Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor

[Firefinder]

Well yeah, it's not just pilots though. It's also maintenance crews. E-6s through E-8s are becoming unicorns in AF maintenance groups because of poor retention and weak promotion. Limited job prospects, bad pay, etc. pushes people out. This is going to impact Raptor the hardest of all the airframes, besides maybe B-1, because Raptor has the most limited supply chain of spares and the hardest mission tasking.

But again a full fleet of 400 F22s neans that the current fleet of nearly 500 F15Cs.

Which mind you are freaking losing their wings mid-flight!

Would have been Retired back in 2015 at the latest. Leaving only the Strike Eagles in service.

Resulting in the personal shortage being a bit less then it is now in all regards.

Cause for as much of a maintenance hog the F22 is its still less then the nearly 50 year old airframes.

While the Spare part issues be non existing, or no worse as the F15Cs is due to have ACTUAL production numbers and not a glorified prototype run.

Resulting in all round better readiness and a fully modern fleet.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well yeah, it's not just pilots though. It's also maintenance crews. E-6s through E-8s are becoming unicorns in AF maintenance groups because of poor retention and weak promotion. Limited job prospects, bad pay, etc. pushes people out. This is going to impact Raptor the hardest of all the airframes, besides maybe B-1, because Raptor has the most limited supply chain of spares and the hardest mission tasking.

I believe I've already told the story here of a 14yr E4 (Senior Airman) that was a Pararescue Jumper, back when I was still in the Navy.

USAF is having a bad problem with deadwood in their senior enlisted ranks, and needs to do some major pruning.

 

[icyplanetnhc (Steve)]

I believe the F-22B was formally type certified so any potential new variate would have been the F-22C.

The big problem with the F-22 program is that it never got to a formal production ramp and the line (and supply chain) was designed for 36 or 48 jets a year (can't remember now). That means that unit costs remained high and the price per jet could've come way down had they program had better funding stability.

The ATF production line was envisioned for 48 aircraft per year after the 1990 Major Aircraft Review (MAR) with a POR of 648 aircraft. When the program went into EMD, the F-22 production line was designed for 48, but dropped to 36 per year since the late-1990s, when the POR was for 339 aircraft with the last aircraft delivered in 2013 or so, although the Air Force had set the requirement to 381 which would have extended production another year. Of course actual rates were never funded to exceed 20-24 per year. That said, while unit costs would have dropped if the rate was at 36 or 48, I don't think it would have been drastically so, and would still have been considerably more than the F-35 simply because it was a bigger aircraft that's also packed with extensive avionics. Sustainment costs would still be an issue, particularly the older RAM design compared to the F-35's and not quite as maintenance-friendly. Also worth noting that since the 1990 MAR, production for the F-22 was projected to end in the early to mid-2010s, which about the same as when production actually ended in reality; really, the difference was in the production rates.

The original 750 ATF goal (and original unit cost predictions) was always a bit aspirational and even 648 from the 1990 MAR would have faced quite a bit of political and financial difficulties since the F-22 was to some extent always going to be quite expensive to produce and operate, but I think ~250-300 would have been a more reasonable number than what we have now while not being unduly expensive, and we wouldn't be facing the issue of needing to operate the F-15C/D into the 2020s (thanks Rumsfeld...). Had we ramped up production rates just to 36 per year we could have achieved that, although again we probably would still have seen production ending in the early to mid-2010s, unless there was some FB-22 strike variant developed but the USAF eventually determined didn't fit operational needs in the early 2000s. Lifting of export restrictions (Japan, Australia, and Israel were the interested ones, I believe) may have also extended production, although I don't think it would have benefited the USAF much in terms of costs, and there were pragmatic arguments for not exporting the Raptor.

And yes, the F-22B would have been a two-seat variant of the F-22A with identical capabilities except for a reduction in internal fuel.

 

[BlackBat242]

Wasn’t the number 339 as per the 1997 QDR?

Yes... that was another reduction step in the descending stairs from 750 in the late 1980s to 648 in 1990, 442 in 1993, 381 in about 1995, 339 in 1997, 277 in 2003, 183 (not counting the 9 prototypes & developmental aircraft) in 2004, and finally 187 in 2008.

