Getting a British Phantom

[pathology_doc]

the swinging 60s

From the viewpoint of variable geometry aircraft, or from the viewpoint of... ah... the other sort of swinging?

I will never agree with those here who love the 50s Dan Dare planes

Tasked with attempting the impossible, the manufacturers gave it their best shot. It's unfortunate that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater, costing the UK a critical (possibly the critical) fighter development generation.

 

[uk 75]

A number of threads about the UK projects in the 60s and 70s have contributions which describe the deep economic crisis in Britain which lasted over two decades and forced governments into collaborative programmes with more successful economies notably France and Germany but also Italy as well as the USA.
The two World Wars hastened many problems already beginning to appear in 1900 from the rise of the US and Germany to the twilight of a far flung Empire.
It is fair to say that no British politicians in this period could come up with solutions to such a tangled web of problems.
A different Britain with a vibrant economy in say 1965 or 1975 requires more than alternate history it needs a completely different world.
Given this background I think contributors are right to focus on possible designs from a technical perspective rather than suggesting how many F177s or P1154RNs could have been in service if Duncan Sandys or Denis Healey had not been around.

 

[Rule of cool]

A number of threads about the UK projects in the 60s and 70s have contributions which describe the deep economic crisis in Britain which lasted over two decades and forced governments into collaborative programmes with more successful economies notably France and Germany but also Italy as well as the USA.
The two World Wars hastened many problems already beginning to appear in 1900 from the rise of the US and Germany to the twilight of a far flung Empire.
It is fair to say that no British politicians in this period could come up with solutions to such a tangled web of problems.
A different Britain with a vibrant economy in say 1965 or 1975 requires more than alternate history it needs a completely different world.
Given this background I think contributors are right to focus on possible designs from a technical perspective rather than suggesting how many F177s or P1154RNs could have been in service if Duncan Sandys or Denis Healey had not been around.

Arguments about the weak British economy are overblown. The British economy grew at an average of 2.9% per annum from 1957 to 1973, almost doubling in size overall. While his was slower than other economies like France, Germany and Italy it came off a higher base as these countries had suffered much greater physical damage than Britain during the last years of the war. In 1957 the Defence budget was £1.72b while the rest of Government spending was £5.92b, in 1973 the numbers were £4.11b and £26.44 respectively and included such non-Defence procurement failures as Concorde and the AGR nuclear reactors. I struggle to believe that given those budgets Britain couldn't have tickled a few million from one place to another with better procurement policy.

 

[Rule of cool]

I always use AFVG to show how far BAC had come with its designs for the VG Fighter Striker.
I dont blame France for (quoting Monty Python and the Holy Grail) saying its very nice but we already got one (Mirage G).
But we screwed them back by forcing them to have their simple trainer upgraded into virtually a CTOL P1154 and then selling it to India instead of the Mirage F1. Oh and they then got lumbered with the Alpha Jet which the Germans turned into a replacement for VAK 191 and G91. Meanwhile we went back to what Hawker do best, simple well designed airframes and got the wonderful Hawk as sold to the US Navy and others.
But strip out the politics and AFVG is a lighter better Phantom able to operate from Clemenceau and Hermes. Well of course this is another paper plane but close enough to Mirage G and MRCA to be a practical proposition.
Of course had the RN not got us into a Phantom buy and P1154 was well underway for the RAF France might have also seen the merit of AFVG and got the ECAT they wanted in return with Jaguar.
I will never agree with those here who love the 50s Dan Dare planes but then I am also biased in favour of the swinging 60s.

The AFVG is a mid-late 60s aircraft design that wouldn't enter service until the mid 70s, and it's being compared to a late 50s design that entered US service in 1961 and UK service in 1968. While this shows how much of an outlier the Phantom is what is the RN and RAF supposed to use until 1975-78, Hunters and Sea Vixens?

The AFVG shouldn't be compared with the Phantom, it should be compared with the F14 and F15, which are (or should have been) its contemporaries.

