may i have to remind you that Rafale is more or less a 80s design ?
This is true for concept - and all aircraft design houses do this work all time.

What matters truly is ability to go end to end (volume production). This is well past desirable point, too, but still we count from early-mid 2000s.

Ideally, new aircraft(or at least deep structural upgrades with full test cycles) should be born at least every ~10-12 years.
 
Germany has pretty much all of it. I can't actually think of anything they're lacking apart from practise, with Mako being the last German project I can think of. Bring in Sweden and the combination is definitely capable. And with France gone, there's nothing to stop them tapping into GCAP for various systems if needed. If permitted by the GCAP partners, of course, but that probably wouldn't be an issue due to the bigger return on investment and the advantages of a bigger installed user base.
Mako never flew... so not sure an old paper aircraft design will be very useful for Airbus DS.

Germany also has major gaps in engine design skills (specifically high pressure turbines). They'll need Rolls Royce or GCAP's engine for that, and I don't see why GCAP countries would agree to enable a direct competitor. They're more likely to offer a license production deal and force Airbus DS to accept junior partner status.

I suspect Germany has no doubt France intends to walk away from the unmanned part of FCAS and buy Dassault's CCA instead. Dassault saying Germany can have all the unmanned bits while flaunting an all-French CCA at Paris is pretty much telling the entire world you think the Germans are gullible idiots.
I think it's likely that the German and French MoDs have divergent visions of UCAV requirements. The FCAS heavy remote carrier is much smaller than a full size UCAV, which is what the Armee de l'Air and Dassault always wanted (including back when FCAS started as a Franco-British project). So yes there's a question whether France will need or want the heavy remote carrier, which is looking more and more like a conceptual dead end anyway, being stuck in the middle between full size UCAVs and cheap disposable light UCAVs.
 
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Germany also has major gaps in engine design skills (specifically high pressure turbines). They'll need Rolls Royce or GCAP's engine for that, and I don't see why GCAP countries would agree to enable a direct competitor. They're more likely to offer a license production deal and force Airbus DS to accept junior partner status.
Germany can in principle go for something smaller and lighter; this would partially resolve similarity.
Maybe indeed with Sweden.

Germans wanted to go lighter at least twice during 80-90s, problem was partners.
 
Mako never flew... so not sure an old paper aircraft design will be very useful for Airbus DS.
Flying's useful, but not really that significant to design capability if you've actually done the design and wind-tunnel work. Mako was around for long enough and gained enough interest I'm presuming there was considerable detailed design work done. Remember, Replica never flew, but no one doubts it was a significant design for BAe.

Germany also has major gaps in engine design skills (specifically high pressure turbines).
Isn't RR Deutschland responsible for the design of the Pearl's high pressure turbine? And even if not they can tap the parent company for expertise. Meanwhile MTU has certainly done HPT work in the past.

I think it's likely that the German and French MoDs have divergent visions of UCAV requirements. The FCAS heavy remote carrier is much smaller than a full size UCAV, which is what the Armee de l'Air and Dassault always wanted (including back when FCAS started as a Franco-British project). So yes there's a question whether France will need or want the heavy remote carrier, which is looking more and more like a conceptual dead end anyway, being stuck in the middle between full size UCAVs and cheap disposable light UCAVs.
You're basically confirming my point that France is unlikely to purchase the unmanned SCAF element and that Germany are being offered full control of something that won't proceed.
 
Germans wanted to go lighter at least twice during 80-90s, problem was partners.
More precisely, Germany in the '90s wanted to go cheaper (because reunification) and taking out an engine and buying a cheaper radar was the simplest way to achieve that that made sense to Volker Ruhe. That the resulting aircraft would be lighter is a consequence, not the intention.
 
