This picture really illustrates the key problem with pushing the island forward. The only place you can put it without having to relocate the aircraft elevators is between the two starboard elevators, which forces you to move the two aft weapon elevators. Which in turn means you need to move the magazines, or plan to shuttle weapons fore and aft between the deep magazine and the upper elevators. It also kills the two-deep deck park amidships, which is where the arming and refuelling "pit stop" arrangement is, which means the time required to turn around aircraft between strikes is much longer. It's a redesign from the keel up and makes the ships significantly worse in the process.
"What? There's only three elevators? We need four!"
 
This picture really illustrates the key problem with pushing the island forward. The only place you can put it without having to relocate the aircraft elevators is between the two starboard elevators, which forces you to move the two aft weapon elevators. Which in turn means you need to move the magazines, or plan to shuttle weapons fore and aft between the deep magazine and the upper elevators. It also kills the two-deep deck park amidships, which is where the arming and refuelling "pit stop" arrangement is, which means the time required to turn around aircraft between strikes is much longer. It's a redesign from the keel up and makes the ships significantly worse in the process.
They really did study the hell out of this issue and came up with the best that met the requirements. If the existing Nimitz had shown itself superior, well, it was in the study too. And it didn't.
 
When is the second ship expected to enter service?
JFK is wrapping her acceptance trials. The last of her weapon elevators need to be completed, but they will likely commission her early next year. There will be exercises and yard availabilities following commissioning. First operational deployment would hopefully be 2029.
 
If the Ford‑class were to revert to the C13‑1/2 catapults plus the Mk 7 arresting gear system, it would essentially become the originally‑planned CVNX‑1. That would make Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to skip CVNX‑1 and proceed directly with CVNX‑2 look quite absurd. Furthermore, it has been nearly ten years since CVN‑78 was delivered. How has improvement progressed for the three systems: EMALS, AGG and AWE? By normal industrial‑product iteration timelines, an improved variant — one resolving issues uncovered aboard CVN‑78 and boosting reliability — should have been available long ago.
 
Old news. Leave it to TMZ to roll out another story on it.
Not wrong to drop another article on it for those not paying attention after the President's idiocy.


Furthermore, it has been nearly ten years since CVN‑78 was delivered. How has improvement progressed for the three systems: EMALS, AGG and AWE? By normal industrial‑product iteration timelines, an improved variant — one resolving issues uncovered aboard CVN‑78 and boosting reliability — should have been available long ago.
You are greatly underestimating the challenges of making design changes to government contracts...
 
Not wrong to drop another article on it for those not paying attention after the President's idiocy.



You are greatly underestimating the challenges of making design changes to government contracts...
Based on available documentation, during the development of the C13‑1 catapult, the Navy achieved rapid execution of a closed‑loop workflow: identify and localize problems → implement design changes → validate the effectiveness of such changes. However, this highly‑efficient closed‑loop process is entirely absent aboard Ford‑class vessels at present. I am aware that the distinction lies in the fact that the C13‑1 was fully managed in‑house by the Navy, whereas EMALS is independently led by General Atomics. Extending this analysis to EMALS, AGG and AWE, one cannot simply attribute their slow improvement cycles to the complexity of the cumbersome approval procedures.

To my knowledge, there are two modalities for ECPs: government‑directed design changes and contractor‑initiated design changes. The former suffers from the issues you described, for which we may assign blame to “bureaucracy”. That being said, have prime contractors implemented such contractor‑initiated design changes even when they were fully aware of the existing problems?
 
That being said, have prime contractors implemented such contractor‑initiated design changes even when they were fully aware of the existing problems?
I'm not aware of any happening at the ship level, but SIG did push for and get government approval for a change to the M17/M18 pistol fire controls, IIRC with titanium parts. And the M16A1 chromed bore was a contractor-driven change.
 
This is my experience with the Army, from my conversations with people in the Navy and Air Force, the situation is more or less the same.
Although DoD (DoW) funding is at record highs right now, there's a number of issues facing the military..

