To add to the difficulties the French expressed considerable disappointment at the decision to focus the Feasibility Studies on the two US systems.96 They offered to examine ‘stretching’ ASMP, to create a new missile, the so called ASMP II, or as it was otherwise known the Substrategic Air-to-Surface missile (SASM). However, they themselves had no requirement for such a weapon, which would have involved research, development and cost, for only a modest increase in range, the end result of which would still probably have fallen short of UK requirements.97 As a result, Younger ‘encouraged discussions with the French on their ideas for a successor’ missile, known as the Air Sol Longue Portee (ASLP).98 However, this new missile was only at the concept stage, and its projected in-service date was 2010, well beyond the timescale of British needs. Despite this, dialogue continued ‘as a hedge against an adverse turn of events in the United States’, as an ‘insurance policy’.99 In early July 1989, the French provided the UK with a briefing on their new proposals and the first detailed technical specifications of the ASMP II (SASM). A series of further discussions and technical exchanges then took place, and a feasibility study was conducted, to ‘further permit the establishment of a baseline upon which subsequent collaboration between our two countries on a system of this kind could be founded.’100
Following exchanges of information, and visits by UK officials to the French state owned aerospace company, Aerospatiale, the French
proposed another new missile, known as the Air Sol Moyenne Portee, ASLP-D2, a ‘sophisticated development of the basic ASMP ramjet vehicle incorporating stealth techniques, with provision for guidance and offering longer range’, ‘which, on paper at least’, met UK needs.101 However, it was ‘little more than a technology demonstrator’, required ‘extensive funding and maybe an input of UK know how’, and its in-service date was uncertain.102 Assessing the feasibility of mating the planned UK warhead, which was based on the US warhead for the SRAM-T to a French missile could only be pursued to a certain extent without involving the US in the exchange of sensitive information, such as the physical characteristics of the nuclear package and various aspects of the warhead/missile interface103
To assess ASLP-D2 it was necessary to undertake a detailed study of the ASMP Mk.II (SASM) and discussions were held with French officials to define the framework and management structure under which a Feasibility Study of their vehicles could take place. In December 1989, the EPC(N) authorized the extension of the Feasibility Studies to permit an expanded examination of the two French systems, which in turn delayed the completion of the full Feasibility study until the summer of 1990.104 By this time the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) had completed the payload studies, which established that a common vehicle to payload interface could be adopted for the two US systems and probably for SASM, enabling progress on the payload to continue in isolation from vehicle selection to preserve the in-service date, and the first projected underground nuclear test of the warhead in 1993. An exchange mechanism was eventually devised to allow the Feasibility Study of French vehicles to proceed in the form of a Government to Government Arrangement to permit the UK access to French design information (caveated for both commercial and security reasons) and to allow the French full access to the UK Staff Target, which was classified Secret.105 US warhead ‘envelope data’ was also provided to the French to aid the study.106