 

[BlackBat242]

The big problem with the F-22 program is that it never got to a formal production ramp and the line (and supply chain) was designed for 36 or 48 jets a year (can't remember now). That means that unit costs remained high and the price per jet could've come way down had they program had better funding stability.

The original plan was for 4 per month (48 per year), but at its peak only 2 per month were made (24 per year).

Freezing the downward numbers slide at 381 (or even 339, or somewhere between) could have seen that 4 per month reached.

 

[bobbymike]

This is a simple statement wrapped around an enormously complex geostrategic environment but I always felt a very large force of F-22s (in the 400+ range) would have had the deterrent effect close to any weapon system ever deployed.

Any adversary’s Air Force planner thinking about facing 300+ combat capable Raptors would have to admit “I’ll lose everything in a few days at little or no cost to the US”

 

[Kat Tsun]

But again a full fleet of 400 F22s neans that the current fleet of nearly 500 F15Cs.

Which mind you are freaking losing their wings mid-flight!

Would have been Retired back in 2015 at the latest. Leaving only the Strike Eagles in service.

Resulting in the personal shortage being a bit less then it is now in all regards.

Cause for as much of a maintenance hog the F22 is its still less then the nearly 50 year old airframes.

While the Spare part issues be non existing, or no worse as the F15Cs is due to have ACTUAL production numbers and not a glorified prototype run.

Resulting in all round better readiness and a fully modern fleet.

The most realistic option that wasn't the actual one would have been something around 250 fighters +/- 20. 400 was out of the question or else DOD never would have deviated from that multiple times.

This would give the USAF two full fighter wings (one for EUCOM and INDOPACOM each) and maybe a pair of ANG squadrons, on top of whatever testing and evaluation units it already has, maybe a training squadron but the TFWs would probably do that themselves. You'd still have F-15C doing work in that case, but F-15 has also been in production pretty much continuously for nearly 50 years, so it's not lacking for parts.

Raptor would still be lacking maintainers, spares, and all the other things that eat into its readiness because it's a bit of a hangar queen. It being the first real 5th gen fighter sort of makes that an unavoidable aspect in this regard. Even with the F-15C's longerons causing cockpits to fly off, it still manages a readiness rate of 70%, while Raptor barely squeaks 50%.

Alternatively, you might be able to get Raptor's readiness rate to F-15C's levels, but only if you have something similar to the present force structure. Which means, as Josh_TN mentioned, putting all those extra airframes in the Boneyard for spare parts.

Raptor is like the B-1 but for TAC: maintenance heavy and too short a production run to build up parts.

The solution would have been to export Raptor to European or Asian allies, to ensure a steady income stream in lean years, which is what JSF did, or to procure the original 750 ship order but over about 50 to 60 years instead of 20. Now, it looks like JSF will have a production run similar in length to F-15C (~50-60 years), so it will never be short of spare parts, but it took a while to get there.

 

[BDF]

The ATF production line was envisioned for 48 aircraft per year after the 1990 Major Aircraft Review (MAR) with a POR of 648 aircraft. When the program went into EMD, the F-22 production line was designed for 48, but dropped to 36 per year since the late-1990s, when the POR was for 339 aircraft with the last aircraft delivered in 2013 or so, although the Air Force had set the requirement to 381 which would have extended production another year. Of course actual rates were never funded to exceed 20-24 per year. That said, while unit costs would have dropped if the rate was at 36 or 48, I don't think it would have been drastically so, and would still have been considerably more than the F-35 simply because it was a bigger aircraft that's also packed with extensive avionics. Sustainment costs would still be an issue, particularly the older RAM design compared to the F-35's and not quite as maintenance-friendly. Also worth noting that since the 1990 MAR, production for the F-22 was projected to end in the early to mid-2010s, which about the same as when production actually ended in reality; really, the difference was in the production rates.

