FFG(X)

[Hood]

Maybe the ideal would be a merger with DDG(X) and have a modular design that can be built in large and medium-sized forms.

G&C was also design agent for LCS-1 and MMSC, so their track record raises some questions IMHO, considering they’re thought by many to be the best design team the US has (given their DDG-51 pedigree).

That's pretty damming. The folks who designed the Burke are probably long retired in the old folks home at best. Tinkering with a nearly 50 year-old design is not exactly a source of street cred (shades of Boeing 737NG).

 

[Felocie]

It is still a possible threat. Your other threat profile is on the order of 15-20 AShMs incoming instead of the 24-32 of the Oscar-Yasen.

Rule of military threat analysis is what is the enemy physically capable of, and plan for that. No matter how likely it actually is.

Ok, a possible threat to a National Security Cutter is a DDG. Immediately fit the NSC with at least 96 cells, SPY-6, a flight deck and catapults for E-2s, etc.
The idea that a frigate alone, much less a PF, should be dealing with a salvo of large AShMs launched against a hypothetical convoy is laughable, if that's what you want then you actually want DDGs

You really think that the USN wouldn't send a couple of Connies into the Red Sea

They would absolutely send Connies into the Red Sea however for a sustained combat operation they would reinforce the Connies with a Burke for magazine depth and for greater theatre awareness (AMDR vs EASR)

So you think we need to permanently station a Burke in the Red Sea. Noted.

Something I literally never said, a Burke would be assigned to the Red Sea based upon circumstances, circumstances that most certainly include a significant and sustained AShM threat

 

[Dilandu]

The difference is that they don't have the magazine depth to be in the battle line.

So even though they have Aegis, they don't have the missiles to survive a multi-Regiment bomber attack on a carrier group.

I wouldn't rely on admirals rationality there. Seeing big frigates - "almost as good as destroyers" - "wasting their time on convoy duty, while they could be protecting carriers or augmenting SAGs", would inevitably create tensions between strike forces and escort forces. So its better to design frigates that are too escort-specialized to be useful outside their niche.

You mean like putting a bunch of Mk70 Typhon containerized launchers on top of the container stacks?

Yep. Not sure about top of container stack being workable, but it would probably be possible to find SOME places on cargo ships to fit Mk-70 anyway. It would be much more logical placement for big area-defense missiles (like SM-6 or PAC-3 MSE) than on frigate itself; cargo ships won't even notice the additional load of a pair of Mk-70 containers, while frigate would be hard-pressed to find space for strike-lenght Mk-41.

 

[DWG]

Ok, a possible threat to a National Security Cutter is a DDG. Immediately fit the NSC with at least 96 cells, SPY-6, a flight deck and catapults for E-2s, etc.
The idea that a frigate alone, much less a PF, should be dealing with a salvo of large AShMs launched against a hypothetical convoy is laughable, if that's what you want then you actually want DDGs

The whole point of a general purpose frigate is they're filling in where you can't afford to put a DDG. The previous generation US frigates, the OHPs with their single SM1 rail launcher, if not the Knox class with RIM-7P or Phalanx, would have been used for exactly the same task, and they were facing Oscars with Shipwrecks.

 

[Dilandu]

IMHO, a good starting point for "escort/light frigate" concept could be a LCS hull. They are suboptimal, sure; but they are , at least, well-known to industry and could be build in numbers.

The LCS hull have an advantage of already having 2-helicopter capability, which could be viewed as essential for escort ship. They also have a proven Sea Giraffe-based FCS, optimized to dealing with low-level threats (alternatively, Saudi Arabia variation demonstrate that putting downgraded Aegis on Freedom-class hull seems to be possible)

My idea is basically to use LCS hull as basic to obtain a ship with:

* Max speed reduced to 25-30 knots in exchange for greater range & endurance
* 2 helicopters capability
* 2 tactical-length Mk-41 modules
* 2 bolt-on OTO Melara 76-mm Sovraponte mounts (guided ammo capacity for dealing with drones & drone boats)
* 2 fire control radar (AN/SPG-61 or compatible)
* Full sonar suit for anti-submarine purpose

 

[EmoBirb]

Lack of modern ASW assets including MPA and helos (with no new designs on the horizon)

Minoga is very much on the horizon, as well as Ivan Rogov and the smaller icebreaking patrol vessels, coupled with Gorshkovs and the proposed improved Gorshkovs. Add the growing number of Yasen-Ms, the potential following Khabarovsks.

