Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

I expect that the US will decide to loan the RAN a Virginia class boat or two to cover the gap at the end of the Collins class.

The RN gave the Australians and Canadians Oberon class back in the 60s when it was bigger and introducing nuclear submarines.

The Dreadnought SSBN will soon be preoccupying VSEL Barrow or whatever its called this week. So if the RN wants or needs more Astutes building them in Australia might be a solution.
 
I was in two minds whether to post this article as it may upset some, but I decided that in the spirit of open debate, all opinions should be listened to. Fair warning to GTX, it does refer to points of view previously expressed by Australian Sen. Rex Patrick.

 
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I was in two minds whether to post this article as it may upset some, but I decided that in the spirit of open debate, all opinions should be listened to. Fair warning to GTX, it does refer to points of view previously expressed by Australian Sen. Rex Patrick.

I think Chinas reaction and the effort it is putting into shoring up support to place international pressure on Australian UK and US to stop the acquisition is the most revealing answer.

Rule of thumb, if narcissistic bully objects to something that will only affect them if they attempt to harm you, its a sign that you probably should continue.

Having read the whole story its obvious the writer is a novice in submarine matters and has simply cherry picked information that suits their chosen narrative.
 
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I think Chinas reaction and the effort it is putting into shoring up support to place international pressure on Australian UK and US to stop the acquisition is the most revealing answer.

Rule of thumb, if narcissistic bully objects to something that will only affect them if they attempt to harm you, its a sign that you probably should continue.
Yes and no, the US and Australia's stated goal of 'containing China' both militarily and economically (one assumes), sort of blows this argument up as the stated goal is already to harm China's interests. Australia isn't currently under threat, China is.

Having read the whole story its obvious the writer is a novice in submarine matters and has simply cherry picked information that suits their chosen narrative.

I largely agree but think the author does raise some good points:
1) that the Japanese and Koreans already operate large numbers of sophisticated conventionally powered subs that will be better suited to operating in the South China Sea in concert with US submarines basing out of Hawaii.
2) that new battery technologies will significantly change the calculus around nuclear vs conventionally powered submarines, or at least make the difference in capability less stark and therefore the enormous cost, risk and delay involved with achieving nuclear less worthwhile. Indeed, if Australia were to adapt the battery technology being deployed on the new Japanese Taigei class in the Collins LOTE, the need for nuclear may be much less clear.

After watching the video linked to by Pioneer earlier, I think I have to agree with Hugh White and suggest that the Australian govt will wake up to itself in a year or two and realize that, at $171B for 8 submarines, or an eye watering $21B a piece, it simply isn't worth it and that a larger fleet of much cheaper -off the shelf- conventionally powered subs leveraging the newer battery technology would serve Australia's interests much better.
 
The RN gave the Australians and Canadians Oberon class back in the 60s when it was bigger and introducing nuclear submarines.
The UK (the RN was not involved) SOLD (they did not give) Oberon-class subs to Australia & Canada (and Brazil, and Chile) - ALL were new-built to orders from those nations (the Canadian subs were incomplete examples finished just for Canada).

The RAN's first 4 (ordered 1963) were at the end of the RN's production run, the RAN was supposed to get 4 more, but only 2 were ordered in 1971 - #s 7 & 8 were dropped to free up funds to purchase A-4G Skyhawks and S-2G Trackers for HMAS Melbourne.
 
Errr China is a nice law abiding democracy?
Does anyone think China has Australia's interests at heart?

How far away from China is Japan and Korea compared to Australia?

And exactly how can a AIP and battery powered submarine match an SSN in performance?

What's with the pro-China claptrap?
 
And exactly how can a AIP and battery powered submarine match an SSN in performance?

But there's more to the question than just performance, there's the phenomenal cost, the risk and most importantly the delay before Australia gets any hypothetical SSNs that has to be considered. As we've discussed before, the whole issue with China is probably going to be settled one way or the other way before Australia gets SSNs in the 2040s.

And in half that time frame, newer battery technologies will make such substantial changes to the capabilities of conventionally powered subs that will likely make their performance even more competitive than they are now at a fraction of the price.
 
But there's more to the question than just performance, there's the phenomenal cost, the risk and most importantly the delay before Australia gets any hypothetical SSNs that has to be considered. A
Risk? Risk in nuclear power is subject to the most stringent management possible.
And Australia will be taking very little of it.

Cost in Defence is ultimately the choice to survive or ......

Hypothetical is a bit hyperbolic. The key question is how much for what timescale.

As we've discussed before, the whole issue with China is probably going to be settled one way or the other way before Australia gets SSNs in the 2040s.
Nothing is guaranteed and China's collapse is itself a major threat to everyone.

And in half that time frame, newer battery technologies will make such substantial changes to the capabilities of conventionally powered subs that will likely make their performance even more competitive than they are now at a fraction of the price.
You think a battery that lasts 20 years on one charge is not fantasy?
 
Their population has peaked in 2019 at 1.4 billion and something. It has started aeging at the speed of light, with the according challenges every country face. But a barbaric, brutal regime like the present chinese one will be "no country for old (chinese) men" - not the kind of taking care of old people decently if they are seen as a burden to precious economic growth.
Bottom line: China is bound for a demographic disaster of epic size.
- "French heat vave of 2003 at the scale of 1.4 billion people"
- "south korea or japan no baby policy because life's too expensive - at the scale of 1.4 billion people".
- "building enough retirement homes for some hundred million aged people, and treat them decently enough"
- "some dozen million of elderly people with Alzheimer or dementia".
A democracy like France is already not capable to treat its elderly people correctly, private or public retirement homes altogether. And we "only"have a million old people and counting, to take care of.
Yeah. I'm 40, and the last place on Earth where I would spent the second half of my life would be a social credit shithole like China, with zero respect for human life.

back to submarines...
 
