Kamov Ka-50 / Ka-52 Hokum Family Thread

Forest Green said:
Well then, by the same token, neither do reports of Ka-52s 'proving deadly' if we don't hear the counter points about the ones that get shot down. Agreed?
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Well, we all know that weapons are capable of being used or being destroyed. I think the question is really whether there is contextual information which allows analysing the equipment or doctrine/use of that equipment.
 
Sorry to hear that... I was trying to read some of what you guys were saying thru translation. Sounds like there are issues with one guy living and another guy dying during the ejection phase and this might have to do with ejections at very low altitude? You know what is going on?

Also hope you dont mind that I posted thr video that you sourced.
 
Looking at the video, it is very possible that the Navigator was incapacitated by the detonation of the missile, as it appears to have hit on the right side of the helicopter.
 
overscan (PaulMM) said:
The Ka-52 has I think proved an effective weapon in this conflict, despite the losses.
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Needs significantly better MANPADS defenses, as well as more competent planners. Many of the Russian losses are ambushes set up on routes the Russian aircraft fly every day.
 
From what I am gathering with the updated dircm defenses of the ka-52m they will have abilities to degrade even iir seeker heads as well as others. Indeed with the enhanced speed and range of legacy weapons and the lmur and new sensor and communication systems the ka-52m is one of the best attack helicopters on the planet.
 
TMA1 said:
From what I am gathering with the updated dircm defenses of the ka-52m they will have abilities to degrade even iir seeker heads as well as others. Indeed with the enhanced speed and range of legacy weapons and the lmur and new sensor and communication systems the ka-52m is one of the best attack helicopters on the planet.
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No camera likes getting a laser in its detectable frequencies to the face. Just like your eye doesn't like getting a laser to the face, you can only see whatever color that is.

I'd have to say that the big lesson of the Russo-Ukraine war is that all combat systems need better countermeasures, and militaries need to account for enormous increases in production on very short order for when hostilities start.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Needs significantly better MANPADS defenses,
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Like what? Name the defense system that faced the combat environment so intensevily siturated with AA assets, especially MANPAD.
as well as more competent planners.
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You can plan the route safe against large AD-systems, but not MANPAD, which can be placed literally under every tree.

Helicopter losses is not a problem of themselves, but the problem of our combat jet aircrafts lacking the ability to recon and precisely strike in real time small, mobile targets like infantry or armoured vehicles. Thus, helicopters crew forced to risk themselves to exclusively do the job that otherwise could be performed en masse by the strike aircraft and multirole fighters, be those equipped with the modern sensors and PGMs.
 
Out of curiousity, how come Ka-52 has such heavy loss compared to Mi-28 and even Mi-25 in Ukraine?
 
I agree with Paul that the Ka-52 is effective. It is difficult at best, without access to more information to derive solid analysis with which to derive combat value. Simple analysis ~40 aircraft declared lost, over 17.5 months (40/17.5 = 2.3 aircraft lost per month ). This is not a bad loss rate in major combat operations. How many sortie are being generated per day? If you are flying 3 sortie a day then the risk per mission is significantly higher than say 10 or 20 sortie per day. I did some simple math early in the conflict from sortie numbers in AW&ST (which was a guess really by them) and assumed a quarter of the sortie where helicopters. I will have to try and find my math, so that someone here can validate it, but it came out that there was less than 1% chance that any helicopter sortie would be shot down. Further, we do not have any information on how many battle damaged Ka-52 have been able to return to base, or land successfully enough for operational recovery. A notable point is that Ka-52 is the only combat helicopter with ejection seat. I have seen two occurrences where successful ejections have saved crew members that would very likely not have survived the event in any other helicopter. I am not aware of any available data on how many times this has worked, but it does improve aircrew survivability clearly. My point here is that without considerably more information (which we are not going to get) on Ka-52 operations, it is near impossible to establish the viability of the platform overall.
Further, war is the ultimate expression of Darwinian theory. At the start of the conflict Ka-52 flew as they trained. Most notably without people trying to shoot them. This is the crucible for any combatant that cannot be trained. Professional opinion appears that the pilots started the conflict with incongruent tactics to the reality they faced, and paid for it. The Ka-52 crews are obviously facing a competent enemy who knows how and where to use their weapons. Vastly different than the US aircrews faced in ~20 years of "lesser" warfare. Popular press tells us that the crews are being much more circumspect in their tactics now with better results, or at least fewer losses. Again without much more data from which to derive combat value, we can only speculate as to the viability of this combat helicopter in major combat operations.
I will end with the point that the Russians do have the data, and have obviously done the math at some level. They have improved the platform from their analysis (Ka-52M) and have started to field them. I am inclined to think they might not do otherwise if the Ka-52 was a failure.
 
