Me 262 a waste of resources?

[HoHun]

Hi again,

[*]Generally, it is correct that the Luftwaffe needs a great number of jets. However, it won't be possible to provide a larger number of jets of a new design until spring or summer 1945 than the number that can be provided by ramping up production of the existing design. This is owed to the well-established industrial learning curve, on which the Me 262 has progressed quite a way, with about 700 examples produced by the time He 162 will start. The He 162 is an untested aircraft, and production initially will be difficult as all kinds of changes have to be introduced into series production to fix the inevitable teething troubles. According to experience, a new design requires about 7 times as much labour as the same type in normal mass production. Hasty development will increase this ratio even further. Just setting up production of a new type is a massive undertaking as well, and this will, unlike production itself, require the employment of a high proportion of valuable skilled labour - 2.5 million skilled labour hours. This will never pay off during the production life of the He 162.
[/LIST]

I'm just reading an excellent book on the Me 262 by a certain Dan Sharp ;-)

It has some very interesting documents in the appendix, including one written by production specialist Otto Lange on on Me 262 production. (On request by the Allies, I guess.)

Lange (who according to Dan was an employee of Speer, not of Messerschmitt) confirms the bad situation with regard to "valuable skilled labour":

"The capacity available in Germany in the construction of jigs, tools and gauges was extremely overstretched due to the enormous demands of the entire armaments industry. This was further increased by the requirements for aircraft construction from March 1944. The unmet demand for skilled workers for this branch of industry in July 1944 was about 20,000, including about 4,000 for Messerschmitt."

That's the background when the Volksjäger idea is proposed to the aircraft manufacturers, threatening to syphon off skilled toolmakers, a critical resource which is in desperately short supply all over the industry, to setting up He 162 production. That a risky investment that will, even if the gamble works out, have a delayed pay-off, but an immediate negative impact on the rest of the industry regardless of the future success or failure of the Volksjäger.

So, I'd still maintain that Messerschmitt's opposition to the Volksjäger idea was well-justified, as I'm sure he was fully aware of the situation described by Otto Lange.

Despite this, I believe it probably was inevitable that the Volksjäger was put into production because at that time in the war, it was more important to create the illusion that something bold and energetic was done to win the war, than actually trying to win the war, as it was as good as lost anyway. That's a bit of the leitmotif of Schabel's "Die Illusion der Wunderwaffen", and I think it applies quite well to the He 162.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Pasoleati]

I completely disagree with HoHun, it was the Me 262 that was the complete waste of resources.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I completely disagree with HoHun, it was the Me 262 that was the complete waste of resources.

I largely agree with this assessment. The Me 262 was self-defeating mainly because of the wretched reliability of the Jumo 004 engine. With something around a 10 to 12 hour service life, often less, this meant that you needed an engine change after just 3 or 4 sorties at most. Junkers was never going to be able to produce sufficient engines and repair parts to keep more than something like 50 to 100 Me 262 flying, at most. That doesn't even include the Ar 234, and other jets the Germans were working on.

So, cranking out lots of Me 262 doesn't help the Germans if they can't supply engines to the production factory AND to operational squadrons to replace those that have failed in service.

I'd say Henkel's He 162 was a better deal, using only one slightly more reliable engine and requiring less critical resources to build.

None of that even addresses the fuel issues involved, and yes, those are serious too. Doesn't matter that the jet fuel was easier to produce, there simply isn't going to be enough to keep more than a couple hundred jets, at most, flying. Each Me 262 sortie takes about triple the fuel sortieing an Me 109 or Fw 190 does.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Pasoleati,

I completely disagree with HoHun, it was the Me 262 that was the complete waste of resources.

Does that mean you consider the He 162 a worthwhile investment in spite of it being a jet? Now I'm really surprised! :-D

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Pasoleati]

Hi Pasoleati,



Does that mean you consider the He 162 a worthwhile investment in spite of it being a jet? Now I'm really surprised! :-D

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Compared to the Me 262, yes. Otherwise, German war effort would have been better served even by more Bf 109Ks and demoting Adolf Galland to cleaning latrines. Just like very few great football/ice hockey players make great coaches, very few great aces make great generals.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Where the effort needed to go was into building a jet engine that had roughly double the mean run time to failure. That is, one that reliably would run 20 to 30 hours before needing an overhaul or being scrapped. That single thing would have made any German jet far more effective than it was historically.

Could the Germans have done this? Possibly. Better metallurgy is one way. Another is improved use of coatings to reduce engine wear from high temperatures. They did use something very close to an aluminum flame spray technique to coat parts and increase time to failure for high temperature parts. An improvement on this, maybe an alumina ceramic coating instead, if that technology was even available at the time would be one way to do that. Couple that with some improvement in the metallurgy, and it possibly could have accomplished this.

 

[Arjen]

German expertise in metallurgy was not the problem. Shortage of critical metals was. In The Secret Horsepower Race, p.361, Calum Douglas quotes Milch to Speer, listing molybdenum, nickel, chrome, tungsten, cobalt, copper, tin and lead as metals where savings had to be made. Lack of nickel is a returning bugbear for German engine development in the book.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Pasoleati,

Compared to the Me 262, yes. Otherwise, German war effort would have been better served even by more Bf 109Ks and demoting Adolf Galland to cleaning latrines. Just like very few great football/ice hockey players make great coaches, very few great aces make great generals.

Well, here's a graph from the US Strategic Bombing Survey. US bombers saw very little opposition from fighters after April 1944, and as the oil campaign basically only started in May 1944 and didn't have immediate results, that has to be seen as the success of the USAAF's long-range escorts that stopped the majority of the Luftwaffe fighters from attacking the bombers.



Here's a graph showing the available fighter strength, based on the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen at https://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/flugbew.htm ... some more Me 109's were serving with reconnaissance units, and some more Fw 190's with ground attack units, and with the total number of fighters being fairly constant for 2nd half of 1943/1st half of 1944 and going up in late 1944, the Luftwaffe's lack of effectiveness against bombers obviously was not a problem of insufficient piston engine fighter production.



Another interesting appendix in Dan's Me 262 book is the reproduction of A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945, which was based on interviews with captured Me 262 pilots (including, amongst others, Barkhorn, Bär and Dahl). It states:

"The use of the Me 262 as an attack fighter against Allied bombers was dictated by the impossibility of using other German fighters for this purpose and by the necessaity of doing something to stop or hinder the Allied raids, but German pilots regard the ideal role of the Me 262 to be that of a pure fighter, finding and destroying Allied fighters and fighter-bombers. [...]

Engagements with Allied fighters were undertaken by Me 262 formations only on rare occassions, when combat with bomber formations was not possible, but German unit leaders regarded the correct function of the Me 262 to be attacking the Allied fighter escort with a view to leaving Allied bombers an easy prey for ordinary German units. But Me 262 were only ready for combat when fuel was so short that all German fighters were ordered by the High Command to concentrate on bombers."