1. The erosion of DoD controls over its own infrastructure, acquisitions, maintenance, etc, all of which affects sustainment. Since the Reagan administration, too much control has been given over to contractors. There was the belief that they did things cheaper, faster, more efficiently, but that ended up not being the case. These days, they have so much control over things, they can easily dictate schedule and costs. The DoD has been clawing back control over its programs, and some of this is evident in things such as kicking LockMart out of the two major next gen fighter programs after what they did with the F-35. But it's not only them, but much more wide spread.
Ultimately, the DoD is fed up of having little control over its own infrastructure and equipment, and they're also fed up with the forced "sharing" with the other branches (joint strike fighters, joint bases, etc). we're gonna see a mutual divorce in a number of areas.

2. Trump has considerable ability to shape what he wants the DoD to purchase and develop, but his preferences will not always align with those of the DOD ( military services, engineers, acquisition professionals, or operational planners, etc). Ideas such as abandoning EMALS, changing the location of a carrier’s island partly for aesthetic reasons, or developing Trump-class battleships will face DoD resistance if technical analysis shows that they would create operational, financial, or engineering problems. Contractors will generally pursue whichever concepts receive funding, but people within the DoD can use requirements analysis, testing, cost estimates, and congressional testimony to demonstrate why a proposal is or is not practical. Congress will also have considerable influence because it ultimately controls funding. The result will be an ongoing struggle among presidential direction, operational requirements, congressional interests, and industry incentives.

3. Many people within the DoD are developing plans for a different era of warfare in which AI, autonomous systems, unmanned vehicles, resilient communications, and large numbers of comparatively inexpensive platforms will become increasingly important. But the DoD can't fully execute them because it faces entrenched interests. Major contractors are often incentivized to offer expensive, proprietary, gold-plated solutions, politicians prioritize jobs and industrial activity in their own districts, the services themselves can produce excessive requirements and resist institutional change, and political or military leaders may remain attached to visually impressive legacy platforms and concepts.
 
How about moving backwards only when passing in front of him? That way, the island would appear to be moving forward.
Or just add a token hull extension aft of the island. May not be visible but the island becomes further forward. Put an extra gun on it.
 
The DOD will focus on what's going to keep the Ford class sustainable during combat operations, I'd ignore the political theater.
 
They drove the Ford until it broke, not sure that's what they will do
Increase crew training, upgrade the logi to bring in the need spares, ACTUAL SCHEDULE SHORE LIVE AND PORT CALLS...

You know the stuff the navy of 1900s figure out and stop under Clinton to save money. THAT coming back to bite us.
 
The erosion of DoD controls over its own infrastructure, acquisitions, maintenance, etc, all of which affects sustainment. Since the Reagan administration, too much control has been given over to contractors. There was the belief that they did things cheaper, faster, more efficiently, but that ended up not being the case. These days, they have so much control over things, they can easily dictate schedule and costs.
I am 10 months into working at a major defense contractor after 20 years in civil aerospace. Besides trying desperately to GTFO to any job I can find that will pay the bills (like I'm planning to go talk to a financial advisor to see if there's a way I can take a drastic pay cut and still at least have a chance of ever retiring) because it is so [expletive deleted] [expletive deleted] boring, soul-destroying, and mental-health-damaging (no, this is not "engineering" it's [expletive deleted] paper-pushing)... these cost-plus contracts are themselves complete fiscal irresponsibility. For every hour of measurable work an actual works-on-the-product engineer does (as opposed to a "systems" "project" or "program" engineer) there is a veritable army of said other "engineers" above them, plus subcontract managers, contract managers, program managers, buyers, administrators, purchasing managers, and more, all demanding hours time of those same actually-works-on-the-product engineers to do pricing analysis, schedule estimates, budget tracking and allocation, and all that. My previous job was 90% technical work and only 3-4 hours of meetings a week. Now I'm in up to 20 hours of [expletive deleted] meetings a week, a solid chunk of my time is spent on supplier management and contract proposal support, and not a single thing I have done in 11 months has actually made one bit of [expletive deleted] hardware or had any impact on the [expletive deleted] product.