paralay said:
The Ka-52 defense system removes up to 18 missiles of a portable anti-aircraft system in one flight
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Majority of warnings comes from the false sources like flashes of shots, RPG launches etc. So that story about 18 MANPAD suppressed in one combat sortie is just another piece of propaganda or journalistic lamerism.
 
Scar said:
Like what? Name the defense system that faced the combat environment so intensevily siturated with AA assets, especially MANPAD.
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Probably layered defenses. DIRCM; chaff; flares; Laser warning system for Starstreak, Hellfires, and tanks playing skeet, with some flavor of antilaser aerosols in the chaff/flare launchers; radar warning receivers and jammers; etc.

Gets expensive and adds a lot of weight, unfortunately.


Scar said:
You can plan the route safe against large AD-systems, but not MANPAD, which can be placed literally under every tree.

Helicopter losses is not a problem of themselves, but the problem of our combat jet aircrafts lacking the ability to recon and precisely strike in real time small, mobile targets like infantry or armoured vehicles. Thus, helicopters crew forced to risk themselves to exclusively do the job that otherwise could be performed en masse by the strike aircraft and multirole fighters, be those equipped with the modern sensors and PGMs.
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It's a lot easier to ambush attack helicopters when you know exactly where they're going to be.

We wouldn't have drone footage of shootdowns if the attack helos were not flying predictably.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Probably layered defenses. DIRCM; chaff; flares; Laser warning system.
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But...but Ka-52 defense system has it all. It just don't give a 100% guarantee of safety.
Scott Kenny said:
We wouldn't have drone footage of shootdowns if the attack helos were not flying predictably.
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Strange logic. Helicopters operating in the areas where the opposing force is presented. And the opfor is using drones...in the places where it is presented. Predictibale? Yes. Avoidable with some magic planning? Impossible.
 
Cannonfodder43 said:
Cause it's the most numerous attack helo in use, it's going to bear the brunt of losses as a result.
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So Russian have 133 Ka-52 and 102 Mi-28, but they lost 41 Ka-52 and only 12 Mi-28 though. That is nearly 4 times higher in loss rate.
 
Cannonfodder43 said:
Cause it's the most numerous attack helo in use, it's going to bear the brunt of losses as a result.
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Ronny said:
So Russian have 133 Ka-52 and 102 Mi-28, but they lost 41 Ka-52 and only 12 Mi-28 though. That is nearly 4 times higher in loss rate.
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I highlighted the keyword. Ka-52 is using much wider than Mi-28N due to the lack of DIRCM in the latter's defensive complex, which is essential in the combat environment full of MANPAD.
 
There are any number of reason this could be as it appears. Mi-28 could be more challenging to maintain. It could be held in reserve. It could be operated with different tactics that are not as prone to western observation. Losses could be misidentified as Mi-24/35.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Needs significantly better MANPADS defenses, as well as more competent planners. Many of the Russian losses are ambushes set up on routes the Russian aircraft fly every day.
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I think it's safe to say given the unprecedented amount of SAM's/MANPAD's/AAA supplied by U.S./NATO, any helicopter, regardless of it's type or nationality would find it hard to survive the Russian-Ukraine battlefield.