In short, the Me 262 could do what the Me 109 and Fw 190 couldn't, and even more importantly, it had the potential capability to create a situation in which the available Me 109 and Fw 190 fighters could have been used effectively again.

However, it's pretty clear that to exploit that capability, it would have needed to be available in numbers in mid-1944 the latest, before the oil campaign began to have its paralysing effects on the Luftwaffe.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[red admiral]

German expertise in metallurgy was not the problem. Shortage of critical metals was.

This is said a few times, but Germany didn't develop even tiny quantities of nickel superalloys like Nimonic or Inconel which took the Allies (UK) many years of development

 

[HoHun]

Hi Arjen,

German expertise in metallurgy was not the problem. Shortage of critical metals was. In The Secret Horsepower Race, p.361, Calum Douglas quotes Milch to Speer, listing molybdenum, nickel, chrome, tungsten, cobalt, copper, tin and lead as metals where savings had to be made. Lack of nickel is a returning bugbear for German engine development in the book.

While I wouldn't disagree in general, in the context of the Jumo 004B the problems were more complex. According to Müller's "Junkers Flugtriebwerke", the inital problems with the turbine wheel failures due to resonance issues had been solved by reduction of the full-power speed from 9000 rpm to 8700 rpm in the series version. The reduced centrifugal forces on the turbine blades also slowed down the thermal creep, which limited the lifespan of the turbine wheel.

Operationally, there was a tendency for the pilots to expose the engine to excessive thermal stress below 7000 rpm, where the original speed governor didn't work and it was up to the human operator to ensure operational limits were observed. This was made more difficult by the available thermo sensor technology, which inevitably had a certain lag behind actual gas temperature.

Additionally, the idling speed was set relatively high to ensure sufficient air flow to avoid high temperatures, but that also gave a high idling thrust. If pilots throttled back below idling speed for a certain amount of time, they'd also overheat the engine to a certain degree.

The solution to the limited lifespan of the turbine wheel was to switch to the intensively air-cooled hollow-blade wheel with the Jumo 004B4, which according to Müller entered large-scale production in October 1944 and had a demonstrated life of 150 hours. (The hollow tubine blades were made from Chromadur.) This allowed a short-term increase of the gas temperature by 100°C and significantly ameliorated the impact of thermal stresses.

Additionally, a new automatic gouvernor was introduced as Gerät 004.704, which controlled the engine in a wider range and thus mostly avoided overheating issues. Müller lists the Jumo 004D1 as being a 004B1 variant having a new gouvernor, and states some Jumo 004D4 were finished before the end of production, so I guess when the first available gouvernors were fitted to Jumo 004B4 engines, these must have been considered 004D4's.

By the way, A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 as reproduced in Dan's Me 262 book briefly notes that engine changes usually were required before the specified 25 - 35 hours, and for lack of trained personnel took longer than the 3 hours nominally scheduled, but that's just stated matter-of-factly with no (negative) comment whatsoever. Apparently, the interviewees didn't consider it important - the conclusion of the section on JV44 combat experience reads:

"German pilots are of the opinion that the Me 262 would have been an effective weapon against the U.S.A.A.F. daylight raids over German if mass employment had been possible. But numerical inferiority, fuel shortage, and lack of good pilots prevented adequate combat testing of the potentialities of the Me 262."

Not a word on engine lifespan or reliability issues. (Not in the part on operational training either - fuel shortage features prominently, though.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[T. A. Gardner]

German expertise in metallurgy was not the problem. Shortage of critical metals was. In The Secret Horsepower Race, p.361, Calum Douglas quotes Milch to Speer, listing molybdenum, nickel, chrome, tungsten, cobalt, copper, tin and lead as metals where savings had to be made. Lack of nickel is a returning bugbear for German engine development in the book.

I know that, but it would have helped immensely making jets that were sufficiently reliable that they weren't self-defeating. An alternative, one the Germans did do to an extent, was use the equivalent of a flame spray aluminum coating on the heat portion of many parts of the Jumo 004 and possibly other engines. Switching to an alumina ceramic for this would have improved the resistance, but I don't know if that technology was possible then.

I would still hold that the engine was the weakest part of the Me 262.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

This is said a few times, but Germany didn't develop even tiny quantities of nickel superalloys like Nimonic or Inconel which took the Allies (UK) many years of development

With Tungsten and Tungsten carbide, the biggest bottleneck was that Krupp thorough a subsidiary had a total monopoly on its production and sale. They limited grades available and refused to sell more than one grade to anyone else in Germany. The government allowed this to continue during the war.

 

[HoHun]

Hi T. A.,

jets that were sufficiently reliable that they weren't self-defeating.

Since you keep repeating it ... I call bullshit on this one. The Me 262 did not "defeat itself", as the quotes I provided from Dan's book illustrate quite nicely. Put up your sources, or shut up.

Remember that I might check your sources like I did over on https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/die-steuerbare-jaegerrakete-ruhrstahl-x-4.38058/ , so it might be a good idea to be more true to the written word this time around.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Pasoleati]

Hi Pasoleati,



Well, here's a graph from the US Strategic Bombing Survey. US bombers saw very little opposition from fighters after April 1944, and as the oil campaign basically only started in May 1944 and didn't have immediate results, that has to be seen as the success of the USAAF's long-range escorts that stopped the majority of the Luftwaffe fighters from attacking the bombers.

View attachment 705662

Here's a graph showing the available fighter strength, based on the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen at https://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/flugbew.htm ... some more Me 109's were serving with reconnaissance units, and some more Fw 190's with ground attack units, and with the total number of fighters being fairly constant for 2nd half of 1943/1st half of 1944 and going up in late 1944, the Luftwaffe's lack of effectiveness against bombers obviously was not a problem of insufficient piston engine fighter production.

View attachment 705663

Another interesting appendix in Dan's Me 262 book is the reproduction of A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945, which was based on interviews with captured Me 262 pilots (including, amongst others, Barkhorn, Bär and Dahl). It states:

"The use of the Me 262 as an attack fighter against Allied bombers was dictated by the impossibility of using other German fighters for this purpose and by the necessaity of doing something to stop or hinder the Allied raids, but German pilots regard the ideal role of the Me 262 to be that of a pure fighter, finding and destroying Allied fighters and fighter-bombers. [...]

Engagements with Allied fighters were undertaken by Me 262 formations only on rare occassions, when combat with bomber formations was not possible, but German unit leaders regarded the correct function of the Me 262 to be attacking the Allied fighter escort with a view to leaving Allied bombers an easy prey for ordinary German units. But Me 262 were only ready for combat when fuel was so short that all German fighters were ordered by the High Command to concentrate on bombers."

In short, the Me 262 could do what the Me 109 and Fw 190 couldn't, and even more importantly, it had the potential capability to create a situation in which the available Me 109 and Fw 190 fighters could have been used effectively again.

