A good, but very long and detailed, overview from France on the current position...
View: https://x.com/annebauerbrux/status/2001562016847106235
Google Translation of article
5 p.m., Thursday, December 11. In Berlin, in the large courtyard of the German Ministry of Defense, Boris Pistorius welcomes his counterpart, Catherine Vautrin, in French. Standing on a small red podium in the dark night, the two ministers listen to "La Marseillaise" and the German national anthem, lay a wreath, then hurry upstairs, accompanied by a throng of uniformed military personnel. Time is of the essence.
The goal is to find
a solution to the conflict over the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a key Franco-German project that has been stalled since the summer. Some still hope that President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz will find a solution on the sidelines of the European Council meeting this Wednesday and Thursday. It's far from a done deal
.
A mysterious 80% hegemony
After the meeting, Catherine Vautrin recited a oft-repeated refrain: "We are committed to continuing our joint work on the SCAF (Future Combat Air System) to have a future-proof aircraft and air combat system by 2040 and to studying the conditions for moving into a new phase of development for a demonstrator."
At this stage, these conditions are clearly not met!
The dispute between Dassault and Airbus escalated last week with a letter from the German trade union
IG Metall calling for Dassault's exclusion from the project. The union is demanding a new governance structure that clearly grants it leadership over the core component of the SCAF (Future Combat Air System), the fighter jet, before the construction of a prototype begins.
Officially the prime contractor for the fighter jet, Dassault must contend with a partner, Airbus, which claims a strictly shared cooperation between the three countries involved in the program. Dassault reportedly holds 33% of the project, while Airbus, present in Germany and Spain, holds 66%.
Everything changed last summer when a German specialist newsletter, Hartpunkt, revealed that Dassault was claiming an 80% stake in the future fighter jet project. "Dassault's now clearly stated intention to be responsible for the systems architecture and to have exclusive design authority for the next-generation fighter is, in our opinion, no longer compatible with the idea of cooperation," the German Aerospace, Defense and Security Industries Association (BDLI) immediately denounced.
Hartpunkt's revelation caused such a stir that Sébastien Lecornu, then Minister of Defense, arranged a visit in late July to his counterpart, Boris Pistorius, in his hometown of Osnabrück. The weather was fine. The two men got along well. They had received the same mission, one from Emmanuel Macron, the other from Friedrich Merz: to assess a realistic prospect for future cooperation.
Back at Villacoublay airport, Sébastien Lecornu seemed reassured. Boris Pistorius had reassured him on three points. Germany would allow France the freedom to export the new aircraft. They shared the same vision of the timeline: to have an operational aircraft by 2040. And they agreed on a relatively lightweight aircraft. On this last point, however, the German minister simply downplayed the problem: "The obstacles are not insurmountable."
They do exist, however. It becomes clear that despite three years of work, the engineers from Airbus and Dassault, meeting at the French aircraft manufacturer's headquarters in Saint-Cloud, haven't quite settled on a single, shared model. Of the half a dozen sixth-generation aircraft architectures studied, two remain. "They're not very different; we could reach an agreement," admits a source at Airbus.
If we go towards two aircraft models, there will be no SCAF.
A Safran executive
Berlin wants a powerful, heavy air superiority fighter capable of deploying a swarm of drones. Paris needs a model compatible
with its future aircraft carrier, maneuverable, fast, and agile enough to carry out its nuclear mission. The German version of the NGF (New Generation Fighter) would therefore weigh 2 to 3 tons more than the French version.
Weight is crucial. "In the aircraft of the future, the critical point is the engine," several Air Force generals confirmed to Les Echos. Safran has divided the task with the German engine manufacturer MTU. The French aerospace equipment supplier must first develop the increased-thrust M88 engine for the Rafale F5 on its own, and then leverage it for the SCAF (Future Combat Air System). "MTU is incapable of producing a military engine on its own, especially if the aircraft is heavy. If we end up with two aircraft models, there won't be a SCAF," predicted a Safran executive.
August passes. Upon returning to work, Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier claims he never requested 80% of the workload for the future aircraft, without offering further explanation.
During parliamentary hearings, however, he becomes increasingly assertive, repeatedly stating that a leader, an architect—in short, a pilot in the cockpit—is necessary, and that he doesn't believe in "co-co-co"—three-way joint decision-making—to determine the technology required for a top-of-the-line aircraft. "I want the best athlete to lead, not do everything," he declares.