@DWG The T-7 Redhawk debacle should be a reminder that the hard part isn't detailed design. It's flying, testing and fixing the issues that will inevitably crop up, and then ensuring reliable real world performance and upgrades. German readers should be familiar with this, if they recall Eurofighter's painful, protracted and expensive flight testing and software development. ;-)

My understanding is that RR Deutschland's experiance in civilian turbofans won't carry over into military turbofans with much more exacting performance requirements, temperature transients, supersonic airflow etc. Plus there's a question mark about how much of the BR700 / Pearl development required help from RR UK.

I'm just speculating re: what France and Germany are thinking about UCAVs. My point is that the USAF and China both seem to be walking away from cheap loyal wingmen to more sophisticated, non-attritable high-performance UCAVs, so it wouldn't be surprising if the Armee de l'Air is also following the same trend given similar constraints (e.g. physical laws - Breguet range equation - and cost effectiveness, sensor suite requirements etc). Especially as the original Franco-British FCAS studies envisioned a large UCAV. I suspect the Luftwaffe will also end up favoring large UCAVs, but they don't seem to have made up their mind yet.
 
German readers should be familiar with this, if they recall Eurofighter's painful, protracted and expensive flight testing and software development. ;-)

Having been on the project at the time, I'd actually call the development straightforward.
 
More precisely, Germany in the '90s wanted to go cheaper (because reunification) and taking out an engine and buying a cheaper radar was the simplest way to achieve that that made sense to Volker Ruhe. That the resulting aircraft would be lighter is a consequence, not the intention.
I am still against wasting resources for little gain due to corruption. There are far more efficient ways to deter Russia than repeating the same "solution" from the past 20 years - namely, throwing money at the problem. How has that worked out so far?

The only valuable addition to the existing European force base would be counter-drone systems and more IADS; everything else is already sufficient for facing Russia (besides conscription). Europe combined has the third-largest and most technologically advanced force in the world, ffs!

You and I both know that throwing more taxpayer money at these importunate money wasters won't solve the problem; not backing down, asserting your position, and holding your ground against Russian provocations will.
 
Having been on the project at the time, I'd actually call the development straightforward.
So you don't agree with the extensive reports of multiple Eurofighter systems, safety and quality defects which delayed operational readiness by years? (I understand you were involved on the FCS side, so you may have better insider knowledge than the public media reports)

(Rear fuselage structural flaws, FCS software that had to be rewritten from the ground up to eliminate Pilot Induced Oscillation, Qinetiq test pilots discovering 2 critical flight safety flaws related to unexpected stall behavior and bug causing the FCS to switch in-flight to ground mode, Luftwaffe almost losing an aircraft due to an FCS overbanking bug, EJ200 engine surges which caused DA6 crash, Austria complaining about dozens of quality/safety issues, unexpected high alpha problems that led to AMK wing modification kit, Tranche 1 standard that had so much obsolete hardware it couldn't be upgraded, landing gear failures...).

Again my point isn't necessarily to trash Eurofighter - other aircraft have also had their share of issues, e.g. A400M, NH90 - but more to illustrate that until an aircraft flies, the hard work hasn't yet really started. And also secondarily it seems that aircraft developed in multinational partnership don't appear to have a great track record (Tornado being the exception perhaps? Though it had its issues too).
 
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I am still against wasting resources for little gain due to corruption.

I've still seen zero evidence of corruption. Perhaps you could cite a few cases?
There are far more efficient ways to deter Russia than repeating the same "solution" from the past 20 years - namely, throwing money at the problem. How has that worked out so far?
Who knows, because no one has been throwing money at defence.

The only valuable addition to the existing European force base would be counter-drone systems and more IADS; everything else is already sufficient for facing Russia (besides conscription).
When some NATO nations had completely scrapped their air defence capability, or their armoured forces, I'd hesitate to call them sufficient to face Russia. Even extant forces tend to be a shadow of the 1980s TOEs, with cuts at every level of manning. We need counter-drone capabilities, true, but that's not the only threadbare patch in our defences.