 

[uk 75]

Eagle and Hermes used Sea Vixen FAW2 into the 70s.
Frankly I would have phased out carriers once it was clear the UK could not build three 55000 ton carriers and cancelled Ark Royal's conversion.
In return the three Invincibles would have been ordered in 1969 for completion in the mid 70s with Bulwark and Albion covering the ASW role then Hermes and Invincible from mid decade. All three Invincibles would have been in service by 1980 with Hermes sold.
What form of STOVL aircraft would have been used depends on P1154 though a variant of AV8 like Spain could have been ordered for the RN only (I agree with Treasury about RAF 1127s).

 

[uk 75]

My point about the Economic Crisis is broader than just GDP or GNP. Everyhing was wrong from poor management through bovine trade unions to banks unwilling to invest at home. You then had the demands of the welfare state and a growing university sector. On top of that after Suez, Aden and then Ulster the electorate was tired of military involvements.
In fact most of the problems that face Starmer faced Heath and Wilson, Macmillan and Eden.

 

[pathology_doc]

The AFVG shouldn't be compared with the Phantom, it should be compared with the F14 and F15, which are (or should have been) its contemporaries.

F-14 especially, since they're both swing-wings.

 

[zen]

Again the problem with the P1154 is HSA had no backup STOL alternative running in parallel.

Which is what they did have for the 'Harrier' version of P1127.

What was needed was a Brough scheme around the same engine only as a straight through variant or a Medway alternative. Reusing the same avionics planned.

Essentially a British Mirage F2.

And by '62 a switch to this cuts R&D risks substantially.

Irony here is the AdA also wanted F2 and F3, but costs and betting on licenced turbofan didn't work out. Dassault Plan B gave them Mirage F1.

 

[iverson]

My point about the Economic Crisis is broader than just GDP or GNP. Everyhing was wrong from poor management through bovine trade unions to banks unwilling to invest at home. You then had the demands of the welfare state and a growing university sector. On top of that after Suez, Aden and then Ulster the electorate was tired of military involvements.
In fact most of the problems that face Starmer faced Heath and Wilson, Macmillan and Eden.

I suspect that Imperial delusions also had a lot to do with Britain's misfortunes in the second half of the twentieth century. The UK could not be the naval and economic power that it was pre-WW2. But imperialist nostalgia seems to have blinded those in political and economic power to this reality and kept the country from developing into a new kind of power, as did the US, Germany, and Japan. Britain did not want to change with the times and could see no reason to change.

Faced with Indian independence, the Malaysian and Kenyan insurgencies, the confrontation with Indonesia, the Suez invasion, the Aden crisis--even the Falklands--Britain's foreign and military policy remained predicated on the idea that Britain could and must defend its vital colonial interests. Military requirements always included a colonial component that compromised realistic military needs.

Post-war leaders failed to see that captive colonial markets and privileged access to colonial raw materials had long masked--and compensated for--the inefficiencies of pre-war British industry. Improvements forced by the demands of a war-time economy were seen as aberrations that could be forgotten once normalcy returned. Britain would always be prosperous--because it had been.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Tasked with attempting the impossible, the manufacturers gave it their best shot. It's unfortunate that the baby was thrown out with the bathwater, costing the UK a critical (possibly the critical) fighter development generation.

That may actually be the key right there.

No fighters designed in the 1950s means you're stuck buying US hardware in the 1960s and there's a college-generation of engineers that have not designed an aircraft to first flight before trying to work on AFVG etc.

Arguments about the weak British economy are overblown. The British economy grew at an average of 2.9% per annum from 1957 to 1973, almost doubling in size overall. While his was slower than other economies like France, Germany and Italy it came off a higher base as these countries had suffered much greater physical damage than Britain during the last years of the war. In 1957 the Defence budget was £1.72b while the rest of Government spending was £5.92b, in 1973 the numbers were £4.11b and £26.44 respectively and included such non-Defence procurement failures as Concorde and the AGR nuclear reactors. I struggle to believe that given those budgets Britain couldn't have tickled a few million from one place to another with better procurement policy.

And yet, how long did rationing last in the UK? mid 60s?