 

[TwoTribes]

I don't think we need to debate its specific air defense capabilities, anti-submarine warfare performance, VLS cells, or whether it uses the metric system... What truly matters is that the U.S. Navy needs a tangible warship—a Perry for our time (not simply resurrecting a 1970s relic, but a modern equivalent for the 2030s).

First, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of warships.

Second, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of low-tier warships.

Third, the U.S. Navy needs 30+ such low-tier warships by 2045.

Notice a common theme here? “Sufficient numbers.”

The U.S. Navy must have “enough” low-tier warships by 2045–2050 to replace the massive wave of retiring Burkes and LCS. By 2050, 50+ Burkes will be decommissioned (that’s two-thirds of the current fleet!), along with 20+ LCS. That’s an 70-ship shortfall. Can the DDG(X) and Burke III fill that gap? And more importantly—should they?

So, just a proper frigate (something better than the LCS — is that really so hard? It should be simple enough, right?)

Quantity is what truly matters. By cancelling the Constellation, the U.S. Navy has once again delayed its own modernization.It's not 2025 today — it's 2045 today, because building 30 ships is going to take a very long time.

 

[Cordy]

Who is doing the design? The yard or NAVSEA?

You can't build what hasn't been designed.

Fincantieri won the bid for the FFG(X) with a design with 85% design compatibility of the Italian FREMM frigate meeting the USN specifications and to use an operational parent frigate in the water to speed up ships in the fleet and control costs.
After the contract placed Apr. '20 then NAVSEA over the years since issued 20,000 plus design change orders and compatibility with the original Italian FREMM dropped to less than 15%, not surprised if now down to 10%, 759 tons overweight, calling stability into question, top speed decreased, costs ballooned, yard unable to build the modules as design was continually changing and delivery date keeps going ever backwards.
The Admirals come across as idiots when the said original call was for a parent design frigate to speed things up and then do their level best to sabotage it and have succeeded.
The successful South East Asian yards will not start ship build until design 100% complete not even 95%, the USN should copy however much the pressure they are under with the siren voices calling for them to start build when design not completed, need Admirals with strong will power, Congress have already legislated to the 100%, but Admirals ignored.

 

[Dilandu]

First, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of warships.

Second, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of low-tier warships.

Third, the U.S. Navy needs 30+ such low-tier warships by 2045.

Well, for all its problems, LCS program produced 35 ships in 20 years. So theoretically, at least the same number of light frigates could be made available by 2045 - especially if LCS hulls would be used. That's basically a half of required numbers.

 

[Dilandu]

The Admirals come across as idiots when the said original call was for a parent design frigate to speed things up and then do their level best to sabotage it and have succeeded.
The successful South East Asian yards will not start ship build until design 100% complete not even 95%, the USN should copy however much the pressure they are under with the siren voices calling for them to start build when design not completed, need Admirals with strong will power, Congress have already legislated to the 100%, but Admirals ignored.

As I said before, one possible solution is to REMOVE procurement from Navy control. Create a separate - civilian - office within the Department of the Navy, that wouldn't be in the Navy rank structure, and give it full responsibility for designs and procurement. So the Navy could only give feedback & suggestion, but could NOT order design changes; admirals & sailors would be forced to use ships that got approval of the government, not the "dream ships" they desire.

 

[Ainen]

As I said before, one possible solution is to REMOVE procurement from Navy control. Create a separate - civilian - office within the Department of the Navy, that wouldn't be in the Navy rank structure, and give it full responsibility for designs and procurement. So the Navy could only give feedback & suggestion, but could NOT order design changes; admirals & sailors would be forced to use ships that got approval of the government, not the "dream ships" they desire.

To be fair, civilian oversight in this particular case is equally responsible...

First, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of warships.

Second, the U.S. Navy needs a sufficient number of low-tier warships.

Third, the U.S. Navy needs 30+ such low-tier warships by 2045.

You may say that USN really only wants Burke, at most a single "good" second tier ship (LCS struggle with good).
But per this conversation, the need is really two tiers, that is before we add USVs into picture.

Notional "cruiser"(frigate), and notional "sloop"(corvette) to comprehensively fill trade protection. Connie tried to sit on both chairs, while trying to be fleet unit in a manner more similar to pre-ww1 armored cruisers(=ersatz ship of the line). Too much.

 

[Cordy]

As I said before, one possible solution is to REMOVE procurement from Navy control. Create a separate - civilian - office within the Department of the Navy, that wouldn't be in the Navy rank structure, and give it full responsibility for designs and procurement. So the Navy could only give feedback & suggestion, but could NOT order design changes; admirals & sailors would be forced to use ships that got approval of the government, not the "dream ships" they desire.