The original 750 ATF goal (and original unit cost predictions) was always a bit aspirational and even 648 from the 1990 MAR would have faced quite a bit of political and financial difficulties since the F-22 was to some extent always going to be quite expensive to produce and operate, but I think ~250-300 would have been a more reasonable number than what we have now while not being unduly expensive, and we wouldn't be facing the issue of needing to operate the F-15C/D into the 2020s (thanks Rumsfeld...). Had we ramped up production rates just to 36 per year we could have achieved that, although again we probably would still have seen production ending in the early to mid-2010s, unless there was some FB-22 strike variant developed but the USAF eventually determined didn't fit operational needs in the early 2000s. Lifting of export restrictions (Japan, Australia, and Israel were the interested ones, I believe) may have also extended production, although I don't think it would have benefited the USAF much in terms of costs, and there were pragmatic arguments for not exporting the Raptor.

And yes, the F-22B would have been a two-seat variant of the F-22A with identical capabilities except for a reduction in internal fuel.

I wasn't implying it was going to be cheaper than say the F-35. My point is that the line never left LRIP for all intents and purposes. GAO estimated that a unit cost of $103m/yr with a full rate of 3 per month in the late 90s (based on a buy of 438). LRIP were estimated to be $140 before program restructuring at that time. Sustainment and indeed readiness are muddied because lack of adequate spares. It wasn't just the total air frames produced but not enough spares were acquired, even for the small fleet we ended up with.

750 jets in the post war era was a pipe dream but 187 was strategic malfeasance. 381 would've given us 3 wings of Raptors plus a extra combat coded squadron plus spairs and was a reasonable goal.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

This is a simple statement wrapped around an enormously complex geostrategic environment but I always felt a very large force of F-22s (in the 400+ range) would have had the deterrent effect close to any weapon system ever deployed.

Any adversary’s Air Force planner thinking about facing 300+ combat capable Raptors would have to admit “I’ll lose everything in a few days at little or no cost to the US”

This plane received the most hate & disdain from DoD of just about any relatively recent acquisition.

Seawolf probably still the leader.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Yes... that was another reduction step in the descending stairs from 750 in the late 1980s to 648 in 1990, 442 in 1993, 381 in about 1995, 339 in 1997, 277 in 2003, 183 (not counting the 9 prototypes & developmental aircraft) in 2004, and finally 187 in 2008.

Reading your post I picture someone sliding down a ramp with no way to stop.
The F-22 really became an orphan.
How many fingerprints were on the murder weapon are? More than F-22s built.

 

[Foo Fighter]

OK, low production rates and moves from high level management wanting done with the program to cut costs. If those other nations had authority and were cleared to recieve them, just how much of the cost would be carried by the Israeli's? I have a sneaky feeling, zilch. Do they contribute anything to their own defence?

Not meant to be snarky, a serious question.

 

[icyplanetnhc (Steve)]

750 jets in the post war era was a pipe dream but 187 was strategic malfeasance. 381 would've given us 3 wings of Raptors plus a extra combat coded squadron plus spairs and was a reasonable goal.

I agree that 381 F-22s was a pretty good number driven by actual operational requirements and analysis from the Air Force. 250-300 would also be reasonable, although 243 was already considered medium risk, and that was a last-ditch push by General Schwartz and Michael Donley (General Moseley's and Michael Wynne replacement after Gates fired him), before they finally gave up and decided to use political capital to advocate for the LRS-B instead, and the FY2010 order amounted to just 4 aircraft for a total of 187, not counting EMD jets (total of 195).

Certainly Rumsfeld and Gates bear a lot of responsibility for the program's early end, but there was also a major economic recession in 2007-2008, so 381 Raptors may have been a difficult political sell when we were so engrossed in the Middle East while facing economic headwinds. Even so, I think Schwartz' push for another 60 jets for 243 total should have gone through, rather than the measly 4 that was the last order.

OK, low production rates and moves from high level management wanting done with the program to cut costs. If those other nations had authority and were cleared to recieve them, just how much of the cost would be carried by the Israeli's? I have a sneaky feeling, zilch. Do they contribute anything to their own defence?

Not meant to be snarky, a serious question.

The ATF/F-22 was developed entirely for the USAF without any foreign partners, so any sales would be through FMS. Had export restrictions been lifted and sales actually went through, Japan and Australia probably would have paid full price, although I suspect Israel would be heavily subsidized.

 

[NMaude]

Raptor is like the B-1 but for TAC: maintenance heavy and too short a production run to build up parts.

