Postwar British missile procurement

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Your really miss-reading my comments, perhaps you should examine your own personal insecurities & prejudices.

The UK had a lot of technical know how and talent in the fields of missiles and radar and had real achievements. But there was also a lot of expensive failures caused by or at least contributed to by the issues I noted above.
And at certain points like Red Hebe and the AWAC Nimrod radar debacle hubris met cold hard reality to predictable results.
This is not to disparage UK efforts or talent; just pointing to the repeated pattern of trying to catch up to or overtake a generation of US or other countries aircraft/ missiles / radar etc despite having significantly less money, experience and in some instances technology that lagged behind.
Sometimes this can be pulled off, a lot of the times it can’t.
It is notable that the UK record in this regard improved when part of international partnerships and joint-projects.
More money, less-insular requirements and sharing of international partners technology and experience obviously helped.

I read precisely what you wrote and it was deeply inaccurate. As are statements like "repeated efforts to catch up to or overtake a generation of US...". I have never seen such a requirement in any UK Operational Requirement document from this period, requirements were set based on perceptions of operational need, sometimes these requirements were overambitious and the results inevitable - that is something common to all countries who develop their own defence material today.

Red Hebe, which you keep insisting was a failure, is hard to judge as such. It was dependent upon a carrier aircraft (F.155T) which was cancelled in 1957 and development was abandoned, we don't know if it would have been a success or failure had development been taken further.

Red Hebe didn't get very far at all, I would say Kaiserd's actually meaning Red Dean, but who knows.

 

[zen]

I would say the developments in anti-tank missiles seem sound.
But the failure to produce a SAM out of Popsy, Mopsy, and Orange Nell left the UK with Tiger Cat /Sea Cat which was not ideal.
I call into question SIGS and the choice of what became Sea Dart. I even question SIGS-16, why did it have both a booster and limited matetials?
The basis of the ramjet missile seems much more applicable for greater ranges as eventually it gained.
I'd suggest that as considered dropping Sea Slug for Thunderbird II would have left more scope for the future.
In fact I think a bigger ramjet missile like Sea Dart in form ought to have been the successor to Thunderbird and Bloodhound.

NIGS spiralled into over ambitious ideas. Shame as a tighter focus might have produced results.

PT.428 was much more reasonable than Mauler as far as I can see and had much more scope for the future than Rapier or Sea Wolf though Sea Wolf is more it's spiritual successor as it is Orange Nell.
SAM.72 and XPX430 seem more logical for the future than Sea Dart.

In AAMs I think Fireflash ought to have led to a Sparrow-like weapon and it seems Fairey had just that in mind.
Red Hebe is just too vague a missile to have an opinion on it. Though the scaled VSW seems more reasonable.
Red Top ought to have undergone a major upgrade/revamp as a missile that size ought to have gained greater performance through such a process and there are indications that was being considered.
The failure to get an alternative SARH seeker haunts this weapon.

Taildog /SRAAM could have been a potent system as a AAM and a SAM. It would not derail later efforts that led to ASRAAM and CAMM.

 

[pathology_doc]

dropping Sea Slug for Thunderbird II

Just like that? Remember, it's not just the missile; it's the storage and handling gear and launcher. Tartar was built from the start around the concept of replacing a 5"/38 twin mount one-for-one, but boosted missiles intended for area defence tend to take up a lot more room in the ship. The converted Baltimores and Clevelands had enough internal volume to adapt (the Clevelands only barely), but the County-class DDGs were essentially shaped around the missile magazines while the very first Terrier DDG - USS Guyatt - only had seven missiles in each of two rings and the most austere guidance fit possible, and even then it was a bare-bones fit that ate up the entire back half of a Gearing-class DD.

 

[pathology_doc]

Red Top ought to have undergone a major upgrade/revamp as a missile that size ought to have gained greater performance through such a process and there are indications that was being considered. The failure to get an alternative SARH seeker haunts this weapon.

When I was younger and knew no better, I used to wonder "Why didn't they just put Sparrow's seeker in it?" I also used to fantasize about a Radar Red Top with an AMRAAM seeker, because even if you couldn't illuminate for the missile with AI.23, you could still replace the cooling unit in the missile pack with the electronics to send it mid-course updates until the terminal interception moment, but of course by the time AMRAAM was ready, both Lightning and Red Top were gone. (Later I understood why it was easier to build a new missile and not put new wine in old wineskins.)

 

[uk 75]

Zen
I think the following were as good or better than the foreign analogues:
Swingfire provided at least as good a cap as TOW and HOT
Bloodhound could only have been replaced by Nike Hercules
Red Top and Lightning gave way to Phantom Tornado with Skyflash
Rapier was better than most towed SAMs
Thunderbird was no worse than early HAWK
Seacat 2 should have replaced Seacat
The naval missiles were tied their platforms
County dlg Seaslug
T42 Seadart
T22 Seawolf
T23 VL Seawolf
Viewed that way it would have been costly and probably not more effective to fit foreignweapons
Blue Water was better than Sergeant but Lance was a NATO fit.
Blue Streak was a British Atlas and could have been a good satellite launcher
Martel and Sea Eagle were as good as Harpoon but this and Maverick were NATO standard

 

[kaiserd]

Your really miss-reading my comments, perhaps you should examine your own personal insecurities & prejudices.