Some relevant quotes

"The Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) was established by Congress in 1940 and consolidated the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering. The Bureau was responsible for the design, construction, procurement, maintenance, and repair of ships as well as establishing relevant specifications for materials, fuel, etc. BuShips was eliminated by order of the Dept. of Defense in 1966 as part of a general reorganization" - presumably to save money

"The General Board of the Navy was established as an advisory group in 1900 and disbanded in 1951 by order of then CNO Forrest Sherman. The board consisted of senior admirals and others, often near the end of their careers or retired who had a wealth of experience, relatively little politicking left to do, and sufficient time to consider issues facing the Navy. While they were tasked with contemplation of any issue brought before them, their greatest value lay in the guidance and direction they provided for the Navy’s shipbuilding programs. Anyone who has read any of Norman Friedman’s series on the design history of the various classes of ships will be well familiar with the role the General Board played in evaluating the various ship design proposals and then establishing the final requirements. It is worthwhile to note that the General Board was abolished by the office of the CNO which viewed the Board as a threat to the CNO’s power."

 

[Dilandu]

Some relevant quotes

Yep. Basically to remedy the problem, the process need to be reversed; the separate agency that handles designs and procurement must be established.

 

[DWG]

"The General Board of the Navy was established as an advisory group in 1900 and disbanded in 1951 by order of then CNO Forrest Sherman. The board consisted of senior admirals and others, often near the end of their careers or retired who had a wealth of experience, relatively little politicking left to do, and sufficient time to consider issues facing the Navy. While they were tasked with contemplation of any issue brought before them, their greatest value lay in the guidance and direction they provided for the Navy’s shipbuilding programs. Anyone who has read any of Norman Friedman’s series on the design history of the various classes of ships will be well familiar with the role the General Board played in evaluating the various ship design proposals and then establishing the final requirements. It is worthwhile to note that the General Board was abolished by the office of the CNO which viewed the Board as a threat to the CNO’s power."

In some ways the General Board functioned like Controller (Third Sea Lord) in the RN in regard to new designs, but it also had roles much closer to First Sea Lord in setting naval policy, it wasn't just a ship design think tank. I'm not sure the claim it didn't do politicking really holds up. I think it's Friedman's Winning a Future War that really digs into the power struggle between the Board and the CNO.

 

[DWG]

Yep. Basically to remedy the problem, the process need to be reversed; the separate agency that handles designs and procurement must be established.

I don't think that addresses the issue. In many ways that's precisely what NAVSEA is, the problem with Constellation was the utter disconnect between "We'll procure an existing frigate design, it'll be cheaper" and "We'll insist on changing everything to meet our standards exactly", rather than seagoing officers insisting on constant changes - it wasn't requirements creep that did for her, but standards creep.

I do wonder whether there was a change of command at either NAVSEA or higher* that resulted in a reduction in NAVSEA's willingness to relax standards. It clearly was willing to do that while building LCS, which would be roughly contemporaneous with the initial planning for FFG(X), then the contract's awarded and suddenly everything has to be precisely to NAVSEA standards.

* For a parallel, consider the way the USN dropped Streetfighter for LCS** the moment Admiral Cebrowski was no longer there to safeguard his baby.

** Even with all the issues, LCS is a far, far larger and more capable vessel than Streetfighter was initially planned to be.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I'm going to start with Convoy Escort, which means able to deal with Oscar-class AShM volleys. 24x P700 missiles. Or these days, Yasen-class, which means 32x P800 or 3M54 Klub missiles. Per single submarine. (once the average merchant ship does 20 knots, that greatly reduces the need to convoy up)

Absurd threat only a Burke or two could do that. More likely is a couple Saccades per merchant and escort. Maybe a dozen or two depending on convoy size? Besides that the main naval threat isn't even the Russians it's the PLANAF.

I don't mean in terms of the likelihood though just the actual ability to stop it fwiw. A frigate should be a helipad with some medium range missiles like ESSM and a LCS-1 type radar fit. The funny European radar is silly and decent enough to stop a few Harpoons. Between that and RAMs or chaff on the merchants should be adequate for defense based on Houthi experience. This is probably a bit irrelevant since all shipbuilding right now is emphasizing post-WW3 plans though. DOD employee portals have a countdown to August 2027 these days.

 

[yeetmahboi]

I find it funny that in many case like this a lot of times it's better to just blame everything on grifters and nepo babies. Like, "disconnect" "malaise" all pretty world salads to describe what's essentially a bunch of people that could go to the gulag.

