expensive when the numbers of NIGS-armed ships would be so small compared to frigates. I think a NIGS ship was overall still low on proabilites to be built and a nuclear-powered ship even lower.
I mentioned the US reactors becuase Bainbridge had influenced the First Sea Lord and in 1961 the D1G was tried in a County hull and a fresh double-ender design plus the CONAD schemes mentioned by Sealordlawrence earlier. I think if the Dollar situation was good buying US would remove any snags and get a ship quicker but I've no dobut a UK reactor would have been used from the SSN and SSBN programmes to reduce the costs of a brand-new design. Friedman though seems unsure about how serious these nuclear studies were and given the operating costs and logistical issues (and how few entered even US service) it seems less likely than a steam-powered NIGS destroyer despite the Type 985 power needs.
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Hood
Your account of the NIGS saga wrapping up various aspects is
incredibly helpful.
I think you have a point in particular about why there are no
drawings around. I suppose the most that ever happened on
these various schemes were tables showing variants and
options and relevant calculations.
We are, however, a lot further along than when this started
and can have a fair idea of what a NIGS ship for the RN might
have looked like, but with the strong caveat that it was not
a real runner.
UK 75
Your account of the NIGS saga wrapping up various aspects is
incredibly helpful.
I think you have a point in particular about why there are no
drawings around. I suppose the most that ever happened on
these various schemes were tables showing variants and
options and relevant calculations.
We are, however, a lot further along than when this started
and can have a fair idea of what a NIGS ship for the RN might
have looked like, but with the strong caveat that it was not
a real runner.
UK 75
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There are some other points niggling me about NIGS.
Friedman is his book 'British Destroyers and Frigates' is basically saying development began with Blue Envoy and tailed off as early as November 1958 when the Fleet Requirements Committee decided the SIGS was more urgent, however work continued on NIGS until 1961.
Reading BSP 4: Hypersonics, Ramjets & Missiles its clear there are several contenders to NIGS. Friedman's dart seems unlike some of the proposals and I wonder whether what he saw in the archives was a baseline version to allow the ship designers to calculate weights and space.
Gibson & Buttler state development on NIGS began in 1958 as WA.726 to counter a 70,000ft mach 3 target to arm the future carriers (a point which seems false which I'll explain later). The Project 502 team of Armstrong Whitworth, Smiths and Sperry was the perferred bidder but they wanted to upgrade Sea Slug with new technology. Bristol was not invitied to tender but got wind of WA.726 and entered a Blue Envoy-type missile but with tandem boost with two ramjets and was 26ft 7in (7.8m) long! It was rejected and they instead offered the Large PT.428, two times bigger than PT.428 with semi-active homing. These seem to be the only known entries despite work carrying on until 1961. The Navy liked the Large PT.428 but even tandem-boost wouldn't give enough range and beam-riding was not acceptable.
So who designed the 1959 dart Friedman mentions? What further NIGS studies were undertaken?
Gibson says in 1961 the Navy demanded the new missile be capable of stowage and handling like gun ammunition and that led to SIGS and the implied death of NIGS. Friedman seems to suggest SIGS had an earlier birth, as early as 1958. The Project 502 team seems to have been offical favourite for SIGS too. This alone suggests Sea Slug was not the failure some say today, they seem to have retained confidence enough for the Navy to ask them to design two follow-on missiles.
If no choice of missile was made it's no wonder no definitive ship was ever drawn up nor that we know nothing about the radar systems to guide the missile. I don't know who designed the guidance/illuminator radars and if the missile never got past the study phase its likely no definitive radar work was ever done either. I agree seperate guidance and illuminator radars seems odd, unless they were mounted co-axially on a common mount?
Likewise Type 985 might never have gotten past the mathematics stage. Probably designed seperately from the NIGS designs due to its search function the DNC must have had some idea of size and weight of the system and likely power consumption figures to design the 17 sketch designs and to look into nuclear powerplants. Early Type 984 and 988 illustrations on plans look little like the final products and I'd guess a 985 would be similar, an artists impression. If the NIGS destroyer was low on the priority list its safe to assume development would be less important plus the problems of the 984 had to be ironed out. Little practical work might have been achieved before NIGS and the ship died.
I looked at 'British Carrier Aviation' P336-37 and it seems little different in concept to CVA-01 except the Blue Envoy is much bigger and would require more space. Gibson writes NIGS was designed for the CVA-01 but the 1960 requirements that led to CVA-01 included the following armaments, from Friedman, "tactical nuclear bombs, shipborne ASW stand-off missiles (Ikara), a long-range air-to-air missile (which never materialised) and a 'Tartar-type' surface-to-air missile (which became Sea Dart)." The 'Tartar-type' is of course SIGS, NIGS was never considered for CVA-01 nor the 1956 hybrid. But it shows the hybrid-carrier was not very different from CVA-01 except that its missile was designed for fast high-altitude targets, the same ones P.177 was supposed to tackle. By including Ikara the CVA of 1960 was far more a hybrid with cruiser-type weapons than the 1956 hybrid. Of course NIGS would have made CVA-01 much closer in capability to the hybrid.
I believe the Sea Dart on CVA-01 was explained in terms of weapons coverage in a dispersed carrier fleet that the extra launcher in the centre was worthwhile as it covered gaps in the screen from her escorts. In a sense the hybrid of 1956 was much the same but of course Blue Envoy had a larger range but in a Navy short of escorts probably the safest move. That's why I think the lack of a missile-armament on the CVF a mistake when the RN surface fleet has never been smalller.
[Edit: Thanks for that link Sealordlawrence, I'd forgotten about that thread. It duplicates some of what I've said above but highlights BSP:4 is not perfect on the story, naval SAMs cover just 3-4 pages and NIGS a few paragraphs. There are gaps and mis-jointed timescales in both books and its hard to suppose anything concrete was ever decided upon before cancellation.]
Friedman is his book 'British Destroyers and Frigates' is basically saying development began with Blue Envoy and tailed off as early as November 1958 when the Fleet Requirements Committee decided the SIGS was more urgent, however work continued on NIGS until 1961.
Reading BSP 4: Hypersonics, Ramjets & Missiles its clear there are several contenders to NIGS. Friedman's dart seems unlike some of the proposals and I wonder whether what he saw in the archives was a baseline version to allow the ship designers to calculate weights and space.