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No they got population wrong by 100 million and it looks like they peaked 2003-6. The decline has been gathering pace since then, but now it's really hitting hard.

Doesn't mean this is safe.
 
I was in two minds whether to post this article as it may upset some, but I decided that in the spirit of open debate, all opinions should be listened to. Fair warning to GTX, it does refer to points of view previously expressed by Australian Sen. Rex Patrick.

Well let's take a look.

In 1992, an Australian Oberon-class submarine entered the crowded waters of Shanghai’s port and became entangled in fishing nets. It had to surface for crew members to cut it free with axes. Chinese Navy sailors witnessed this, but nevertheless the submarine escaped. Had it not, the crew would’ve been imprisoned and Australia widely condemned and potentially convicted for an outrageous breach of international law.
This is an unsourced account of an operation the RAN hasn't declassified so it's hard to judge, but the idea that PLAN got eyes on an Oberon on the surface in close proximity to Shangahi and just kept that to themselves is a bit suspect. Other versions I've seen of this incident say the boat never surfaced and are less incendiary in general about it. Also "outrageous breach of international law" doesn't exactly set a great tone for what's to come.

Almost a decade earlier, the Australian Navy had seriously considered scrapping submarines, according to former senior Australian Defence official Mike Gilligan. A study in 1985 had concluded they offered “little marginal benefit to Australia’s defences yet inflict a large marginal cost”. The cost could’ve been much higher given the tremendous risks the government allowed the navy to take, snooping in Chinese and Russian waters on behalf of the Americans, who wouldn’t put their nuclear submarines in danger.
Yes, the US is well known for not putting their boats in danger. Those cables totes tapped themselves, comrades. Hard to believe that America was such a terrible ally as to ask a close ally to assist them with a mission said ally had the skills and capability to perform.

Also, Dr Gilligan (why was his honorific omitted?) has been insisting since AUKUS was announced that the whole arrangement is a set up for the United States to "provoke" the innocent PRC into an attack on Taiwan and then respond by nuking mainland China. Seems like something this article might mention in passing when discussing AUKUS.

In Washington last month, Defence Minister Richard Marles said Australia, the United States and Britain were moving from “interoperability to interchangeability in defence hardware”. This would effectively mean Australia could not buy high-quality defence equipment from other countries if there was a higher-cost American or British version available.
Ah, this old saw. Notice how there's no definitions here, so "high-quality defence equipment" and "higher-cost American or British version" can mean whatever he wants them to mean. It's also utterly dismissive of the extent to which the US, British, and Australian defense industries are connected/intertwined, I would be fascinated about how he describes Wedgetail.

It’s obvious the real policy is to subsidise the US Navy’s submarine budget. Some will be located in Australia, with Australian flags and personnel, but they’re essentially US boats operated in the US’s great power interests. We’re paying for them to set up part of their current and future fleet in Australia.”
I know there's a school of thought that the US has no allies, only vassals and I don't really want to do 1000 words on that. The "subsidize" line is a bit silly, though.

Australia has a short and patchy record on submarine purchases. The government acquired many major weapons during World War II. None were submarines. That capability had to wait until the first of a total of six Oberon-class submarines was commissioned in 1967 from a Scottish shipyard. They operated satisfactorily but weren’t considered the nation’s most important military assets.
"The United States has a short and patchy record on Aircraft Carrier purchases. The government acquired many major weapons during the Great War. None were Aircraft Carriers. That capability had to wait until the Langley and shortly thereafter Lexington class conversions of the early 20s. They operated satisfactorily but weren't considered the nation's most important military assets." - This guy in 1936

After Kim Beazley became Defence minister in the Hawke government, he gambled on the value of submarines by ordering six large, battery-powered versions to be built in Adelaide. No other country has bought this type. The first was commissioned in 1966 and the last in 2003. Called the Collins class, it was based on a good Swedish design. But Beazley greatly increased its size and complexity, partly by adding American equipment that proved completely useless.
Skipping over the typo (who needs an Editor anyway?), love the implication that some random useless "American" crap was just slapped into them for no reason. Good Stuff.

Maintenance problems drove annual sustainment costs to $670 million. Often only two or three were available at a time, although availability later improved. And none attended the 2010 Rim of the Pacific event – known as Rimpac, the world’s largest international maritime warfare exercise, held biennially near Hawaii.
They missed a RIMPAC? Damn ye! Let Neptune strike ye dead, Beazley! HAAARK!

Former prime minister Scott Morrison and his successor, Anthony Albanese, have taken a much bigger gamble than Beazley did, with their commitment to buy at least eight nuclear attack submarines – almost certainly the American Virginia class. One of the US’s most highly regarded defence analysts, Winslow Wheeler,
HA
recently pointed out the Virginia-class subs have been available only 15 times in 33 years for their six-monthly deployments. This suggests fewer than two of Australia’s eight nuclear submarines would be operationally available, on average, each year.
Winslow's citing an article he didn't write about a speech he didn't attend, and as his style it lacks detail. Before they deploy and especially after yard time US Subs train, shockingly enough, and conduct sea trials to ensure they're in condition to deploy. Would love to hear how often he thinks other navies' SSNs pull 6-month deployments.