Regards
Pioneer
 
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Scott Kenny said:
Probably layered defenses. DIRCM; chaff; flares; Laser warning system for Starstreak, Hellfires, and tanks playing skeet, with some flavor of antilaser aerosols in the chaff/flare launchers; radar warning receivers and jammers; etc.
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Starstreak/Marlet although laser guided, doesn’t shine a laser on the target as per the more traditional systems, precisely to deny the target the advance warning. It employs a more clever application of the laser technology.
 
It shines laser at very last moment to target. Feels like more into operator training as these systems are laser beamrider which needs the laser to shine to guide the missile.

Such technique has been observed in use of Stugna ATGM against helicopter.
 
stealthflanker said:
It shines laser at very last moment to target. Feels like more into operator training as these systems are laser beamrider which needs the laser to shine to guide the missile.

Such technique has been observed in use of Stugna ATGM against helicopter.
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Ah no, it’s real easy to use (there’s reports of operators reading the manual, then successfully using it, first try), the laser is on throughout missile flight and the complete engagement could occur without the beam touching/grazing the target. It’s very clever, doesn’t home on light backscatter and believe unique but I don’t know how Stugna works so can’t compare/be sure.
 
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jsport said:
The anti-efp stuff is good.

Not sure arty entered this discussion
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You have to have NLOS to achieve full utility of superior Western secure networking and remote targeting capability with good FPA imagers. The Russians can match our precision gunlay and ERA absorb longrange SLRP shots. In urban environments where you can actually hide tanks with overhead cover against airpower and RT, the fighting distances get so close that you cannot stay outside of overmatch distance against a 6,000fps round arriving with 15-20MJ. There is no 'rub some dirt on it and walk it off' at that level of KE.
jsport said:
What is Moar Dakka?
..have been arguing that there is need to get back NLOS for tank guns introduced under FCS which started at 105mm

Drone cued NLOS defines the new maneuver supports fire replacing the fire supports maneuver concept being bantered about these days and defines hitting first.

Are u suggesting a proactive APS msle out to 15km?..would agree.:)

tanks and IFVs shouldnt carry full swarms that is for another vehicle and coyote is more toy garbage.

The current ocean of defenses do to small units what they are doing to them now and both sides will have synoptic awareness..Minus full spectrum "blast thru" capability no units have any capability. APS and counter-obstacle/mine is needed at the lowest level

MAPS
must be a base integrator for a small family of capabilities and deeper magazine APS (s) than trophy IMHO.
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Moar Dakka is a War Hammer 40K reference in which the Orcs are the dumbest of the combatants but come at you in enormous numbers and have a fascination with massed firepower as overwhelming force as 'Dakka' (dakka dakka dakka, Battle Of Britain film covert reference).

The Germans hated assigning infantry formations to tank units, even when SdKfz.251 began to become normalized as Gen-0 'APC'. According to Balck and Von Mellenthin, they are slow, slow to deploy supporting fires (PAK-40 then, ATGW now) and unable to survive the kinds of pounding (RT near misses) which a tank can shrug off. Even simply getting back to friendly lines requires an armored escort. 'Combined Arms' isn't. For the simple reason that what will kill a tank shreds infantry and the reaction time/standoff range (NLAW from window, Javelin from 4km) is beyond ready human counter detection/suppression.

This is further born out, according to Karber in 2014-15, Donbas 1, experience in which Cold War IFV/ICV are simply out classed for overall hardening against airburst/cargo artillery which the Russians now have in numbers. He says it's now Nammer or nothing as MBT class weights in the 40-60 ton range.

Before they shifted to static defenses fronted by mines and backed by divisional artillery, the Russians had been losing 6-10 tanks per day to ATGW and LAM attacks.

In direct advance they would likely lose 10-20 per defensive belt. Because that is what the Ukrainians are doing head-to-brick-wall in and around Zaporizhya and the Vremivka Ledge.

Conversely, Russian T-80s, using Nakidka thermal/radar camouflage 'parkas' have been quite successful as night time snipers, using the controlled exit lanes, through the minefields, to head out and harry Ukrainian resupply.