Gibson & Buttler state development on NIGS began in 1958 as WA.726 to counter a 70,000ft mach 3 target to arm the future carriers (a point which seems false which I'll explain later). The Project 502 team of Armstrong Whitworth, Smiths and Sperry was the perferred bidder but they wanted to upgrade Sea Slug with new technology. Bristol was not invitied to tender but got wind of WA.726 and entered a Blue Envoy-type missile but with tandem boost with two ramjets and was 26ft 7in (7.8m) long! It was rejected and they instead offered the Large PT.428, two times bigger than PT.428 with semi-active homing. These seem to be the only known entries despite work carrying on until 1961. The Navy liked the Large PT.428 but even tandem-boost wouldn't give enough range and beam-riding was not acceptable.
So who designed the 1959 dart Friedman mentions? What further NIGS studies were undertaken?
Gibson says in 1961 the Navy demanded the new missile be capable of stowage and handling like gun ammunition and that led to SIGS and the implied death of NIGS. Friedman seems to suggest SIGS had an earlier birth, as early as 1958. The Project 502 team seems to have been offical favourite for SIGS too. This alone suggests Sea Slug was not the failure some say today, they seem to have retained confidence enough for the Navy to ask them to design two follow-on missiles.
If no choice of missile was made it's no wonder no definitive ship was ever drawn up nor that we know nothing about the radar systems to guide the missile. I don't know who designed the guidance/illuminator radars and if the missile never got past the study phase its likely no definitive radar work was ever done either. I agree seperate guidance and illuminator radars seems odd, unless they were mounted co-axially on a common mount?
Likewise Type 985 might never have gotten past the mathematics stage. Probably designed seperately from the NIGS designs due to its search function the DNC must have had some idea of size and weight of the system and likely power consumption figures to design the 17 sketch designs and to look into nuclear powerplants. Early Type 984 and 988 illustrations on plans look little like the final products and I'd guess a 985 would be similar, an artists impression. If the NIGS destroyer was low on the priority list its safe to assume development would be less important plus the problems of the 984 had to be ironed out. Little practical work might have been achieved before NIGS and the ship died.
I looked at 'British Carrier Aviation' P336-37 and it seems little different in concept to CVA-01 except the Blue Envoy is much bigger and would require more space. Gibson writes NIGS was designed for the CVA-01 but the 1960 requirements that led to CVA-01 included the following armaments, from Friedman, "tactical nuclear bombs, shipborne ASW stand-off missiles (Ikara), a long-range air-to-air missile (which never materialised) and a 'Tartar-type' surface-to-air missile (which became Sea Dart)." The 'Tartar-type' is of course SIGS, NIGS was never considered for CVA-01 nor the 1956 hybrid. But it shows the hybrid-carrier was not very different from CVA-01 except that its missile was designed for fast high-altitude targets, the same ones P.177 was supposed to tackle. By including Ikara the CVA of 1960 was far more a hybrid with cruiser-type weapons than the 1956 hybrid. Of course NIGS would have made CVA-01 much closer in capability to the hybrid.
I believe the Sea Dart on CVA-01 was explained in terms of weapons coverage in a dispersed carrier fleet that the extra launcher in the centre was worthwhile as it covered gaps in the screen from her escorts. In a sense the hybrid of 1956 was much the same but of course Blue Envoy had a larger range but in a Navy short of escorts probably the safest move. That's why I think the lack of a missile-armament on the CVF a mistake when the RN surface fleet has never been smalller.
[Edit: Thanks for that link Sealordlawrence, I'd forgotten about that thread. It duplicates some of what I've said above but highlights BSP:4 is not perfect on the story, naval SAMs cover just 3-4 pages and NIGS a few paragraphs. There are gaps and mis-jointed timescales in both books and its hard to suppose anything concrete was ever decided upon before cancellation.]
Hmmm.....
Now bear with me, as this is speculative.
I'm not a radar man, and this is based on vague reccolections....However.
I seem to reccal reading the Arleigh Burkes Aegis system dicates the location of the SPY-1 radars, in terms of distance from each other, and this dicates the distinctive shape of the superstructure, that is repeated on a number Aegis vessels.
Something about a waveguide to each radar from a central source which is of equal distance from each radar, in fact I dimly reccal they where limited in how long that waveguide could be. In my more speculative moments I suspect something about precise matching of the signal for each radar array is important, perhaps with avoiding interference or with handling the return signals and processing it all for a common picture.
This same set of vague reccolections includes something about the Ticonderoga's not being like that, only two radar arrays are so connected to some common source, and thus it is two pairs of radars, with some issues related to this same set up in syncronising between these pairs causing all sorts of headaches and having implications for the system.
.....Now strangely enough the US equivilents of the Type 985 on both Long Beach and Enterprise seem to be in a vaguely similar setup to the Arleigh Burkes. No surprise if Aegis is in fact building uppon thise earlier technology....
Does this perhaps explain the reference to two Type 985's for the CV studies? That in fact like the Tico's its two pairs of radars each syncronised by a common source. If you where fitting Aegis to some of those CVA-01 studies you'd be forced to go down the Tico' route by viture of long islands or even two seperatre islands some of them had.
But on a smaller warship, especialy one with nuclear power and thus no funnel to have to cope with, you might go down a design route that leads to something closer to the Long Beach setup?
Now bear with me, as this is speculative.
I'm not a radar man, and this is based on vague reccolections....However.
I seem to reccal reading the Arleigh Burkes Aegis system dicates the location of the SPY-1 radars, in terms of distance from each other, and this dicates the distinctive shape of the superstructure, that is repeated on a number Aegis vessels.
Something about a waveguide to each radar from a central source which is of equal distance from each radar, in fact I dimly reccal they where limited in how long that waveguide could be. In my more speculative moments I suspect something about precise matching of the signal for each radar array is important, perhaps with avoiding interference or with handling the return signals and processing it all for a common picture.
This same set of vague reccolections includes something about the Ticonderoga's not being like that, only two radar arrays are so connected to some common source, and thus it is two pairs of radars, with some issues related to this same set up in syncronising between these pairs causing all sorts of headaches and having implications for the system.
.....Now strangely enough the US equivilents of the Type 985 on both Long Beach and Enterprise seem to be in a vaguely similar setup to the Arleigh Burkes. No surprise if Aegis is in fact building uppon thise earlier technology....
Does this perhaps explain the reference to two Type 985's for the CV studies? That in fact like the Tico's its two pairs of radars each syncronised by a common source. If you where fitting Aegis to some of those CVA-01 studies you'd be forced to go down the Tico' route by viture of long islands or even two seperatre islands some of them had.