Former submariner, naval consultant and South Australian senator Rex Patrick says, “Australia could buy 20 high-quality, off-the-shelf, modern submarines for $30 billion.”
You could just about buy 20 type 212 CD from TKMS for $30 billion AUD, if you buy them off the German production line, don't spec anything different, and leave out a lot of lifecycle costs which Australia prefers to price into its contracts. Delivery would start in the late 30s.
Patrick also makes the point that nuclear submarines are often “defeated” in exercises by ultra-quiet conventional submarines.
This has no detail at all so I'm just amused by the use of "Often."
Major new developments are making conventional submarines even more formidable than the nuclear versions. More powerful sensors mean submarines can be detected by the noise they make and by their passage through the Earth’s magnetic field. In addition, nuclear submarines can be detected by the wake they leave at high speeds, as well as the hot water they release from cooling their nuclear reactors, operating loud steam engines and other equipment. In future, submarines may also be detected by blue-green lasers that make the ocean more transparent.
Who knew sonar and MAD didn't exist until just now. Who knew a 2,000t SSK can carry the same sonar and thus detect as well as an 8000t SSN. Who knew non-nuclear subs leave no wake and are invisible to lasers nobody's invented yet. Who knew William Wallace can destroy the Anglish with lightning from his eyes and fireballs from his arse.

Most conventionally powered submarines – except Australia’s – use what is called air independent propulsion (AIP), which allows them to remain silent for four to six weeks before snorkelling. That often entails using a hydrogen fuel cell to propel the submarine, but it takes up significant space on the vessel.

In a major change, Japan’s new Taigei-class submarines don’t need AIP because they’re equipped with particularly efficient lithium-nickel-cobalt-aluminium oxide batteries, rather than the lead-acid batteries that the Australian Navy prefers, due in part to the risks of lithium-ion batteries catching fire. Other navies are increasingly confident the new types of battery will prove safe. Hans Ohff, a submarine specialist and visiting fellow at Adelaide University, told The Saturday Paper, “Generally speaking, lithium-ion batteries have a 1.5-times range advantage over lead-acid at lower speeds and an incredible four-times range advantage at high speeds.”
Yes, when you frame the discussion only in terms meant to make SSK/Ps look good, the discussion looks good for SSK/Ps. But how about this: whether battery or fuel cell powered, the economical submerge cruising speed of such boats generously sits in the 8-9 knot range. So just getting from Perth to a patrol area north of Australia will take a couple weeks, as will the return. And any running done at high speed underwater during the deployment will take a big chunk out of that submerged endurance. So, if the intention is to patrol anywhere beyond Australia's Contiguous zone, transit distances and times seem like something an honest discussion about the merits of SSK/Ps should include.

Since the Collins class is due to start retiring in 2026, a replacement is urgently required to help fill the gap until the first nuclear submarine might arrive, near 2045, and the last in 2065. Senator Patrick says the time it takes to do this can be reduced by choosing one of the three available “off-the-shelf” submarines: Japan’s Taigei, which has passed numerous tests demonstrating the safety of its new batteries; Singapore’s Type 218SG, made by Germany’s thyssenkrupp Marine Systems; and the Spanish S-81. The latter two still use conventional lead-acid batteries, but Ohff says a French and German joint venture is under way to develop their own lithium-ion batteries.

These options have advantages and drawbacks. The new Taigei class – of which Japan is acquiring 22 – requires a costly crew of 70 per vessel. The Type 218SG’s German manufacturer is the biggest submarine exporter in the world, with an enviable reputation for low maintenance costs across its range. Extensive automation means it needs only 28 crew members, and the vessel has a longer range than the Taigei’s 12,500 kilometres. Spain’s S-81 has a crew of 32 but a less experienced manufacturer.
Taigei uses a licensed variant of a US combat system, I thought those were bad? S-80 (not 81) had to be saved by Electric Boat but we won't hold that against them, extended build time we might. 218SG is an interesting choice to cite from TKMS' catalog, given it's lineage from 216, and isn't in service yet....but it should be a quality little boat. However if the requirement is for a stopgap between Collins and an AUKUS SSN, going with a boat that isn't able to use existing RAN weapons seems unlikely.

Going to stop here as the last few paragraphs are a mishmash, though I will note I'm amused he features a paragraph from Dr Gilligan which states that all submarines are a waste when aircraft can defend Australia's home waters, but ends the article saying:
The only urgency for Australia is to forget about nuclear submarines and get some conventionally powered submarines to enhance deterrence.
So, even the author doesn't put much stock in the words he's put in his article. I'm not angry about reading it, but whomever paid for it probably should be.
 
I think Chinas reaction and the effort it is putting into shoring up support to place international pressure on Australian UK and US to stop the acquisition is the most revealing answer.

Rule of thumb, if narcissistic bully objects to something that will only affect them if they attempt to harm you, its a sign that you probably should continue.
Yes and no, the US and Australia's stated goal of 'containing China' both militarily and economically (one assumes), sort of blows this argument up as the stated goal is already to harm China's interests. Australia isn't currently under threat, China is.

Having read the whole story its obvious the writer is a novice in submarine matters and has simply cherry picked information that suits their chosen narrative.