 

[uk 75]

That may actually be the key right there.

No fighters designed in the 1950s means you're stuck buying US hardware in the 1960s and there's a college-generation of engineers that have not designed an aircraft to first flight before trying to work on AFVG etc.




And yet, how long did rationing last in the UK? mid 60s?

Although British food was pretty awful in the 60s rationing stopped by 1953 more or less.
I am not sure that British aircraft engineers were that far behind their US counterparts, indeed many moved across the Atlantic to better conditions.
Because we tend to focus a lot on British projects here the screw ups (or cock ups as we call them) get a good airing.

 

[zen]

Rationing was wound down by the Tories after wining in '51.....along with scrapping wartime 'emergency powers acts' that included ID Cards.
It wasn't immediate but staged over years.
My Mum remembers the Sugar Rationing ending and children's sweets becoming available.

Arguably it took the cheese industry decades to recover from being shut down.

We can say the bulk of this was gone by the late 50's to early 60's, which coincided with Baby Boomers entering the workforce.

This is part of why D.Sandys was being tasked with cutting military budgets and industry to free up for civilian use.

 

[Rule of cool]

In any case British rationing ensured everyone got enough while saving on shipping space and maximising domestic agriculture. It gave everyone on average 2400 calories at 77 grams of protein a day, far from the starvation rations seen in Germany and the Soviet Union. And staples like potatoes and bread were not rationed during the war.

But my original point was that to get something as impressive as a Phantom by 1961 would be much more achievable if the Miles M.52 had flown.

 

[Scott Kenny]

But my original point was that to get something as impressive as a Phantom by 1961 would be much more achievable if the Miles M.52 had flown.

Agreed, I think the UK missed a critical piece of development.

 

[zen]

I think we can all agree that.
It makes things worse to think more money was spent developing the drone research tool that proved Miles design.
Expensive and late.

I'd also argue it delayed development on reheat as well.

 

[Hood]

Well when the scientists pointed out that only a dozen H-bombs could end the UK as a functioning entity, the politicians perhaps rightly thought, why bother spending millions on arms we won't ever be in a position to use? We'll scuttle into the Drakelow tunnels and turn 40 Soviet cities into radioactive wastelands in retaliation and incinerate a similar number (or greater) number of Soviet citizens.

But my original point was that to get something as impressive as a Phantom by 1961 would be much more achievable if the Miles M.52 had flown.

I've seen these claims hundreds of times yet no-one has ever specified how the M.52 would have altered the landscape of British aviation so drastically.

The fact it took nearly a decade to get our second-generation fighters from prototypes in the late 40s to frontline use is the real issue. Stuff like the Sea Hawk should have been in service in 1950, Sea Vixens, Swifts and Hunters by 52-53. We spent the better part of the 50s tinkering with late 40s prototypes and dreaming up Dan Dare machines for late-40s specifications.
GW were a basket case in the main - needed far more directed application.

 

[red admiral]

I've seen these claims hundreds of times yet no-one has ever specified how the M.52 would have altered the landscape of British aviation so drastically.

Quite. When you look at the details then it's really difficult to see what the data collected would be usefully applied to. It has little/no relevance to Hunter/Swift, Lightning, Fairly Delta, TSR2. And then because it's being collected and operated by RAE then some companies are likely just to ignore it anyway...

Zen's point on Reheat is maybe a tangible example but again is being done by PowerJets. Historically then their development and flying of reheat on other engines didn't seem to help much. It's still up for RR, AS, Bristol, dH to all individually design and develop their own reheat systems for their own engines. And nozzles.

Interestingly then there's actually really good traceability and exploration from the rocket powered subscale M.52s through to the various liquid fuelled rocket engines in the late 50s and 60s.