However, it's pretty clear that to exploit that capability, it would have needed to be available in numbers in mid-1944 the latest, before the oil campaign began to have its paralysing effects on the Luftwaffe.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

What the Luftwaffe needed was quantity plus well-trained pilots, a combination never possible with the 262 with German industrial resources. This reminds of the fantasy pamphlet by a Finnish guy, a supposed "father of Finnish fighter tactics". With straight face he fantasized how the Finnish AF would have swept the skies of Soviet aircraft over Karelian Isthmus during the Winter War with two dozen CW-21s or similar "super fighters". Pure fantasy.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Hi T. A.,



Since you keep repeating it ... I call bullshit on this one. The Me 262 did not "defeat itself", as the quotes I provided from Dan's book illustrate quite nicely. Put up your sources, or shut up.

Remember that I might check your sources like I did over on https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/die-steuerbare-jaegerrakete-ruhrstahl-x-4.38058/ , so it might be a good idea to be more true to the written word this time around.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Did the Me 262 have any significant impact on the war's outcome? What was the attrition rate of Me 262 units compared to prop driven Luftwaffe units, and was there a difference in what the causes were? The 262 had serious reliability issues. It was a fuel hog too. Doesn't matter that it ran on easier to make fuels, it required roughly triple the amount per sortie a 109 or 190 did.

It was self-defeating and that is obvious to anyone that looks at its operational history.

 

[edwest4]

Did the Me 262 have any significant impact on the war's outcome? What was the attrition rate of Me 262 units compared to prop driven Luftwaffe units, and was there a difference in what the causes were? The 262 had serious reliability issues. It was a fuel hog too. Doesn't matter that it ran on easier to make fuels, it required roughly triple the amount per sortie a 109 or 190 did.

It was self-defeating and that is obvious to anyone that looks at its operational history.

Are you asking a real question or just stating conclusions?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Asking real questions. For example, on the fuel problem. If you have a unit that has 30 Me 262 flying, and each plane requires--this is rounding off just a little for ease of the example-- 1.5 metric tons of fuel for a sortie, then you need 45 tons of fuel to fly the whole unit one time. If they are flying daily, it's 1350 tons in a month.

That's all roughly five times (I thought it was three but it looks closer to five) the volume and weight of fuel 30 Me 109 require. Correct this if it's wrong, but an Me 262 has 1970 liters of fuel capacity versus 400 in an Me 109.

That's a huge, massive, increase in the weight and volume of fuel you have to transport from the refinery to wherever the Me 262 unit is. Most of that would obviously have to go by rail. By 1944, the German rail system is starting to crumble to sustained bombing attacks.

This is a serious logistics question. Where does all that fuel come from? And, that's with just 30 aircraft. Now make it 300 where the 262 might actually start being effective in terms of numbers. That's just fuel. Replacement engines, other parts, food and such for the pilots and ground crew, etc. all factor in on top of that.

It's no different for the Luftwaffe in 1942 or 43, or any other time. Bomber units couldn't often fly missions because they couldn't get the fuel they needed for more than a few sporadic ones by 1944. Keeping up with losses proved nearly impossible to achieve by industry and the Luftwaffe's training programs.

It was mentioned that it takes less than a day to change out an Me 262's engine. Great, but you have to have a replacement engine to finish that process. Where do these come from? How many could Junkers theoretically produce per day, week, month?

Mentioned above was something about focusing the Me 262 on Allied fighter suppression. Without vast numbers of 262 flying this won't work. The Allied units could still do what they did. Given the greater range and loiter time of Allied escort fighters, they some could mix it up with the 262's while other units sat on the 262's airfields waiting for them to land and laying waste to them on the ground.

Numbers are necessary for the 262 to cause any sort of major shift in the direction the air war was going. How do you keep 300+ Me 262 flying? A unit with 30 or 40 isn't going to accomplish a thing. Sure, it might shoot down more aircraft than a similar sized 109 or 190 unit would, but that changes nothing.

The logistics of the 262 is something that requires serious attention. I can't see any way for Germany, given their resources and transportation system by the end of 1943, being able to put a serious number of Me 262 into regular--daily--service. That's why I ask. If Dan or someone else can show how you do this, great. But right now, I can't see it happening. The 262 is self-defeating on a number of logistical fronts.

 

[edwest4]

Asking real questions. For example, on the fuel problem. If you have a unit that has 30 Me 262 flying, and each plane requires--this is rounding off just a little for ease of the example-- 1.5 metric tons of fuel for a sortie, then you need 45 tons of fuel to fly the whole unit one time. If they are flying daily, it's 1350 tons in a month.

That's all roughly five times (I thought it was three but it looks closer to five) the volume and weight of fuel 30 Me 109 require. Correct this if it's wrong, but an Me 262 has 1970 liters of fuel capacity versus 400 in an Me 109.

That's a huge, massive, increase in the weight and volume of fuel you have to transport from the refinery to wherever the Me 262 unit is. Most of that would obviously have to go by rail. By 1944, the German rail system is starting to crumble to sustained bombing attacks.

This is a serious logistics question. Where does all that fuel come from? And, that's with just 30 aircraft. Now make it 300 where the 262 might actually start being effective in terms of numbers. That's just fuel. Replacement engines, other parts, food and such for the pilots and ground crew, etc. all factor in on top of that.

It's no different for the Luftwaffe in 1942 or 43, or any other time. Bomber units couldn't often fly missions because they couldn't get the fuel they needed for more than a few sporadic ones by 1944. Keeping up with losses proved nearly impossible to achieve by industry and the Luftwaffe's training programs.

It was mentioned that it takes less than a day to change out an Me 262's engine. Great, but you have to have a replacement engine to finish that process. Where do these come from? How many could Junkers theoretically produce per day, week, month?

Mentioned above was something about focusing the Me 262 on Allied fighter suppression. Without vast numbers of 262 flying this won't work. The Allied units could still do what they did. Given the greater range and loiter time of Allied escort fighters, they some could mix it up with the 262's while other units sat on the 262's airfields waiting for them to land and laying waste to them on the ground.

Numbers are necessary for the 262 to cause any sort of major shift in the direction the air war was going. How do you keep 300+ Me 262 flying? A unit with 30 or 40 isn't going to accomplish a thing. Sure, it might shoot down more aircraft than a similar sized 109 or 190 unit would, but that changes nothing.

The logistics of the 262 is something that requires serious attention. I can't see any way for Germany, given their resources and transportation system by the end of 1943, being able to put a serious number of Me 262 into regular--daily--service. That's why I ask. If Dan or someone else can show how you do this, great. But right now, I can't see it happening. The 262 is self-defeating on a number of logistical fronts.

You've answered your own questions, so I don't see the point.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

You've answered your own questions, so I don't see the point.