I largely agree but think the author does raise some good points:
1) that the Japanese and Koreans already operate large numbers of sophisticated conventionally powered subs that will be better suited to operating in the South China Sea in concert with US submarines basing out of Hawaii.
2) that new battery technologies will significantly change the calculus around nuclear vs conventionally powered submarines, or at least make the difference in capability less stark and therefore the enormous cost, risk and delay involved with achieving nuclear less worthwhile. Indeed, if Australia were to adapt the battery technology being deployed on the new Japanese Taigei class in the Collins LOTE, the need for nuclear may be much less clear.

After watching the video linked to by Pioneer earlier, I think I have to agree with Hugh White and suggest that the Australian govt will wake up to itself in a year or two and realize that, at $171B for 8 submarines, or an eye watering $21B a piece, it simply isn't worth it and that a larger fleet of much cheaper -off the shelf- conventionally powered subs leveraging the newer battery technology would serve Australia's interests much better.
Look at a map, Australia is much further from China than Japan or Korea, also further from the US. Australia has very long, easily interdicted trade routes and will never be able to compete with China on numbers. Conventional subs just don't cut it unless you can deploy dozens, not a dozen. SSN's on the other hand mean if China sails a CBG into the South Pacific to secure "their interests" then they need to think twice.

Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

China is actively expanding it's territory (as is Russia) they don't want to live peacefully with others, they want primacy and that primacy means submission for every nation unlucky enough to be in their sphere of influence.

Interesting that you mention Japan and South Korea, because while Japan has been building advanced subs for years Korea has been doing it for less time than Australia. In fact the Collins was more advanced and capable than Japans best when they were commissioned, even now after more than two decades of service, some other nations subs are now only just getting up to the Collins level of capability. The problem is Australia stopped building subs, then stopped working on future designs due to politicians deciding to offshore, then not, back and forth, until the capability was hobbled. Korea on the other hand kept building, improving the design, building more and is now exporting subs.
 
Let's pour a bit of oil into the fire (muhahahahaha !)

French trolling.
"Oh you may need some interim submarines? We have just the thing!"

LOL.

I would call it "pragmatic" - you never know, they could see the light... (LEU advantages, cough, Attack - Barracuda symbiosis, cough cough) :D
:rolleyes::rolleyes:
Like too many French Presidents before him Macron while smart and stubborn is too often an arrogant dickhead. In that regard he is like Sarkozy and Giscard before him. The difference being he managed to get reelected, unlike the other two.
 
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Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

China lacks experience and the equipment to undertake this. It has rarely demonstrated the ability to operate forces beyond the Malaysian barrier. It has only one demonstrated the ability to operate a task force close to the Australian shoreline.
China is actively expanding it's territory (as is Russia) they don't want to live peacefully with others, they want primacy and that primacy means submission for every nation unlucky enough to be in their sphere of influence.

Not quite true. The PLAN appears to have demonstrated that it lives quite peacefully with others. The CCP wants to dominate others, primarily the nations surrounding the South China Sea. Don't get me wrong, I believe that the CCP is an expansionist organisation without a doubt and it is attempting to equip the PLAN to further that aim, however it is at least 10-15 years before it gets there and represents a real danger and it will be another 10-15 years after that it represents a danger to Australia.
 
Look at a map, Australia is much further from China than Japan or Korea, also further from the US. Australia has very long, easily interdicted trade routes and will never be able to compete with China on numbers. Conventional subs just don't cut it unless you can deploy dozens, not a dozen. SSN's on the other hand mean if China sails a CBG into the South Pacific to secure "their interests" then they need to think twice.

Holy cow guys, I can read a map! Can you? Can you see how far away China is from the coast of Australia? Can you explain why it is necessary for Australia to provide a naval submarine presence just off the Chinese coast? Especially since the Koreans, Japanese and the US is already doing so? Furthermore, and this is the point you all seem to be missing, the Koreans and Japanese can build and operate SSKs in the South China Sea without the operational penalty or the necessity of long transits. They can build 5 or 6 or more SSKs to 'contain' Chinese subs for the cost of just one Australian SSN (at the current gobsmackingly high price of $21B a boat). Given that the primary driver of Australia obtaining SSNs, as currently stated, is so they can make high speed transits to the Chinese coast and shipping lanes, and that nations in China's locale can much more easily and efficiently provide better 'containment' and 'sea lane' guarding, please explain again why Australia NEEDS SSNs?

And yes, I know Australian SSNs could fast transit to other places as well, but for as much as it would be needed to provide strategic defence in depth, newer advanced SSK designs will be perfectly capable of achieving what's required 90% of the time. Hell, if equipped with land attack systems like Tomahawk (or its hypersonic follow ons) they'd only need to get within a 1,000km of a land target anyway.

Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTCqXlDjx18&ab_channel=Whisper555


Again, more numerous Japanese and Korean SSKs can more efficiently defend the area and sea lanes, why would Australia need to do it? Could Australia do it with 8 SSNs? Isn't it in the interests of Japan, Korea and other countries in the region to keep sea lanes to their ports open? Are they incapable of doing that themselves?

Additionally, the scenario you describe here, where China suddenly starts acting like Imperial Japan and cutting trade routes to the region makes no sense. China is 'the world's factory', cutting itself off from the world would be tantamount to economic suicide. I just don't think the scenario makes sense.

Interesting that you mention Japan and South Korea, because while Japan has been building advanced subs for years Korea has been doing it for less time than Australia. In fact the Collins was more advanced and capable than Japans best when they were commissioned, even now after more than two decades of service, some other nations subs are now only just getting up to the Collins level of capability. The problem is Australia stopped building subs, then stopped working on future designs due to politicians deciding to offshore, then not, back and forth, until the capability was hobbled. Korea on the other hand kept building, improving the design, building more and is now exporting subs.