I think it's much more accurate to look at the various immediate postwar research aircraft as "make work" schemes for the minor companies rather than as part of a well thought out research strategy and exploitation plan. M.52 is hardly the sole aircraft e.g. it's pretty difficult to see any value from the below:

• Boulton Paul P.111 and 120
• Fairey Delta 1
• dH 108 Swallow
• Short SB.4
• Bristol 188
• AW.52

Earlier consolidation into fewer, stronger teams with better infrastructure was needed

 

[Archibald]

Earlier consolidation into fewer, stronger teams with better infrastructure was needed

This is what France did from 1936. At the time there were 18 major aviation companies, some as old as Blériot itself. They were nationalized, then all the plants were consolidated on a geographical basis. The reasoning was: better to have the plants building a plane close from each others. Even if at the beginning it meant franken-companies : one plant formerly from Bloch, the one nearby from Amiot, the third ex- Breguet. Unfortunately this ended in a disaster called 1940... but the consolidations carried on, even during Vichy.

SNCA -- Société Nationale de Construction d'Avions.

Then throw in a slice of France: North, Center, West, South-West, Center ( = Midi), South-East.
Each fiefdom with its "aviation capital"
SNCA-N (Meaulte)
SNCA-C (Bourges)
SNCA-O (Saint-Nazaire)
SNCA-SO (Bordeaux)
SNCA-M (Toulouse)
SNCA-SE (Cannes)

A total of six conglomerates instead of 18 small private companies. Only Breguet and Bloch ( = Dassault) escaped and stayed private. They ended consolidating too, Dassault taking over an ailing Breguet after 1967.

The six conglomerates were then gradually consolidated, often merging in pairs : it took 35 years (1936 to 1971) to get a single public giant. Called SNIAS, with the -AS turning into Aérospatiale. Later EADS, with Germany and Spain.

1940: SNCA-SO takes over SNCA-O - so only five left
1941 : SNCA-SE took over SNCA-M - so only four left. (Meaulte, Bourges, Bordeaux, Cannes)
1949 : SNCA-C : Bourges, bankrupt : liquidated with its assets passed to the others - so only three left
1957 : SNCA-SO + SNCA-SE, plus SNCA-N so only two left (Sud Aviation and Nord Aviation)
1970: Sud and Nord merge into Aérospatiale, only one left.

 

[red admiral]

I can't say I'm a great fan of France's top down geographic consolidation approach. I think better to let Industry sort it out themselves. For the UK then even inside single companies there were separate units e.g. dH Hatfield doing Vampire, Venom and early Sea Vixen before moving the Sea Vixen programme over to dH Christchurch who having little experience eventually finished development 5-10 years later / messed it up. (Unfortunately for combat air then dH Hatfield got diverted onto GW including BMs which were higher national priority - but this happened because they were competent.)

It's telling that Miles was the only company that went bankrupt in this period - only to set up a "new" Miles company only a year later that continued to produce a number of unsuccessful aircraft designs...

At the same point from a government perspective then they had no idea which company was going to produce yet another duffer or a blinder e.g. Blackburn going from classics like Roc, Botha, Firebrand, Beverley etc. to the Buccaneer

 

[Rule of cool]

What was the point of the X1 and it's derivatives A though E, or the X2, X3 etc? None of them had anything to do with the century series fighters, other than the fact of course that the US was first to reach Mach 1 in a manned aircraft and put a lot of study into all aspects of supersonic flight with these aircraft.

 

[uk 75]

I think the main problem faced by the UK is overreach and failure to select winners.
The V bombers and the Shorts Sperrin were a good example of this. All were flawed designs. The Sperrin was obsolete before it flew. The Valiant used a defective alloy. The Vulcan endangered three of its crew members. The Victor was too low on the ground to carry missiles safely. The Vulcan was the best of the bunch and development should have focussed on it. TSR2 becomes the Valiant replacement but noone admits this publicly. Then the job is given to 48 Vulcan B2s.
France meanwhile builds the Mirage IV based on the Mirage III and keeps it in service much longer than the Vulcan B2.

Despite being proud rightly of its own industry France grasps the nettle of having a modern naval fighter. While the RN is still building Sea Vixen FAW2s in the early 60s France orders the Crusader and keeps it in service for many years.

I agree very much with Hood.