Are the answers accurate though? There are clearly others here that have more details on these aircraft than I do. Yea, I have more of that production / logistics background but this counts. The Me 262 doesn't operate in a logistical vacuum. My theory is that it was a self-defeating effort because the Germans didn't or couldn't produce the logistical train necessary to support it.

 

[edwest4]

The August 27, 1945 issue of Life magazine had a special section sponsored by the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation.. It starts with this headline: ... by the Skin of our Teeth

An excerpt: "SEVERAL TIMES during the European phase of this war, victory was almost within Germany's grasp, on land, on the sea or in the air.

"Above all, knowing the vital importance of air supremacy, the Nazis tried time and again to wrest it back from the Allies.

"And they almost succeeded."

"Especially in the last months of the war, our margin of safety was slimmer than most of us suspected.

"Just how slim it was is known best to certain American military experts who have since inspected some of Germany's underground research laboratories and war plants."

Keep in mind that the U.S. Office of War Information would continue until September, 1945. It had an understanding with newspaper and magazine publishers about how to handle the publication of war related information.

 

[HoHun]

Hi T. A.,

That's all roughly five times (I thought it was three but it looks closer to five) the volume and weight of fuel 30 Me 109 require. Correct this if it's wrong, but an Me 262 has 1970 liters of fuel capacity versus 400 in an Me 109.

The piston-engined day fighters were commonly flying with 300 L drop tanks on defense duties, but never mind. If your implied conclusion is that the Me 262 is a bad deal, that's a fallacy because it's based on the assumption that the Me 109 or Fw 190 are just as effective per sortie as the Me 262, when the operational reality, as evidenced in the report I quoted above, showed that the Me 262 was far more effective. Galland, when he was still General der Jagdflieger, one said he'd rather have one Me 262 than five Me 109's, and if we use that as a yard stick for per-sortie effectiveness, the Me 262 actually was more fuel-efficient than the Me 109.

It's no different for the Luftwaffe in 1942 or 43, or any other time.

Why stop there ... as one could convincingly argue that Germany had no realistic chance of ever winning WW2, why don't we call the Wehrmacht a self-defeating army? Because it took an awful lot of defeating before the inevitable result was achieved.

Or what does "self-defeating" mean in your mind?

How many could Junkers theoretically produce per day, week, month?

I asked for your sources ... maybe you should do your research *before* posting.

Mentioned above was something about focusing the Me 262 on Allied fighter suppression. Without vast numbers of 262 flying this won't work. The Allied units could still do what they did.

You don't seem to be aware that to give the bombers continuous fighter cover, the escorts would have to adhere to a fairly rigid schedule, with several fighter units taking turns by rendezvousing with the bombers on pre-planned coordinates at precise times. Miss the rendezvous, and you have unescorted bombers deep in German airspace. That occasionally happened even without Me 262 interference, and the German fighter controllers had learned to recognize and exploit such situations. Now unleash a meaningful number of jet fighters at let them have a go at the fighters, and there will be plenty of missed rendezvous ... not to mention that the hunted escorts will take actual losses, too.

The 262 is self-defeating on a number of logistical fronts.

Again, what does "self-defeating" mean in your mind? It took a massive bombing campaign against hundreds and thousands of targets to wear down the German industry and transportation system to the point where it became difficult to operate a modest number of jet fighters, which regardless were far from ineffective in spite of being "constantly harried by the overpowering fighter escort" (as A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 put it).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Pasoleati,

This reminds of the fantasy pamphlet by a Finnish guy, a supposed "father of Finnish fighter tactics". With straight face he fantasized how the Finnish AF would have swept the skies of Soviet aircraft over Karelian Isthmus during the Winter War with two dozen CW-21s or similar "super fighters". Pure fantasy.

Well, A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 mentioned mass-employment of jet fighters. Maybe by the standards of the Finnish Air Force, 24 propeller fighters already counted as mass-employment? ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Hi T. A.,



The piston-engined day fighters were commonly flying with 300 L drop tanks on defense duties, but never mind. If your implied conclusion is that the Me 262 is a bad deal, that's a fallacy because it's based on the assumption that the Me 109 or Fw 190 are just as effective per sortie as the Me 262, when the operational reality, as evidenced in the report I quoted above, showed that the Me 262 was far more effective. Galland, when he was still General der Jagdflieger, one said he'd rather have one Me 262 than five Me 109's, and if we use that as a yard stick for per-sortie effectiveness, the Me 262 actually was more fuel-efficient than the Me 109.



Why stop there ... as one could convincingly argue that Germany had no realistic chance of ever winning WW2, why don't we call the Wehrmacht a self-defeating army? Because it took an awful lot of defeating before the inevitable result was achieved.

Or what does "self-defeating" mean in your mind?



I asked for your sources ... maybe you should do your research *before* posting.



You don't seem to be aware that to give the bombers continuous fighter cover, the escorts would have to adhere to a fairly rigid schedule, with several fighter units taking turns by rendezvousing with the bombers on pre-planned coordinates at precise times. Miss the rendezvous, and you have unescorted bombers deep in German airspace. That occasionally happened even without Me 262 interference, and the German fighter controllers had learned to recognize and exploit such situations. Now unleash a meaningful number of jet fighters at let them have a go at the fighters, and there will be plenty of missed rendezvous ... not to mention that the hunted escorts will take actual losses, too.



Again, what does "self-defeating" mean in your mind? It took a massive bombing campaign against hundreds and thousands of targets to wear down the German industry and transportation system to the point where it became difficult to operate a modest number of jet fighters, which regardless were far from ineffective in spite of being "constantly harried by the overpowering fighter escort" (as A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 put it).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

A 300 liter drop tank would mean that an Me 262 is still using about 4+ times the fuel.

I'm not saying that the Me 109 or Fw 190 would be better in combat than an Me 262, I'm saying that at least they could get into combat more regularly on the basis of logistics than an Me 262.

Then you toss in a logical fallacy by taking things to absurd proportions. The demand for sources is the same thing, an irrelevant appeal to authority. But to address it directly: When something like 80% of the German army was for all intents incapable of offensive action on a divisional or larger level, it pretty much argues that they were not going to win.

A self-defeating weapon system is one that is so unreliable, so unserviceable, etc., that it makes itself combat ineffective.

Next, you give us a 'what-if' and as is common in these, you attribute to one side a change in something and fail to consider what the other side would do in response. For example, by 1944 the Allies had plenty of fighter aircraft. They could--and did--send a wave of them ahead of a bomber strike to sweep the opposition's defending fighters from the sky before the bombers arrived.

If the Allies do that more regularly, the Me 262's end up in a fight with the fighter sweep and never reach the bombers and their close escort fighters. Of course, the US could easily also do what the British were so adept at too: They start jamming the fighter controllers just like the RAF is doing making it nearly impossible to issue any orders whatsoever. So now the defending fighters are milling about wondering where to go to engage anything.

The 262 is self-defeating because it is unreliable and a fuel hog. It is logistically unsupportable for the Germans and that makes it, at best, the occasional spoiler rather than a continuous threat.