Now imagine that happening, front wide, with tanks that have organic drone targeting and NLOS fires to extend their SOE bubble by 50km targeting and 15km fires.

That is how we should be fighting and the use of M4 in Korea and M48 in Vietnam (off dirt ramps, preregistered) out to 20km, also supports this, historically.

Right now, the only system with the kind of speedy-quick capability to enable this however is the jet version of coyote with 300 knots and a camera that can take pictures inside a jammer zone (the Ukrainians are doing the Krasukha/Zhitel game now too, soon it will be the entire world) and then come back out OR hit enemy key assets, like attack helicopters, over horizon, and about to launch Izdeliya 305 LMUR.

Again, remember that microwave link via X/Ka band missile tether can be very powerful when it's driven by AESA radars with excellent burn through and sidelobe controls. Which is what the new version of Arbalets is. So you may have a 12km LMUR launch and a 30km guidance illuminator.

You will shut that nonsense down or you will be arrows-vs.-archer in a bad way. The Marines seem to think the answer is CLAWS/Sentinel/LMADIS. I don't think anything on wheels is survivable or mobile enough to matter.

In order to break down companies into platoons and platoons into sections, you have to have organic AD and targeting. That means on-tank. Not in an associated vehicle. If you want a broader scope, as more range or persistence, replace your attack helicopter force with ESTOL UAS that are jet capable, like Japan's TACOM, with a different airfoil setup (scissor wing plus canards = lots of high lift). Those can move out at cruise missile speeds of 550-600 knots, from a 400ft roadway, 200nm back, to a 100nm depth of coverage and return the sensor package and RAM treatment to a softer landing than a parachute equipped equivalent.

BQM-34 in SEA were routinely dumped into a swamp as return point and still came out so badly dinged up they had to be repaired for about a week before being ready for next mission. Helicopter snare recovery was no better as the HH-3 could not hover with the drone weight and so had to sling it into a 'sand box'. Full drone roadbase recovery is the beginnings of a proxy-warfighter, plug'n'play, air force.

Which is what you're going to need, if you really insist on slapping the bear, on it's doorstep, with a rolled up two by four. Your deep strike/recce drone becomes a cruise missile with landing gear.

The Germans are doing UAS wrong with KF-51 and an elevating, four-foot, launcher. Too much ammo loss, too much turret roof real estate waste. They should be employing VLS/SLS stacks, behind outer turret spaced armor packages (such as now protect the smoke dischargers on Leopard 2A7+) and thus conserve the interior of the turret for main gun round stowage.

If you are going to beat down enemy APS, you need 60-70 (M60 equivalent) 105mm shots, using a mix of static and moving target precision rounds. Not 40 odd 120mm or 18 130mm equivalents. Shoot the rhino through the ear, not the horn. And fire three times to MRSI saturate any top attack APS reload-and-slew engagement lag.

I prefer not being seen to 360` Iron Vision. I will go so far as to say an elevating IRST mast is cool, because horizon pushback gives you sightlines on tiltrotor drones that may be taking pictures through trees or with short porpoising bobups.

But in general, not having to deal with the drone threat ihs better than being aware of all shooters. And that means splitting up disaggregated units so that they are on BOTH SIDES of threats whose conventional UAS as LSS FPV and LAM now have to cover 706 square km vs. 153 square km of area to find all shooters pointed inwards at them.

Even if you halve those numbers to account for a fixed front line trace/security zone you cannot cross into (mines, UGS, etc.) dispersal is simply too useful in allowing you to treat tank teams like fighter sections instead of bomber boxes.

They can be everywhere and are thus very hard to saturate with massed RT cargo rounds dumping hundred of TGSM type smart bomblets.

IMO, tanks should be replacing the tinplate SPH right away.

You don't need 30km ranged fires when the threat has 90-150km ranged MRL to shoot back with. All's they have to do is push a drone into the zone defined by counter battery radar defined fire sourcing and then find the displacing vehicles. And the GMLRS/Tornado missile will beat the Paladin/Pzbh2K/Archer/Caesar.