After the last F-22 was built in 2012 the production line should've still been kept open for a few more years to build up an adequate supply of spare-parts.

 

[Desertfox]

I agree that 381 F-22s was a pretty good number driven by actual operational requirements and analysis from the Air Force. 250-300 would also be reasonable, although 243 was already considered medium risk, and that was a last-ditch push by General Schwartz and Michael Donley (General Moseley's and Michael Wynne replacement after Gates fired him), before they finally gave up and decided to use political capital to advocate for the LRS-B instead, and the FY2010 order amounted to just 4 aircraft for a total of 187, not counting EMD jets (total of 195).

Certainly Rumsfeld and Gates bear a lot of responsibility for the program's early end, but there was also a major economic recession in 2007-2008, so 381 Raptors may have been a difficult political sell when we were so engrossed in the Middle East while facing economic headwinds. Even so, I think Schwartz' push for another 60 jets for 243 total should have gone through, rather than the measly 4 that was the last order.


The ATF/F-22 was developed entirely for the USAF without any foreign partners, so any sales would be through FMS. Had export restrictions been lifted and sales actually went through, Japan and Australia probably would have paid full price, although I suspect Israel would be heavily subsidized.

Dick Cheney really did a number on the military, first as SecDef (RIP Tomcat) and then as VP. Imagine what the US could have done with all the money sunk into Iraq.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

OK, low production rates and moves from high level management wanting done with the program to cut costs. If those other nations had authority and were cleared to recieve them, just how much of the cost would be carried by the Israeli's? I have a sneaky feeling, zilch. Do they contribute anything to their own defence?

Not meant to be snarky, a serious question.

There was a 2000 AvWeek article about Israel expecting to be an F-22 customer. I would guess that all the F-15 countries would have asked for F-22.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Dick Cheney really did a number on the military, first as SecDef (RIP Tomcat) and then as VP. Imagine what the US could have done with all the money sunk into Iraq.

Many people forget or don’t want to remember that the Cold War drawdown started under Bush with Cheney as SecDef.
This website is practically built on the projects canned by them.

 

[icyplanetnhc (Steve)]

There was a 2000 AvWeek article about Israel expecting to be an F-22 customer. I would guess that all the F-15 countries would have asked for F-22.

I believe the only three countries that made any serious considerations for buying the F-22 were Australia, Japan, and Israel during the 2000s.

In 2018 Lockheed Martin did offer an F-22/F-35 “hybrid” to Japan, although “derivative” may be a more accurate term since it would get larger wings to increase combat radius to 2,200 km (1,200 nmi), so it may be more akin to an FB-22 (a Nikkei graphic depicts it as such), although Japan passed on this due to costs and export restrictions still in place.

 

[Kat Tsun]

OK, low production rates and moves from high level management wanting done with the program to cut costs. If those other nations had authority and were cleared to recieve them, just how much of the cost would be carried by the Israeli's? I have a sneaky feeling, zilch. Do they contribute anything to their own defence?

Not meant to be snarky, a serious question.

Yeah, they make their own tanks' sub-components and several ammunition and small arms plants. In the Merkava Mark IV, America just supplies the hulls, tracks, wheels, and engines, while Israel makes the armor, guns, ammo, and thermal sights. They gave a bunch of money to Boeing to build the Arrow family of missiles too IIRC.

They mostly just make land equipment, aviation bombs, or missiles though. There's some small arms factories and ammo plants in there. IAI is mostly an upgrade shop for F-15/F-16 and Elta makes a lot of capable of combat radars for air defense and ground search. They're quite impressive in a few niche areas, but it's a small country, so it's a bunch of tiny ateliers and family owned businesses doing it. Plasan, the company that makes a lot of armor kits for a bunch of people, is based out of a kibbutz.

Israel is too small to support a serious shipyard of any kind no matter, and when Israel tried to get an aviation industry in the 1970's, that was shot down by America deliberately using a variety of trade war shenanigans. Now, America has to pay for Israel's own planes, but this is considered better than Israel being independent in aviation (or cooperating with France) for some reason.

Had Nickel Grass not happened, and Lavi been allowed to live, I guess Israel would be using Rafales and some sort of Super Lavi these days. They would still pay into F-35 though, because even if they can't contribute much industrially besides technical requirements and money, they want it. Maybe if Lavi existed, they'd have a full assembly plant, like Japan does, or more likely a regional maintenance center like they're getting, but much earlier.