The UK had a lot of technical know how and talent in the fields of missiles and radar and had real achievements. But there was also a lot of expensive failures caused by or at least contributed to by the issues I noted above.
And at certain points like Red Hebe and the AWAC Nimrod radar debacle hubris met cold hard reality to predictable results.
This is not to disparage UK efforts or talent; just pointing to the repeated pattern of trying to catch up to or overtake a generation of US or other countries aircraft/ missiles / radar etc despite having significantly less money, experience and in some instances technology that lagged behind.
Sometimes this can be pulled off, a lot of the times it can’t.
It is notable that the UK record in this regard improved when part of international partnerships and joint-projects.
More money, less-insular requirements and sharing of international partners technology and experience obviously helped.

I read precisely what you wrote and it was deeply inaccurate. As are statements like "repeated efforts to catch up to or overtake a generation of US...". I have never seen such a requirement in any UK Operational Requirement document from this period, requirements were set based on perceptions of operational need, sometimes these requirements were overambitious and the results inevitable - that is something common to all countries who develop their own defence material today.

Red Hebe, which you keep insisting was a failure, is hard to judge as such. It was dependent upon a carrier aircraft (F.155T) which was cancelled in 1957 and development was abandoned, we don't know if it would have been a success or failure had development been taken further.

Red Hebe didn't get very far at all, I would say Kaiserd's actually meaning Red Dean, but who knows.

Yes! Exactly! Many thanks for mind-reading my muddle.

 

[kaiserd]

No one (that I am aware of) in this discussion is saying all UK equipment (I was specifically speaking of aircraft mounted missiles & radar) was all rubbish or all fantastic.
And all countries have successful and not so successful projects.
But the UK had their fair share of dogs or misconceived projects and a lot of them had over-ambition, and that sense of desperately trying to catch-up after being left behind, in common. And given the UK’s limited resources and lack of domestic alternatives/ competitors such failures tended to do more damage then equivalent problems with, say, US systems.

Red Dean and AEW Nimrods are among the examples of trying to do more than the UK could actually pull off at their respective times.
While I’m a fan the TSR-2 could also be seen to fall into a similar category.

The likes of the French and the Swedish in this time period each had their own issues but at least appeared less vulnerable to the hubris of over-reach.

 

[JFC Fuller]

You keep saying this: "and that sense of desperately trying to catch-up after being left behind" but I have never seen any evidence that this was the case. As pointed out before UK ORs were written against perceived operational needs; sometimes those were far beyond fiscal resources and were never anymore than paper exercises (e.g. NIGS, PT.428), sometimes they were technically well executed but fell foul of other factors (Blue Water), other times they were runaway successes (Rapier, Blowpipe).

There are multiple reasons for programme failure, even "over ambition" has multiple fathers - failure to understand technology maturity, imposing platform constraints early, poor cost prediction etc. When one actually looks at these programmes in detail and examines the archive documents it rapidly becomes apparent that such sweeping statements as "trying to do more than the UK could actually pull off at their respective times" are rarely true. You repeatedly mention Nimrod AEW3, this seems to have one of those spectacular blow-ups in which nobody comes out blameless and every conceivable error was made- underestimating the required computing power, specifying an airframe that was too small, requirements creep (according to GEC), etc. Does that mean the UK could not develop its own AEW aircraft? Of course it doesn't, it just means that programme was executed terribly.

 

[kaiserd]

You keep saying this: "and that sense of desperately trying to catch-up after being left behind" but I have never seen any evidence that this was the case. As pointed out before UK ORs were written against perceived operational needs; sometimes those were far beyond fiscal resources and were never anymore than paper exercises (e.g. NIGS, PT.428), sometimes they were technically well executed but fell foul of other factors (Blue Water), other times they were runaway successes (Rapier, Blowpipe).

There are multiple reasons for programme failure, even "over ambition" has multiple fathers - failure to understand technology maturity, imposing platform constraints early, poor cost prediction etc. When one actually looks at these programmes in detail and examines the archive documents it rapidly becomes apparent that such sweeping statements as "trying to do more than the UK could actually pull off at their respective times" are rarely true. You repeatedly mention Nimrod AEW3, this seems to have one of those spectacular blow-ups in which nobody comes out blameless and every conceivable error was made- underestimating the required computing power, specifying an airframe that was too small, requirements creep (according to GEC), etc. Does that mean the UK could not develop its own AEW aircraft? Of course it doesn't, it just means that programme was executed terribly.

This appears to be a case of saying very similar things but for some reason insisting we are disagreeing.
What I am trying to say is that perhaps, versus the likes of France and Sweden, the UK arguably more often didn’t scale their requirements and objectives to their applicable means, be it technical and/or financial, and went for requirements and objectives that the US or the USSR struggled with or failed to achieve with greater means.
And I would humbly suggest that such over-reach may not just relate to specific technical decisions when framing requirements but partially reflected a particular mindset at a particular time among UK decision makers.

For example in retrospect the TSR2 and F.155T designs were “too much” for the UK to pull off both technically and financially. Ditto Red Dean and a number of other projects.
Realism became more prevalent later on, allowing for bad examples like the repeated Nimrod debacles.
And examples like not wanting to be seen as buying “inferior” Buccaneers when the US was developing the F-111 did invariably play a role in relevant decision making.