All the time.

Tanks combine reasonable armor with shoot and scoot as a norm of maneuver and are primarily associated with direct fire support and anti-armor, under 5km.

On a system where the threat reaction difference in TOF is one of 4 seconds LOS vs. 11 seconds NLOS, as a function of much shorter times of flight and preestablished drone coverage (shorter flyout, cheaper drone, available in numbers, with jammer proof directional MMW/Laser masted comms), the tank is the better SPG than the SPH will ever be.

Sharks don't kill every fish in the ocean, because that's a lot of water. Be the water. Surround and envelope and logistically attrite the threat. Then beat feet and leave. If you have a threat which is holed up like an Alabama tick in a MOUT zone the difference between a Mariupol (3,000 total casualties, 900 dead) and a Bakhmut (20,000 dead vs. 50,000 Ukrainians) is obvious. The deeper you can go in that ocean, the more they have to worry about losing logistical connectivity via MSR cuts. And the less mines matter.

Mines do matter. But top attack defense like the Strv.122 camper back, combined with dozer blades on every vehicle so you aren't restricted to 'lead mine clearance vehicle, hit by Kornet, in the only combat lane, now who pushes through the minefield' stupidity, will largely protect you. Especially if you de-man the turret and thus isolate the fighting compartment/magazine spaces. Lose the gun, the vehicle becomes an assault breacher. Lose the crew (short range remote control based on known minefield dimensions from UWB overhead radar passes by UAS) and now you can breach the security zone right up to the FLOC at minimum mission/crew/catastrophic loss risk.

But mostly, you just want to stay away from the cans. Cheap, CLGP, NLOS does this. NLOS lets you be a fish in the ocean.

Going where the water flows.
 
LEG said:
But mostly, you just want to stay away from the cans. Cheap, CLGP, NLOS does this. NLOS lets you be a fish in the ocean.
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I generally agree, though if I can I want both a sensor mast and Iron Vision.

My mind boggles at just how long the US army has been trying to field some variety of NLOS tank gun round. STAFF, MRM, and I'm sure I'm missing a couple more off the top of my head. But IIRC only the South Koreans have fielded some variety of NLOS munition for tanks, the KSTAM.
 
I don't think we need to see every shootdown listed here, so yes, there should be some point of technical or operational interest behind any such postings.
 
Dunno but you dont get to see live ejections from helicopters every day, flateric.

I think overscan was referring to posting every single known or rumored destruction of a vehicle because you are extremely emotionally invested in this current wicked conflict. Posting a novel or important video here or there should be seen as acceptable.
 
Scott Kenny said:
I generally agree, though if I can I want both a sensor mast and Iron Vision.

My mind boggles at just how long the US army has been trying to field some variety of NLOS tank gun round. STAFF, MRM, and I'm sure I'm missing a couple more off the top of my head. But IIRC only the South Koreans have fielded some variety of NLOS munition for tanks, the KSTAM.
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STAFF, ERM/TERM, X-Rod, those are just the easy ones and most of them predated XM1111 by decades. There was a lot of overreach in the 1970s-80s, considering we were using 6800 series (Motorolla equivalent from to Intel 8088) and had just begun doing VLSI/VHSIC through the Pave Pillar program. We didn't even have eyes on the precursors to MMIC (One of the reasons AIM-120A was a decade late was that it was a hybrid RF electronics nightmare...).

Today we have all those things plus reliable SDRAM flash memories.

For all that, we had working CLGP (as M712 Copperhead/GLLD), back in 1984. It was 70,000 dollars and not nearly as flexible as we would have liked, due to trajectory variables on control effector zone flight laws and SAL pooling/scintillance. While overall munition reliability after the 30,000G worth of initial tube launch acceleration kick also was less than stellar.

But we made it work.