It's being logical. Do we assume that's whomever in charge of the PLAN's procurement are inherently better because they have a Damocles's sword hanging over by a bare thread? Nope it's just something someone who got past high school with average logical reasoning skill and some evenings to skim through this thread would do.

We will be witnessing alot of shenanigans like this in the future where people in charge is absolutely a career officer and got no voice in the game beyond pushing for his affiliated corpo and the civil agency either demands to push through with eventual rot or cancel, disband and go back to ol and proven. OHP revival in 2030 baby.

 

[Dilandu]

Do we assume that's whomever in charge of the PLAN's procurement are inherently better because they have a Damocles's sword hanging over by a bare thread?

Well, one thing they DO have, is the government with a planning horizon not limited by next-year midterms or elections in four years. PLAN could plan (sorry for the pun) for decades forward, secured in knowledge that no vital program would be cancelled or drastically cut next years due to populist reasons.

One of the MAJOR problem of modern democracy, in fact - inability to plan long-term. The nearby goal of "winning next election & staying in power" always tend to steer toward populist, short-term politics.

 

[WatcherZero]

It didn't used to be that way, used to be that a Navy would essentially run itself deciding what it required and adjust its plans up or down as funding changed. If they decided they needed a big ticket item they would send the budgetary request but the politicians weren't involved in choosing the design or appointing the contractors. But then politicians decided they wanted to make all the spending decisions so that they personally received the acclaim. Its not just the military, there has been a gradual shift towards centralisation in lots of areas such as transport and health. Sadly I think the primary reason is when being a politician became a paid career rather than an idle hobby.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

The whole point of a general purpose frigate is they're filling in where you can't afford to put a DDG. The previous generation US frigates, the OHPs with their single SM1 rail launcher, if not the Knox class with RIM-7P or Phalanx, would have been used for exactly the same task, and they were facing Oscars with Shipwrecks.

It's also worth pointing out that the OHPs effectively had a pre-Aegis DDG combat system, as capable a something intended for DDG FY67, and more capable than what most Charles F. Adams carried, as it was integrated combat system with digital computers, rather than the manually integrated analog systems of all but four of the Charles F. Adams class.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

The successful South East Asian yards will not start ship build until design 100% complete not even 95%, the USN should copy however much the pressure they are under with the siren voices calling for them to start build when design not completed, need Admirals with strong will power, Congress have already legislated to the 100%, but Admirals ignored.

The Arleigh Burke started construction when the design was 25% complete, so I don't think that was a problem.

 

[Airbus A340]

If you're talking about China, then it probably doesn't matter very much.

America’s National Security Wonderland - American Affairs Journal

While America is battling exhaustion and political polarization at home, it is now facing something it’s never faced abroad: it is locked into a security competition against multiple opponents who, when taken together, are in fact vastly superior to America in terms of industrial capacity. This...

americanaffairsjournal.org

Any situation in which convoys are happening implies a pretty massive war, one in which I'd pretty much expect all non-military freight to stop moving.

Ignoring the ever increasing speed of merchant ships, any Merchies doing over 20 knots are not something you engage with submarines! IIRC the current container ships are capable of cruising at 20 knots. Break-bulk ships are still slower, ~15 knots ish, but there's not a whole lot of Break-bulk that would be moving during a war. Oil tankers and LNG/LPG tankers are the only real 15 knot convoys you'd see.





Generally agree with this.



There's other reasons to have a watered down Aegis suite on all ships in the USN, even if it is more expensive.

1) commonality of training. A radar tech can be assigned to any ship.​

2) signals intelligence. A SPY-6 detection could be anything, while SPY-1 is early Burkes or Ticos only.​

3) simplified supply of spare parts. You can borrow a part from any other ship in the fleet to fix your broken stuff.​

I don't think you understand how superstitious the USN is, nor how casualty-averse the entire US military is.

Ships without names are unnatural things. You're literally talking about using the modern equivalent of PT boats for convoy escorts etc. If it's big enough to mount Standard Missiles, it's a ship and needs a name or it will always be a piece of junk. Crud, I expect the larger USVs to be named as well.

As to casualties, the media will lose their minds over "US Navy Warship sunk" headlines.

How much did battleships achieve in WW1? Ships too valuable to risk are not useful. When carriers are scarce, they do not get used like they were in 1942, they get used like they were used in the Guadalcanal campaign. There are some deep rooted issues that have to be resolved before money is spent on massive numbers. If all vessel are going to be viewed the way BBs were in WW1, then how can they be used in a war?