You and I both know that throwing more taxpayer money at these importunate money wasters won't solve the problem; not backing down, asserting your position, and holding your ground against Russian provocations will.
Thanks for telling me what I know. As it happens, that isn't what I believe. I'm all for asserting our position, but that needs to be backed by defence investment now, because Russia post-Ukraine will regenerate a combat ready force faster than NATO will be able to create one from scratch. It's precisely the situation we saw in the late '40s - the Western Allies knew post-WW2 Russia couldn't take them on in 1950, but given their likely regeneration a 'Year of Maximum Danger' could be postulated about 1957 and the Western Allies needed to start reacting to that immediately, not in five years time.
 
So you don't agree with the extensive reports of multiple Eurofighter systems, safety and quality defects which delayed operational readiness by years?
What significantly delayed operational readiness were persistent delays in funding (usually on the German part) and intentional slow-down of work due to the 'peace dividend'. The main issue we faced at our level was delayed delivery of requirements from the customer side.

FCS software that had to be rewritten from the ground up to eliminate Pilot Induced Oscillation,
There was a rework (the year before I joined the team), but that was considerably short of a rework from the ground up* and was due to newly recognised risks in the combination of highly unstable aircraft, flight control systems, and pilots that no one anywhere understood the gravity of until the investigations into the YF-22 and Gripen crashes. Rather than starting again from the ground up it was essentially just inserting a bunch of mathematical filters. Overall, it's roughly like complaining that no one had a Covid vaccine ready in December 2021.

* Anyone claiming that doesn't understand which is the difficult part of flight control software. Hint, it's not the flight control laws. A rework from the ground up would have taken considerably more than a year.

Qinetiq test pilots discovering 2 critical flight safety flaws related to unexpected stall behavior and bug causing the FCS to switch in-flight to ground mode, Luftwaffe almost losing an aircraft due to an FCS overbanking bug,

This is why we do flight testing, and design by contract (pretty much the first programme to do that - the Qinetiq guys coming in for software reviews were involved in the development of the SPARK verifier). I don't recall any panic fixes, and I was doing the delivery builds, so would have known. This is no worse than for, instance, 777 (we did daily builds on 777, 18 monthly deliveries on Eurofighter). NB: I'm not saying these things didn't happen and weren't fixed, simply that they weren't serious enough to require an urgent fix, and fall within the normal range of issues discovered during flight testing on any project - such as 777 having two decompression incidents, one of which put at least one flight test engineer in hospital, and that time it didn't want to land. At that point in time aviation was lucky if it got through a year without at least one fatal crash of a prototype aircraft.

EJ200 engine surges which caused DA6 crash

Not engine surges, a failure in flight-test design according to https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...ng-787-8-crash-in-ahmedabad.46675/post-801796 Sole needed fix: 'lets not do that again'.

Austria complaining about dozens of quality/safety issues
And only Austria, odd that.
 
Why such lengthy comments on the Eurofighters in this FCAS thread? What that has to have with it? The professionalism of retired old men & Women has nothing to do with FCAS today. Also those problems are fairly famous (but often wrongly reported), we probably don´t need another lengthy discussion here.
Why don´t you meet in the Eurofighter Thread or jus create a new discussion? I am sure we will be plenty to appreciate that touch of attention.
 
Why such lengthy comments on the Eurofighters in this FCAS thread? What that has to have with it? The professionalism of retired old men & Women has nothing to do with FCAS today.
It’s relevant because the Eurofighter and Rafale experiences are clearly driving negotiating positions on both sides.

With Dassault saying they don’t want a repeat Eurofighter and can do everything alone « from A to Z » if necessary. And Airbus DS saying there’s nothing wrong with the Eurofighter model, it’s OK to allocate work to companies that aren’t the « best athlete », and they can find other partners like Saab if necessary.
 