What the Luftwaffe / Germany needed was a paradigm shift in technology, not an evolutionary one like jet fighters offered. Jets didn't change the dynamic of the air war, they just offered a better, somewhat harder to fight, version of the same thing already in service. They needed something that disrupted what the other side was doing completely. That is, the Allies' tactics, strategy, and equipment were no longer going to work effectively.

 

[edwest4]

Your constant repetition of self-defeating means you are not interested in any information to the contrary. And you have not listed any sources or figures from official documents to back up your claims.

Why would the USAAF approve for publication a true picture of the last months of the war? They could've just published photos of German soldiers surrendering, some destroyed tanks and planes, and some bombed out cities, followed by "We Won!" Instead, the scenario they presented was different from yours. Life magazine was a popular, high circulation publication.

Perhaps an article in a U.S. Army Air Force publication would be helpful:

The July 1946 issue of Army Air Force Review had an article by Charlotte Knight titled "German Rocketeers. German rockets and guided missiles almost won the war for the Nazis." The article quotes Donald L. Putt, Commanding General at T-2 (Intelligence) at Wright Field. Here is the first sentence:

"That the allies won the war in Europe by a terrifyingly narrow margin is a fact now accepted by almost all military leaders who have seen at first hand Germany's progress in the guided missiles field."

 

[HoHun]

Hi T. A.,

Since most of what you wrote is not worth my time, I'll cut right to the chase:

A self-defeating weapon system is one that is so unreliable, so unserviceable, etc., that it makes itself combat ineffective.

The Me 262 did clearly not make *itself* combat ineffective. It operated, it shot down enemy aircraft, the Allies allocated considerable resources to suppressing the Me 262 and to protecting their bombers.

If you want to argue that the Me 262 was self-defeating, you will have to prove that it was not effective, and that this lack of effectiveness was indeed inherent in the design and not due to enemy action. And I mean prove by presenting sources ... sorry for this "appeal to authority", but your vivid imagination alone is not going to cut it.

The 262 is self-defeating because it is unreliable and a fuel hog.

The same could be said about the B-29. However, I don't think anyone ever called it self-defeating.

To be honest, I don't think anyone except you ever called the Me 262 self defeating either! :-D

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Your constant repetition of self-defeating means you are not interested in any information to the contrary. And you have not listed any sources or figures from official documents to back up your claims.

Why would the USAAF approve for publication a true picture of the last months of the war? They could've just published photos of German soldiers surrendering, some destroyed tanks and planes, and some bombed out cities, followed by "We Won!" Instead, the scenario they presented was different from yours. Life magazine was a popular, high circulation publication.

Perhaps a U.S. Army Air Force publication article would be helpful:

The July 1946 issue of Army Air Force Review had an article by Charlotte Knight titled "German Rocketeers. German rockets and guided missiles almost won the war for the Nazis." The article quotes Donald L. Putt, Commanding General at T-2 (Intelligence) at Wright Field. Here is the first sentence:

"That the allies won the war in Europe by a terrifyingly narrow margin is a fact now accepted by almost all military leaders who have seen at first hand Germany's progress in the guided missiles field."

That clearly is hyperbole. The V-2 accomplished really very little. Sure, the Allies had no way to defeat it other than to try and attack the launch sites and factories. Saddam Hussen, likewise used ballistic missiles in the first Gulf War to no avail even as the press made much of the attacks.

A more rational and thought-out version is found in The US Air Force and the National Guided Missile Program 1945 - 1950

Where (pg 96)

There is another striking feature that becomes apparent from this monograph and that is the very limited input from German technology...

Over the years, a veritable industry has grown up describing the "advanced technology" allegedly developed by the German at the end of World War Two. Within this industry it is an article of faith that these alleged German developments "laid the foundation for all existing guided missile technology and ICBM delivery systems." (This monograph) reveals just how false this picture is.

The Me 262 accomplished nothing of significance during the war. It didn't stop a single bomber raid. It wasn't so much as a speed bump in the road to victory. What result did it manage to accomplish, even once, that made any significant difference to the outcome of anything?
If anything, by the end of 1944 the Luftwaffe was completely irrelevant, with the exception of its flak component. If all Western Allied air activity ceased, they would have still won the war, and likely about the same date.

The B-29 by comparison burned Japan's cities to the ground, then delivered the ultimate city buster, the atomic bomb.

Not one German rocket or missile program outside of the V-1, and then only for a short period of time, really had any significant impact on the flow of events in the last year of the war. The V-2 was a grotesquely expensive way to deliver a 1 metric ton warhead onto a large city at random. It had zero impact on Allied war production, zero impact on Allied field forces, and in retrospect accomplished little other than gobbling up scarce resources and manpower to field it.

With respect to the V-1, the US had a working copy in the JB-2 / Loon 60 days after the first one was launched on London and for a bit planned to mass produce this cheap weapon and fire thousands back on Germany. That was cancelled as a waste of effort given how the war was going. It was also considered for use against Japan, but nuclear weapons seemed a better bet.

The Germans also tried to develop a SAM, but nothing they did by the end of the war was close to being a truly viable system. The closest they came to a workable SAM was likely the Ba 349 Natter. By substituting a pilot for automatic guidance in the terminal phase of intercept, the Natter was a poor man's SAM that could have possibly worked.

 

[HoHun]

Hi T. A.,

It wasn't so much as a speed bump in the road to victory.

That's cheap circular logic. Which non-"self-defeating" weapon system could *not* be called a "speed bump in the road to victory"?

You're automatically making all weapons of the losing side "self-defeating", regardless of their actual qualities.

That's an old and rather tired trope from the 1960s or something. Except that even back then, no-one ever was dumb enough to call the Me 262 "self-defeating".

I don't know of any Me 262 pilot who ever said, "We could have done just as much damage to the USAAF by just sitting on the ground and snipping our fingers every three minutes". And as you seem to be allergic against research, I am pretty sure you don't know of any, either.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Hi T. A.,



That's cheap circular logic. Which non-"self-defeating" weapon system could *not* be called a "speed bump in the road to victory"?

You're automatically making all weapons of the losing side "self-defeating", regardless of their actual qualities.

That's an old and rather tired trope from the 1960s or something. Except that even back then, no-one ever was dumb enough to call the Me 262 "self-defeating".

I don't know of any Me 262 pilot who ever said, "We could have done just as much damage to the USAAF by just sitting on the ground and snipping our fingers every three minutes". And as you seem to be allergic against research, I am pretty sure you don't know of any, either.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Let's look at one of the units that was issued a full complement of Me 262 early on, Kommando Nowotny. It lasted a month in action, with almost all of its losses due to technical issues, accidents, and other non-operational causes. It didn't fail because its planes were shot down by enemy aircraft, but rather because of problems surrounding the 262 itself.