 

[JFC Fuller]

This appears to be a case of saying very similar things but for some reason insisting we are disagreeing.
What I am trying to say is that perhaps, versus the likes of France and Sweden, the UK arguably more often didn’t scale their requirements and objectives to their applicable means, be it technical and/or financial, and went for requirements and objectives that the US or the USSR struggled with or failed to achieve with greater means.
And I would humbly suggest that such over-reach may not just relate to specific technical decisions when framing requirements but partially reflected a particular mindset at a particular time among UK decision makers.

For example in retrospect the TSR2 and F.155T designs were “too much” for the UK to pull off both technically and financially. Ditto Red Dean and a number of other projects.
Realism became more prevalent later on, allowing for bad examples like the repeated Nimrod debacles.
And examples like not wanting to be seen as buying “inferior” Buccaneers when the US was developing the F-111 did invariably play a role in relevant decision making.

We are absolutely not saying the same thing, you are trying to claim that the UK was somehow unique in the proportion of defence programmes that did not come to fruition, you are then further attempting to assign unique reasons for that. I am pointing out that you are wrong. Your sporadic naming of individual programmes consistently fails to prove your point:

F.155T: no hardware was ever started, there was no prototype construction and barely any systems work, the files at Kew suggest the radar was still a paper exercise, there is no reason to assume that it was technically "too much". It's cancellation, owed as much as to a radical change of approach to UK air defence brought about realisation of the ballistic missile threat, much like the abandonment of the F-108 and later the F-12 in the US.

TSR-2: As with AEW3, was plagued with programme management failings and (similar to AEW3) a poor mission computer choice, that doesn't mean the programme wasn't achievable - just that it was poorly run.

As for France, other members have already provided you with lists of comparable cancellations, there are threads here where you will find multiple abandoned Swedish programmes.

 

[kaiserd]

This appears to be a case of saying very similar things but for some reason insisting we are disagreeing.
What I am trying to say is that perhaps, versus the likes of France and Sweden, the UK arguably more often didn’t scale their requirements and objectives to their applicable means, be it technical and/or financial, and went for requirements and objectives that the US or the USSR struggled with or failed to achieve with greater means.
And I would humbly suggest that such over-reach may not just relate to specific technical decisions when framing requirements but partially reflected a particular mindset at a particular time among UK decision makers.

For example in retrospect the TSR2 and F.155T designs were “too much” for the UK to pull off both technically and financially. Ditto Red Dean and a number of other projects.
Realism became more prevalent later on, allowing for bad examples like the repeated Nimrod debacles.
And examples like not wanting to be seen as buying “inferior” Buccaneers when the US was developing the F-111 did invariably play a role in relevant decision making.

We are absolutely not saying the same thing, you are trying to claim that the UK was somehow unique in the proportion of defence programmes that did not come to fruition, you are then further attempting to assign unique reasons for that. I am pointing out that you are wrong. Your sporadic naming of individual programmes consistently fails to prove your point:

F.155T: no hardware was ever started, there was no prototype construction and barely any systems work, the files at Kew suggest the radar was still a paper exercise, there is no reason to assume that it was technically "too much". It's cancellation, owed as much as to a radical change of approach to UK air defence brought about realisation of the ballistic missile threat, much like the abandonment of the F-108 and later the F-12 in the US.

TSR-2: As with AEW3, was plagued with programme management failings and (similar to AEW3) a poor mission computer choice, that doesn't mean the programme wasn't achievable - just that it was poorly run.

As for France, other members have already provided you with lists of comparable cancellations, there are threads here where you will find multiple abandoned Swedish programmes.

I’m pretty sure that’s not what I was contending (for example I wasn’t saying that the UK couldn’t build the TSR2 or F155T from a technical perspective, just that they were too demanding to do so and be affordable at the same time) and it’s certainly an interesting perspective to essentially blame every such failure on “project management”.

However I am ultimately happy to leave it to other contributors to make their own minds up.

 

[zen]

I don't have my books with me and bashing this out on a phone is no fun. So I'll pick an element that intrigues me.
Blue Water seems ok if a bit superfluous. However the dual thrust rocket motor is very interesting and was tested in a scaled 17" Diameter form. Apparently it worked.
Much could have been made of that system to remove the need for seperate boost stages in a number of other missile projects.

 

[Rickshaw]

I would say the developments in anti-tank missiles seem sound.
But the failure to produce a SAM out of Popsy, Mopsy, and Orange Nell left the UK with Tiger Cat /Sea Cat which was not ideal.

Not ideal but they were unique at the time - a small, short range, easily controlled SAM. They sold well overseas as well and the Seacat at the end of it's career with the RN performed quite well in the Falklands in its role as a last ditch point-defence SAM. It deterred quite a few Argentine pilots who believed it was aimed directly at them (which it was) and it was intending to hit them as well!

 

[JFC Fuller]

I’m pretty sure that’s not what I was contending (for example I wasn’t saying that the UK couldn’t build the TSR2 or F155T from a technical perspective, just that they were too demanding to do so and be affordable at the same time) and it’s certainly an interesting perspective to essentially blame every such failure on “project management”.

However I am ultimately happy to leave it to other contributors to make their own minds up.