But on a smaller warship, especialy one with nuclear power and thus no funnel to have to cope with, you might go down a design route that leads to something closer to the Long Beach setup?
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zen said:
Close. The problem is that it takes several years and a lot of money to develop a certain antenna and waveguide configuration for AEGIS. So unless you want to spend a lot of money and time you are limited to the current AEGIS array configurations for any new ships. Which are CG 47, DDG 51, DDG 51 Flight IIA, F100 and the SPY-1F lightweight system configuration. This is why the various export AEGIS ship’s like the Kongou, Atago and Sejong classes have either DDG 51 or DDG 51 Flight IIA array configurations.
For the Gibbs & Cox designed Evolved Air Warfare Destroyer that was developed for Australia (but not ordered into production) the DDG51 Flight IIA array configuration was chosen. When the competition came down to this design versus the F100 the entire DDG 51 Flight IIA radar system was lifted a deck to increase the radar horizon to make it competitive. The F100 configuration having the highest positioning of the SPY-1D antennas and the largest subsequent horizon.
The reason the CG 47s have the antennas in two separated blocks is to avoid interference from the superstructure. This was why the DDG 51 Flight IIA lifted the rear arrays a deck higher so they could look over the new hangar superstructure. There was also another AEGIS array configuration planned for the CGN 42 and the AEGIS modification of the CGN 9 but I don’t think this progressed far enough in development to be considered off the shelf.
zen said:
Ticonderoga class cruisers have two sets of transmitters and associated equipment for the SPY-1 radar, one in each deck house forward and aft. The transmitter sets both give data to the signal processor and the entire system is controlled with the same UYK-series computer, I know several tech reps who have worked on SPY since almost the beginning and none of them mentioned issues synchronizing the arrays. If you look at some of the old Strike Cruiser concepts the Arrays were laid out in different configurations however they always had 2 deckhouses with the arrays about 90 degrees from each other, but that was more for complete coverage than anything else.
The Burkes only have one transmitter set that is shared by all 4 arrays and the layout of the transmitter and the waveguides did have a large impact on the super structure design but it was more for cost savings. Wave guides are expensive to engineer and produce so keeping them as short as possible makes a lot of sense, that is also why every foreign Aegis ship has a similar superstructure setup as a Burke it just isn't worth redesigning the waveguides for a limited production run of ships.
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This might be a very long shot, but, what about a nuclear powered development of the Type 82 hull, although that would probably postphone start of actual construction to around 1964 at the earliest?
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I am probably cross-threading again, but another thing I have
got from reading this thread is that Seaslug does not seem to
have been as duff as the various published source tend to make
out.
I was told some years ago when I went on HMS Kent in 1974
as a schoolboy with the RAF CCF that the RN considered Seaslug
to be a much better missile than Tartar/Terrier. We had sailed
out of Portsmouth past a visiting Adams class destroyer when the
topic came up.
In which case a developed Seaslug for NIGS which could be
operated on new or converted ships based on the successful
County hull would have been reasonable.
The success of the Type 12 frigates and the development of
CF299 would have been always likely to urge RN along that
path. Type 82 was I suppose a sort of super Type 12.
UK 75
got from reading this thread is that Seaslug does not seem to
have been as duff as the various published source tend to make
out.
I was told some years ago when I went on HMS Kent in 1974
as a schoolboy with the RAF CCF that the RN considered Seaslug
to be a much better missile than Tartar/Terrier. We had sailed
out of Portsmouth past a visiting Adams class destroyer when the
topic came up.
In which case a developed Seaslug for NIGS which could be
operated on new or converted ships based on the successful
County hull would have been reasonable.
The success of the Type 12 frigates and the development of
CF299 would have been always likely to urge RN along that
path. Type 82 was I suppose a sort of super Type 12.
UK 75
What is not answered is, what is the setup on Long Beach, compared to either the Arleigh Burke or the Ticonderoga?
Does Long Beach have a single transmitter linked by waveguides to each array?
Because in essence I have a suspicion the Type 985 is going to look like that setup, and if we're talking a nuclear powered cruiser, my gut instinct is the superstructure might well seem familier to Long Beach.
That is of a large square block, housing the systems and decks of the AIO, with a array on each 'side' of said block, and the TIRs located outside of this. Possibly a surface search radar and some comms arials on the top...
Certainly the cost aspect of using a single transmitter and waveguides of equal length to each array is likely to be more attractive than the extra costs of two transmitters or more.
The alternative to this of course is to have the array rotate, but I have doubts the Type 985 was going to follow that route.
Does Long Beach have a single transmitter linked by waveguides to each array?
Because in essence I have a suspicion the Type 985 is going to look like that setup, and if we're talking a nuclear powered cruiser, my gut instinct is the superstructure might well seem familier to Long Beach.
That is of a large square block, housing the systems and decks of the AIO, with a array on each 'side' of said block, and the TIRs located outside of this. Possibly a surface search radar and some comms arials on the top...
Certainly the cost aspect of using a single transmitter and waveguides of equal length to each array is likely to be more attractive than the extra costs of two transmitters or more.
The alternative to this of course is to have the array rotate, but I have doubts the Type 985 was going to follow that route.
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Rotating arrays crossed my mind but the number of four I think is evidence of fixed arrays.
Still we don't know enough to estimate the size of those arrays even though they must have been similar to the US systems of Long Beach.
It's odd that both Type 82 and the NIGS ship share common origins, NIGS destroyer began as a Frigate based on the Type 12 hull and machinery plus larger County hulls while Type 82 grew from Leander (with a Leander powerplant) as the 'CF299 Frigate' 'New Frigate' and 'Post Leander Frigate' in November 1961. Both grew to destroyer/ cruiser size very quickly and both seem to duplicate design trends.
It seems odd that the work on the NIGS studies was not used for the SIGS frigate, they must have known that the NIGS ships were the optimum size for air-defence ships and yet they went back to sqaure one and came right back to a 7,000 ton destroyer.
Study 1D was 7,700tons 470x59ft; Scheme 14 (steam) was 7,386tons 535x60ft 29.5kts deep & dirty; Scheme 15 (CONAS) 7,950tons 550x60ft; Scheme 16 (nuclear) 8,500tons 560x60ft. Design 53 which became Type 82 went the full range of steam, gas turbine and COSAG machinery and all were 3,500-4,000 tons, the chosen 53A was steam powered and 4,100tons deep 400x45ft 28kts and cost twice as much as Leander. By 1963 it was 4,975tons and 430ft long and with heavier machinery for 30kts and now cost three-times more than a Leander, then beam went up to 50ft in late 1963. Then in 1964 a County Class type COSAG layout was put in to raise the speed to 30kts and beam went to 54 then 55ft and displacement climbed to 7,700tons. Length was 507ft.