And now have been parceling out the rounds to the likes of the Lebanese Army who have used them as recently as 2019 to kick to the curb the Daesh who came slithering out of Syria, looking to set up a next-nest.

www.thedrive.com

Lebanese Troops Hammered ISIS With Laser Guided Artillery Shells in 2017

The United States says it just delivered more than 800 Copperhead projectiles to Lebanon replenish the country's stockpiles.
www.thedrive.com www.thedrive.com

Flying Hilux's whoot.

This is the kind of single target (homing) round you want and we can do it, one better, with thermal imagers that are roughly equivalent to a video phone camera and grant full munition autonomy, as the round leaves the muzzle and programs off the datalink tether.

But for 90% of 10-15km targets, you don't need that kind of capability, nor even a GPS spatial cued IMU. You just need a really effective strapdown gyro. Hit within a 2m CEP on a static target or even mark a lead point to blow a hole in the road on a moving convoy column and then clean up whatever scattered panic comes next.

This is PGK level stuff and the M1156 costs 13,000 dollars in a 155. For comparison, M829A4 (APFSDS) 120mm is 10,100 dollars, per round, according to Wiki.

So it's not cost. It's opportunity and mission pull. Helicopters are on their way out since 2003 and Najaf as simply not survivable. Ukraine has proven this.

Big Blue U(SAF) as the fighter pilot union will not give up on the gazillion dollar manned system for a throwaway Bede-5J with Artoo autopilot. Even though their 10 mission survivability in a high end DEW plus ARH SAM environment is about the same.

And that leaves armor to wade into the bushes and see what bites. Which is a genuinely dumb way to fill coffins.

Especially given the bad guys are coming the other way in a box or chevron battlefield formation of armor at 45mph and doing the formation zig-zag to mess with lead, you have to have homing because even MRSI with some kind of a lead-scatter algorithm is not going to work, often enough, to stop the rush.

If you're the one who is malingering, hull down under a screen, treeline or building, trying to be inconspicuous in the face of all the LAM/LSS drones running around is asking to get ticket punched, waiting for the horde to clear the hill crest.

But if you are the hunter... Now you are the one who gets to snipe while the enemy vehicle crew is snoring. And a two shot of PGK with a diver trajectory mod to narrow the scatter and get roof kills is going to be simple-as-HE deadly because it can eat the engine deck or it can drill the turret roof on a much greater total target area and it doesn't have to plow through the frontal slope with a meter plus of RHAe. Same for D-20/D-30 gun pits. 9M133 Kornet. HJ-10/12, Spike, Akeron, Javelin ATGW. Or 120-PM-43/Nemo/AMOS.

There are a lot of targets out there which simply don't need a homing round because they aren't moving. But should not automatically be assumed as amenable to direct-fire close approach, due to mines and other-fires interlock.

So why compete with a 200,000 dollar Javelin for most expensive, shortest ranged, ATGW when you can use drones and NLOS as cordite instead of a solid rocket motor and substitute a simple gyro for an FPA imager?

Which brings us to KSTAM. To my understanding, this is a single bomblet equivalent to BONUS (2-3). The round goes out, the bomblet dispenses and comes down on a parachute (like a Skeet), hitting threats at large elevational differentiation, endemic to ROKs mountainous east and limited (urbanized) coastal plain western target sets.

That's fine if they want to do it that way, their operational needs etc. But for fast moving MTTs in an open field Ukrainian Steppe or Saudi Empty Quarter condition, you really want a system that is coming in faster and can direct guide on the threat. As soon as the round, not the enemy, clears that 10km horizon.

You can still use a (silhouette pixel size fusing indicator) EFP to beat a Trophy style MEFPS, firing directly through the seeker.

But rapid saturation and precision on the moving target counts for quite a bit and so you need a system which can use seeker mil differentiation to create laning and other restrictors that effectively say 'this one but not that one, mine vs. yours' between several, simultaneous, rounds as eyes-open seeker activation moments, set at launch by gunner or AI recognition of the geometry requirements inherent to a drone-relayed video image of the chevron or box or road march spacing and total footprint of the target set.