You very clearly stated that "the TSR2 and F.155T designs were “too much” for the UK to pull off both technically and financially" which can only be interpreted as you "saying that the UK couldn’t build the TSR2 or F155T from a technical perspective".

It is also very clear from my posts through this thread, specifically post 48, that I am not blaming every such "failure" on programme management. You are deliberately misrepresenting my views.

 

[kaiserd]

I’m pretty sure that’s not what I was contending (for example I wasn’t saying that the UK couldn’t build the TSR2 or F155T from a technical perspective, just that they were too demanding to do so and be affordable at the same time) and it’s certainly an interesting perspective to essentially blame every such failure on “project management”.

However I am ultimately happy to leave it to other contributors to make their own minds up.

You very clearly stated that "the TSR2 and F.155T designs were “too much” for the UK to pull off both technically and financially" which can only be interpreted as you "saying that the UK couldn’t build the TSR2 or F155T from a technical perspective".

It also very clear from my posts through this thread, specifically post 48, that I am not blaming every such "failure" on program management. You are deliberately misrepresenting my views.

Your comments suggest your English comprehension could do with some work while I need to work on being a bit clearer - I clarified, and your still appear insistent on having an argument...

But to cut through some of the clutter, and some apparent animosity coming from somewhere (?), I would also clarify that I think it is disingenuous and/or self-deceptive to blame "project management" on a number of the misconceived/ failed projects named above.
A number of them were set up for failure almost from conception by excessive ambition and not fully taking into account the real technical and/or fiscal realities UK projections were born into.

Evidence suggests that Red Dean (& Red Hebe) were heading to be horrible technical failures, hobbled by inferior technology being pushed past what it could achieve. I would suggest you read the fascinating content in the relevant UK secret project books for more detail on this.
Without the 1957 Defence Paper the F155T would very likely proved to be unaffordable (and badly matched to future requirements, but in that they were very much not alone). The RAF was trying for too much but industry had its own issues.
While superficially comparisons with projects like the F-108 may appear to be like-for-like there is one very important difference. The US could afford dozens of such projects, complementary aircraft etc. etc. while the UK could not. The F-108 was a significantly more advanced weapons system and co-existed with a number of other tactical fighters etc. in a way the F155T could never have done so.

TSR2 is the classic case of the best being the enemy of the good; again even with better project management the chances of an affordable outcome were slim and the TSR2 weapon systems would have very likely become its own mini-debacle. If just about technically feasible the TSR2 in the form in which it emerged was also likely to never be fiscally affordable. An given that it was replaced by the Buccaneer it does suggest that requirements were pushed past what was really necessary at that time.
And even relative UK successes in the 1950s-70s had a tendency to be only about as good or a times marginally better than direct US equivalents but many times more expensive.

But to be fair I think the UK learned a lot from these programs (which were also very much projects of the their time and that time's dominant mindsets); the fact that a lot of the future projects tended to by multi-national helped but that wasn't the only factor.
AEW Nimrod is an example of lessons being forgotten and then being learned again, only to be forgotten again.
Hope the Project Tempest people have brushed up on their aviation history.

And in comparison with the French and the Swedish I struggling to come up with a similar pattern of pushing too far and then doubling down and keep digging themselves a deeper hole.
The French themselves had a sea of ultimately unsuccessful prototypes but a lot of that was due to being out-competed by Dassault and/or Dassault convincing the French authorities to instead go with something that was easier for them to sell abroad.
Maybe Rafale could almost be seen as something similar but it hardly compares in terms of negative outcomes.
I'll hold up my hand and say I don't know as much about Saab and Sweden's projects but I'm not aware of a direct equivalent to the examples I've mentioned above.

Hence I'm not at all saying the UK was in any way technically inferior to France or Sweden (Sweden bought Bloodhounds & Skyflashes after all); the UK had and has a superb aviation engine industry and many fine successful programs.
I'm simply saying when you look at who spent what for what the French and the Swedes often got more bang-for-the-buck than the UK.
And often that can be traced back to more realistic and less ambitious requirements, and the mindset of those setting these requirements is a significant factor in this.

I'm open to constructive feedback if any contributors other than JFC Fuller or the usual suspects have some.

 

[JFC Fuller]

My English comprehension is fine, you, do need to be much clearer though.

You have received plenty of "constructive feedback". Despite that, all you have done above is repeat the same disproven comments, this time in an even more longwinded form. For instance, you have one again claimed that Red Hebe was going to be a "horrible technical failure", yet there is not a shred of evidence to suggest this - as you have already been told. You are once again claiming that France had less projects come to fruition, despite having previously been given a list of such projects.

 

[uk 75]

JFC and Kaiserd your discussions throw up some interesting points but can we please stick to missile projects. If you keep bringing up TSR2 and co I will have to see another good thread trashed

 

[Archibald]

We have covered individual projects and the infamous Sandys 1957 White Paper in some depth but I wanted to draw together what we have learnt with some open questions:

Which missile projects across the board: Malkara to Blue Streak would you bin or save?

Which Foreign systems would you have bought instead? or vice versa which Foreign systems that we did buy should have been binned?

For example my pet hate is Seaslug. Masurca or Terrier later Standard would have been in service sooner or longer?

Masurca ? are you kidding ? no better than Sea slug, actually. You need a 7000 tons+ ship to carry that huge thing, either a Suffren or... a WWII heavy cruiser, 10 000 tons +. Or a brand new, very large hull like Colbert and Jeanne d'Arc.