So really it can be argued that SIGS saved nothing from the NIGS ships in terms of weight although of course it had Ikara and was more multi-purpose. Certainly the result was far from the required frigate design.
The 4.5in Mk8 wasn't chosen for Type 82 until 1964 so perhaps NIGS might have had a single 4.5in like those fitted to the Tribals or a twin Mk6.
As regards to Sea Slug, there's a nice picture of a near-miss of a Firefly drone in BSP:4! Also Friedman alludes to the fact that Sea Slug Mk2 may never have been certified for service owing to booster seperation problems causing missile break-up. The trials to solve the problem began in 1971 but failed to duplicate the problem and were stopped in 1972.
Still we don't know enough to estimate the size of those arrays even though they must have been similar to the US systems of Long Beach.
It's odd that both Type 82 and the NIGS ship share common origins, NIGS destroyer began as a Frigate based on the Type 12 hull and machinery plus larger County hulls while Type 82 grew from Leander (with a Leander powerplant) as the 'CF299 Frigate' 'New Frigate' and 'Post Leander Frigate' in November 1961. Both grew to destroyer/ cruiser size very quickly and both seem to duplicate design trends.
It seems odd that the work on the NIGS studies was not used for the SIGS frigate, they must have known that the NIGS ships were the optimum size for air-defence ships and yet they went back to sqaure one and came right back to a 7,000 ton destroyer.
Study 1D was 7,700tons 470x59ft; Scheme 14 (steam) was 7,386tons 535x60ft 29.5kts deep & dirty; Scheme 15 (CONAS) 7,950tons 550x60ft; Scheme 16 (nuclear) 8,500tons 560x60ft. Design 53 which became Type 82 went the full range of steam, gas turbine and COSAG machinery and all were 3,500-4,000 tons, the chosen 53A was steam powered and 4,100tons deep 400x45ft 28kts and cost twice as much as Leander. By 1963 it was 4,975tons and 430ft long and with heavier machinery for 30kts and now cost three-times more than a Leander, then beam went up to 50ft in late 1963. Then in 1964 a County Class type COSAG layout was put in to raise the speed to 30kts and beam went to 54 then 55ft and displacement climbed to 7,700tons. Length was 507ft.
So really it can be argued that SIGS saved nothing from the NIGS ships in terms of weight although of course it had Ikara and was more multi-purpose. Certainly the result was far from the required frigate design.
The 4.5in Mk8 wasn't chosen for Type 82 until 1964 so perhaps NIGS might have had a single 4.5in like those fitted to the Tribals or a twin Mk6.
As regards to Sea Slug, there's a nice picture of a near-miss of a Firefly drone in BSP:4! Also Friedman alludes to the fact that Sea Slug Mk2 may never have been certified for service owing to booster seperation problems causing missile break-up. The trials to solve the problem began in 1971 but failed to duplicate the problem and were stopped in 1972.
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zen said:
Long Beach's SCANFAR system (consisting of SPG-32 and SPG-33) was not very much related to AEGIS, except as an example of "what not to do" (the other example being Typhon/SPG-59). SCANFAR relied on many separate transmitter tubes rather than a central transmitter passing signals though a bank of phase shifters. The ship geometry was constrained, but not because of waveguide issues -- it was the sheer size of the billboard emitters that dictated the size of the installation. And that in turn was driven by the frequencies used and the desired range and resolution of the radar.
So we get a little closer if only in that we can ask more precise questions.
Is Type 985 following the same concept as SPG59?
Is it a set of multiple transmitters as with SPG59, SPG-32 and SPG-33 or a single one connected to each array by waveguides as per the later Aegis setup?
What band is it being designed to operate in?
What range? Because that may indicate along with band, the size of the array needed.
Presumably its aimed at a range of at least 180nm detection and 145nm target descrimination, the levels set by Type 984. Though a more 'target for requirements' like figure would be 200nm or 250nm for detection.
This sort of thing must be resolvable, in that there should be official documents related to Type 985 that reveal the direction they where taking.
If they are billboard emitters of the scale of the US efforts, this will be highly forceful in driving a large vessel to carry the hardware high enough to be useful and yet retain stability in rough weather. Even if the arrays are smaller they will still be heavy and drive up the size of the ship.
Equaly just what is the effect of the size of the electronics of the time, in terms of demanding not just power, but volume in the ship?
After all this is not like the SeaDart setup, its going to be bigger and heftier not just on the missile front, but in terms of the electronics it uses. If only because its handling four radar arrays, and four Type 87 Scorpion units as well as whatever is needed for the ADAWS, and the controllers of the missile loading machinary and launcher arms.
Speaking of launcher arms even though this is not Violent Friend its still larger than SeaDart, and going to require quite some machinary to swing around and point the damn thing in the right direction quickly.
It strikes me that 10,000tons seems a reasonable figure, especialy for a nuclear powered vessel of this sort.
Is Type 985 following the same concept as SPG59?
Is it a set of multiple transmitters as with SPG59, SPG-32 and SPG-33 or a single one connected to each array by waveguides as per the later Aegis setup?
What band is it being designed to operate in?
What range? Because that may indicate along with band, the size of the array needed.
Presumably its aimed at a range of at least 180nm detection and 145nm target descrimination, the levels set by Type 984. Though a more 'target for requirements' like figure would be 200nm or 250nm for detection.
This sort of thing must be resolvable, in that there should be official documents related to Type 985 that reveal the direction they where taking.
If they are billboard emitters of the scale of the US efforts, this will be highly forceful in driving a large vessel to carry the hardware high enough to be useful and yet retain stability in rough weather. Even if the arrays are smaller they will still be heavy and drive up the size of the ship.
Equaly just what is the effect of the size of the electronics of the time, in terms of demanding not just power, but volume in the ship?
After all this is not like the SeaDart setup, its going to be bigger and heftier not just on the missile front, but in terms of the electronics it uses. If only because its handling four radar arrays, and four Type 87 Scorpion units as well as whatever is needed for the ADAWS, and the controllers of the missile loading machinary and launcher arms.
Speaking of launcher arms even though this is not Violent Friend its still larger than SeaDart, and going to require quite some machinary to swing around and point the damn thing in the right direction quickly.
It strikes me that 10,000tons seems a reasonable figure, especialy for a nuclear powered vessel of this sort.