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You can't just hire people to solve the issue
You need an entire industrial ecosystem.
Both Germany and spain have partial ecosystems, Spain's is lot less developed than germany's.
Well you can hire people to tell you what you need and then build it step by step. Of course you can't snap you're finger for it
 
@DWG The T-7 Redhawk debacle should be a reminder that the hard part isn't detailed design. It's flying, testing and fixing the issues that will inevitably crop up, and then ensuring reliable real world performance and upgrades. German readers should be familiar with this, if they recall Eurofighter's painful, protracted and expensive flight testing and software development. ;-)

My understanding is that RR Deutschland's experiance in civilian turbofans won't carry over into military turbofans with much more exacting performance requirements, temperature transients, supersonic airflow etc. Plus there's a question mark about how much of the BR700 / Pearl development required help from RR UK.

I'm just speculating re: what France and Germany are thinking about UCAVs. My point is that the USAF and China both seem to be walking away from cheap loyal wingmen to more sophisticated, non-attritable high-performance UCAVs, so it wouldn't be surprising if the Armee de l'Air is also following the same trend given similar constraints (e.g. physical laws - Breguet range equation - and cost effectiveness, sensor suite requirements etc). Especially as the original Franco-British FCAS studies envisioned a large UCAV. I suspect the Luftwaffe will also end up favoring large UCAVs, but they don't seem to have made up their mind yet.
As far as my knowledge goes they want both but not both are part of FCAS. Only the smaller ones (cruise missile like remote carrier) and the slighty bigger one are part of FCAS.
 
A lot of focus is being put on the "metal bashing" skills to get something that outwardly looks like a whatever a 5th or 6th Gen fighter is meant to look like.

But Western experience with F-22 and F-35 (no equivalent published information on J-20 etc.) indicate that this is the "easy" bit for current combat aircraft.

The key skills are things such as:
  • Avionics and Mission Systems and integrating these together with the airframe, pilot and wider system
  • The massive software enterprise that writes the functionality into what are predominantly software-defined systems. And keeps this updated.
  • The management of a complex multi-national supplier and consumer base across multiple aircraft standards
 
It isn't anything positive from experience point of view.
How so? Eurofighter, jointly developed with partners, has been widely exported, is periodically modernized (rather recently the radar upgrades are being rolled out) and none of these aircraft were lost in combat.

While being able to evaluate why an aircraft was successfully shot down has some value in trying to address a potential deficit, one would argue not getting shot down in the first place is the more valuable experience. A bridge that doesn't collapse may not be an exciting case study, but most people will prefer it over a bridge that did collapse.
 
A strikingly bold remark ...


The stalemate between Berlin and Paris has triggered concern among Airbus workers in Germany. “Employees want clarity,” said Thomas Pretzl, chair of the works council for Airbus Defence and Space, noting that a decision was needed “soon on what will happen next with FCAS”.

“I believe that FCAS will come without Dassault,’
’ he added. ‘‘There are more attractive and suitable partners in Europe.”
 
"Trappier said Dassault was arguing for clearer control of the core crewed fighter component of the project, while granting Airbus similar room for manoeuvre in the parts of the wider manned and unmanned system for which it has responsibility."

I suspect Germany has no doubt France intends to walk away from the unmanned part of FCAS and buy Dassault's CCA instead. Dassault saying Germany can have all the unmanned bits while flaunting an all-French CCA at Paris is pretty much telling the entire world you think the Germans are gullible idiots.
The french UCAV along Rafale F5 is a stop gap solution. nothing more.
Rafale F5 : 2032 target.
SCAF : 2045 target now.
 
French government replies to the German media offensive with its own background briefings. Key points:
  • France and Germany are diverging on timelines and aircraft weight, with Germany being willing to wait longer and spend more, while France wants to stick to the original 15-ton empty weight target. France also refuses to risk any delays to the original in service target date of 2040 and fears a cost blowout.
  • Unresolved intellectual property concerns (about sharing French IP) and about the capabilities of some German suppliers
  • It is implied that a recent joint audit was heavily critical of the program
  • France still open to partnership with Spain and other countries using a subcontractor model (similar to Neuron)
All the above leading the French side to insist on a governance model that gives Dassault the leadership role, with better accountability to deliver on weight / cost / timeline goals.