 

[uk 75]

The UK guided weapons industry is not alone in producing duds.
Seaslug is not markedly worse than Terrier but it is harder to evolve. On the other hand the UK Seadart is a better missile than Tartar and probably than Standard.
Seacat occupies the same space as a 40mm gun but again the missile is not evolved. It is not clear to me why Seawolf could not be designed to use Seacat launchers as both are manually loaded.
Swingfire compares well with HOT and TOW and Vigilant with SS11.
Blue Streak leant too heavily on the US Atlas missile which only had a short service life. If France can develop effective and deploy its own battlefield, medium range and submarine launched ballistic missiles and the famous Exocet why is the UK so behind the curve.

 

[Archibald]

I can't say I'm a great fan of France's top down geographic consolidation approach.

Not a fan either, be assured. The nationalisations were necessary but were done the worst possible way. Geography isn't the most logical approach when dealing with a belaguered aviation industry. Lke I said, this created franken-companies with very pissed workers and bosses too.

It led to absurdities like duplicating Potez : the former Potez, nationalised as the SNCA-N (Meaulte), with a strawman send there by Henri Potez to keep control of the former plant - and rack public monies. And a brand new Potez, as a private company, with Henri Potez as the boss and funded by some public money extracted from the nationalized Potez. Ain't that beautiful ? Bloch did the same, born the same year as Potez (1892) they had a smart lawyer with the name of Chirac - not Jacques, but his father: Abel-François. Bloch, Potez and Chirac Sr made some shenanigans where some public money dumped into their former companies, now SNCA, returned to them, the former bosses. And they funded new private companies out of that !

 

[PMN1]

I think the main problem faced by the UK is overreach and failure to select winners.
The V bombers and the Shorts Sperrin were a good example of this. All were flawed designs. The Sperrin was obsolete before it flew. The Valiant used a defective alloy. The Vulcan endangered three of its crew members. The Victor was too low on the ground to carry missiles safely. The Vulcan was the best of the bunch and development should have focussed on it. TSR2 becomes the Valiant replacement but noone admits this publicly. Then the job is given to 48 Vulcan B2s.
France meanwhile builds the Mirage IV based on the Mirage III and keeps it in service much longer than the Vulcan B2.

Despite being proud rightly of its own industry France grasps the nettle of having a modern naval fighter. While the RN is still building Sea Vixen FAW2s in the early 60s France orders the Crusader and keeps it in service for many years.

I agree very much with Hood.

Vulcan fuselage shape and undercarriage height with Victor bomb bay size and wings...........

 

[zen]

The moment for things to have gone right is January 1951 with the issue of N.114T and NR/A.14.
Had that focused on aircraft over 40,000lb all-up weight and specified twin engines.....
Then the industry would have produced a solution.
Much of what they did produce was limited by weight restrictions.

Next comes N.113D on 16 July.
Based around DH116 Super Venom.
So then significantly lightweight.

NR/A.38 leading to N.131T in March. Twin engined solution desired.
1952 is the next moment.

March '53 DH110 revised draft of NR/A.38 to N.139D and then P.

May '53 N113P
Supermarinee Type 544 ordered.
Sept '53 Admiralty confirm DH110 is wanted.

In March '54 response to ministery request of Feb that year led to Supermarine Type 556 being ordered as a single prototype XH415 in Sept 1954. But work suspended in April '55 and cancelled in July.
20 June that year DH110 flew.

Three firms designed and built twin engined fighters. DeHaviland, Vickers Supermarine, and Gloster.
A fourth, Blackburn designed and built a Strike Attack aircraft to NR/A.39 that could have been adapted to fighter missions. Albeit by dint of the design's origin from naval fighter studies.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I think it's much more accurate to look at the various immediate postwar research aircraft as "make work" schemes for the minor companies rather than as part of a well thought out research strategy and exploitation plan. M.52 is hardly the sole aircraft e.g. it's pretty difficult to see any value from the below:

• Boulton Paul P.111 and 120
• Fairey Delta 1
• dH 108 Swallow
• Short SB.4
• Bristol 188
• AW.52

Earlier consolidation into fewer, stronger teams with better infrastructure was needed

Easy tiger, there’s a lot of things and stuff which is not very widely visible coming from these projects;-

I was once told the pre computer age ie the empirical aero elastic model used to size the Trident to A320 wings was reference to that developed from the DH108, indeed it was sighted as certification evidence.

