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I was recently recommending the book „Die Illusion der Wunderwaffen“ (The illusion of the
wonderweapons) by Rolf Schabel. As it isn’t available in english and translator software probably
will fail due to its style, I would like to post a summary of the conclusions drawn by the author.
I think, it could be interesting for all those of you with a special interest in the german aviation
of WW II and, yes, I really think, it can shed a slightly different light at least on some german
aircraft projects.
I’ll confine myself to themes with direct relation to aircraft, leaving aside those concerning, for
example the doctrine of the german airforce. I’ll start with some statements, that can often be
read, but are disproved by the author :
-“ In Germany the development of jet engines was done only on private initiative and was ignored
by the german officials for too long “
Programs for the development of jet engines were started by the RLM as early as 1937/38 and pressed
ahead, mainly in responsibility of the traditional engine manufacturers. Such programs were regarded
by both sides, industry and officials, as long term options, often regarded by the industry as a
contender to the piston engine development and disturbing the development of pis-ton engines by
absorbing man hours.
- “ With the beginning of the war, Germany stopped development of new aircraft and of jet engines.”
In fact there was nothing like a stop of new developments, especially not for jet engines. Although
they hadn’t had the highest priority, their importance wasn’t regarded lower, after the (necessary)
attempt to dedupe the programs and give higher priority to frontline types.
- “The first jet fighters could have been operational much earlier”
Development of the He 280, Me 262 and Me 163 had started before the war, the aircraft itself were
more or less ready by 1941, but their engines still far from being ready. The difficulties and amount of
time needed to make them operational had been completely underestimated by the RLM, but by the
industry, too. More realistic plans expected the Me 262 to be ready for mass pro-duction not before
1945. For (then) conventional aircraft, the standard time from starting the project to the beginning of
mass production was 4 years, that means, for types, which didn’t need basic research, as still was
necessary for the jet engine.
- “ The success of the Me 262 was hampered by Hitlers decision and strict order to use it solely as
a “Blitzbomber” (fast bomber)."
As long as the high command really insisted on this order, the number of available aircraft was much
too low either, for achieving a worthwhile effect. The development of the troublesome engines wasn’t
effected in a negative way by this decision and in November 1944 the Me 262 was allowed to be used
as a fighter again. BTW, in a memorandum from 13th September 1942 Willy Messerschmitt himself
spoke about the Me 262 as proposed as a bomber to the RLM and he did so in other cases, too !
- “ The Me 262 didn’t get enough support by the german officials/by the RLM”
At the end of 1942 the Me 262 got a higher priority and in early 1943, states secretary Eberhard Milch
ordered the cancellation of the Me 209, the planned successor to the Bf/Me 109, in favour of the
Me 262. Willy Messerschmitt himself appealed against this order und succeeded in its revocation, using
his relations to Hitler.
As can be seen, the author makes clear, that it wasn’t only the german high command, that failed in
the case of the jet powered aircraft, but to a large part the german aviation industry itself.
From the very beginning, the german aviation industry was suffering from a severe lack of qualified
personal. Until the program for rationalisation of aircraft production ordered by Udets successor
Eberhard Milch, the german aircraft manufacturers still used universal tools and workshop-like
production methods, demanding quite highly qualified personal, which was in short supply and couldn’t
be taken from other branches of the industry easily. It wasn’t before summer 1941, that leaner
methods were introduced, using more specialised tooling and manufacturing processes, that could be
handled by quickly trained personal. Without those changes the high production numbers reached
by the german aircraft industry couldn’t have been realised.
But more severe was the deficiency of engineers and scientists. Between 1932 and 1940 from 20.995
graduates only 271 had a degree in aviation technology. A side note: In the brewery trade it were
896 ! There were several institutions in Germany dealing with basic aviation research, but their
personal generally wasn’t tasked with direct supporti of the aircraft manufacturers. With the
worsening situation, this was recognised by many scientists form those institutes themselves, who
felt to be obliged to contribute to the war effort, often leading to weird proposals and inventions.