This. Australia coulda, shouda, woulda, had the best SSKs in the world except for all the usual reasons they screw this sort of thing up. Case in point, Australia has one of the longest maritime borders in the world and one of the smallest navies in the world, go figure. As you say though, Korea and Japan are building some of the best SSKs in the world now.

Doubtless there are counter arguments, I look forward to reading them.
 
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Can you explain why it is necessary for Australia to provide a naval submarine presence just off the Chinese coast?
Drake at Cadiz.
Better to burn the enemy in their own harbour than wait for them to burn you in yours.
please explain again why Australia NEEDS SSNs?
You want a seat at the table, then you have possess something of use.

newer advanced SSK designs will be perfectly capable of achieving what's required 90% of the titime.
Not really. The SSN could off the coast of Africa, or India, or the South Atlantic or the South China Sea.
The SSK is guaranteed to be either operating in your coastal area, or very slowly transiting to some other, with a certainty that the longer the distance the shorter the operational endurance.
Hell, if equipped with land attack systems like Tomahawk (or its hypersonic follow ons) they'd only need to get within a 1,000km of a land target anyway.
Do you grasp how big China is?
 
Guys, please leave the geopolitical arguments at the door. Unless someone here is in a position to directly influence government decision making on this subject it is all pointless anyway. The subject of SSN acquisition has already been decided and re-affirmed by the Australian Govt. It has widespread support. More details will be forthcoming soon enough.
 
In direct response to the Coulda, woulda shoula jibe a bit of a history lesson is required.

BlackBat242 was spot on with the timings and numbers, including why the last two, much needed Oberons were not acquired.

The capability was initially stood up to provide an ASW training cadre for the RAN, a duty that had been filled since the end of WWII by RN DE boats.

Even when this was the primary intended role, it was realised that more than six hulls were required to generate a useful level of availability.

In the 1970s the RAN Oberon's began an extensive modernisation program that dramatically increased their capability. In the same/similar time frame the USSR (not Russia but the Cold War Big Bad) began operations out of Cam Ranh Bay, making it of vital intelligence importance to the West. These intelligence gathering missions became an RAN mission set and one of the main drivers behind the large and capable Collins Class.

At this point in time China wasn't even a major trading partner, and thanks to diplomacy and Chinas falling out with the USSR, was no longer perceived as a threat.

When the RAN replacement submarine requirement was kicked off it was simply an unfunded project that existed because it was known the Collins had a finite life and the capability had to be maintained. It wasn't until Kevin Rudd, a former Diplomat and China Expert, became PM that Submarines were recast as our primary deterrent for the by then, undeniable, Chinese expansionism.

Since then, there has been lots of talk, lots of money spent, but no material change in the RANs submarine capability, other than the existing platform is older and less competitive. In this time the strategic situation has completely changed, China has progressed from crawl to walk and is now learning how to run, at the same time as their leadership is becoming more totalitarian and usurping their own political and social conventions to maintain and grow personal power and influence of their elite.

The twelve "regionally superior" conventional submarines that were to be procured were the response to the requirement to deter China from expanding their territorial claims and intimidating nations in their sphere of influence, in particular, Australia. Well that long drawn out program has been cancelled and China has expanded their territorial claims and is intimidating nations in their region of influence, in particular, Australia.

The goal posts have moved, the consequences of doing nothing have become so severe that even the sizable political centre in Australia who, would never previously have supported increased spending on defence let alone the acquisition of SSNs, are now granting bipartisan support.

The biggest issue is how, where and what. There are no easy, let alone, solutions to the looming capability gap, i.e. the point where capability reduces or disappears before it increases. No in production program, with or without the capacity to provide hulls to Australia is currently building anything that comes close to the RANs minimum requirements. Adapting anything available to meet RAN requirements will result in delays that would put the in service date too far in the future. The only solution that could have provided something useful in time was SEA 1000, which is now dead and buried.

Note: RAN requirements is the stuff the platform actually needs (not what we would like it) to do, it is not gold plating or like to have, it is the bare minimum. Anyone who thinks RAN submarine requirements are unnecessarily gold plated has no idea what they are talking about.
 
Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

China lacks experience and the equipment to undertake this. It has rarely demonstrated the ability to operate forces beyond the Malaysian barrier. It has only one demonstrated the ability to operate a task force close to the Australian shoreline.
China is actively expanding it's territory (as is Russia) they don't want to live peacefully with others, they want primacy and that primacy means submission for every nation unlucky enough to be in their sphere of influence.

Not quite true. The PLAN appears to have demonstrated that it lives quite peacefully with others. The CCP wants to dominate others, primarily the nations surrounding the South China Sea. Don't get me wrong, I believe that the CCP is an expansionist organisation without a doubt and it is attempting to equip the PLAN to further that aim, however it is at least 10-15 years before it gets there and represents a real danger and it will be another 10-15 years after that it represents a danger to Australia.
10 to 15 years plus 10 to 15 years is 20 to 30 years.

As we stand right now, if everything goes to plan, no delays, no unknown unknowns, no slips, missteps or surprises, then in just under 20 years the RAN will be getting its first new submarine, not IOC, let alone FOC, just getting it into commission. Also at this point the current fleet will be retiring faster than the new fleet can be stood up.