This business of waiting for the bomblet to deploy and the SFW to parachute down to the fusing window on a target that is hauling it, quickety lickety, at 100m spacing increments, is going to waste a lot of missed shots unless you saturate with a cargo round. In which case, you have both a caliber (bomblet count) and a cost issue. Putting down a cool half million on a 20-30 submunition round with a ten year electronics/battery shelf life, what's not to like...

This is why we need to seriously consider what our top end caliber needs are as a function of how many and how fast (ROF) a total threat count needs engaging. I prefer 105 because _everyone_ is going to mount APS, after the debacle of Ukraine. And also because I don't expect every target to need a seekered round. But when they do pop up, they are almost certainly going to have DIRCM and Hard Kill.

Iron Vision is a cool system, if only because it is the fundamental baseline for Combat UGVs and protected vision in a dazzler environment. But it cannot be allowed to beat fundamental protection (APS), firepower (ranged NLOS) and mobility/persistence (lighter tank) improvements to the Iron Triangle.

Some little kid plays sneak with the satchel charge, as happened several times in Iraq, I expect the sergeant in charge of lager security to end the threat from 100m out.

Everything else (spaced ballistic/HEAT protection, NBC, manned/unmanned teaming) inherent to 'nobody hangs out of the tank' is just a convenience compared to NOT EXPOSING THE TANK to enemy direct fires. When you only brought ten MPF (in the back of five Barneys) to theater and there are 200+ threat T-90M and perhaps a 1,000 UAS organic to the threat, you cannot afford the LOS fight.
 
LEG said:
Helicopters are on their way out since 2003 and Najaf as simply not survivable. Ukraine has proven this.
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I'm not sure I agree with that. Not survivable? correct. So make them drones so you don't care about losing the helo as much.

But having a fast moving antitank platform is still just as good an idea now as when the US came up with Tank Destroyer Doctrine in the 1930s. Having something that can move to within firing range rapidly and attrit or outright stop an attempted breakthrough. They may need to be tilt-rotors to pack enough speed and maneuverability to address the SAM threat, and they probably will need 25-50km weapons if your basic tanks can shoot 10-15km, to keep the attack helos a few KM behind the tanks.


LEG said:
Which brings us to KSTAM. To my understanding, this is a single bomblet equivalent to BONUS (2-3). The round goes out, the bomblet dispenses and comes down on a parachute (like a Skeet), hitting threats at large elevational differentiation, endemic to ROKs mountainous east and limited (urbanized) coastal plain western target sets.

That's fine if they want to do it that way, their operational needs etc. But for fast moving MTTs in an open field Ukrainian Steppe or Saudi Empty Quarter condition, you really want a system that is coming in faster and can direct guide on the threat. As soon as the round, not the enemy, clears that 10km horizon.

You can still use a (silhouette pixel size fusing indicator) EFP to beat a Trophy style MEFPS, firing directly through the seeker.
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Except for the issue of magazine size, I can see wanting both.

Or at least having both in the supply system and settings for both in the FCS. So that if you're stuck playing Kursk 2 or Iraq 3 you can use the fast rounds, or if you're dealing with big mountains or cities with lots of vertical terrain you can use the slow rounds. Hopefully you'd never be in a situation where you can't get the optimal NLOS rounds before going into the fight. And it's not like the 105 tank gunners aren't used to 5-6 different round types already. Sabot, HEAT, HEP, Canister, Smoke, Illum...


LEG said:
This is why we need to seriously consider what our top end caliber needs are as a function of how many and how fast (ROF) a total threat count needs engaging. I prefer 105 because _everyone_ is going to mount APS, after the debacle of Ukraine. And also because I don't expect every target to need a seekered round. But when they do pop up, they are almost certainly going to have DIRCM and Hard Kill.

Iron Vision is a cool system, if only because it is the fundamental baseline for Combat UGVs and protected vision in a dazzler environment. But it cannot be allowed to beat fundamental protection (APS), firepower (ranged NLOS) and mobility/persistence (lighter tank) improvements to the Iron Triangle.
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I'd argue that good situational awareness is an integral part of fundamental protection.