Masurca - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

As far as ship-launched SAMs are concerned, I think a case could be made for buying Terrier and/or Tartar. That system (and its Standard successor) has had a VERY long and fruitful development history, with a great deal of stretch. The other possibility would have been collaboration with the French, but I read online recently that even later versions of Masurca owe a lot to transferred US work on Terrier (with which it shared a common general layout from the start).

I looked at relative dimensions, recently - a double-ended US missile cruiser like the Leahy is actually not that much bigger than a WW2 Leander in OAL terms, and while I'm not suggesting for a minute that you can take a Leander-class hull, gut it and rebuild it into a double-ended CG, I think it shows what could have been. I need to re-read Friedman's post-war cruiser book and also grab a copy of "The Postwar Naval Revolution" if it's not too pricey - I'm pretty sure Terrier and/or Tartar options were seriously considered there.

I second that opinion. Buying Tartar, that exactly what France did. And the system was so good... it is still in service on the Cassards ! In the 80's the french navy handpicked Tartar from old T-47 ships and transfered them on the brand new Cassards.

T 47-class destroyer - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Cassard-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Cassard-class frigate was initially designed to replace the four T 47-class anti-air warfare vessels in service at the time. Initially procured with four ships in the class, (the third and fourth hulls authorized for construction in 1983), the class was cut back to two vessels after the United States chose to terminate the production of the Standard SM-1MR missile. The prolonged design period led to the plans being redrawn several times.[2]

Facepalm...

I didn't knew about the MASURCA being related to Terrier, but in fact it makes a lot of sense and I'm not surprised by the fact they were related.

 

[Archibald]

Scrap all British AAMs in favour of licensing Sidewinder and Sparrow.

I think this is a bit on the harsh side, because I think you NEED local development expertise in order to be able to improve upon the basic model. That seeker research isn't going to write itself.

The big deficiency in British AAM development is their complete failure to ever produce a completely indigenous SARH AAM. Everything I've ever read of Red Dean, either from BSP or John Forbat, mentions the possibility of SARH control, but this is never elaborated.

The real problem, of course, is that until the adoption of the Phantom there was NO BRITISH FIGHTER EVER with a radar that had the innate capability to perform SARH illumination. And without that, Sparrow has no value unless you either bite the bullet and adapt/redesign AI.18 (is it even possible to add an illuminator to AI.23?) or replace it with an American SARH-missile-capable unit (and associated fire-control system).

The Crusader's radar dish MIGHT fit in the Lightning's centrebody, but even if it does, where are you going to package everything behind it plus the FCS and missile-interface gear? Is the drop-out package for the Firestreaks big enough?

The big problem for the British with AAM development was never the fighters or the missiles, IMO; it was the radar/FCS interface between the two. And that resulted from the insistence on fire-and-forget, which meant there was never any impetus to integrate SARH illumination into British AI sets from the beginning; the only thing they were ever going to be asked to do was to point a seeker head in the right direction for on-rack acquisition prior to firing.

IIRC Red Hebe was going to be SARH, but whatever might have happened in regard to producing an illuminator for it went out the window when the 1957 generation of interceptors was killed. Meanwhile, neither Firestreak nor Red Top ever went to the same school of hard knocks that Falcon, Sparrow and Sidewinder attended, so we will never know how well they would actually have performed in service.

France eventually fielded a SARH medium range AAM, Matra R-530. Not very efficient nor reliable. Might be fun if GB took a licence, maybe you British could improve it, microchips and electronics were your cup of tea (lame pun entirely assumed, run for cover).

R.530 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Matra R530 — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

The israelis got some kills with the thing, but soon found cannon fire was far more efficient to demolish MiGs by the dozens.

 

[kaiserd]

My English comprehension is fine, you, do need to be much clearer though.

You have received plenty of "constructive feedback". Despite that, all you have done above is repeat the same disproven comments, this time in an even more longwinded form. For instance, you have one again claimed that Red Hebe was going to be a "horrible technical failure", yet there is not a shred of evidence to suggest this - as you have already been told. You are once again claiming that France had less projects come to fruition, despite having previously been given a list of such projects.

I’ve tried to be polite but a fellow contributor is being extremely uncivil which is not helpful to debate.

Specifically re: Red Hebe I am referring to pages 39-40 of Chris Gibson & Tony Butler’s
British Secret Projects: Hypersonics, Ramjets & Missiles (2007).
In the section with the title “Criticism from the Services” the authors make reference to Squadron Leader Poole, a radar & EW specialist with the Operations Requirements branch of the RAF (OR.18B) who had been dispatched to the US to asses radar projects to compare them to their UK equivalents.
He came back with extremely negative feedback on UK missiles and radar of the time, specifically Red Hebe which is mentioned in this section.
I’ve added a picture of some of the relevant section as an attachment below.
I intend no copyright infringement; indeed I would rather not post this section but feel obliged to refute another contributors accusations and rather one-eyed perspective and insistence that his view is the only valid view.
I hope this helps give other contributors a more rounded view of this period than would otherwise be the case.

 

[kaiserd]

It goes without saying that I highly recommend this book, indeed any book by either or both Chris Gibson and Tony Buttler are highly recommended.