In a nut shell, at this point of maximum danger (assuming nothing happens sooner), Australia will be worse off than it is right now.
 
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Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

China lacks experience and the equipment to undertake this. It has rarely demonstrated the ability to operate forces beyond the Malaysian barrier. It has only one demonstrated the ability to operate a task force close to the Australian shoreline.
China is actively expanding it's territory (as is Russia) they don't want to live peacefully with others, they want primacy and that primacy means submission for every nation unlucky enough to be in their sphere of influence.

Not quite true. The PLAN appears to have demonstrated that it lives quite peacefully with others. The CCP wants to dominate others, primarily the nations surrounding the South China Sea. Don't get me wrong, I believe that the CCP is an expansionist organisation without a doubt and it is attempting to equip the PLAN to further that aim, however it is at least 10-15 years before it gets there and represents a real danger and it will be another 10-15 years after that it represents a danger to Australia.
10 to 15 years plus 10 to 15 years is 20 to 30 years.

As we stand right now, if everything goes to plan, no delays, no unknown unknowns, no slips, missteps or surprises, then in just under 20 years the RAN will be getting its first new submarine, not IOC, let alone FOC, just getting it into commission. Also at this point the current fleet will be retiring faster than the new fleet can be stood up.

In a nut shell, at this point of maximum danger (assuming nothing happens sooner), Australia will be worse off than it is right now.
A lot can happen in 10-15 years, let alone 20-30 years. A lot. We might even get nice shiny, new SSNs. China might become democratic. Taiwan might be peacefully integrated into the PRC. The thing is we are dealing with situations we know nothing about and cannot plan for. Placing our money on technology that we have no experience of might be dangerous and expensive.
 
Its not about containing China anymore (if it ever was) its about securing trade routes to prevent Australia being cut off from the rest of the world, a capability China has been keen to demonstrate, the capability of cutting off Australia, South Korea and Japan from the rest of the world and don't forget every other country in the region.

China lacks experience and the equipment to undertake this. It has rarely demonstrated the ability to operate forces beyond the Malaysian barrier. It has only one demonstrated the ability to operate a task force close to the Australian shoreline.
China is actively expanding it's territory (as is Russia) they don't want to live peacefully with others, they want primacy and that primacy means submission for every nation unlucky enough to be in their sphere of influence.

Not quite true. The PLAN appears to have demonstrated that it lives quite peacefully with others. The CCP wants to dominate others, primarily the nations surrounding the South China Sea. Don't get me wrong, I believe that the CCP is an expansionist organisation without a doubt and it is attempting to equip the PLAN to further that aim, however it is at least 10-15 years before it gets there and represents a real danger and it will be another 10-15 years after that it represents a danger to Australia.
10 to 15 years plus 10 to 15 years is 20 to 30 years.

As we stand right now, if everything goes to plan, no delays, no unknown unknowns, no slips, missteps or surprises, then in just under 20 years the RAN will be getting its first new submarine, not IOC, let alone FOC, just getting it into commission. Also at this point the current fleet will be retiring faster than the new fleet can be stood up.

In a nut shell, at this point of maximum danger (assuming nothing happens sooner), Australia will be worse off than it is right now.
A lot can happen in 10-15 years, let alone 20-30 years. A lot. We might even get nice shiny, new SSNs. China might become democratic. Taiwan might be peacefully integrated into the PRC. The thing is we are dealing with situations we know nothing about and cannot plan for. Placing our money on technology that we have no experience of might be dangerous and expensive.
You are the one who said 10 to 15 years plus another 10 to 15 years. The thing is lead times to acquire transformational capability stretch across decades, the only definite being, if you sit on your hands and do nothing, in 10 to 15 years, let alone 20 to 30 years, you will have nothing.

We are where we are at now because of inaction going back twenty years, fluffing around now, instead of doing something, means we will likely be worse off in another twenty years.
 
You are the one who said 10 to 15 years plus another 10 to 15 years. The thing is lead times to acquire transformational capability stretch across decades, the only definite being, if you sit on your hands and do nothing, in 10 to 15 years, let alone 20 to 30 years, you will have nothing.

We are where we are at now because of inaction going back twenty years, fluffing around now, instead of doing something, means we will likely be worse off in another twenty years.

in part, I agree however the main cause of inaction is effectual politicians who refuse to grasp a hard nettle, not because of the unavailability of technology. Superficially SSNs are attractive but come with a whole load of problems which we have skirted around in this thread and which the moderator doesn't want discussed. Why? I have no idea. Conventional have a load of limitations which we appear frightened to grasp. Exactly who are/what are we supposed to be protecting with this purchase? The South China Sea or Australia's periphery? The map seems to suggest that the South China Sea is a long way from Australia.
 

in part, I agree however the main cause of inaction is effectual politicians who refuse to grasp a hard nettle, not because of the unavailability of technology. Superficially SSNs are attractive but come with a whole load of problems which we have skirted around in this thread and which the moderator doesn't want discussed. Why? I have no idea. Conventional have a load of limitations which we appear frightened to grasp. Exactly who are/what are we supposed to be protecting with this purchase? The South China Sea or Australia's periphery? The map seems to suggest that the South China Sea is a long way from Australia.
The South China Sea is one of the world’s main shipping routes by volume, and is bounded to the west, south, and east by Australia’s neighbours. Many of those neighbours are Australia’s friends and allies, and if Australia does not consider defense of the SCS a priority, then those neighbours may, in future, consider an accommodation with totalitarian China in their own best interests - isolating Australia diplomatically, economically, and militarily.
 