 

[TorpedoJ]

Reading this thread makes me want to scream (I'm British BTW)
YOU WANT A FRIGATE. Not a "small destroyer", or an "Arleigh Burke substitute", a FRIGATE. It won't have enough VLS to deal with a peer opponent, because a frigate prioritises lower cost. It won't have a radar equivalent to SPY-1D, because SPY-1D was designed for a cruiser. It won't have the same damage control systems as a DDG because a) it needs to be cheap and b) all of your DDGs were designed decades ago when damage control meant lots of people running around with fire hoses or hand pumps or both. It might not even be fast enough to escort your carriers, because a) there are lots of other things to escort that aren't carriers and b) you want it to be good at ASW, right? That means it can't be stuffed full of GTs because those are very difficult to make quiet.
So, my assessment of what you need is as follows:

• A ship of 130-150m. Not too small that it can't go around the world or that it can't be upgraded, but not too big that it costs as much as a DDG.
• 32 strike-length mk41. That's the standard, for frigates, because it gives you enough big SAMs to save yourself against an initial salvo of high-end missiles, plus some cruise missiles in case you need a strike at short notice, plus ASROC if you need a snap shot against a sub.
• A small radar (by your standards). If it's fixed panel that will sacrifice range for all-round coverage, but I'd recommend a rotating one in case you want to stop and stare at a ballistic missile to fire an SM-6. A rotating version of SPY-6 exists, make use of it. Anything more and it becomes too heavy for a frigate and you need to redesign the superstructure.
• A big towed sonar and hull sonar. CAPTAS-4 is a good choice, but getting rid of the hull sonar was a mistake because there are confined waters where you might want to do ASW without a mile of cable trailing behind. This is tied in with the speed point above.
• A good defensive gun armament. 57mm and 1 RAM launcher isn't really enough against drones, so mix in some extra cheap missiles or some extra small calibre guns.

IMO AH140 is nearly a perfect fit. Can have 32mk41 plus 16 SD length if you want more ESSM in place of second RAM. Three gun positions that can take a 57mm, RAM or any small gun, plus two more SCG positions amidships. Weight margins are pretty good, it's a big ship. It's just had damage control updated to the latest RN standards designed for automation and low crewing. Direct diesel drive is a flaw but Babcock could raft them.
And it's designed to have national equipment fitted and has done so twice before, so you'd have to try really hard to screw up.

 

[Martes]

I do wonder, how many of those ships the US would have had today if they went straight to Fincantieri or Navantia in the start of the program, and ordered hulls built in Europe with later fitting out in US, like Australia did.

But we all know that's not how US defense procurement works, of course.

 

[DWG]

I do wonder, how many of those ships the US would have had today if they went straight to Fincantieri or Navantia in the start of the program, and ordered hulls built in Europe with later fitting out in US, like Australia did.

But we all know that's not how US defense procurement works, of course.

Looking at the dates in the Wiki FREMM article, looks like Fincantieri were averaging 30 months from laid down to launched, and a year from launched to commissioned. Which makes me thing they were fairly far through fitting out prior to launch, which is the nature of building with pre-fitted modules, I suppose.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

...getting rid of the hull sonar was a mistake because there are confined waters where you might want to do ASW without a mile of cable trailing behind.

While I broadly agree with this point, the location of the yard on the Menominee River prevents this. It's not deep enough.

I do wonder, how many of those ships the US would have had today if they went straight to Fincantieri or Navantia in the start of the program, and ordered hulls built in Europe with later fitting out in US, like Australia did.

While this is an option, understand you would be permamently killing domestic shipbuilding in the United States.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Reading this thread makes me want to scream (I'm British BTW)
YOU WANT A FRIGATE. Not a "small destroyer", or an "Arleigh Burke substitute", a FRIGATE. It won't have enough VLS to deal with a peer opponent, because a frigate prioritises lower cost. It won't have a radar equivalent to SPY-1D, because SPY-1D was designed for a cruiser.

SPY-1D was designed for a destroyer, and the three-face SPY-6(V)3 that Constellation carried is probably the most minimal radar fit for any modern ASW frigate currently under construction aside from the Type 26 (Type 31 is a general purpose for gate, not an ASW frigate, but it's radar fit is similarly minimal to Type 26).

It won't have the same damage control systems as a DDG because a) it needs to be cheap and b) all of your DDGs were designed decades ago when damage control meant lots of people running around with fire hoses or hand pumps or both.

Most other navies have not had the same experience as the US Navy when it comes to action damage, and given how survivable US warships have been, I think they're on the right track when it comes to insisting of such stringent survivability standards.