It is quite obvious that this insanely complex and hierarchical structure is intended to maximize the number of people who are ostensibly required to deliver the product, and thereby maximize the cost and thus the "fee" (aka profit). The level of independent action and autonomy I previously had at the job I loved but had to leave due to family circumstances is simply horrifying to most of my coworkers.

if we could please just go back to naming carriers after famous battles and ships.
Agreed, starting now. Keep the name on the Miller though--that man deserves a ship, and the ship deserves a name her crew would be proud of.

The only ships that should get politicians' names should be garbage scows.
 
these cost-plus contracts are themselves complete fiscal irresponsibility. For every hour of measurable work an actual works-on-the-product engineer does (as opposed to a "systems" "project" or "program" engineer) there is a veritable army of said other "engineers" above them, plus subcontract managers, contract managers, program managers, buyers, administrators, purchasing managers, and more, all demanding hours time of those same actually-works-on-the-product engineers to do pricing analysis, schedule estimates, budget tracking and allocation, and all that. My previous job was 90% technical work and only 3-4 hours of meetings a week. Now I'm in up to 20 hours of [expletive deleted] meetings a week, a solid chunk of my time is spent on supplier management and contract proposal support, and not a single thing I have done in 11 months has actually made one bit of [expletive deleted] hardware or had any impact on the [expletive deleted] product.

It is quite obvious that this insanely complex and hierarchical structure is intended to maximize the number of people who are ostensibly required to deliver the product, and thereby maximize the cost and thus the "fee" (aka profit). The level of independent action and autonomy I previously had at the job I loved but had to leave due to family circumstances is simply horrifying to most of my coworkers.

Is this a major factor why the costs of weapons and weapon-systems are so grotesquely over-priced and take forever to design, test, produce and field?
 
Sandboxx has a video out about Trump's highly ill-considered decision to retrofit steam-catapults onto the Ford-class CVNs:


The president wants the Navy to do away with the more advanced aircraft-launching electromagnetic catapults found in its newest Ford-class supercarriers, in favor of the legacy steam systems found in earlier Nimitz-class ships. And truth be told, there’s actually a lot more to this debate than it seems at first glance.​
 
Stay with EMALS, China has implemented their EMALS, and the French will be using EMALS as well in their new carrier. Steam is old tech, complicated and lots of maintenance. We should then probably go back to boilers and black oil again for s**ts and giggles.
 
I’ve never dealt with steam catapults in real life, but if you have a basic understanding of the chemical properties of lubricants, then think about the steam in a catapult, and then try to imagine the lubricating oil in those catapults turning into thick, sticky, black sludge under high-temperature steam, with sailors having to clean it all by hand… Also, take US Navy steam catapult carriers as an example—during operations, it’s common for a carrier to launch aircraft 200 times a day, and theoretically, a steam catapult needs maintenance every 500 launches. This means that in wartime, the catapults would frequently need servicing, which could affect operational efficiency and increase logistical pressure. Electromagnetic catapults are totally different in this regard.
 
Is this a major factor why the costs of weapons and weapon-systems are so grotesquely over-priced and take forever to design, test, produce and field?

I would argue it is at least part of the reason, to some extent. Yes, some of it is simply that cutting edge tech is hard--but I'm quite convinced that cost-plus, the bureaucracy that grows to support it, and the inevitable mindset that creeps in of "someone else is paying the bill" certainly make it worse. So does the year to year uncertainty and unpredictable nature of contracts and their vulnerability to political jackassery.

I also wonder if the general industry consolidation and slowdown in development programs (military and civil) over the last 30-40 years has contributed. Programs drag out longer for various reasons, but I'm betting lack of experience doing them plus the need to keep the people around and doing something so they're there when you need them has resulted in a lot of make-work that we now can't get rid of when there's real work to be done.
 