Just a clarification, static defence is ultimately handing the initiative to the opponent. Active mobile forces present the capacity to take the initiative and place the opponent on the back foot.
 

in part, I agree however the main cause of inaction is effectual politicians who refuse to grasp a hard nettle, not because of the unavailability of technology. Superficially SSNs are attractive but come with a whole load of problems which we have skirted around in this thread and which the moderator doesn't want discussed. Why? I have no idea. Conventional have a load of limitations which we appear frightened to grasp. Exactly who are/what are we supposed to be protecting with this purchase? The South China Sea or Australia's periphery? The map seems to suggest that the South China Sea is a long way from Australia.
The South China Sea is one of the world’s main shipping routes by volume, and is bounded to the west, south, and east by Australia’s neighbours. Many of those neighbours are Australia’s friends and allies, and if Australia does not consider defense of the SCS a priority, then those neighbours may, in future, consider an accommodation with totalitarian China in their own best interests - isolating Australia diplomatically, economically, and militarily.
Oh, dearie, dearie, me, someone who is not familiar with a map. Australia is the southernmost continent of the SE Asia chain. It cannot be isolated as easily as you appear to imagine. Diplomatically maybe, economically perhaps, Militarily impossible. The South China Sea is a route that is easily navigated but it is not possible to isolate the nations surrounding because they all tend to be on the periphery with the exception of Taiwan. It would be possible to isolate the PRC much more easily than it would the surrounding nations. The PRC is very susceptible to naval blockade. Australia if it was involved in such an event would be part of a much larger task force.
 
Just a clarification, static defence is ultimately handing the initiative to the opponent. Active mobile forces present the capacity to take the initiative and place the opponent on the back foot.
No one is suggesting such. All that is being asked if it is in Australia's interests to be involved in events in NE Asia. We have had a long history of involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, most of which did not go well for us...
 
We've (the UK) had a long involvement in our region of the world. Most of which did not go well.
 

in part, I agree however the main cause of inaction is effectual politicians who refuse to grasp a hard nettle, not because of the unavailability of technology. Superficially SSNs are attractive but come with a whole load of problems which we have skirted around in this thread and which the moderator doesn't want discussed. Why? I have no idea. Conventional have a load of limitations which we appear frightened to grasp. Exactly who are/what are we supposed to be protecting with this purchase? The South China Sea or Australia's periphery? The map seems to suggest that the South China Sea is a long way from Australia.
The South China Sea is one of the world’s main shipping routes by volume, and is bounded to the west, south, and east by Australia’s neighbours. Many of those neighbours are Australia’s friends and allies, and if Australia does not consider defense of the SCS a priority, then those neighbours may, in future, consider an accommodation with totalitarian China in their own best interests - isolating Australia diplomatically, economically, and militarily.
Oh, dearie, dearie, me, someone who is not familiar with a map. Australia is the southernmost continent of the SE Asia chain. It cannot be isolated as easily as you appear to imagine. Diplomatically maybe, economically perhaps, Militarily impossible. The South China Sea is a route that is easily navigated but it is not possible to isolate the nations surrounding because they all tend to be on the periphery with the exception of Taiwan. It would be possible to isolate the PRC much more easily than it would the surrounding nations. The PRC is very susceptible to naval blockade. Australia if it was involved in such an event would be part of a much larger task force.

Despite your caustic wit, I am familiar with a map.

Isolation can be caused as much by distance as direction. If all neighboring nations feel the need to kow-tow to China, having NZ to the southeast, India distant to the northwest, and the US far across the Pacific won’t be much succor - especially if China is aggressively maneuvering outside of the SCS.
 
Placing our money on technology that we have no experience of might be dangerous and expensive.
Getting out of bed in the morning might be dangerous and expensive. If we kept this sort of attitude mankind would never have evolved. Seriously though, the planned acquisition of SSNs is not something being blindly stumbled into. There is a study underway of requirements (which will inform all much more soon enough), and there are already RAN personnel on exchange postings. Australia/RAN is also able, thanks to AUKUS, learn from those that have operated such capabilities for decades.
 

Superficially SSNs are attractive but come with a whole load of problems which we have skirted around in this thread and which the moderator doesn't want discussed. Why? I have no idea.
Please feel free to list a so-called problem that hasn't been discussed. All I have seen is concern about problems already shown not to be. Anything on the geopolitical side is pointless though as has already been explained.
 
It cannot be isolated as easily as you appear to imagine. Diplomatically maybe, economically perhaps, Militarily impossible. The South China Sea is a route that is easily navigated but it is not possible to isolate the nations surrounding because they all tend to be on the periphery with the exception of Taiwan. It would be possible to isolate the PRC much more easily than it would the surrounding nations. The PRC is very susceptible to naval blockade. Australia if it was involved in such an event would be part of a much larger task force.

Isolation can be caused as much by distance as direction. If all neighboring nations feel the need to kow-tow to China, having NZ to the southeast, India distant to the northwest, and the US far across the Pacific won’t be much succor - especially if China is aggressively maneuvering outside of the SCS.
Please also remember that the planned acquisitions is not simply focussed on WW2 style Defence of Australia's borders. That thinking largely went out the window 30+yrs ago. Having military force able to be projected (and SSNs are an ideal form for this) are a great form of exerting influence and helping shape strategic situations far from home and thus working with like-minded nations to hopefully avoid future conflicts. It is very much a case of applied deference - remember the maxim Sī vīs pācem, parā bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war).
 