It might not even be fast enough to escort your carriers, because a) there are lots of other things to escort that aren't carriers and b) you want it to be good at ASW, right? That means it can't be stuffed full of GTs because those are very difficult to make quiet.

GTs are quieter than diesels, there is a reason why most ASW combatants built from the 1970s onwards have used COGAG. Rafting has made diesels viable to the point that their fuel efficiency might outweigh their acoustic signature. It should be pointed out that Constellation and both the French and Italian FREMMs only have a single LM2500.

• A small radar (by your standards). If it's fixed panel that will sacrifice range for all-round coverage, but I'd recommend a rotating one in case you want to stop and stare at a ballistic missile to fire an SM-6. A rotating version of SPY-6 exists, make use of it. Anything more and it becomes too heavy for a frigate and you need to redesign the superstructure.

This is news to the Germans, Spanish, Belgians, Dutch, Canadians and Australians, who are all in the process of building ASW Frigates with very capable radar suites made up of multiple staring phased arrays (no less than four such arrays, usually more in two or more bands for all ships but the River class), and all, aside from the Canadians, also have dedicated AAW combatants they intend to operate alongside their ASW frigates.

• A big towed sonar and hull sonar. CAPTAS-4 is a good choice, but getting rid of the hull sonar was a mistake because there are confined waters where you might want to do ASW without a mile of cable trailing behind. This is tied in with the speed point above.

Towing a multi-static multi-tow VDS and Towed Array combination at high speed in rough weather is going to be a significant driver in size. I don't think it's a coincidence that nearly all for the Euro Frigates are similarly large.

• A good defensive gun armament. 57mm and 1 RAM launcher isn't really enough against drones, so mix in some extra cheap missiles or some extra small calibre guns.

They would have doubtless have carried Mk 38 Mod 4, that combined with RAM and 57mm are more than enough.

IMO AH140 is nearly a perfect fit. Can have 32mk41 plus 16 SD length if you want more ESSM in place of second RAM. Three gun positions that can take a 57mm, RAM or any small gun, plus two more SCG positions amidships. Weight margins are pretty good, it's a big ship. It's just had damage control updated to the latest RN standards designed for automation and low crewing. Direct diesel drive is a flaw but Babcock could raft them.
And it's designed to have national equipment fitted and has done so twice before, so you'd have to try really hard to screw up.

I think a Type 26 derivative (ideally based on the Hunter design) is a far better fit.

 

[Ainen]

SPY-1D was designed for a destroyer, and the three-face SPY-6(V)3 that Constellation carried is probably the most minimal radar fit for any modern ASW frigate currently under construction aside from the Type 26 (Type 31 is a general purpose for gate, not an ASW frigate, but it's radar fit is similarly minimal to Type 26).

Well, we can argue 054B is also less than Constellation.

Most other navies have not had the same experience as the US Navy when it comes to action damage, and given how survivable US warships have been, I think they're on the right track when it comes to insisting of such stringent survivability standards.

Naval history knows more than a few cases, where overly well built ships were downfall of their builders.
Human presense at sea is tied to ships. There's no substitute to lack of (any) presense.

I think a Type 26 derivative (ideally based on the Hunter design) is a far better fit.

Type 26 is expensive even in UK/Norway configuration, i.e. with ... AA/Radar fit more befitting a combatant 1/10 her size. More elaborate Canadian/Australian designs are already going uncomfortably towards Burke pricetags even before coming to US (which drives costs up).

Type 26 is a very high end hull, but still a 100% NIH one.

 

[Pioneer]

US Navy scraps Constellation-class Frigate Program - Australian Defence Magazine

The US Navy has cancelled plans for the next four frigates under the Constellation-class Frigate Program. They had begun procuring the Constellation-class frigates in 2020, and a total of six were pro...

www.australiandefence.com.au

Regards
Pioneer

 

[whatismoo]

I wouldn't rely on admirals rationality there. Seeing big frigates - "almost as good as destroyers" - "wasting their time on convoy duty, while they could be protecting carriers or augmenting SAGs", would inevitably create tensions between strike forces and escort forces. So its better to design frigates that are too escort-specialized to be useful outside their niche.


Yep. Not sure about top of container stack being workable, but it would probably be possible to find SOME places on cargo ships to fit Mk-70 anyway. It would be much more logical placement for big area-defense missiles (like SM-6 or PAC-3 MSE) than on frigate itself; cargo ships won't even notice the additional load of a pair of Mk-70 containers, while frigate would be hard-pressed to find space for strike-lenght Mk-41.