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uk 75 said:
It’s very much coincidence. The Belknap started as an austere destroyer and its armament fit grew as more capabilities were added. ASROC and ASW capability was a late addition via adding a third 20 missile carousel to the magazine. The Bristol weapons fit was conceived as such in order to be the CVA-01’s escort for AAW and ASW.
The Truxtun’s weapon fit is a product of its design and only bares a resemblance to the Belknap. The Truxtun as a nuclear powered "version" of the Belknap is one of the widest accepted frauds perpetuated on the naval history world. Truxtun was a repeat Bainbridge but with the addition of the big LF bow sonar. Which meant there wasn’t a weight margin for the forward missile launcher so a 127mm and an ASROC pepperbox were stuck there to fill the void.
As to having gun aft and missile launcher forward or vice versa (Belknap and Bristol) neither arrangement is superior overall. Having the missile launcher aft is a good way of clearing water spray away from the launcher in heavy seas. Though the Belknaps have a very big hull knuckle forward to achieve this. Having the gun aft is a superior arrangement for naval gunfire support when the ship only has one gun. As you can turn away from shore when reversing on the gunline while keeping up the firing. With a single gun forward you need to stop firing for the turn as the superstructure masks the gun or turn into the shore bringing the ship closer to coast defences and shallow water.
uk 75 said:
That’s only because Thatcher stopped development of the Sea Dart 2. If that had gone ahead the RN would have had a missile en par with the SM-2ER Block IV in the 1980s.
This is a great thread, lots of lateral thinking and well worth it for those of us reading.
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Yes I agree the NIGS ship would be much heavier than 7,700tons. Given Type 82's similar weight yet some 50ft shorter hull and more defined electornic fit and lighter radars it's obvious the NIGS ship with less well defined launchers, magazine sizes and radar weights would have climbed much higher. I was just curious as to why they repeated the same design process without using the NIGS ship as a basis for an ideal destroyer and saving weight using SIGS than trying to cram a qaurt into a pint glass again.
Another question is which came first, NIGS to complement the 985's range or 985 to match the NIGS performance. Were the two strongly linked or two seperate developments married together.
I wonder if Type 984 would have made an adeqaute stand-in system with further refinement. As it was it was superior to anything the USN had at that time. The work expended for the 3 sets actually sent to sea seems wasted, perhaps the Admiralty was worried about spending millions to equip only four-eight destroyers and a couple of carriers and finding out only a handful left the labs.
When was the Anglo-Dutch Type 988 begun? Is there any overlap between the 985 and 988 development?
Another question is which came first, NIGS to complement the 985's range or 985 to match the NIGS performance. Were the two strongly linked or two seperate developments married together.
I wonder if Type 984 would have made an adeqaute stand-in system with further refinement. As it was it was superior to anything the USN had at that time. The work expended for the 3 sets actually sent to sea seems wasted, perhaps the Admiralty was worried about spending millions to equip only four-eight destroyers and a couple of carriers and finding out only a handful left the labs.
When was the Anglo-Dutch Type 988 begun? Is there any overlap between the 985 and 988 development?
Several thoughts.
Type 985 is not trying to be jack of all trades as the SGP59 was, so their more free in terms of choice of band.
Type 984 is 1950's technology when the interceptor was to be a manned fighter, and even that fighter was only just emerging as one which would carry AAMs.
Certainly the Type 984 was being matched with the P.177 as effectively a combined interception system, since its DLI, and the aircraft is little more than manned missile. Possibly appropriate for replacing the aircraft with a SAM, if a suitable TIR is produced.
Thus presumably the consideration of Green Flax (Thunderbird II) for the Counties.
Now what where Types 986 and 987?
Type 985 is not trying to be jack of all trades as the SGP59 was, so their more free in terms of choice of band.
Type 984 is 1950's technology when the interceptor was to be a manned fighter, and even that fighter was only just emerging as one which would carry AAMs.
Certainly the Type 984 was being matched with the P.177 as effectively a combined interception system, since its DLI, and the aircraft is little more than manned missile. Possibly appropriate for replacing the aircraft with a SAM, if a suitable TIR is produced.
Thus presumably the consideration of Green Flax (Thunderbird II) for the Counties.
Now what where Types 986 and 987?
Type 986 is an updated 983 according to this:
http://middle-watch.com/post_war_radar_in_the_rn.htm
http://middle-watch.com/post_war_radar_in_the_rn.htm
You missinterpret me.
What I was saying the bear minimum would have to be equal to Type 984, not that its requirement was to only match that, its far more likely it was a long higher. Friedman talks of a 250nm range, in the context of defences for a surface fleet, though that is from the later debate about a guided missile fleet verses a carrier fleet. But perhaps its relevent in terms of the sort or performance 985 was required to meet.
Green flax was considered, but for several reasons the RN carried on with SeaSlug. One of them being they where a lot more certain SeaSlug would perform as advertised.
Considering NIGS is about interception of a mach 3 target at 70,000ft, it will need rather longer detection and descrimination ranges compared to the Type 984, which was felt adequet for a mach 1.3 target at 60,000ft. In essence it needs to see the incomming attacker at a longer range to give the AIO staff time to decide on whether to launch a missile or not. Since the incomming is a much faster beast.
Now the '55 study for DLI is focused on a mach 1.3 bomber between 50,000ft and 60,000ft.
And it pays to remember that NIGS being post '57 is certainly going to have to fullfill the mission the DLI role was formerly focused on. That will be in the minds of the Admiralty and they will have brought requirements and pressure to bear on the tenders to meet that need.
150nm is not far from the 145 descrimination range of Type 984, (that range is reniscent of Blue Envoy)can we assume that 170nm being the "at least" range of the Type 87 radar is likely the minimum descrimination range for Type 985, though its probably a lot higher?
That would make some sense, in that once you can desciminate the incomming, you can hand off targets to the Type 87 for tracking and then guidance of the missile.
What I was saying the bear minimum would have to be equal to Type 984, not that its requirement was to only match that, its far more likely it was a long higher. Friedman talks of a 250nm range, in the context of defences for a surface fleet, though that is from the later debate about a guided missile fleet verses a carrier fleet. But perhaps its relevent in terms of the sort or performance 985 was required to meet.
Green flax was considered, but for several reasons the RN carried on with SeaSlug. One of them being they where a lot more certain SeaSlug would perform as advertised.
