Comet R2 and Nimrod R1

[Hood]

There is a little on the genesis of the Comet R.2 and Nimrod R.1 in Richard Aldrich's book 'GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency.' I thought I'd share these since some of it might be interesting info.

Probably the decision to equip Comets as sigint platforms goes back to a US/UK elint conference of December 1952, Canberra was soon delivered but the Treasury dragged its heels on Comet for about a year. Three airframes were converted at CSE Watton by the Special Radio Installation Flight (SRIF). Work began in the spring of 1957 but one airframe was destroyed in a hangar fire on 3 June 1959. Two years elapsed before GCHQ could persuade the Treasury to release funds to replace it.

The decision to replace the Comets was made perhaps as early as 1961 (Draft Air Staff Targets CR/3614 and CR/3615 Jan 1961). A secret group, the Technical Committee of London Signals Intelligence Committee, headed by Ken Perrin began looking into future elint research in November 1961. This group had been behind the development of Peter Wright's 'Airborne Rafter' programme hunting for KGB agent's radio transmissions over Britain. The committee reported back that tactical elint collection over the Eastern Bloc borders was a future need and in 1962 Plessey was awarded a development contract for a "experimental sideways-looking elint system." This system was covered under Air Staff Requirement 817 'Sideways Looking Airborne Search Reviewing System.' Aldrich claims this as the offical start of the what became the Nimrod R.1 programme. In March 1964 the London Signals Intelligence Committee agreed the need for a replacement. It looked at cost effectiveness of different aircraft, Aldrich mentions the Boeing 707 (whether this was an EC-135 derivative is not mentioned in the book) but Nimrod came out cheapest. Then Air Staff Requirement 389 was written. Aldrich claims no-one questioned the choice of Nimrod, especially on cost grounds but the £14 million budget was too much for the sigint budget so it was buried in the strategic nuclear weapons budget and thus was borne by Strike Command as a sigint platform to aid nucelar targetting. On a related note, in 1972 sigint personnel witnessed trials of Gaurdrail II in Vietnam. Indeed it seems British operators were interested in the Gaurdrail programme when it began but they felt the light aircraft would be vulnerable unless kept far behind the lines.

 

[Spark]

Hi,
The Vickers V1000 would have acted as radio air warfare platform, with a 3mile ceiling advantage over the Comet.
It was a dictum of the Air Staff that it should operate at the same altitudes and speeds as the V bombers.
I understand the B29 Washington was used for the same purpose.
I remember seeing a Privateer at RAF Coningsby,1950 that may have been used for the same purpose.

There is a little on the genesis of the Comet R.2 and Nimrod R.1 in Richard Aldrich's book 'GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency.' I thought I'd share these since some of it might be interesting info.

Probably the decision to equip Comets as sigint platforms goes back to a US/UK elint conference of December 1952, Canberra was soon delivered but the Treasury dragged its heels on Comet for about a year. Three airframes were converted at CSE Watton by the Special Radio Installation Flight (SRIF). Work began in the spring of 1957 but one airframe was destroyed in a hangar fire on 3 June 1959. Two years elapsed before GCHQ could persuade the Treasury to release funds to replace it.

The decision to replace the Comets was made perhaps as early as 1961 (Draft Air Staff Targets CR/3614 and CR/3615 Jan 1961). A secret group, the Technical Committee of London Signals Intelligence Committee, headed by Ken Perrin began looking into future elint research in November 1961. This group had been behind the development of Peter Wright's 'Airborne Rafter' programme hunting for KGB agent's radio transmissions over Britain. The committee reported back that tactical elint collection over the Eastern Bloc borders was a future need and in 1962 Plessey was awarded a development contract for a "experimental sideways-looking elint system." This system was covered under Air Staff Requirement 817 'Sideways Looking Airborne Search Reviewing System.' Aldrich claims this as the offical start of the what became the Nimrod R.1 programme. In March 1964 the London Signals Intelligence Committee agreed the need for a replacement. It looked at cost effectiveness of different aircraft, Aldrich mentions the Boeing 707 (whether this was an EC-135 derivative is not mentioned in the book) but Nimrod came out cheapest. Then Air Staff Requirement 389 was written. Aldrich claims no-one questioned the choice of Nimrod, especially on cost grounds but the £14 million budget was too much for the sigint budget so it was buried in the strategic nuclear weapons budget and thus was borne by Strike Command as a sigint platform to aid nucelar targetting. On a related note, in 1972 sigint personnel witnessed trials of Gaurdrail II in Vietnam. Indeed it seems British operators were interested in the Gaurdrail programme when it began but they felt the light aircraft would be vulnerable unless kept far behind the lines.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The Vickers V1000 would have acted as radio air warfare platform, with a 3mile ceiling advantage over the Comet.
It was a dictum of the Air Staff that it should operate at the same altitudes and speeds as the V bombers.