If Raptor was allowed exports, I could see some sort of integrated ATF/JSF depot in Israel.

But tl;dr yeah they pay for a lot in the components. They struggle with the heavier parts like engine production or hull fabrication though.

 

[NeilChapman]

The idea we are talking about is a pipe dream. If more F-22s were produced, they would just be in the bone yard providing spare parts. Pilots are not cheap and neither is that aircraft; the idea that anyone would have continuously supported an active an up to date F-22 fleet larger than current is bull shit.

The USAF has repeatedly made the case that it doesn’t matter how many planes are on the books; it matters how many are capable against their opponents, and how many are available. And the U.S. Congress ignores that reasoning. It does so with the USN as well.

People misinterpret numbers for capability.

It's obvious they did not support on-going production. That's what we're discussing. It is also likely that early models would be in the boneyard. Newer airframes, those that would have the advantage of design updates, streamlined and updated manufacturing techniques and processes, mature suppliers, etc, however, would not. And, it is likely that their manufacturing maturity would have significantly reduced their costs. To suppose that greater numbers of F-22's would not be welcomed at this moment is folly. We can also infer that the fleets MC rate would be significantly higher.

There would be a clear benefit to have continued an active F-22 production line through today as there is in having an active F-18, F-15, and C-130 production line. In a hot war, aircraft are lost for myriad reasons, many are stupid human error. If a carrier is lost, perhaps pilots are saved but you lose 60 F-18's. Where are the replacements coming from? In an emergency, an active line has an ability to be increased over time. Starting one from scratch, not so much.

Here's a thought, if you think you might have another war, don't shut down a military aircraft production line until the replacement is at full rate production and airframes are actually being replaced.

People may misinterpret numbers for capability. But I would suggest that if your numbers are too low, you have no meaningful capability.

 

[Scott Kenny]

People may misinterpret numbers for capability. But I would suggest that if your numbers are too low, you have no meaningful capability.

I very much agree with this. See the various Oil States and Global South with half a dozen of one type, two dozen of another, etc ad nauseam.

 

[BlackBat242]

Yes... that was another reduction step in the descending stairs from 750 in the late 1980s to 648 in 1990, 442 in 1993, 381 in about 1995, 339 in 1997, 277 in 2003, 183 (not counting the 9 prototypes & developmental aircraft) in 2004, and finally 187 in 2008.

Many people forget or don’t want to remember that the Cold War drawdown started under Bush with Cheney as SecDef.
This website is practically built on the projects canned by them.

750>648 = Bush41 1990
Clinton became President 20 Jan 1993
648>442 = Clinton 1993
442>381 = Clinton 1995
381>339 = Clinton 1997
Bush43 became President 20 Jan 2001
339>277 = Bush43 2003
277>183 = Bush43 2004
183>187 = Bush43 2008
Obama became President 20 Jan 2009

 

[Bruno Anthony]

750>648 = Bush41 1990
Clinton became President 20 Jan 1993
648>442 = Clinton 1993
442>381 = Clinton 1995
381>339 = Clinton 1997
Bush43 became President 20 Jan 2001
339>277 = Bush43 2003
277>183 = Bush43 2004
183>187 = Bush43 2008
Obama became President 20 Jan 2009

The victim and the murder suspects. Incl the first one.
If I may add.
Bush 41: Major Aircraft Review
Clinton 1993: Bottom Up Review
Clinton 1997: Quadrennial Defense Review

 

[BlackBat242]

Bush43 (both reductions): sudden funding drain to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Bush43 (both reductions): sudden funding drain to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Not to mention the bloody transformationalists!

 

[icyplanetnhc (Steve)]

I noticed that pictures of the pods so far indicate a lack of cooling scoop inlet normally found on other FLIR or EW pods for environmental control. This may indicate that the pods' ECS may be using cooling from the airframe's own PAO coolant circuit. A statement from the F-22 PM about two years ago indicated that some upgrades are "pretty intrusive" for the airframe, which could imply that these are depot-level modifications.

 

[Forest Green]

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