That holds true for all of its operations. Also, your assertion it could successfully mix it up with Allied fighters is generally less true than false. The 262 had poor maneuverability compared to Allied piston engine fighters and was best used in hit and run tactics using its speed to avoid interception. When it started maneuvering, there was the danger of losing an engine to a compressor stall, and the 262 slowed down to speeds where it could be successfully engaged by the fighters.

Do you know any 262 pilots who said there were always serious fuel shortages and the planes were frequently down for maintenance issues?

 

[HoHun]

Hi T. A.,

Let's look at one of the units that was issued a full complement of Me 262 early on, Kommando Nowotny. It lasted a month in action, with almost all of its losses due to technical issues, accidents, and other non-operational causes.

So where's the breakdown of their losses into technical issues, accidents, other non-operational causes and combat losses? You seem to be a big fan of arguing empty-handed, but I am not.

Also, your assertion it could successfully mix it up with Allied fighters is generally less true than false.

Don't misrepresent my words - I never said "mix it up", which is a colloquial and rather vague term suited to invite misunderstandings.

And it is not my assertion, I was explaining the previously quoted source on the German pilots' opinion of the value and best use of the Me 262 to you. It's always a sign I'm being trolled when I have to quote myself in the same thread again, but here it is:

Another interesting appendix in Dan's Me 262 book is the reproduction of A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945, which was based on interviews with captured Me 262 pilots (including, amongst others, Barkhorn, Bär and Dahl). It states:

"The use of the Me 262 as an attack fighter against Allied bombers was dictated by the impossibility of using other German fighters for this purpose and by the necessaity of doing something to stop or hinder the Allied raids, but German pilots regard the ideal role of the Me 262 to be that of a pure fighter, finding and destroying Allied fighters and fighter-bombers. [...]

The 262 had poor maneuverability compared to Allied piston engine fighters and was best used in hit and run tactics using its speed to avoid interception.

So what? Every US fighter had poor manoeuvrability compared to the Japanese Zero, and was best used in hit and run tactics using its speed to avoid interception. We all know the combat results.

Do you know any 262 pilots who said there were always serious fuel shortages and the planes were frequently down for maintenance issues?

Is that question a sign you're interested in actual research? Then go and do some.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Hood]

So where's the breakdown of their losses into technical issues, accidents, other non-operational causes and combat losses? You seem to be a big fan of arguing empty-handed, but I am not.

Even Wikipedia can provide you with that! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommando_Nowotny

By my reckoning of the 28 losses within a period of less than two months (ignoring the one loss listed as unknown reason the break down would be:
Engine: 5 (18.5%)
Running out of Fuel: 5 (18.5%)
Technical (usually nosewheel leg collapse): 4 (14.8%)
Combat (including battle damage causing forced landing): 12 (44.4%). - interestingly only 2 were shot down while taking off
Pilot Error: 1 (3.7%)

Only 6 pilots killed though, including Nowotny himself in combat.
Some of the airframes only damaged, some will have been repaired and re-issued to other units.

The unit claimed 24 Allied aircraft shot down (I don't know how many of these are actual confirmed kills from the Allied side). On paper that's a 50% advantage to the Me 262 in combat, 24 losses Vs 12 but once you factor in the fuel and engine losses (over a third of all losses) then the unit lost more aircraft 24 Vs 28.
Now we know that a lot of Allied aircraft were lost in training flights, undercarriage collapses, flying into high ground in bad weather, engine failures etc., you would have to calculate Allied wastage for an equivalent sized unit to really find out if the Me 262 was prone to excessive loss - 13 aircraft in 6-7 weeks feels high to me.

Me 262 combat claims seem to range from 542 to 300, quite a range but given the fog of war that doesn't seem surprising. It seems quite a high kill rate given only 100 or so were serviceable at any one time. Allied pilots claimed around 100 Me 262s shot down but far more were claimed in strafing attacks (90 claimed on two airfields in Feb-March 1945 alone). I don't think it can be doubted that the Me 262 was not effective in aerial combat - certainly it was but given the high numbers destroyed on the ground its clear that Allied airpower by this stage was omnipotent, ranging far and wide at will. And of course if hundreds of Me 262s were sitting on the ground to be shot up you have to ask the reasons for that... The same reason why only 120 out of nearly 1,000 He 162s were ever delivered - lack of parts, fuel, and pilots.
Nobody has ever won an aerial campaign where they lost more aircraft on the ground than in the air.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Hood,

Thanks for joining in with a really well-composed post!

Even Wikipedia can provide you with that! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommando_Nowotny

More appropriately, Wikipedia could even provide T. A. with that.

Now we know that a lot of Allied aircraft were lost in training flights, undercarriage collapses, flying into high ground in bad weather, engine failures etc., you would have to calculate Allied wastage for an equivalent sized unit to really find out if the Me 262 was prone to excessive loss - 13 aircraft in 6-7 weeks feels high to me.

Relying on https://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/flugbew.htm and checking data for October 1944 for JG 26, they suffered 32 losses to enemy action, and another 32 losses without enemy action. Based on that semi-random sample, the Me 262 was actually suffering relatively lower "wastage" losses (if that's the right term) than the Me 109 and Fw 190. (JG 26 was operating both.)

I believe the JG 26 experience of an even split between losses to enemy action and other losses was more or less typical, but I haven't checked that in systematically.

I don't think it can be doubted that the Me 262 was not effective in aerial combat - certainly it was but given the high numbers destroyed on the ground its clear that Allied airpower by this stage was omnipotent, ranging far and wide at will.

I guess that's an ideomatic turn of phrase as I'd have put it, "... no doubt that the Me 262 was effective ...", but I think we're probably in agreement here.

That it took omnipotent, far-and-wide ranging Allied airpower to defeat the Me 262 is in fact a very good argument for the type not be "self-defeating" at all.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Hood]

I guess that's an ideomatic turn of phrase as I'd have put it, "... no doubt that the Me 262 was effective ...", but I think we're probably in agreement here.

I take pilot combat claims with doses of salt, both sides over-estimated and in the confusion of the heat of combat it is understandable. But two examples show how success could ebb and flow:
- 18 March 1945, 37 Me 262s of JG 7 intercepted a force of 1,221 bombers and 632 escorting fighters. They claimed 12 bombers and 1 fighter and lost 3 Me 262s.
- 7 April 1945 III./JG 7 and I.(J)/KG 54 (around 60 Me 262s) intercepted the fighter escort accompanying 1,261 bombers. They claimed 19 kills but lost 27 Me 262s (19 pilots killed). 180 Bf 109s of Sonderkommando Elbe went for the bombers and lost 60 aircraft. The USAAF recorded losses were 19 bombers and 8 fighters.
So that's a combat loss rate somewhere between 11 on a good day and 45% on a bad day (arguably the Bf 109s did "better" at 33%) . The Kommando Nowotny combat loss rate seems to be around 44% too.