I think people are thrown off by USN FFGs and unfamiliar with the history. When the Perry class FFGs were being designed and built they brought a Mk.13, two helicopters, and SPS-49. Contemporary DDG like the Audace, Cassard, T42, and earlier DDG like the Adams family, Impavido, T47 DDG, basically brought roughly similar capabilities to the Perry class.

So I think to an extent people are conflating Perry style multirole FFG with lower capability ASW frigates (i.e. FF).

 

[Archibald]

So, what's in store for the USN, after they finish the two "orphan" Constellations ?

 

[TorpedoJ]

SPY-1D was designed for a destroyer, and the three-face SPY-6(V)3 that Constellation carried is probably the most minimal radar fit for any modern ASW frigate currently under construction aside from the Type 26 (Type 31 is a general purpose for gate, not an ASW frigate, but it's radar fit is similarly minimal to Type 26).

An 8000t destroyer. APAR (the usual euro-frigate radar) is significantly less powerful and a lot lighter. SPY-6 is designed for SM-6 use whereas APAR has 'limited' volume search to 150km.

Most other navies have not had the same experience as the US Navy when it comes to action damage, and given how survivable US warships have been, I think they're on the right track when it comes to insisting of such stringent survivability standards.

Sir/Ma'am, we've lost ships to AShMs not to mention ripping the bottom out of one of our destroyers on a rock. RN damage control is really quite good, which is why the rest of Europe uses our instructors to test their own.

GTs are quieter than diesels, there is a reason why most ASW combatants built from the 1970s onwards have used COGAG. Rafting has made diesels viable to the point that their fuel efficiency might outweigh their acoustic signature. It should be pointed out that Constellation and both the French and Italian FREMMs only have a single LM2500.

That's not what the RN have done in their frigates designed for ASW. The T23s use CODLAG and T26 uses CODLAG with constant speed diesels in acoustic enclosures, and (correct me if I'm wrong) we have more recent experience with specialist surface ASW than any other navy. Gas turbines are just for sprinting where noise is not a consideration.

Powering the stealthy submarine hunter – Type 26 frigate propulsion system in focus - Navy Lookout

The Type 26 frigate is widely accepted as the best anti-submarine warship design available in the world right now. The quiet propulsion system that limits noise radiated from the ship is a key part of its ability to detect submarines. Here we take an overview of this very technical subject. At...

www.navylookout.com

This is news to the Germans, Spanish, Belgians, Dutch, Canadians and Australians, who are all in the process of building ASW Frigates with very capable radar suites made up of multiple staring phased arrays (no less than four such arrays, usually more in two or more bands for all ships but the River class), and all, aside from the Canadians, also have dedicated AAW combatants they intend to operate alongside their ASW frigates.

Again with APAR for Germany, Belgium and the Dutch. Canadian and Australian T26 are very heavy frigates, they'd certainly be more effective than Constellation but also just as expensive. None of these navies have enough ships to form task groups like the USN do, so you have an advantage in not having to prioritise AAW.

Towing a multi-static multi-tow VDS and Towed Array combination at high speed in rough weather is going to be a significant driver in size. I don't think it's a coincidence that nearly all for the Euro Frigates are similarly large.

140m is plenty, the T23s tow Captas-4 on 130m and 5000t.

They would have doubtless Alps carried Mk 38 Mod 4, that combined with RAM and 57mm are more than enough.

Fair, but I'd go 40mm rather than 30 (ask BAE) for airburst rounds.

I think a Type 26 derivative (ideally based on the Hunter design) is a far better fit.

Fair, but the USN seem to want cheaper platforms than Constellation rather than more expensive ones.
And the River class is more Americanised, you could always use the aft VLS for counter-drone missiles and add the fourth mk41 unit up front.

 

[Martes]

While this is an option, understand you would be permamently killing domestic shipbuilding in the United States.

What is dead may never die.

There has to be a way to resurrect it without betting fleet readiness on it. Like order some other ships.

So, what's in store for the USN, after they finish the two "orphan" Constellations ?

"After they finish" is a very optimistic take for the situation. I rather expect whatever parts they assembled to be scrapped in a year or so.

Anyway, It would be tragically ironic if they go back to LCS, and that seems the most likely option now.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Anyway, It would be tragically ironic if they go back to LCS, and that seems the most likely option now.

The most likely path forward is the Freedoms receieve the Lethaltiy & Survivability Upgrade, and the Independences begin prepping for Increment II of said program.
I'm also expecting (hoping) Congress to push the Constellation program through, a rare example of Congressional oversight over defense procurement being a plus. If the legislature refuses to do so, it seems likely FMM will get contracts for LSM and UxVs, and the frigate niche will just go unfilled.