LEG said:
Everything else (spaced ballistic/HEAT protection, NBC, manned/unmanned teaming) inherent to 'nobody hangs out of the tank' is just a convenience compared to NOT EXPOSING THE TANK to enemy direct fires. When you only brought ten MPF (in the back of five Barneys) to theater and there are 200+ threat T-90M and perhaps a 1,000 UAS organic to the threat, you cannot afford the LOS fight.
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If your intervention model is requiring a 20+:1 kill ratio, I think we need to talk about not being in that location in the first damn place unless you're going to send enough troops to have a realistic chance of winning it.
 
If you fly slowly at ~200 feet in broad daylight within 2-3 Km of enemy troops you are very much at risk. If you fly at night and engage from ~5Km you are not at the same level of risk. ALL primary attack helicopter developers have designed and built systems and missiles that can be launched from at least 5km. Some have developed missiles that go much further. Targeting technology has also drastically improved. So flying into the "omni-present" "all encompassing" air defenses is not as necessary.
Does anyone have any data to support weapon effectiveness, other than lab coated engineers shooting in controlled test environments? How many MANPAD are fired versus successful engagement? How many aircraft sortie are flown versus aircraft lost to MANPAD?
I worked for a former MANPAD unit commander and he was very matter of fact that while his gunners were very good at identifying aircraft in the day, at night it was useless and the missile acquisition window is very small. This is also assuming that these MANPAD gunners are super diligent and not "smokin and jokin" trying to stay warm in a barn or doing anything but standing out in the rain and cold waiting for a target.
I do think that UAS of all sizes and shapes are here to stay, but they are not the panacea of modern war. They are much more susceptible to weather conditions and electronic warfare than are manned platforms. 7 to 10 thousand UAS a week is sustainable usage rate as long as you have access to electric motors. Artillery. We all have engorged ourselves on the videos of "one shot, one kill", ignoring the hundreds of craters that pockmark the landscape around the (usually) uninhabited vehicle. Countries must have misspoke at running low on artillery ammunition.

I have said several times on this forum that war is the ultimate Darwinist expression. Adapt or die. Helicopter operations are indeed adapting.

I think "Helicopters are on their way out" is said as much as "Tanks are an anachronism of war". Neither has swayed combatants. They are left to us armchair generals to haggle over.

But this thread is on Ka-52 not military theory.
 
muttbutt said:
...notice how they kept the laser off target until the last minute..clever.
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stealthflanker said:
It shines laser at very last moment to target. Feels like more into operator training as these systems are laser beamrider which needs the laser to shine to guide the missile.

Such technique has been observed in use of Stugna ATGM against helicopter.
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Zoo Tycoon said:
Ah no, it’s real easy to use (there’s reports of operators reading the manual, then successfully using it, first try), the laser is on throughout missile flight and the complete engagement could occur without the beam touching/grazing the target. It’s very clever, doesn’t home on light backscatter and believe unique but I don’t know how Stugna works so can’t compare/be sure.
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Gonna make a very late response - I'm not sure about other beam-riding weapons, but AFAIK it's been the feature on Ukrainian laser ATGMs that they've been consistently advertising in the export market as a counter-LWR measure.

This includes Oplot's Kombat GLATGM and BTR-3's Barrier ATGM (part of the same Skif family as Stugna, using RK-2S missile), which I've been told that a certain export user has been very happy about even long before the war.

Basically, this mode (dubbed "overflight") will be automatically activated by the launcher's FCS (PN-S) if the engagement distance is beyond 1400m, guiding the missile to a slightly deviated trajectory (~10m from the aim point) before steering the beam back onto the target in the last 2-3 seconds of the flight. The operator just needs to keep the sight on target, and the computer will handle the rest. There are some other fine details here and there, but I'm not sure where I kept the manual...
 
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That double canard configuration is noteworthy as to improve the maneuverability of the missile. Much needed for a weapon with multiple sudden course correction during terminal phase.
 

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