In another case an absolutely fundamental decision to design the Olympus 593 to be surge tolerant instead of cashing a significant weight saving came from the T188 flight experience. The story teller noted the cost of the whole T188 project was worth that alone. It may surprise, but the T188 was the first British (maybe world) to use finite element modelling for its structure optimisation, albeit in quite a primitive form.

Fairy Delta work was instrumental in giving the confidence for Concord, both in terms of performance models and structural design.

BP120 provided data for the optimisation of later Javelin wing configuration and controls… yeah I know the Javelin was a bit of a cul de sac.

For the above I’m pretty sure there’s more hidden away.

Both SB4 and AW52 proved there concepts as dead ends, which is useful if negative. And of course the AW52 got that most notable first …. First real use of an MB ejection seat.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

If France can develop effective and deploy its own battlefield, medium range and submarine launched ballistic missiles ……. why is the UK so behind the curve.

Full independence was not valued.

 

[H_K]

AFVG
Anglo-FRENCH Variable Geometry.

Remind us of why that fell through.

AFVG fell through because it was an unworkable mishmash of changing requirements, not because of the French.

The first AFVG, the carrier-capable multirole fighter aircraft, died in early 1966 when the UK killed CVA-01. That was the closest AFVG ever got to being a UK Phantom, but it was no more than a rough joint requirement at that point (after 9 months of joint staff work), not even a preliminary design concept.

The second AFVG, even less workable than the first, emerged as the RAF made a hard pivot to a non-carrier capable long range strike aircraft to fill the carrier gap AND TSR-2 gap, as the F-111K became increasingly unaffordable and its order numbers were pared down from 110 to 50. At the same time the RAF ordered the F-4M to replace the Hunter, removing any need for a Phantom-like interceptor.

Obviously the new RAF priorities ran straight into a brick wall as the AFVG the RAF now wanted no longer met the original carrier requirement that defined AFVG 1.0. Nor did it meet the original RAF interceptor requirement that was becoming increasingly important to the French as they were doing their own pivot away from NATO and needed a fast climbing interceptor (which a UK Phantom would have been great at).

When it became clear that the requirements had diverged to such a point, the French basically just did the polite thing by notifying the UK that “this isn’t going to work”.

 

[Rule of cool]

Easy tiger, there’s a lot of things and stuff which is not very widely visible coming from these projects;-

I was once told the pre computer age ie the empirical aero elastic model used to size the Trident to A320 wings was reference to that developed from the DH108, indeed it was sighted as certification evidence.

In another case an absolutely fundamental decision to design the Olympus 593 to be surge tolerant instead of cashing a significant weight saving came from the T188 flight experience. The story teller noted the cost of the whole T188 project was worth that alone. It may surprise, but the T188 was the first British (maybe world) to use finite element modelling for its structure optimisation, albeit in quite a primitive form.

Fairy Delta work was instrumental in giving the confidence for Concord, both in terms of performance models and structural design.

BP120 provided data for the optimisation of later Javelin wing configuration and controls… yeah I know the Javelin was a bit of a cul de sac.

For the above I’m pretty sure there’s more hidden away.

Both SB4 and AW52 proved there concepts as dead ends, which is useful if negative. And of course the AW52 got that most notable first …. First real use of an MB ejection seat.

The X-planes were the same. While the speed records get all the hype these were not designed to break records, Yeager's supersonic flight was the X1's 50th and the X1 family did over 100 flights. According to Wiki the X1A's design brief was to investigate aerodynamic phenomena at speeds greater than Mach 2 and altitudes greater than 90,000 ft, specifically emphasizing dynamic stability and air loads.