After Dassault, an official French source assures that "we have the capacity to make the plane on our own"

A recent audit conducted by the Combined Project Team, representing the partner governments, has sparked a crisis of confidence
among manufacturers. Airbus accuses Dassault of wanting 80% of the program—a claim strongly contested by the French aircraft manufacturer, which emphasizes governance and questions German industrial capabilities in the field of combat aircraft. Intellectual property issues remain unresolved.

There is an urgent need to break the current impasse. Indeed, Phase 1B of the program is coming to an end, and Phase 2 should be launched at the end of the year, in order to build an NGF demonstrator, perhaps in 2029. According to official French sources, " one possible path would be to move the cursors between the different pillars of the program." If France and Dassault obtain satisfaction on the NGF pillar, other manufacturers (Thales, MBDA for example) may have to give in to German and Spanish demands.

For the French authorities, the key issue now is the timetable. "The current organization does not allow us to respect it", they assure us, it must therefore be reviewed. "With or without SCAF, there should be no doubt that France will have a combat aircraft capable of ensuring the nuclear deterrent mission in 2040. We have the capacity to make this aircraft on our own, in a sovereign manner and on time," assures a French official source.

Another concern, as seen from Paris: the aircraft's weight. The initial agreement was for a fifteen-ton empty aircraft (compared to a little over 10 tons for the Rafale). However, the Germans now want a heavier aircraft. This is out of the question for France: the NGF must be able to operate on the future aircraft carrier—which imposes weight limits. And above all, a heavier aircraft would require more powerful engines, which will have to be developed. Developing a new engine is a technical risk that could delay the program. The French side recognizes that Germany has both "the time and the money to do it."

In the event that the FCAS program is abandoned, or at least its NGF pillar, official French sources do not exclude "calling on the industrial expertise of our European partners", as subcontractors. For Paris and Dassault, this includes keeping Spain on board—Spain being the last major European country not equipped with the F-35. Other cooperation opportunities could be considered, including outside Europe.

Without an agreement with Germany, Paris is ready to develop FCAS "alone"

"If we are unable to reach an agreement on how to reorganize the program, France is able to make the fighter alone, however that does not mean it will be exclusively French," said the official on condition of anonymity, echoing the position expressed by Dassault Aviation, the industrial leader of the project for France.
 
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P.S. The sentences about being open to non-French subcontractors and to more German workshare in the other FCAS pillars (along with past comments about the "best athlete" model) also implies that the French side has likely fewer concerns about partnering with other German companies (Hensoldt, Diehl, MTU) but is very concerned about Airbus DS's capability gaps and doesn't want a governance model that allows Airbus DS to influence design decisions and grab too much of the German workshare.
 
Good luck to France in developing the FCAS alone. I would think that after developing the Rafale alone I would think that FCAS should be no problem.
France may have no choice but go it alone and they probably will succeed. On the GCAP front, too many players and too much potential conflict.
 
Raw quotes taken from today’s hearing of E.Trappier at the french parliament.
It's multiple answers bundled together, sorry for the presentation... And i used an LLM to extract the quotes and translate them

--> View: https://www.youtube.com/live/nvi6IjuyJKg

And we have a future SCAF project, in which the challenges are of all kinds, in reality, and not just, as you might read in the press, a rivalry between Dassault and Airbus, although I do not hide that rivalry.

Regarding SCAF, I will just remind you of one thing: I do not want to put myself in the place of the authorities of the country.
I am only giving a technical opinion : do I know how to build a combat aircraft from A to Z, in France, of sixth generation?
I repeat it in front of all of you: the answer is yes.


Do I refuse to cooperate with Pierre, Paul, or Jacques? The answer is no. I am ready to cooperate with anyone, designated by the political authorities. It is not up to me to decide with whom we should work or not.