Given the wide range of figures quoted for Me 262 kills (542-300) its hard to pin down how effective they were, certainly serviceable Me 262 numbers fluctuated between 60-130 at any one time so they had more impact than their small number might suggest.

There is no indication that the Me 262 did particularly well at shooting down fighters. 8th AF fighter units claimed they shot down 100 Me 262s (plus 29 other jets) for the loss of 12-15 fighters to Me 262s. RAF Tempests claimed 7 confirmed and 3 damaged. Even allowing for over-claiming in combat (even the 12-15 losses to 262s seems optimistic) the odds are never in the Me 262s favour.
A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 gives the opinion that the Me 262s pilots believed they could mix it with the Allied fighters, I'm sure they probably did feel that way, they were fighter pilots after all! But the events of 7 April 1945 where that was tried it ended badly, which takes the shine off the enthusiasm they showed under interrogation.
From the Allied perspective there is no "jet panic", quite evidently Allied pilots tangled with 262s without too much fear and there were no emergency countermeasures put in place, the P-80As stayed in Italy on trials, the Meteor was sent to Belgium but never actually used in operations.

Logistically its hard to dispute that the Me 262 was not hampered by lack of spares, fuel and pilots. The fact only 60-130 could be mustered as flightworthy on a given day out of 1,300 built is not a record for the Luftwaffe to be proud of. That's barely a sixth of a typical Allied day bombing raid escort.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I am going to chip in with my understanding of the "Vengance weapons", they were there to terrify the population rather than overwhelm the military effort of the allies.

Large resources in the realms of:-
Inteligence gathering.
anti aircraft gun units around high value targets (V1).
Movement of fighter aircraft to intecept V1.
Attacks on production/launch sites.

This took time and assets away from other targets which imho, expended the war even if it was by a few months.

Personally, I do not know the real situation, there is so much that can only be drawn by inference which we always have a personal slant on. Mea culpa too in this.

Geneally speaking, I get the feeling that rather like the allies, Germany had far too many pots on the stove and if they had reduced their efforts to the better projects the result may have been substantially better for them. The Me-262 going into production earlier as a pure fighter/interceptor (IF the engine could be ready too) is something oft stated as a war winner but without the engine, mucking about to modify the thing as a fast attack aircraft/bomber really seems to be whimsy. Could it have been better in this instance, yes of course.

So I reckon the evidence demonstrates more common ground than not and the decider being the way in which the individual puts a slant on the facts.

BTW, just how many dead wood projects were running in the TR between 1943/45 and how much more could have been done without them and refining effort?

Consider also that some of those gas turbine engines were going into research for use in heavy armoured vehicles, reducing the available number and production of such units.

 

[edwest4]

I am going to chip in with my understanding of the "Vengance weapons", they were there to terrify the population rather than overwhelm the military effort of the allies.

Large resources in the realms of:-
Inteligence gathering.
anti aircraft gun units around high value targets (V1).
Movement of fighter aircraft to intecept V1.
Attacks on production/launch sites.

This took time and assets away from other targets which imho, expended the war even if it was by a few months.

Personally, I do not know the real situation, there is so much that can only be drawn by inference which we always have a personal slant on. Mea culpa too in this.

Geneally speaking, I get the feeling that rather like the allies, Germany had far too many pots on the stove and if they had reduced their efforts to the better projects the result may have been substantially better for them. The Me-262 going into production earlier as a pure fighter/interceptor (IF the engine could be ready too) is something oft stated as a war winner but without the engine, mucking about to modify the thing as a fast attack aircraft/bomber really seems to be whimsy. Could it have been better in this instance, yes of course.

So I reckon the evidence demonstrates more common ground than not and the decider being the way in which the individual puts a slant on the facts.

BTW, just how many dead wood projects were running in the TR between 1943/45 and how much more could have been done without them and refining effort?

Consider also that some of those gas turbine engines were going into research for use in heavy armoured vehicles, reducing the available number and production of such units.

Facts do not include a slant. The so-called vengeance weapons did two things well. Actual trained pilots were not required. While the British had to assemble a Diver Belt, enough V-1s got through to cause significant damage and loss of life. I have seen an original British intelligence report that included drawings. I think most people have no idea what the detonation of a one ton warhead could do at ground level. On the drawings, three zones of damage were shown: total damage to structures, significant damage and some damage. It was important to get the terms just right to convey information correctly. You couldn't be vague or use your own words.

While the V-1 could be shot down, the V-2 could not. Since it traveled at over 3,000 miles per hour, witnesses to the ground detonation never heard it coming. It was traveling faster than sound. Only after the ground blast did witnesses hear "the sound of a large body moving through the air." The speed involved meant a larger impact crater and ground shaking.

The goal of both weapons was to get the British to sue for peace with Germany and end the bombardment.

As far as the Me 262, the Americans viewed it as a big enough threat that they were compelled to attempt to build their own jet fighter. The Bell P-59 Airacomet was a failure. It was later used only for training. And this was emblematic of the American response to the appearance of significant new weapons fielded by the Germans. The American jet engine was based on the Whittle design, yet their engineers could not match the performance of the Me 262. A fact lost on critics.

 

[riggerrob]

Let's look at one of the units that was issued a full complement of Me 262 early on, Kommando Nowotny. It lasted a month in action, with almost all of its losses due to technical issues, accidents, and other non-operational causes. It didn't fail because its planes were shot down by enemy aircraft, but rather because of problems surrounding the 262 itself.

That holds true for all of its operations. Also, your assertion it could successfully mix it up with Allied fighters is generally less true than false. The 262 had poor maneuverability compared to Allied piston engine fighters and was best used in hit and run tactics using its speed to avoid interception. When it started maneuvering, there was the danger of losing an engine to a compressor stall, and the 262 slowed down to speeds where it could be successfully engaged by the fighters.

Do you know any 262 pilots who said there were always serious fuel shortages and the planes were frequently down for maintenance issues?

Even before the USAAF entered WW2, the Flying Tigers had learned that dive-and-slash attacks were the best way to employ faster, heavier American-made fighters against mor maneuverable Japanese airplanes.
Dive-and-slash remains the preferred method of interception. The only difference now is that BVR missiles allow fast attacks from beyond visual range. No modern fighter pilot wants to get into a turning fight.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Hood,

So that's a combat loss rate somewhere between 11 on a good day and 45% on a bad day (arguably the Bf 109s did "better" at 33%) . The Kommando Nowotny combat loss rate seems to be around 44% too.

Kommano Nowotny was an Erprobungskommando which had to work out the best methods for employing the jet fighter through trial and error. From Ethell/Price in "Deutsche Düsenflugzeuge":

"Generalmajor Galland, who was visiting Achmer for inspecting on the same day [Nowotny was killed], recognized that Nowotny had been overtaxed with the task he had been given, to work a totally new fighter type with unusual properties that was flown by quickly and insufficiently trained pilots up to operations. All this from an area near the front which was continuously dominated by a numerically superior enemy. Thus Galland immediately ordered to deploy the unit for operational training to Lechfeld [in Southern Germany]."