Considering NIGS is about interception of a mach 3 target at 70,000ft, it will need rather longer detection and descrimination ranges compared to the Type 984, which was felt adequet for a mach 1.3 target at 60,000ft. In essence it needs to see the incomming attacker at a longer range to give the AIO staff time to decide on whether to launch a missile or not. Since the incomming is a much faster beast.
Now the '55 study for DLI is focused on a mach 1.3 bomber between 50,000ft and 60,000ft.
And it pays to remember that NIGS being post '57 is certainly going to have to fullfill the mission the DLI role was formerly focused on. That will be in the minds of the Admiralty and they will have brought requirements and pressure to bear on the tenders to meet that need.
150nm is not far from the 145 descrimination range of Type 984, (that range is reniscent of Blue Envoy)can we assume that 170nm being the "at least" range of the Type 87 radar is likely the minimum descrimination range for Type 985, though its probably a lot higher?
That would make some sense, in that once you can desciminate the incomming, you can hand off targets to the Type 87 for tracking and then guidance of the missile.
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The answer to my Type 988 question was staring me in the face!
It was begun in 1962 and endorsed by the Defence Research Policy Committee and a Letter of Understanding exchanged with the Dutch in May 1964. Inflation killed in as unit costs rose from £1.475 to £2.75 million inc spares. Development costs were split 50-50.
So we can infer work began directly from the cancellation of Type 985, perhaps as a low-grade 3-D radar suited to SIGS than NIGS, perhaps either from a realisation of technical problems or costs of the 985. Whether independent work began before the Dutch joined in 64 is open to question.
Was Type 985 do-able with 1960s technology given the range and discrimination required?
The Type 87 Scorpion would have been a navalised example I take it since the RN used no other land-based guidance radars (this also assumes the makers of the NIGS gudiance radar are the same as Type 87's makers). It makes sense for the two to be very similar but perhaps not identical. I guess radiation hazards played a part too given the insistence of enclosed guns with the Tartar system on the 1959 frigate designs.
It was begun in 1962 and endorsed by the Defence Research Policy Committee and a Letter of Understanding exchanged with the Dutch in May 1964. Inflation killed in as unit costs rose from £1.475 to £2.75 million inc spares. Development costs were split 50-50.
So we can infer work began directly from the cancellation of Type 985, perhaps as a low-grade 3-D radar suited to SIGS than NIGS, perhaps either from a realisation of technical problems or costs of the 985. Whether independent work began before the Dutch joined in 64 is open to question.
Was Type 985 do-able with 1960s technology given the range and discrimination required?
The Type 87 Scorpion would have been a navalised example I take it since the RN used no other land-based guidance radars (this also assumes the makers of the NIGS gudiance radar are the same as Type 87's makers). It makes sense for the two to be very similar but perhaps not identical. I guess radiation hazards played a part too given the insistence of enclosed guns with the Tartar system on the 1959 frigate designs.
The yanks managed something that worked, albeit, they ended up dropping it later for what was systems of greater reliability. Not such a problem when you have Hawkeye, and TFX or later VFX comming down the line with their weapons system.
What does the shift from 985 to 988 and NIGS to SIGS do to the whole planning of the fleet?
Does this also reflect the ministerial decision to get the largest CV possible, which happens I seem to reccal around 1962, when the minister questions why they've put forward a 50,000ton design when larger could be accomodated. Then they open up more drydock options to remove restrictions on size, its only the Treasurey that dictates its displacement. Crucialy equating displacement with cost.....
Does NIGS die for more than cost reasons? Could it be that AEW and a "Class II fighter" where expected to match it for dealing with attacks? While being more flexible.
.
By '64 the Russians display some serious anti-ship missiles that render the likes of the SeaVixen and Seaslug of doubtful utility in defence. Did they have earlier warning of that, did SIS get wind of the Russian weapons and they realised the consequences for defence?
On the other hand FAA tactics with the Buccaneer did expose issues with how well defended the fleet would be against such concerted and organised attack by low level strike aircraft (as in not very well defended at all). But some admirals where adamant that the Russians would never use such methods.
How does this relate to the timelines for Argus AEW, and the Aspinal CW radar with a new AAM for OR.346?
Or indeed the revised AW406 requirement. That seems to have a set of requirements about low level interception, not just medium and high altitudes.
SIGS is lighter than SeaSlug and its associated systems, though thats as much a move from valves to transistors as anything. But along with 988 its certainly more achievable for a ship under 10,000tons.
NIGS with Type 985 looks like it will have to be nuclear powered, even though the Type 985 is'nt having to do as much as the SPG-59, we know the SPG-32 was large and power hungry.
Reliability will be an issue, as will the weight of the system.
Assuming its S-band (modern E/F band) is plausable, since the UK has lots of experience with this type and has produced powerful transmitters of this type.
Although the Type 985 is concurrent with the SPG-59 its clearly aimed at the surveillance role, handing tracking and guidance to seperate radars simplifies the issues and makes sense if the system was concieved as a Type 984 successor.
So had it gone ahead its possibly more workable than the US Typhon system.
Reliability will be an issue, as will the weight of the system.
Assuming its S-band (modern E/F band) is plausable, since the UK has lots of experience with this type and has produced powerful transmitters of this type.
Although the Type 985 is concurrent with the SPG-59 its clearly aimed at the surveillance role, handing tracking and guidance to seperate radars simplifies the issues and makes sense if the system was concieved as a Type 984 successor.
So had it gone ahead its possibly more workable than the US Typhon system.
Errr I'm lost here, you see I agree with that so what are you on about?
Agreed?
Plausable if we're in a world where the funding is made available.
So thats the last text I can quote, so I'm typeing blind now.
Yes seems a short answer, so lets refine that.
But as far as I can see, we'd have NIGS in the CVs and a limited number of attendant....well cruisers is the best word for them.
the power requirements for NIGS is likely to drive these as CGN and CVN. Which is certainly something in vogue back then. and favoured for the CVA-01 at the start of the process. Ruled out of course, likely for cost reasons.
But there will be a need to bulk out the numbers in the fleet, as even in a world where we can afford such things, we will afford only limited numbers, its clear even the USN could'nt afford an all nuclear fleet.
Pondering this some more, its possible the carriers might only get SIGS, to free up space, leaving NIGS on attendant AAW ships only.
Do we see then by the mid-to-late 1960's a plan for three layers of SAMs?
Do I have to say the next? ASSUMING NIGS CARRIES ON.
NIGS = area defence out to 150nm
SIGS = local defence out to 25nm?
PX.430 = point defence out to 5nm
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I've been doing some further digging around Type 988 in the hope of uncovering more on Type 985.