I did it with the Neuron; we cooperated with Swedes, Italians, Spaniards... It went very well. I will give you a key reason why it went well: it’s the recognition that France is a leader in these fields. Dassault Aviation is a leader in the field of combat aviation in Europe. If the partners acknowledge this, there is no problem in cooperating.

Today, the reason why I am raising my voice is because my partners do not recognize the fact that I am a leader
. So it is useless to put papers and billions on the table if this kind of understanding is not acknowledged.

Germany, last week, at the highest level, said: “We are ready… we are ready to exclude France from the program.” That is a bit strange... They are going to exclude us from a domain we know and from a program we launched. I will leave them to their statements.

And I repeat: we can do it on our own.


Where I disagree, and I say it loudly and clearly, is that if we want combat aircraft capable of doing the job tomorrow against Americans who are progressing, and against Chinese who are progressing ever faster, we must make the best.

I do not understand how, in an industrial and technological field of this level—which is top-level and surely one of the most complex in the world—I am imposed a governance system that is not based on competence. That’s all I’m saying.

It is not me who says: “I don’t want Germany.” Germany says: “I want equality in Franco-German relations.”


But it is up to the state to say this, for France to take governmental leadership and act as the reference agency… And I do not see why the Germans do not accept it.

So, it’s just that, at my level, if we want the best weapons for France—such as for its airborne nuclear component, or for making a carrier-compatible aircraft—give me the keys to be able to lead it.

That does not mean I want to do everything alone. I will be the architect, that’s what I’m saying. And in front of me, I have people who say: “No, no, every technical, political, tactical decision will be taken by three.”

And among those three, I have one Dassault and two Airbus… including Airbus which depends on Airbus Germany. So in reality, I always have two against one.


I state this very clearly in front of you today. I am not saying we should not work with others. In fact, we did it with the Neuron, and I am not questioning the political authority. The one who will have to engage to get the job done, it’s me.

One last point: if cooperation must cost more to the French budget, that is a choice.
I will take my part, I will stand at attention.
I just tell you that if you want to spend less and get a better aircraft, still look at the rules of industrial governance. And that’s my part, and it’s up to me to say it, and I take responsibility for it.

I don’t do three-cushion shots; I don’t know how and I don’t need to. I am simple.
The approach with SCAF is simple: I ask for the reality of being able to exercise the role of an architect.

If you take two architects and say both are right, you will have two different houses. And if in the end it becomes a single house, it will be somewhat unstable.

I am just asking for clarity. I am not against the project; I said it again yesterday to the press.

But still: When Germany says, “We will exclude the French,” doesn’t that bother you, French politicians?

Germany is going to exclude the French from a combat aircraft development project, all because Dassault says he would still like to have the keys to lead… It’s strange that you don’t react, and I am the only one reacting. So this is indeed a raising-of-the-voice moment.

It is a raising-of-the-voice moment because I know the Germans. Contrary to what one might think, it is the Bundestag that is driving this.

And the Bundestag, what it wants is that the industrial company it sees every day has more work than the other.

Competence, knowing if the aircraft will be effective, that’s not their concern. Believe me, that’s not their concern
.

So we just need a balance of power : what do we want?

We want project management, because behind it, you have military personnel who will use this aircraft in 15 or 20 years. It will have to be good.

If it were only about money, I would take the budget and do the bare minimum like the others.
But I am not like that. So it is a raising-of-the-voice moment, perhaps a negotiation; some may think it is a negotiation… but it’s about leverage. It’s like with every topic: unfortunately today, if you do not create leverage, you do not get results. Every negotiation works this way.

First : my number-one answer is: if we can do SCAF, I am happy, with an ad-hoc governance.