 

[JFC Fuller]

That passage in no way supports your claim that Red Hebe would have been a failure. That US missile technology was ahead of UK missile technology in no way supports an argument that Red Hebe would have been unable to meet the requirements laid out by its OR. It is notable that you even managed to include the section that is positive about the missile that would become Red Top.

Pointing out that you are incorrect and are offering no evidence is not uncivilised.

 

[uk 75]

Archibald
Thank you for giving us such detail on the French projects.
A Terrier or Masurca fit does not seem to work for the Countys. Seaslug despite its odd appearance was probably as good an area SAM as the RN could get up to Standard and Seadart.
Tartar was looked at by the RN but it hoped CF299 Seadart would do a better job. Mated to the T82 Inv. and T42 ships it probably did.
The next leap is AEGIS and the UK bought into the NATO Frigate90 programme which failed so comprehensively that all the potential NATO customers went on to field unique national solutions.
AA missiles and their radars and platforms seem with the exception of the remarkable Sidewinder family and its imitators to be bound up. I admit to not taking as much interest in these projects.

 

[kaiserd]

That passage in no way supports your claim that Red Hebe would have been a failure. That US missile technology was ahead of UK missile technology in no way supports an argument that Red Hebe would have been unable to meet the requirements laid out by its OR. It is notable that you even managed to include the section that is positive about the missile that would become Red Top.

Pointing out that you are incorrect and are offering no evidence is not uncivilised.

Did you even read the content of that attachment?
Do I need to quote actual lines from it to show how ridiculously at odds you comments above are with its content?
Comments like Red Hebe being “...still in the piston era”, and “Red Hebe will fade out in a few months since (it is) in a different technical age”. Squadron Leader Poole clearly a big fan...

And I’ve never mentioned let alone criticized Red Top in any of my comments above so don’t see how that’s to do with this....

 

[uk 75]

That passage in no way supports your claim that Red Hebe would have been a failure. That US missile technology was ahead of UK missile technology in no way supports an argument that Red Hebe would have been unable to meet the requirements laid out by its OR. It is notable that you even managed to include the section that is positive about the missile that would become Red Top.

Pointing out that you are incorrect and are offering no evidence is not uncivilised.

The giant missiles and their equally bizarre aircraft platforms do look odd and baroque compared with the US F102 and106 and the Avro Arrow. Sandys simply removed the requirement and bought a mix of Bloodhounds and Lightnings instead. As these served for a pretty decent period I think he got that bit right.

 

[Archibald]

Folks,
Before picking a fight, please remember that until 1980, most AAMs were a lost cause - whatever the country.

Sidewinders locked on the Sun or whatever IR source, rather than the aircraft they were to destroy.

AIM-7 Sparrow either killed friendly aircraft, or just dropped dead like dumb bombs (see testimonies of May 10, 1972 Phantom pilots - and this was a GOOD day ! - yet it took 3 Sparrows to get 1 kill. First one dropped like a bomb, second one chased clouds, third at least detonated near the Mig and with a little luck, killed it). Rinse, repeat all the day. Surely enough, ten RVNAF Migs went down in flames, but it probably took 20-25 AAMs to get that result ! Pretty expensive...

During training a R530 turned a barrel roll around the Mirage F1 that launched it (!!), making its pilot a little nervous. Its success rate in Falklands was abysmal, and the Israeli Mirage III ruled the skies only thanks to their DEFA guns.
French pilots made clear that the R530 was a lost cause. Only the vastly different Super 530 D & F worked properly.

Same for the Israeli Shaffrir: version 1 was a flying stick of shit. Shaffrir 2 markedly improved but only in the 80's.

I realized how AAM were hopeless when reading Le Fana epic saga of the IDF/AF Mirage IIIC. If the Israelis couldn't make AAMs reliable in the 60's - 70's, nor could the Americans in Vietnam, then nobody could, really.

And don't start me on the AIM-4 Falcon. I wish I could know its reliability on the Swedish Drakkens. Once again, if even the Swedish couldn't make it reliable, then nobody could.

The turning point might have been the Falklands and the AIM-9L stellar results. The Argentinian pilots had AIM-9B and the entire world could watch how the Sidewinder had markedly improved.

The only one I can think off that worked decently enough was the Phoenix. Considering its size and immense cost, it had to be. Maybe it was because of its large size that allowed enough electronics to be packed into the body.

I don't think the British lost much not developping viable AAMs before 1980. Then Skyflash was pretty good.

 

[kaiserd]

Folks,
Before picking a fight, please remember that until 1980, most AAMs were a lost cause - whatever the country.

Sidewinders locked on the Sun or whatever IR source, rather than the aircraft they were to destroy.

AIM-7 Sparrow either killed friendly aircraft, or just dropped dead like dumb bombs (see testimonies of May 10, 1972 Phantom pilots - and this was a GOOD day ! - yet it took 3 Sparrows to get 1 kill. First one dropped like a bomb, second one chased clouds, third at least detonated near the Mig and with a little luck, killed it). Rinse, repeat all the day. Surely enough, ten RVNAF Migs went down in flames, but it probably took 20-25 AAMs to get that result !

A R530 turned a barrel roll around the Mirage F1 that launched it, making its pilot a little nervous. Its success rate in Falklands was abysmal, the Israeli Mirage III ruled the skies only thanks to their DEFA guns.