I have never seen a reference for the V1000 electronic role myself and I would also be careful about assuming that Comet R2/Nimrod R1 are part of the same requirement as this V1000 scheme. The original 240 aircraft/33 squadron V-Force plan included one "special signals" squadron in addition to two photo reconnaissance squadrons. It is unclear whether this was a countermeasures squadron or an ELINT squadron. I suspect the former, in the early days the V-Bombers did not carry their own countermeasures so would likely have had to rely on dedicated aircraft, only later (with the B.1A/B.2 versions) were countermeasures pushed down into the bombers themselves. One squadron of Valiants was equipped for the countermeasures role (No18; formerly No199) but was disbanded in March 1963 (a full 18 months prior to the fatigue issues of the Valiant becoming apparent).

 

[Spark]

Hi,

The V1000 referance was in documents at PRO Kew. just an obsevation thanks for the reply.



The best choice based on performance was the Handley Page development of the B.35/46 Victor

from notes,

November 1951 fuselage diameter increased to cater for 120 troops.

O.R. 315 was issued in August 1952 The principle types of operation for which the aircraft was to be used were now defined as.

(a) Large scale transfer of personnel and equipment between theatres
(b) Radio warfare
(c) Movement of a Canberra wing including ground echelon including spares from U.K. to Singapore
(d) Prolonged airlift of personnel and equipment at the rate of 100 personnel or 25,000 lbs. per day to the Far East.
(e) Carriage of light freight such as jet engines or jeeps.
(f) It was also a dictum of the Air Staff that in the support role it should be capable of flying at the same speed and altitude as the V-Bomber Force.

The Vickers V1000 would have acted as radio air warfare platform, with a 3mile ceiling advantage over the Comet.
It was a dictum of the Air Staff that it should operate at the same altitudes and speeds as the V bombers.

I have never seen a reference for the V1000 electronic role myself and I would also be careful about assuming that Comet R2/Nimrod R1 are part of the same requirement as this V1000 scheme. The original 240 aircraft/33 squadron V-Force plan included one "special signals" squadron. It is unclear whether this was a countermeasures squadron or an ELINT squadron. I suspect the former, in the early days the V-Bombers did not carry their own countermeasures so would likely have had to rely on dedicated aircraft, only later (with the B.1A/B.2 versions) were countermeasures pushed down into the bombers themselves. One squadron of Valiants was equipped for the countermeasures role (No18; formerly No199) but was disbanded in March 1963 (a full 18 months prior to the fatigue issues of the Valiant becoming apparent).

 

[Spark]

Hi,
Thanks, The west lost 50 aircraft over the Eastern Bloc in the decade following WW2. I remember the reports of the Swedish spy plane with British kit that was shot down in the Baltic followed by reports of the SR aircraft being shot down when it was sent to look for survivors. At a later date the V1000 c56,000ftceiling whould have been useful.

A bit more on OR.315 here: http://www.aviation-news.co.uk/archive/support1.html

At first glance the radio warfare requirement sticks out like a sore thumb compared to the rest of the requirement and the core thrust of the role, but I have seen references to the fuselage of a valiant being a bit tight for the various equipment required for the EW bomber support role so there may have been thought to using an airframe with a bit more space.


What is interesting about both of the programmes Hood has teased out of the book he is currently reading is the manner in which GCHQ was driving platform requirements that then became blistered onto the core capabilities of the services, it suggests GCHQ was/is a very influential, successful and forward thinking organisation in stark contrast (depending on which history you read) to SIS.