Second : the Eurofighter, for me, is not the model. Ask the air force and Navy staff: would they prefer a Eurofighter or a Rafale? The answer is simple: they didn’t make the right product. So it is not a model of cooperation. They were in this “co–co–co…” model; there was no real leader, although the British had to be slightly more in the lead than the others. But the British are not with us today.

So that’s what I want to point out: it’s not cooperation I am questioning.

We can cooperate tomorrow, but I tell you: it has to be effective cooperation.


And once again, I repeat, I can do it alone, but it must be recognized by the others.

And that’s what I am asking.
I am not saying: “I want to be the boss because I am the best, and everyone else stand at attention.”
I would like the others to say: “Since we recognize that your skills are superior, because you’ve been working in this field with your company for over 70 years, and you’ve built all types of aircraft from the Ouragan to the Rafale, we give you the baton as leader, as architect, with these responsibilities…”


What I am asking is concrete. I say it loudly because no one else says it loudly.

And i am not saying our politicians don't understand it, but how do you enforce it ?
 
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"the Eurofighter, for me, is not the model. Ask the air force and Navy staff: would they prefer a Eurofighter or a Rafale? The answer is simple: they didn’t make the right product. So it is not a model of cooperation."

That statement is utterly illogical. 'The Eurofighter didn't meet French requirements, so it is not a model for how the industrial partnership should work'.

The requirements and the industrial partnership model are two separate and utterly unconnected issues. You could have built the Rafale under the Eurofighter model, or the Eurofighter under the Rafale model.
 
Ouch, sounds like a mad despot.
These automatic translations aren’t perfect. People should focus on the substance of what he is saying.

Which is that he believes that the Eurofighter model led to poor outcomes (high cost, delays, a less suitable aircraft…) due to the violation of several basic good governance principles (eg. clear leader, best athlete, no veto rights etc).

This is the core issue, not arguments about workshare. The German side truly appears to believe that there is nothing wrong with the Eurofighter model or with how the Bundestag sabotaged it along the way, and appear to be unwilling to engage on the substance of the French concerns. These French concerns also appear to have hardened after a few years of experiencing the German partnership approach first hand, and interestingly the Brits and Italians have kept the Germans at arms length which implies that they also wouldn’t want a repeat Eurofighter.

Of course some friction is normal and Trappier may not be the easiest partner, which makes things worse, but the real news for me today is that they can’t even agree (apparently) on NGF’s empty weight… (shades of AFVG!). Now how do you fix something that fundamental?!
 
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Substance of what he's saying is he wants to be the leader and for others to do whatever he says, he says he cant work with equals, he can only work with those that bow down to him and obey unquestioning and he doesn't understand why the Germans don't accept that. He seems to think Dassault is the only company in Europe that can design a plane and that Neuron worked because the Spanish and the Swedes recognised that Dassault was the undisputed leader in aviation design.
 
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It's surprising that there isn't more discussion of alternative Industrial models rather than just repeating the "Rafale programme good, Eurofighter programme bad" line. There are plenty of alternatives that could be better for the programme. There seems to be little discussion of the pros and cons of different models, bringing in the precious experience of the different companies, to then work out what is the best approach for this particular programme.
 
French government replies to the German media offensive with its own background briefings. Key points:
  • France and Germany are diverging on timelines and aircraft weight, with Germany being willing to wait longer and spend more, while France wants to stick to the original 15-ton empty weight target. France also refuses to risk any delays to the original in service target date of 2040 and fears a cost blowout.
  • Unresolved intellectual property concerns (about sharing French IP) and about the capabilities of some German suppliers
  • It is implied that a recent joint audit was heavily critical of the program
  • France still open to partnership with Spain and other countries using a subcontractor model (similar to Neuron)
All the above leading the French side to insist on a governance model that gives Dassault the leadership role, with better accountability to deliver on weight / cost / timeline goals.


Germany is a bad partner for France. Let them go. At the end they will order F-47 so as to export BMW and Merco.
 