Airbus, for its part, continues to claim that Dassault wants 80% of the work. In fact, according to an investigation by Les Echos, the misunderstanding about the 80% figure stems from Dassault's responses to a questionnaire from the Combat Project Team, the team of military personnel and engineers monitoring the progress of the FCAS (Future Combat Air System). In this letter, the French aircraft manufacturer states that it can supply up to 80% of the prototype's components. This technical letter, however, was never intended for public release.
Airbus is stuck with intellectual property agreements with BAE Systems.
A source familiar with the work done
"In the future prototype, everyone has to contribute a part of the equipment. For example, Safran will provide the M88 engine. The Spanish responded as best they could, but Airbus Germany did not. Airbus is stuck with intellectual property agreements with BAE Systems on the Eurofighter, which prevents them from contributing," explains a source familiar with the work done.
In Saint-Cloud, relations between Airbus and Dassault engineers have deteriorated. "That's right, Airbus isn't contributing much," confirms another expert. Meanwhile, the damage is done.
The demands of Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier regarding the governance of the project have contributed to inflaming the discussions.
Everyone in Germany is convinced that Dassault wants 80% of the project. "I never knew if French politicians really supported this 80% requirement. We never received a clear signal on the matter," a member of parliament from the ruling coalition told Les Echos.
In Paris, Eric Trappier, exasperated, saw red, raised his voice, and refused to meet with "the German," Michael Schoelhorn, head of Airbus Defence and Space. In this volatile situation, Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz asked their generals to take action.
On November 5th at the Senate, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Fabien Mandon, promised that "French, German, and Spanish military leaders are all in agreement on the need." The German military hierarchy, however, did not respond. "Politicians blame the industrialists, who blame the military; everyone's passing the buck," a high-ranking officer remarked with amusement.
And so the weeks go by. Without meetings, without dialogue. The leaders of Airbus and Dassault are no longer speaking to each other. The ball is in the German court, believes Dassault, which is waging an existential battle. What would become of Dassault Aviation if it were content to build only a third of the aircraft? "We can't ask Dassault to commit suicide; it needs 51% of Pillar 1 of the program, knowing that Airbus dominates other pillars, such as drones and the combat cloud," summarizes a source close to the group.
The idea does not convince everyone. "Dassault's industrial interest is contradictory to the national interest. The national interest, as defined by politicians, is to carry out a program in cooperation, both for a question of political symbolism, but also so that it is less expensive," explains Olivier Schmitt, professor and research director at the Royal Danish Defence College.
Plan Bs are being considered
Berlin is considering alternative plans. Should Germany join the competing sixth-generation aircraft project, GCAP, led by BAE Systems with Leonardo and Mitsubishi Industries, which also includes the UK, Italy, and Japan? The Italian Defense Minister has expressed support, but BAE Systems will be even more ruthless than Dassault in dividing the workload.
Airbus is also looking to Sweden, which has awarded Saab a study contract to design its own sixth-generation aircraft by the end of 2027. For the IG Metall union, Germany, which is going to invest massively in defense, must take advantage of this to become a leader in defense aeronautics again with its national industries.
This crisis situation reinforces the prejudices of some German elected officials and industrialists. "There is a very deep mistrust on the German side regarding the French arms industry's capacity for cooperation. And Dassault has done little, if anything, to dispel this mistrust," explains a German opposition member of parliament.
Across the Rhine, doubts are particularly strong regarding France's ability to finance a next-generation fighter jet on its own, and there are concerns about the potential outcome of the French elections, where extremist parties are fiercely attacking the SCAF (Future Combat Air System). "For us, what's important is making a decision. What we don't want is for people to be afraid to end this cooperation for political reasons when the companies aren't cooperating," said another member of parliament.
Several scenarios are on the table.
At this stage, all scenarios are still possible. A complete break: each side goes its own way and develops its projects according to its needs and timeline. Another scenario involves a period of waiting and continued discussions. The war in Ukraine has altered the hierarchy of military priorities, also giving rise to other Franco-German cooperation projects, particularly in space defense and long-range strikes.
There is also, and finally, the less than glorious path of compromise. Saving certain pillars of the program such as interoperability, the combat cloud, and the adaptation of drones and missiles, even if it means letting Airbus and Dassault develop different prototypes.
"The evolving geopolitical context requires prioritizing genuine industrial projects based on the prospects of both national and export orders, rather than large programs initiated by states to pool investments as was the case during the period of drastic reductions in military budgets," Senators Pascal Allizard and Hélène Conway-Mouret emphasize in a recent report on the European defense industrial and technological base.