Adding to the problem was the fact, that the number of engineering hours needed to put a new aircraft
into service was very often grossly underestimated, not only by the RLM, but by the industry, too.
The time needed to get a new type ready for mass production was regarded as too long by the RLM
at the beginning of the war, so it was ordered to shorten the standard procedure of development: With
the prototype just in the phase of test flying, a pre-series was ordered and mass production was
already prepared. So, with every change to the design, demanded by the growing experience with this
type, not only the prototype and the pre-series aircraft, but often the tooling, too, had to be modified.
And as the test phase was held as short as possible, flaws in the design often remained uncured. Best
known examples for the failing of this method were the Me 210, He 177 and later the He 162. Another
point, that was neglected, was the need for engineering hours spent to modify those types still in
production. Changes to a design were regularly incorporated, either to improve perform-ance or
armament, or to ease production. Here the US aviation industry, for example, could rely heavily on the
experiences of the car industry, the german aircraft manufacturers were more or less left on their own,
as individual transport wasn’t as common in Germany before the war, as it already was in the US.
Another point adding to the stress of the designers, was the need to save precious resources and to
make due with materials of deteriorating quality, often resulting in the need to re-design parts.
With regards to those points, building and bringing into service at least in some numbers the Me 262
and Ar 234 was quite an achievement, but it had no chance to change the outcome of the war and it
hadn’t from the start. To press those types into service earlier simply wasn’t possible.
That’s for short the authors statement, which is, as said before, limited to the mentioned aircraft types
and those weapons like the Enzian or Feuerlilie ground-to-air missiles. Nevertheless, to my opinion it
says a lot, too, about the chances for realisation of many of those weird projects and maybe about
the seriousness of their designs.
What in my mind makes the difference to other publications is the authors approach, which isn’t just
from the technical, but from the historical and economical side. And of course, the amount of used
and mentioned sources, although the author was critised for including authors like Green and Novarra
into his sources !
wonderweapons) by Rolf Schabel. As it isn’t available in english and translator software probably
will fail due to its style, I would like to post a summary of the conclusions drawn by the author.
I think, it could be interesting for all those of you with a special interest in the german aviation
of WW II and, yes, I really think, it can shed a slightly different light at least on some german
aircraft projects.
I’ll confine myself to themes with direct relation to aircraft, leaving aside those concerning, for
example the doctrine of the german airforce. I’ll start with some statements, that can often be
read, but are disproved by the author :
-“ In Germany the development of jet engines was done only on private initiative and was ignored
by the german officials for too long “
Programs for the development of jet engines were started by the RLM as early as 1937/38 and pressed
ahead, mainly in responsibility of the traditional engine manufacturers. Such programs were regarded
by both sides, industry and officials, as long term options, often regarded by the industry as a
contender to the piston engine development and disturbing the development of pis-ton engines by
absorbing man hours.
- “ With the beginning of the war, Germany stopped development of new aircraft and of jet engines.”
In fact there was nothing like a stop of new developments, especially not for jet engines. Although
they hadn’t had the highest priority, their importance wasn’t regarded lower, after the (necessary)
attempt to dedupe the programs and give higher priority to frontline types.
- “The first jet fighters could have been operational much earlier”
Development of the He 280, Me 262 and Me 163 had started before the war, the aircraft itself were
more or less ready by 1941, but their engines still far from being ready. The difficulties and amount of
time needed to make them operational had been completely underestimated by the RLM, but by the
industry, too. More realistic plans expected the Me 262 to be ready for mass pro-duction not before
1945. For (then) conventional aircraft, the standard time from starting the project to the beginning of
mass production was 4 years, that means, for types, which didn’t need basic research, as still was
necessary for the jet engine.
- “ The success of the Me 262 was hampered by Hitlers decision and strict order to use it solely as
a “Blitzbomber” (fast bomber)."