It seems the Dutch began work on the Type 988 in 1960 as a 3-D radar with a mix of electronic and mechanical scan and designed specifically for use on destroyers. At least one author, Richard Harding, believes this is why the RN abandoned Type 985 in favour of buying into the Dutch programme on a 50/50 basis.
Type 988 offered a lighter and cheaper alternative to 985 and without all the demands on weight, internal space and power (eg nuclear reactors etc).
However, given that co-operation wasn't endorsed by the Defence Research Policy Committee until 1962 and that the Letter of Understanding exchanged with the Dutch until May 1964 that gives 3 years of inaction unless Type 985 lived on until 1962, or one year past 1961 when NIGS died.
Stranger still is that, according to Harding, Sea Dart (SIGS) didn't really require a 3-D radar at all and that is why it was removed from Type 82 and the British left the programme, as much as it was about the increase in costs. That implies either the Admiralty followed Type 988 as a means to allow NIGS to go ahead or as a means for a very top-end SIGS better than was really needed (but presumably essential to CVA-01 to vector her Phantoms?).
Also been looking at NIGS.
It seems that the WA.726 joint Army/Navy requirement for a long-range SAM awarded to Armstrong Whitworth/ Gloster might have been the intial basis for NIGS. I know nothing further about WA.726.
The Bristol RP.25 illustrated in BSP:4, with the huge BS.1001 13in ramjet and Gothic delta wings was a NIGS submission. It was 13.1ft long, span 5ft and had a range of 50 miles. Somewhat lower than the NIGS ideal.
Bristol also tendered Naval Bloodhound which had a new airframe and Bloodhound II electronics in "opposition" to NIGS.
It seems the Dutch began work on the Type 988 in 1960 as a 3-D radar with a mix of electronic and mechanical scan and designed specifically for use on destroyers. At least one author, Richard Harding, believes this is why the RN abandoned Type 985 in favour of buying into the Dutch programme on a 50/50 basis.
Type 988 offered a lighter and cheaper alternative to 985 and without all the demands on weight, internal space and power (eg nuclear reactors etc).
However, given that co-operation wasn't endorsed by the Defence Research Policy Committee until 1962 and that the Letter of Understanding exchanged with the Dutch until May 1964 that gives 3 years of inaction unless Type 985 lived on until 1962, or one year past 1961 when NIGS died.
Stranger still is that, according to Harding, Sea Dart (SIGS) didn't really require a 3-D radar at all and that is why it was removed from Type 82 and the British left the programme, as much as it was about the increase in costs. That implies either the Admiralty followed Type 988 as a means to allow NIGS to go ahead or as a means for a very top-end SIGS better than was really needed (but presumably essential to CVA-01 to vector her Phantoms?).
Also been looking at NIGS.
It seems that the WA.726 joint Army/Navy requirement for a long-range SAM awarded to Armstrong Whitworth/ Gloster might have been the intial basis for NIGS. I know nothing further about WA.726.
The Bristol RP.25 illustrated in BSP:4, with the huge BS.1001 13in ramjet and Gothic delta wings was a NIGS submission. It was 13.1ft long, span 5ft and had a range of 50 miles. Somewhat lower than the NIGS ideal.
Bristol also tendered Naval Bloodhound which had a new airframe and Bloodhound II electronics in "opposition" to NIGS.
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I don't know what was going on 1961-64 but it seems likely the Admiralty made that jump pretty quickly after NIGS died. Either from lack of need or lack of success.
Further digging hasn't uncovered mich more only that ASRE began work on Type 985 in 1957. That is four years development time and fits in neatly with the Blue Envoy for naval use being superseded by NIGS.
Type 985 was designed to work with Action Data Automation (ADA) which it seems was ready in time for Type 984 and so used with that system.
As for the missle if Armstrong Whitworth (Group 502) was the favoured bidder for the WA.726 joint Army/Navy long-range SAM and NIGS I think its a fair bet they are related and not just perhaps warmed-over Sea Slugs. Certainly the Army/ RAF didn't like liquid fuels like the Navy a common missile seems possible. The only problem is I don't see where WA.726 fits into Stages 1-3 (or the vulgar fractions). Perhaps as a Thunderbird successor? Certainly whatever Armstrong Whitworth proposed fired the imagination of the Navy.
Further digging hasn't uncovered mich more only that ASRE began work on Type 985 in 1957. That is four years development time and fits in neatly with the Blue Envoy for naval use being superseded by NIGS.
Type 985 was designed to work with Action Data Automation (ADA) which it seems was ready in time for Type 984 and so used with that system.
As for the missle if Armstrong Whitworth (Group 502) was the favoured bidder for the WA.726 joint Army/Navy long-range SAM and NIGS I think its a fair bet they are related and not just perhaps warmed-over Sea Slugs. Certainly the Army/ RAF didn't like liquid fuels like the Navy a common missile seems possible. The only problem is I don't see where WA.726 fits into Stages 1-3 (or the vulgar fractions). Perhaps as a Thunderbird successor? Certainly whatever Armstrong Whitworth proposed fired the imagination of the Navy.
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ADA is used only with Type 984 in Eagles reconstruction, both Victorious and Hermes shipped CDS instead the use of ADA with the Type 984 probably has more to do with radar being the only system available. Certainly the development of ADA seems to have been reasonably successful though.
The brutal reality is that the Staged Air Defence plan was to all intents and purposes killed with the 1957 defence review, not only is Blue Envoy canned but so is a lot of the supporting radar and C4I infrastructure. There are however significant studies into ABM systems including some very powerful land based radars that are finally shut down by involvement in BMEWS.
As for the 1961-4 period, I posted this in the previous NIGS/Typhon thread that is very intersting, I have highlighted the pertinent points.
I found the following in the flight global archive (from a 1962 edition): http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1962/1962%20-%202057.html?search=sea%20bloodhound
The Ministry of Defence recently stated that "'further work" is
to be carried out on Bloodhound 2; "this will facilitate the eventual
development of a third-generation large surface-to-air guided
weapon which might be required by all three Services." This sug-
gests that the Bloodhound family, which has already achieved
great success both in RAF service and in export to Sweden, Swit-
zerland and Australia, may fairly be regarded as the most important
in the entire field of British defensive weapons. At the same time,
it is certainly premature to suggest that the "large" weapon en-
visaged will replace Seaslug and Thunderbird. in the Royal Navy and Army respectively.