Same for the Israeli Shaffrir: version 1 was a flying stick of shit. Shaffrir 2 markedly improved but only in the 80's. I realized how AAM were hopeless when reading Le Fana epic saga of the IDF Mirage III. If the Israelis couldn't make AAMs reliable in the 60's - 70's, nor could the Americans in Vietnam, then nobody could, really.

And don't start me on the AIM-4 Falcon. I wish I could know its reliability on the Swedish Drakkens. Once again, if even the Swedish couldn't make it reliable, then nobody could.

The turning point might have been the Falklands and the AIM-9L stellar results. The Argentinian pilots had AIM-9B and the entire world could watch how the Sidewinder had markedly improved.

I quite agree, it was the 70’s until air to air missiles began to properly mature as demonstrated in their use in the early 80’s.

I make particular reference to Red Dean and Red Hebe as their planned capabilities were such strong drivers and justification for F.155T.
Earlier comments that the UK ended better off are quite correct.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Did you even read the content of that attachment?
Do I need to quote actual lines from it to show how ridiculously at odds you comments above are with its content?
Comments like Red Hebe being “...still in the piston era”, and “Red Hebe will fade out in a few months since (it is) in a different technical age”. Squadron Leader Poole clearly a big fan...

And I’ve never mentioned let alone criticized Red Top in any of my comments above so don’t see how that’s to do with this....

Yes, which why I know that at no point does it say that Red Hebe would have been unable to meet the specification laid out in it's Operational Requirement and that therefore it does not support your claim that it would have been a failure.

Folks,
Before picking a fight, please remember that until 1980, most AAMs were a lost cause - whatever the country.

I am sure some would quibble with the date but there is definitely something too this, I would add the Hughes AIM-4 Falcon to your list.

 

[Archibald]

Red Hebe and Red Dean were really extremely heavy and draggy, so much they become an enormous burden for the interceptors to carry them externally ! This, by itself, killed them. Unless you pull an Arrow trick and carry these beast internally. But the weapon bay made the Arrow enormous, as large as a freakkin' Mirage IV nuclear bomber. Only the Tu-128 was larger and heavier (the YF-12, too, admittedly. and Mig-31, too.)

 

[Archibald]

Folks,
Before picking a fight, please remember that until 1980, most AAMs were a lost cause - whatever the country.

I am sure some would quibble with the date but there is definitely something too this, I would add the Hughes AIM-4 Falcon to your list.

I did. AFAIK US AIM-4 falcons were tested in vietnam on F-102s and that Phantom variant, and were found to be even more hopeless than AIM-7B and AIM-9b, which speaks (large) volume.
Yet the swedish Drakens and also the Swiss Mirage IIIS carried variants of the Falcon. I'm left wondering how reliable were these AIM-4 variants.
Famously, the entire Swedish air defence system (STRILL something) was based on the Draken and hence on the Falcon missile. Which mean the airspace safety of Sweden depended from the AIM-4 falcon ! And considering its aforementioned, abysmal results in Vietnam, the Swedes must have been a little nervous...

SAAB 35 Draken

The Falcon AAM saw little combat use and its effectiveness has been debated, though it must be acknowledged the effectiveness of all early AAMs was unimpressive. It is unclear how useful the J 35F's armament would have been if things had come to a shooting match, but it appears the Draken never fired a shot in anger. However, the Swedish Falcons were by no means simple copies of the American models, and much was done to improve the weapon's effectiveness.

 

[zen]

So in terms of Tartar as I have said repeatedly the RN wanted the UK sourced Q-band seeker. Had such a system become available then UK Tartar would have been applied to a host of RN vessels. This is virtually Orange Nell Anti-missile-missile.

In terms of Red Hebe, it's fairly clear that had this gone ahead it would be much revised prior to service let alone development firings. It's just too vague to assert a definitive statement of whether it was any good, as nothing was hardware.
As it was the demand to move to monopulse seeker technology, changes to conventional warhead and improvements in rocket motors would likely draw down the size.
Hence the VSW a scaled Red Hebe for 'warm wars' 'like Korea'.
Almost certainly there would be a convergence between the full scale Hebe and it's scaled relative as they applied developments in technology.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Hence the VSW a scaled Red Hebe for 'warm wars' 'like Korea'.

Does anybody happen to have the dimensions of the VSW, fuselage diameter and length?

It and Blue Jay V are both interesting what-ifs.

 

[zen]

I did try to measure it's depiction in BSP:Missiles and Ramjets but it was rather small a scaled diagram.

I remember it fitted best under the Type 583 when I looked at missiles to recess in the fusilage underside.

 

[pathology_doc]

And don't start me on the AIM-4 Falcon.

I vaguely recall reading somewhere an account of forty-ish missiles that left the rail in Vietnam, for a total of four kills plus one cripple that needed finishing off with another weapon. That's the same 10%-ish figure as Sparrow and Sidewinder, BUT you have to remember AIM-4D's limitations: small warhead and impact fuze only. What is the direct-hit percentage of Sparrow and Sidewinder, and what might the missile have done with the proximity fuze it never got to carry into US service?