There is also the potential tendency to procure certain military equipment to feel important and/ or to create/ maintain a self-illusion of significance and/ or influence you may not realistically be actually able to exercise or exert even if you go ahead with the procurement in question.
The bald fact is that in the short to medium term China is likely not to particularly care about or be especially influenced by these Australian nuclear subs (or by the infrequent token visits by UK nuclear subs to the general area).

For the record I think the Australian procurement of nuclear subs is very likely to be justified/ justifiable by the threat environment they will face when they enter service in approx. 20 years time.

But the decision has some notable negative consequences (in the short-medium term it’s declining capability waiting for “jam-tomorrow”), potentially massive challenges (financial etc.), and I think a number of the other contributors are making reasonable arguments about the opportunity costs (potential advantages of other options not chosen) and challenges associated with going down this path. I’m just not sure those contributors are entirely being given a fair shake at the moment.
 
There is also the potential tendency to procure certain military equipment to feel important and/ or to create/ maintain a self-illusion of significance and/ or influence you may not realistically be actually able to exercise or exert even if you go ahead with the procurement in question.
Definitely with the previous Australian Government but less so with the current IMHO.
The bald fact is that in the short to medium term China is likely not to particularly care about or be especially influenced by these Australian nuclear subs (or by the infrequent token visits by UK nuclear subs to the general area).
And yet their actions seem to indicate otherwise.
For the record I think the Australian procurement of nuclear subs is very likely to be justified/ justifiable by the threat environment they will face when they enter service in approx. 20 years time.
I don't think we will have to wait that long.
I’m just not sure those contributors are entirely being given a fair shake at the moment.
They have as much opportunity as any other contributor.
 
With regard to nuke vs batteries, to give some perspective a nuclear reactor generates an order of magnitude more power than a set of diesel engines, which in turn generate about an order of magnitude more power than any AIP set up. The battery life/storage of Li batteries might be greatly superior to lead-acid, but your recharge rate isn't going to change drastically. You're still going to have a lower top speed and while you can maintain it longer, you're still stuck snorting. If anything I'd think you have to snort longer to gain the benefits of the larger storage capacity. The rate of advance for the sub doesn't change appreciably; you're still running on the same power generation.
 
Ok for a moment.
What advantages does a large non-nuclear powered submarine have over a nuclear submarine?

Or are we talking about forward basing in say Singapore, Brunei, Taiwan and the Philippines?
 
Until we hear the results of the 18-month feasibility study I don't think anyone can add anything but speculation.
We can discuss the geopolitical and maritime power projection aspects until the cows come home but it all depends on how the RAN and Australian politicians and civil servants see things.
They may well decide its too much hassle and pull out or they may feel now they've set down the path they have no choice but to commit.

Declining capability for jam tomorrow is almost inevitable in any procurement, lead times are too long to avoid it. Had the SSN decision been made a decade ago it may well have been feasible for them to have coat-tailed on Astute or Virginia production lines more effectively. But they didn't. There isn't the time or money to buy interim modern SSKs and SSNs without pushing the latter back.

I would suggest we'll know how seriously the PLAN will take the threat the day they unveil a P-1/P-8 clone instead of warmed up transport conversion jobs. We've seen the F-35 clone and the E-3 clone but no advanced ASW/MPA aircraft yet.
 
With regard to nuke vs batteries, to give some perspective a nuclear reactor generates an order of magnitude more power than a set of diesel engines, which in turn generate about an order of magnitude more power than any AIP set up. The battery life/storage of Li batteries might be greatly superior to lead-acid, but your recharge rate isn't going to change drastically. You're still going to have a lower top speed and while you can maintain it longer, you're still stuck snorting. If anything I'd think you have to snort longer to gain the benefits of the larger storage capacity. The rate of advance for the sub doesn't change appreciably; you're still running on the same power generation.
To add even more perspective conventional submarines have heat and power budgets that determine what they run with what and for how long. Nuclear boats cool the entire boat and then heat each compartment to the required temperature due to their surplus of power.

There has been a lot a talk about UUVs operating in concert with manned subs going forwards, the obvious point to make is SSNs tend to be larger and therefore more suited to transporting and operating them. The other point is they can charge them.
 
Until we hear the results of the 18-month feasibility study I don't think anyone can add anything but speculation.
We can discuss the geopolitical and maritime power projection aspects until the cows come home but it all depends on how the RAN and Australian politicians and civil servants see things.
They may well decide its too much hassle and pull out or they may feel now they've set down the path they have no choice but to commit.

Declining capability for jam tomorrow is almost inevitable in any procurement, lead times are too long to avoid it. Had the SSN decision been made a decade ago it may well have been feasible for them to have coat-tailed on Astute or Virginia production lines more effectively. But they didn't. There isn't the time or money to buy interim modern SSKs and SSNs without pushing the latter back.

I would suggest we'll know how seriously the PLAN will take the threat the day they unveil a P-1/P-8 clone instead of warmed up transport conversion jobs. We've seen the F-35 clone and the E-3 clone but no advanced ASW/MPA aircraft yet.
I'll have to go searching but I was reading an article the other day specifically discussing the PLAN commitment to improving ASW. New frigates, sea floor sensor arrays and work on new MPAs.

Apparently the Pacific war is compulsory reading, in particular the USN submarine campaign against Japan.
 

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