The brutal reality is that the Staged Air Defence plan was to all intents and purposes killed with the 1957 defence review, not only is Blue Envoy canned but so is a lot of the supporting radar and C4I infrastructure. There are however significant studies into ABM systems including some very powerful land based radars that are finally shut down by involvement in BMEWS.
As for the 1961-4 period, I posted this in the previous NIGS/Typhon thread that is very intersting, I have highlighted the pertinent points.
I found the following in the flight global archive (from a 1962 edition): http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1962/1962%20-%202057.html?search=sea%20bloodhound
The Ministry of Defence recently stated that "'further work" is
to be carried out on Bloodhound 2; "this will facilitate the eventual
development of a third-generation large surface-to-air guided
weapon which might be required by all three Services." This sug-
gests that the Bloodhound family, which has already achieved
great success both in RAF service and in export to Sweden, Swit-
zerland and Australia, may fairly be regarded as the most important
in the entire field of British defensive weapons. At the same time,
it is certainly premature to suggest that the "large" weapon en-
visaged will replace Seaslug and Thunderbird. in the Royal Navy and Army respectively.
Hmmm....missing something there.
CDS used digital plot transmission (DPT) to convert an analogue picture to digital and send it via datalink (HF band) for sharing between vessels in the fleet equipped with CDS.
This is superseeded by ADA and Link 11, which is fully digital.
Fascenating piece sealordlawrence and very curious.
Is he talking about Bloodhound as the 'large' weapon, or something else there?
A successor to Bloodhound perhaps, or a development of it instead?
CDS used digital plot transmission (DPT) to convert an analogue picture to digital and send it via datalink (HF band) for sharing between vessels in the fleet equipped with CDS.
This is superseeded by ADA and Link 11, which is fully digital.
Fascenating piece sealordlawrence and very curious.
Is he talking about Bloodhound as the 'large' weapon, or something else there?
A successor to Bloodhound perhaps, or a development of it instead?
sealordlawrence,
I was not suggesting you did'nt know that, merely point it out for all to see.
As to that curious matter. The following is musing outloud, not aimed at anyone.
What was the diameter of the BS.1004 ramjet?
Is this an UK equivilent to Typhon? SeaDarts bigger brother perhaps?
RP.25 we all know as a NIGS proposal by Bristol, RP 20 was a combination engine for the ER.181, so what is RP.21?
Is this their Bloodhound derivative?
BS.1003 is the ramjet in SeaDart, but does this bear any relation to a BS.1004 ramjet?
I was not suggesting you did'nt know that, merely point it out for all to see.
As to that curious matter. The following is musing outloud, not aimed at anyone.
What was the diameter of the BS.1004 ramjet?
Is this an UK equivilent to Typhon? SeaDarts bigger brother perhaps?
RP.25 we all know as a NIGS proposal by Bristol, RP 20 was a combination engine for the ER.181, so what is RP.21?
Is this their Bloodhound derivative?
BS.1003 is the ramjet in SeaDart, but does this bear any relation to a BS.1004 ramjet?
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The Bristol Siddeley BS.1004 was a Mach 2.3 ramjet intended for the X-12 standoff missile. It had a diameter of 20” (50.2cm). While it could be fitted to a SAM it would have a lower speed than the Sea Dart’s Mach 3.5 Odin (BS.1003) and more drag
http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/ramjets.htm
The Sea Dart 2 reduced the size of internal missile avionics to allow for more fuel to be carried (being a kerosene burner this was very easy to do) and with the improved booster had much longer range than Sea Dart (still classified).
http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/ramjets.htm
The Sea Dart 2 reduced the size of internal missile avionics to allow for more fuel to be carried (being a kerosene burner this was very easy to do) and with the improved booster had much longer range than Sea Dart (still classified).
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Abraham,
I dont have it to hand but BSP.4 does have a brief piece on this although there are some inconsistencies.
More significantly Sea Dart 2 would have added a second fire channel to each director and a form of TCV to the booster.
I dont have it to hand but BSP.4 does have a brief piece on this although there are some inconsistencies.
More significantly Sea Dart 2 would have added a second fire channel to each director and a form of TCV to the booster.
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sealordlawrence said:
Same...
sealordlawrence said:
I'm pretty sure Sea Dart 2 was ICWI - interrupted continuous wave illumination - so like SM-2 it only needed target illumination in the terminal phase. Which means the number of interceptions is effectively limited by the tracking capacity of the combat system or the slaving speed of the director if they are coming from multiple bearings.
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I am not prepared to say for certain but I understood that ICWI was used on one of the latest upgrades whilst a second channel of fire would actually have been introduced for Sea Dart Mk2.
Hang on, in BSP4, it states X12 had a BRJ.824 of 18 inches diameter.
So who's right there or is that just different designations of the same ramjet?
Just speculating here, but RP.25 used a BS.1001 ramjet and its definately larger than SeaDart in size and diameter.
Hang on! Reading the revelent parts of BSP. This may all be down to printing errors?
Since in Chapter 13 we're told.
BS.1001 is a 13 inch diameter for the Bloodhound NIGS
Then we see BS.1002 is a integrated unit.
BS.1003 is for SIGS in RP.25
Then BS.1004 is 20inches and used on RP.21
BS.1005 a 21.5inch for X.12.
However in Chapter 8
X.12 uses a BRJ.842 of 18 inches.
And that BS.1003 is used in CF.299 SeaDart, which has a diameter of 16.5 inches.
So what might account for this could be just that the technology represented in BS.1003 is used or scaled to CF.299?
Euqaly it would not be clear then what diameter RP.21's engine(s) actualy would have.
So who's right there or is that just different designations of the same ramjet?
Just speculating here, but RP.25 used a BS.1001 ramjet and its definately larger than SeaDart in size and diameter.
Hang on! Reading the revelent parts of BSP. This may all be down to printing errors?
Since in Chapter 13 we're told.
BS.1001 is a 13 inch diameter for the Bloodhound NIGS
Then we see BS.1002 is a integrated unit.
BS.1003 is for SIGS in RP.25
Then BS.1004 is 20inches and used on RP.21
BS.1005 a 21.5inch for X.12.
However in Chapter 8
X.12 uses a BRJ.842 of 18 inches.
And that BS.1003 is used in CF.299 SeaDart, which has a diameter of 16.5 inches.
So what might account for this could be just that the technology represented in BS.1003 is used or scaled to CF.299?
Euqaly it would not be clear then what diameter RP.21's engine(s) actualy would have.
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The Skomer site is explicit in stating that RP.21 would have had the BS.1004 and it would have been a Mach 4 missile.
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