With regard to the "bad day", it's not suprising to see KG(J) 54 involved there - as Hajo Hermann in "Bewegtes Leben" points out, these were crewed mostly by bomber pilots who weren't trained as fighter pilots, and thought of attacking the US bombers in the way they had flown their bombers to attack surface ships. The deeper background of this was the opposition of the fighter pilot to Goering, which lead to a dominance of the bomber arm within the Luftwaffe, as guys like Peltz and Hermann were seen as politically more reliable than fighter pilots like Galland or Steinhoff (see Steinhoff, "In letzter Stunde").

With regard to "Sonderkommando Elbe", I'm not sure it's a good idea to use this as a bench mark. These were ramming attacks which were not typical of Luftwaffe tactics, based on an initiative by Hermann who was involved in the abovementioned power struggle within the Luftwaffe, and in "Bewegtes Leben", he actually claimed 60 bombers destroyed by the Sonderkommando. (Which I believe is probably greatly optimistic.)

Given the wide range of figures quoted for Me 262 kills (542-300) its hard to pin down how effective they were, certainly serviceable Me 262 numbers fluctuated between 60-130 at any one time so they had more impact than their small number might suggest.

I believe hard numbers are difficult to come by for the late-war period, but I think your conclusion aligns with the opinion of the German pilots interviewed for the report I quoted.

There is no indication that the Me 262 did particularly well at shooting down fighters. 8th AF fighter units claimed they shot down 100 Me 262s (plus 29 other jets) for the loss of 12-15 fighters to Me 262s. RAF Tempests claimed 7 confirmed and 3 damaged. Even allowing for over-claiming in combat (even the 12-15 losses to 262s seems optimistic) the odds are never in the Me 262s favour.

The Allied report also points out that it was rare that the Me 262 pilots actually attacked fighters ... they almost exclusively concentrated on bombers, so most fighter-vs.-fighter confrontations would begin with the Allied fighters in an offensive position. Accordingly, the exchange ratio can be expected to be disfavourable.

A.D.I.(K) Report No. 323/1945 gives the opinion that the Me 262s pilots believed they could mix it with the Allied fighters, I'm sure they probably did feel that way, they were fighter pilots after all! But the events of 7 April 1945 where that was tried it ended badly, which takes the shine off the enthusiasm they showed under interrogation.

Ironically, the KG(J) pilots involved on that day actually were bomber pilots, while the interviews for the report seems to have mostly been conducted with fighter pilots of JV 44. That probably was a sensible choice by the interviewers, as clearly they were trying to get a good picture of the potential of the new technology.

From the Allied perspective there is no "jet panic", quite evidently Allied pilots tangled with 262s without too much fear and there were no emergency countermeasures put in place, the P-80As stayed in Italy on trials, the Meteor was sent to Belgium but never actually used in operations.

I believe there were a total of two YP-80A's in Italy, so they probably wouldn't have done much to calm down the Allies even had they been sent to England! The Meteor in 1944 had quite a few issues with regard to handling and performance that probably made it less than ideal to fight a Me 262.

(See http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/meteor/Meteor-CFE.pdf ... "The Meteor has an instability in yaw ("snaking"), which makes it unsuitable as a gun platform at operational speeds.")

Logistically its hard to dispute that the Me 262 was not hampered by lack of spares, fuel and pilots. The fact only 60-130 could be mustered as flightworthy on a given day out of 1,300 built is not a record for the Luftwaffe to be proud of.

The point is, this has nothing to do with the Me 262 as an aircraft type. The German industry could have produced P-80 fighters instead, and the situation would have been exactly the same. Yet no-one in his right mind would consider the P-80 a "self-defeating weapon" ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[riggerrob]

Yes, Germany was suffering from shortages of skilled tool-makers during WW2. Germany may have been the first continental European nation to fully-industrialize, but she still lagged behind the USA.
I suspect that part of the problem was too many German metal-workers conscripted into the Wehrmacht ... a great strategy for a short war, but disastrous for a long war.
Shortages of skilled metal-workers plagued all participants in WW2.
British production ramp-ups were hindered by shortages of welders, fitters, machinists, tool-an-die makers and shortages of apprentices. It took more than a year to establish a shadow factory - at Castle Bromwich, to build Spitfires - because of delays in making tooling to stretch-form the complex curved leading edges.
Similarly, Canadian factory managers grumbled about delayed shipments of tools to build British-pattern war materials. One rumor has it that an RAF engineering officer angrily refused the first Canadian-built Lancaster as sub-standard. A more detailed inspection revealed that it had been built precisely to an earlier set of drawings.
Only the USA seemed to have a surplus of metal-workers at the start of WW2. That allowed them to supply tools and complete airplanes, complete tanks, etc. to Australia, Britain, China, Finland, France, Holland, the USSR, etc. Lend-lease shipments to the USSR included large amounts of raw materials and semi-processed industrial products (e.g. tetra-ethal lead). I would be curious to know how many machine tools the USA supplied to the USSR during WW2.

 

[edwest4]

"Sonderkommando Elbe" was not the first use of ramming (rammstoss in German). When the Germans attacked the Russians, ramming by Russian aircraft also occurred (taran in Russian).

One problem for the Me 262 was a lack of high temperature metals for the engines. The lower temperature metals meant the engines had a life of 22 hours before needing replacement. There was also the issue of micro-fracture in the turbine blades. This was solved through making them hollow and giving them a ceramic coating.

 

[Fluff]

Serious post. You could model the dilemma, of do you build more of what you already have, or research and build something new/'better' using a decent PC strategy game. But the question then, is what's your aim. Building more or better Me262 wasn't going to 'win' Germany the war, it would have killed more allied aircrew - and arguably more german civilians. So as Germany, in 45, what are you trying to achieve, no-one is coming to help you. End result could have been famine, or lots of other 'unforseen outcomes;'

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Serious post. You could model the dilemma, of do you build more of what you already have, or research and build something new/'better' using a decent PC strategy game. But the question then, is what's your aim. Building more or better Me262 wasn't going to 'win' Germany the war, it would have killed more allied aircrew - and arguably more german civilians. So as Germany, in 45, what are you trying to achieve, no-one is coming to help you. End result could have been famine, or lots of other 'unforseen outcomes;'

This is the real rub here. The Me 262 was evolutionary, not revolutionary. It didn't change the dynamic of the air war but rather was simply a faster fighter plane that was going to be harder to counter.
What the situation called for, for Germany, was something revolutionary. That is, a viable working SAM and / or AAM would have been one such revolution. But Germany lacked the guidance systems and a workable proximity fuze to get one into service. Either, or both, would have changed the dynamic of the air war considerably.

A supersonic fighter would have too, but that's not in the cards at all.

"Better" wasn't going to cut it for the Germans by 1944.