As long as the high command really insisted on this order, the number of available aircraft was much
too low either, for achieving a worthwhile effect. The development of the troublesome engines wasn’t
effected in a negative way by this decision and in November 1944 the Me 262 was allowed to be used
as a fighter again. BTW, in a memorandum from 13th September 1942 Willy Messerschmitt himself
spoke about the Me 262 as proposed as a bomber to the RLM and he did so in other cases, too !
- “ The Me 262 didn’t get enough support by the german officials/by the RLM”
At the end of 1942 the Me 262 got a higher priority and in early 1943, states secretary Eberhard Milch
ordered the cancellation of the Me 209, the planned successor to the Bf/Me 109, in favour of the
Me 262. Willy Messerschmitt himself appealed against this order und succeeded in its revocation, using
his relations to Hitler.
As can be seen, the author makes clear, that it wasn’t only the german high command, that failed in
the case of the jet powered aircraft, but to a large part the german aviation industry itself.
From the very beginning, the german aviation industry was suffering from a severe lack of qualified
personal. Until the program for rationalisation of aircraft production ordered by Udets successor
Eberhard Milch, the german aircraft manufacturers still used universal tools and workshop-like
production methods, demanding quite highly qualified personal, which was in short supply and couldn’t
be taken from other branches of the industry easily. It wasn’t before summer 1941, that leaner
methods were introduced, using more specialised tooling and manufacturing processes, that could be
handled by quickly trained personal. Without those changes the high production numbers reached
by the german aircraft industry couldn’t have been realised.
But more severe was the deficiency of engineers and scientists. Between 1932 and 1940 from 20.995
graduates only 271 had a degree in aviation technology. A side note: In the brewery trade it were
896 ! There were several institutions in Germany dealing with basic aviation research, but their
personal generally wasn’t tasked with direct supporti of the aircraft manufacturers. With the
worsening situation, this was recognised by many scientists form those institutes themselves, who
felt to be obliged to contribute to the war effort, often leading to weird proposals and inventions.
Adding to the problem was the fact, that the number of engineering hours needed to put a new aircraft
into service was very often grossly underestimated, not only by the RLM, but by the industry, too.
The time needed to get a new type ready for mass production was regarded as too long by the RLM
at the beginning of the war, so it was ordered to shorten the standard procedure of development: With
the prototype just in the phase of test flying, a pre-series was ordered and mass production was
already prepared. So, with every change to the design, demanded by the growing experience with this
type, not only the prototype and the pre-series aircraft, but often the tooling, too, had to be modified.
And as the test phase was held as short as possible, flaws in the design often remained uncured. Best
known examples for the failing of this method were the Me 210, He 177 and later the He 162. Another
point, that was neglected, was the need for engineering hours spent to modify those types still in
production. Changes to a design were regularly incorporated, either to improve perform-ance or
armament, or to ease production. Here the US aviation industry, for example, could rely heavily on the
experiences of the car industry, the german aircraft manufacturers were more or less left on their own,
as individual transport wasn’t as common in Germany before the war, as it already was in the US.
Another point adding to the stress of the designers, was the need to save precious resources and to
make due with materials of deteriorating quality, often resulting in the need to re-design parts.
With regards to those points, building and bringing into service at least in some numbers the Me 262
and Ar 234 was quite an achievement, but it had no chance to change the outcome of the war and it
hadn’t from the start. To press those types into service earlier simply wasn’t possible.
That’s for short the authors statement, which is, as said before, limited to the mentioned aircraft types
and those weapons like the Enzian or Feuerlilie ground-to-air missiles. Nevertheless, to my opinion it
says a lot, too, about the chances for realisation of many of those weird projects and maybe about
the seriousness of their designs.
What in my mind makes the difference to other publications is the authors approach, which isn’t just
from the technical, but from the historical and economical side. And of course, the amount of used
and mentioned sources, although the author was critised for including authors like Green and Novarra
into his sources !
)