Similarly, the Douglas D558 program wase to investigate the characteristics of swept-wing aircraft at transonic and supersonic speeds with particular attention to pitch-up. The three aircraft gathered a great deal of data about pitch-up and the coupling of lateral (yaw) and longitudinal (pitch) motions; wing and tail loads, lift, drag and buffeting characteristics of swept-wing aircraft at transonic and supersonic speeds. The number three aircraft also gathered information about the effects of external stores (bomb shapes, drop tanks) upon the aircraft's behaviour in the transonic region.

Of course, all anyone remembers is that the X1 was the first supersonic plane, the D558 the first Mach 2 plane and the X2 the first Mach 3 plane.

 

[uk 75]

I am happy to admit AFVG was all over the place in 1966.
The carrier version may or may not have been possible. It was intended to be able to operate from Clemenceau and Hermes.
Since I dont think the Royal Navy could have designed and built three CVAs much less crewed them in the 60s and 70s without focussing less on Polaris and the Fleet Nuclear submarine programme, I dont mind too much.
I would also say that rather like the Canadair Sabre the F4 Phantom was a good solution and it was just too bad that a UK solution was not available.

 

[Rule of cool]

the F4 Phantom was a good solution and it was just too bad that a UK solution was not available.

The issue is that as the capability and price of combat aircraft rose so too did a big production run become a necessity, and by the mid mid-60s the RN/RAF have very few fleets big enough to warrant entirely domestic production. The TSR2 run of about 190 units is marginal, probably worthwhile given it's a theatre strike bomber rather than a fighter, but certainly the RN's about 100-unit Phantom requirement pre-CVA cancellation is too small to justify the development cost. However, for Britain to build a competitive fighter domestically starting in 1965-66 it would need a run of at least 350 units, so getting a junior partner would be handy.

 

[red admiral]

@Zoo Tycoon
Thanks for those examples. I'd be pretty sure that there will be more as well e.g. additional data points that went into developing various RAE and ESDU methods.

I'm not convinced that these present good value for money. It's very much data into RAE for underpinning knowledge in some areas rather than direct exploitation. Whereas the engineers in the smaller companies moving into some of the others to bulk up their design teams might make rather more impact e.g. de-bugging Hunter, speeding up Sea Vixen, Comet etc. Was it really a priority to spend effort on this basic research whilst neglecting the major development programmes.

 

[Hood]

The three aircraft gathered a great deal of data about pitch-up and the coupling of lateral (yaw) and longitudinal (pitch) motions; wing and tail loads, lift, drag and buffeting characteristics of swept-wing aircraft at transonic and supersonic speeds.

All true, but these were NACA programmes and could be considered esoteric until the results were written up and published and then widely digested in the industry.
The X-planes didn't help Convair designing the XF-102 that refused to go supersonic until it was redesigned, nor did they dissuade North American from putting a tiny tail on the F-100A that led to deadly instability.

If the American industry was like the British, then they tended to view the RAE with suspicion in certain matters (indeed it was the RAE who forced the Bristol Type 188's configuration and they considered this to be the only practical layout for a Mach 2+ interceptor.... despite the entreaties of the industry).

 

[Hood]

One of course could point to Sweden as an example of a nation who developed cutting-edge fighters without resort to special-build research aircraft.

The USSR to some degree had no research-only types, although the sheer number of prototypes and one-offs probably fulfilled much the same role in reality.

 

[Arjen]

One of course could point to Sweden as an example of a nation who developed cutting-edge fighters without resort to special-build research aircraft.

With one exception - SAAB 210 Lildraken:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saab_210

 

[pathology_doc]

AFVG fell through because it was an unworkable mishmash of changing requirements, not because of the French.

The first AFVG, the carrier-capable multirole fighter aircraft, died in early 1966 when the UK killed CVA-01. That was the closest AFVG ever got to being a UK Phantom, but it was no more than a rough joint requirement at that point (after 9 months of joint staff work), not even a preliminary design concept.

The second AFVG, even less workable than the first, emerged as the RAF made a hard pivot to a non-carrier capable long range strike aircraft to fill the carrier gap AND TSR-2 gap, as the F-111K became increasingly unaffordable and its order numbers were pared down from 110 to 50. At the same time the RAF ordered the F-4M to replace the Hunter, removing any need for a Phantom-like interceptor.