The development of the R-530 and its predecessor the R.511 (IIRC) would make a fascinating read. R.530F and R.530D seem to bear the same relation to the early 530 as the success of Sky Flash did to the failure of Red Dean (Forbat states in Secret World of Vickers Guided Weapons that they were having problems with ground-return sidelobe echoes bamboozling the guidance head all the way up to 15,000 feet; not an enviable position to be in). The little I've read about them paints them as being almost in the class of the Phoenix as far as kinematic performance is concerned, albeit limited to SARH.

 

[zen]

Wasn't the requirement for Red Hebe to 'jump up' some 5,000ft above the launch aircraft and engage a bomber doing mach 2+ from a mach 1.3 launch aircraft or some such?

 

[JFC Fuller]

Looking through Ministry notes, it is clear that Red Top was designed for high altitude use against supersonic bombers. This effectively covered the Air Ministry requirement for P1 (target speeds Mach 1.3 - 2.0) but the Admiralty requirement for Sea Vixen insisted on targets down to Mach 0.7. That's why Blue Dolphin (radar Red Top) was proposed. Pulse and CW versions were considered but the additional CW emitter required would only fit in AI.18, not AI.23 due to space limitations, and a redesigned radar would not be available until the 200th Lightning, so the Pulse version was preferred. Blue Dolphin was then cancelled on cost grounds.

Hi Paul, I haven't seen those docs (I would like to) but I have seen some that show the basic concept of Blue Dolphin was resuscitated as a potential weapon for the P.1154 in 1962/63. It was compared against the Sparrow III and the GAR-9. Generally Radar Red Top was inferior to both, though there was some dispute as to whether this was a meaningful difference in the case of the Sparrow III, which is hardly unsurprising as Red Top was the smallest of the three. Study contracts were awarded to GEC and Ferranti, presumably to look at seekers, but the whole effort came to a stop with the end of the P.1154 programme. The GEC and Ferranti studies seem to have been completed but if they have survived they aren't at Kew. Total cost for development was estimated at £10-15m with the later estimates being £10m or £12m. Per missile unit cost was estimated at £22,000 with an additional £8,000 per aircraft for ancillary equipment.

 

[Deleted member 11733]

Just like in relation to aircraft the UK missile (and radar) industry was vulnerable to the same reoccurring issues as excessive ambition, insufficient money, technology and experience, with the same drive to “catch-up” with a lack of realism of what they were really capable of or what they had to work with.
With honorable exceptions like the Skyflash development of the Sparrow and the Blue Vixen radar (in the updated Sea Harrier) the likes of the French and Sweden arguably consistently achieved more with less.

May I ask you why you wrote "the French and Sweden" ? and not "France and Sweden" ? Or "the French and the Swedes" ? I am really interested to know why in the case of France the name of the country seems so difficult to use for Anglo-Saxons, whereas they almost always refer to themselves as "the UK" , "the US", etc.

 

[kaiserd]

Just like in relation to aircraft the UK missile (and radar) industry was vulnerable to the same reoccurring issues as excessive ambition, insufficient money, technology and experience, with the same drive to “catch-up” with a lack of realism of what they were really capable of or what they had to work with.
With honorable exceptions like the Skyflash development of the Sparrow and the Blue Vixen radar (in the updated Sea Harrier) the likes of the French and Sweden arguably consistently achieved more with less.

May I ask you why you wrote "the French and Sweden" ? and not "France and Sweden" ? Or "the French and the Swedes" ? I am really interested to know why in the case of France the name of the country seems so difficult to use for Anglo-Saxons, whereas they almost always refer to themselves as "the UK" , "the US", etc.

My apologies; I quite agree with your point, I also dislike blanket references like I (miss)used in this instance, rather than using country names.
Sorry for any offence, I will try to do better going forward.

 

[zen]

Just like in relation to aircraft the UK missile (and radar) industry was vulnerable to the same reoccurring issues as excessive ambition, insufficient money, technology and experience, with the same drive to “catch-up” with a lack of realism of what they were really capable of or what they had to work with.
With honorable exceptions like the Skyflash development of the Sparrow and the Blue Vixen radar (in the updated Sea Harrier) the likes of the French and Sweden arguably consistently achieved more with less.

May I ask you why you wrote "the French and Sweden" ? and not "France and Sweden" ? Or "the French and the Swedes" ? I am really interested to know why in the case of France the name of the country seems so difficult to use for Anglo-Saxons, whereas they almost always refer to themselves as "the UK" , "the US", etc.

States is the answer, the UK is a Union state of formerly seperate Kingdoms of (for simplicity sake) national basis.
France and French or Swedes and Sweden is fairly uncontroversial.
Strictly one can use Britain and British. Occasionally we do.
But it would be wrong and disrespectful to say England and English since that ignores the other partners of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Refering to English as Anglo-Saxons would be rather like refering to the French as Franks or even Gauls.

 

[kaiserd]

No, it is not uncontroversial; it sounds "wrong and disrespectful". France, Sweden or Germany are states, too. Plus there never were 60 million people all working on missiles...

I’d suggest other contributors think about if somewhat sweeping statements were made (like I did inadvertently per above) around a large group of people that they themselves belong, rather than say their country (which in the case of the country would often be read and meant as reference to the Government/ administration in place in that country at the time).
For example references to “China” (as short hand for the government of the People’s Republic of China”) is a lot better than references to “the Chinese” which starts sounding rather racist rather quickly.
Apologies for the digression; I’d also suggest that we get back to topic