Stay with EMALS, China has implemented their EMALS, and the French will be using EMALS as well in their new carrier. Steam is old tech, complicated and lots of maintenance. We should then probably go back to boilers and black oil again for s**ts and giggles.
In my view, the fundamental comparison lies in reliability rather than technical superiority, much like how the F‑15 program opted for an MSA radar instead of a PESA radar. If EMALS has not achieved meaningful reliability improvements over the past decade and performs even worse than the C13‑1/2 catapult, why should GA‑built EMALS remain in service? Does the U.S. industrial base currently possess the capacity to resolve this issue? Judging from the AWE experience aboard CVN‑79, the answer is clearly no. It is high time for a return to an engineering‑driven culture.
 
In my view, the fundamental comparison lies in reliability rather than technical superiority, much like how the F‑15 program opted for an MSA radar instead of a PESA radar. If EMALS has not achieved meaningful reliability improvements over the past decade and performs even worse than the C13‑1/2 catapult, why should GA‑built EMALS remain in service? Does the U.S. industrial base currently possess the capacity to resolve this issue? Judging from the AWE experience aboard CVN‑79, the answer is clearly no. It is high time for a return to an engineering‑driven culture.
Any new tech has issues from the first cars. computers, etc. Steam catapults had their issues also in the beginnings and really have not changed much. EMALS is new tech and has to mature. You focus on the US industrial base but say nothing of China which is using EMALS on it's Type 003 and France which is planning on an EMALS system for their new carrier, so EMALS must be a good thing, if not, no one else would be using or considering it. I know first hand from friends of mine which were AB's and worked in V2 on the cats on CVN-65, constant maintenance and a pain to work on.

If EMALS turns out to be a complete failure then maybe newer tech steam cats or high-capacity pneumatics could be a solution. With high pressure pneumatics, there are safety concerns (along with high-temp, high pressure steam) like if there is a breach, chance fragging and potentially killing personnel due to instantaneous release of air pressure, not to mention the size of the compressors (including electrical power to drive the compressors) in order create the volume of compressed air required.

It will be interesting if we hear of any issues with China's EMALS, probably not due to way China tweaks info but you never know or maybe they solved the issues, have to wait and see.

When implementing new tech, there is no free lunch and most does not work 100% out of the box.
 
I know one of the very early problems with EMALS was that you could not actually disconnect it from ship's power without shutting down the reactors. You also could not isolate one catapult from the electrical power supply to do work on them! :mad:

I have no clue how that design made it past NAVSEA.

Assuming that has been fixed (IIRC the Ford required a whole lot of rework after the first sea trials), EMALS should be a much better system than steam cats.
 
I know one of the very early problems with EMALS was that you could not actually disconnect it from ship's power without shutting down the reactors. You also could not isolate one catapult from the electrical power supply to do work on them! :mad:

I have no clue how that design made it past NAVSEA.

Assuming that has been fixed (IIRC the Ford required a whole lot of rework after the first sea trials), EMALS should be a much better system than steam cats.
I agree, or NAVSEA could have been the issue and not listened to GA design recommendations. Plus you have to consider requirements, design trade-offs, cost are all factors, I hope all turns out well in EMALS land. Seems the AAG is doing OK, have not been keeping up with that?
 
I suspect, based on my experience in the Navy, that the major problem with the system is that it is maintained and mostly run by conventional EM's. Given the newness and complexity of the system, it's likely they can't figure out how to keep it running properly. For years I was one of shop 51A's sought after reservists. I would show up on some weekend, and they'd have an extra E-nothing (1 to 3) they called in specifically to be my "step n' fetch." Gotta have one of those to be efficient.

I'd then get handed like half-a-dozen work orders, or more, and asked to solve the problems because the active-duty side couldn't figure out what was broken. The active-duty guys get to about 8 to 10 years, mostly just watch standing and doing 'clean and inspect' maintenance then they shift to being paper pushers as First Class or Chiefs. They get comfortable waiting for shore commands or civilian technicians to come aboard to fix anything beyond the simplest problems.

I think the problems can be worked out with EMALS but it will be an extended and painful honeymoon.
 
I honestly feel if the Navy says ..."we changed it to Steam" after a decent interval he would never know the difference...of course that would involve a lot of people in the deception.
 

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