Obviously the new RAF priorities ran straight into a brick wall as the AFVG the RAF now wanted no longer met the original carrier requirement that defined AFVG 1.0. Nor did it meet the original RAF interceptor requirement that was becoming increasingly important to the French as they were doing their own pivot away from NATO and needed a fast climbing interceptor (which a UK Phantom would have been great at).

When it became clear that the requirements had diverged to such a point, the French basically just did the polite thing by notifying the UK that “this isn’t going to work”.

Thanks for the summary.

 

[pathology_doc]

On the other hand the UK Seadart is a better missile than Tartar and probably than Standard.

To a point. Sea Dart runs into a brick wall because it's a ramjet, and it can't be evolved into the exoatmosopheric forms the Standard family has branched into.

That being said, about the only thing a current SM-series missile has in common with Tartar or tail-control Terrier is the general aerodynamic-surface layout. To put it another way, when I was a kid, two of my biggest crushes were on blue-eyed redheads but the two girls in question were otherwise totally dissimilar (and the blue-eyed redhead I'm married to resembles neither of them).

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Red Admiral
The most capable engineers I ever knew were graduates of the University of Bloodhound/T188/T221 ( although I heard similar from T1121/Kestrel). They were just a breed apart from any I’ve met since. In the pre computer days these projects ran on the principle of thinking, design, try, think, fiddle try until it more or less worked. These projects pushed the solution boundaries, while mitigating high risks with highly monitored testing with not too far reaching consequences if it crashed. Most of these graduates went to work on Concorde, A300- 320 (or Harrier). This approach seemed to push engineers into a different mindset from those that have rattled through the latter “must be right first time” CAD commercial designs.

It’s interesting that the UK (indeed US) aero industry decline maps against a decline in the push the limits research projects.

 

[orlovsky]

AFVG fell through because it was an unworkable mishmash of changing requirements, not because of the French.

The first AFVG, the carrier-capable multirole fighter aircraft, died in early 1966 when the UK killed CVA-01. That was the closest AFVG ever got to being a UK Phantom, but it was no more than a rough joint requirement at that point (after 9 months of joint staff work), not even a preliminary design concept.

The second AFVG, even less workable than the first, emerged as the RAF made a hard pivot to a non-carrier capable long range strike aircraft to fill the carrier gap AND TSR-2 gap, as the F-111K became increasingly unaffordable and its order numbers were pared down from 110 to 50. At the same time the RAF ordered the F-4M to replace the Hunter, removing any need for a Phantom-like interceptor.

Obviously the new RAF priorities ran straight into a brick wall as the AFVG the RAF now wanted no longer met the original carrier requirement that defined AFVG 1.0. Nor did it meet the original RAF interceptor requirement that was becoming increasingly important to the French as they were doing their own pivot away from NATO and needed a fast climbing interceptor (which a UK Phantom would have been great at).

When it became clear that the requirements had diverged to such a point, the French basically just did the polite thing by notifying the UK that “this isn’t going to work”.

And if you look at the follow-up programs, AFVG would have to be Mirage2000 and Tornado in one plane. Oh yes, make it carrier suitable, too....

 

[H_K]

And if you look at the follow-up programs, AFVG would have to be Mirage2000 and Tornado in one plane. Oh yes, make it carrier suitable, too....

Mirage 4000 might have worked. Similar empty weight as Tornado, but much more internal fuel (+75%... 9,000kg vs only 5100kg).

Now insert much lighter Rolls Royce engines with lower fuel burn and you have a winner. (M53 weighed ~500kg more than RB199 x 2 engines!). Though personally I would opt for a bypass ratio somewhere in between the RB199 and M53, more like the US F-15/F-16 engines (F100 or F110 with ~0.6-0.8 bypass ratio), as that offers a better compromise between low fuel consumption and high altitude / supersonic performance.

So Mirage 4000 with fly by wire, RR engines and UK avionics. Basically a twin engine Viggen JA/AJ or mid 1970s Rafale.