"the Eurofighter, for me, is not the model. Ask the air force and Navy staff: would they prefer a Eurofighter or a Rafale? The answer is simple: they didn’t make the right product. So it is not a model of cooperation."

That statement is utterly illogical. 'The Eurofighter didn't meet French requirements, so it is not a model for how the industrial partnership should work'.

The requirements and the industrial partnership model are two separate and utterly unconnected issues. You could have built the Rafale under the Eurofighter model, or the Eurofighter under the Rafale model.
See the export market. It is the sole real answer.
 
I'd like to hear more about this joint audit - sounds more like the kind of inter-partner work that's going on that we're not hearing about due to the political-level loudspeakers on both sides. And it s
There must be at some level an industrial-level collaboration that's going on that's non-public that might not even reflect what's going on at the macro political-industrial level.

I guess fundamentally collaboration in built into Airbus's management DNA having always been a multi-national company. Therefore I'm surprised that Airbus wouldn't know how to collaborate or how to set up a joint programme of this magnitude - regardless of the what the politician's might want. As I've said before, at some stage the politicos have to butt out and let industry get on with it.
Dassault is not used to that environment, appointing sub-contractors is not the same thing as collaborative design. Both sides seem to be talking a different language and without compromise it's not going to hold together.

But the weight issue sounds like a repeat of the ACX Vs EFA all over again - carrier constraints are a pain in the butt but something that France cannot ignore - and they could never countenance ordering F-35Bs or F-35Cs to overcome the issue.
Talk of allowing Airbus Spain sub-contractor rights because Spain hasn't ordered F-35's seems a rather shallow motive - given most of Europe has ordered F-35s, Dassault's subcontractor options are likely to be pretty thin soon...
 
Last Trappier/Dassault quotes from the hearing
I firmly reject the so-called “80% claim.” It’s fake. As often happens, people listen to the rumor, but I denied that figure. And yet, they keep saying that Dassault is demanding 80%.

What I am asking, within the principle of being the architect, is, for example, to have the choice of subcontractors.

One can be an architect without being the prime contractor, but in this case, I am being asked to be the prime contractor.
All three states agree and ask me to act as prime contractor
. So I am also asking for the tools that allow me to fulfill that role.

I already refused, in India at the time, to take responsibility for the 126 aircraft if I didn’t have the choice of subcontractors.
I will do the same with the SCAF. If I am the prime contractor/architect, and I am asked to assume the responsibilities, then I must also have the freedom to choose my subcontractors.

But today, that is not the case: choices are made by three. And again, in principle, deciding by three doesn’t bother me… except that it’s two against one. So what am I supposed to do?

Put yourself in my place: I am being given responsibilities, but I cannot fully assume them.

That’s what I am asking to change the rules. Because today, they tell me: “OK, you are the competent one, OK, you are the prime contractor, OK, you are the architect… but you will do what we say.”
Well, it doesn’t work like that. Because with three, there’s always a vote, and it ends up two against one.


And I am not even sure that the future NGF will be exportable… So I hope we will build a smaller aircraft.
This is one of the difficult issues at the moment, and it has nothing to do with Dassault and Airbus: it is much broader than that.


A smaller aircraft will cost less per unit than if it were bigger, and we will still be able to export it.
Because I don’t believe that, over the next 30 years, we will manage to export enough of it, even if we build it as a Franco-German project.
 
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Last Trappier/Dassault quotes from the hearing
Would a smaller aircraft be able to have enough electrical power and cooling?
From what i know electrical power generation is one of the primary aspects of 6th gen fighters in development.
 
But today, that is not the case: choices are made by three. And again, in principle, deciding by three doesn’t bother me… except that it’s two against one.
I don't think Trappier is cut out for a program of the magnitude and complexity of FCAS if that's already where he falters. I think it would be in the interest of France, the FCAS and the other partners if he gets replaced by someone more competent and cooperative soon. Which may be a step towards getting this joint program out of the quagmire it's currently in.
 

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