 

[EmoBirb]

Maybe the ideal would be a merger with DDG(X) and have a modular design that can be built in large and medium-sized forms.

The idea is neat, in theory...

But:

The DDG(X) as it is, is still like a decade away at the earliest (which in itself is something that should leave someone utterly speechless)

And

As soon as things like "modularity" are introduced into a program, schedules slip, spending obliterates budgets and ultimately the result will be something that's not satisfactory in either configuration.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

The DDG(X) as it is, is still like a decade away at the earliest (which in itself is something that should leave someone utterly speechless)

I'm not sure why.
The Burke program began early conceptual design in FY79, and was not ordered until FY85. DDG(X) formed in FY21 with the goal of ordering Hull #1 in FY28, but then the Fiscal Responsibility Act was pushed through delaying the first buy until FY32.
It seems to take Ingalls 6-7 years to deliver a Flight IIA from when the contract is awarded, which aligns with the FY39 commissioning date. Now keep in mind Ingalls is the "better" of the two DDG-51 yards, and was not hit nearly as bad as BIW with the Flight IIA restart. Keep in mind that's not counting COVID delays either.
Everything seeems to check out, especially for a ship 60% bigger and with a much, much more complex electrical grid.

 

[Felocie]

which in itself is something that should leave someone utterly speechless

I'm left utterly speechless that we are still expecting LSCs to materialize within 3 years in the big 2-5

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

An 8000t destroyer. APAR (the usual euro-frigate radar) is significantly less powerful and a lot lighter. SPY-6 is designed for SM-6 use whereas APAR has 'limited' volume search to 150km.

If you'd bothered to look at the examples I have, the new generation of Euro-Frigates increasingly use a dual-band approach similar to that originally intended for Zumwalt (although using European radars). On a couple of designs APAR Block II is the I/J-Band component, complementing a lower G-Band TRS-4D or E/F-Band SM-400 Block II. Both the River and F110 classes have SPY-7, the former was originally intended to combine this with X-Band arrays developed by MDA Space, the latter has Prisma-25X. Australia has combined I/J-Band CEAMOUNT (with additional dedicated zenith arrays), E/F-Band CEAFAR-S and D-Band CEAFAR-L.

Sir/Ma'am, we've lost ships to AShMs not to mention ripping the bottom out of one of our destroyers on a rock. RN damage control is really quite good, which is why the rest of Europe uses our instructors to test their own.

Which is not relevant when we're discussing US modifications to a Franco-Italian design to meet their standards. It might be relevant if the US decides to adopt something derived from Arrowhead 140 or Type 26.

That's not what the RN have done in their frigates designed for ASW. The T23s use CODLAG and T26 uses CODLAG with constant speed diesels in acoustic enclosures, and (correct me if I'm wrong) we have more recent experience with specialist surface ASW than any other navy. Gas turbines are just for sprinting where noise is not a consideration.

Powering the stealthy submarine hunter – Type 26 frigate propulsion system in focus - Navy Lookout

The Type 26 frigate is widely accepted as the best anti-submarine warship design available in the world right now. The quiet propulsion system that limits noise radiated from the ship is a key part of its ability to detect submarines. Here we take an overview of this very technical subject. At...

www.navylookout.com

Gas Turbines were explicitly selected both for main propulsion and to replace the diesel generators for the Spruance class because of their lower noise (and this is without rafting). Diesels offer better fuel efficiency, and they required both rafting and being placed in the Type 23's superstructure to reduce noise.

Again with APAR for Germany, Belgium and the Dutch. Canadian and Australian T26 are very heavy frigates, they'd certainly be more effective than Constellation but also just as expensive. None of these navies have enough ships to form task groups like the USN do, so you have an advantage in not having to prioritise AAW.

They have enough ship to form task forces with each other, other European partners and the US. These fleet structures don't exist in complete isolation, they are part of a coalition of nations and will operate as such in wartime.

140m is plenty, the T23s tow Captas-4 on 130m and 5000t.

The weight of Type 2031 was enough to cause serious strain to the Leanders it was fitted to, and severely limited hull life. It was expected that the longer (and abortive) Type 2038 was expected to do the same thing to the Type 23s, and it's likely that the Type 2087 (merger of the the Type 2057 towed array, successor to Type 2038, and the Type 2080 VDS), will do the same to the Type 23 hulls.

Fair, but the USN seem to want cheaper platforms than Constellation rather than more expensive ones.

The USN probably still wants Constellation, or something similar, this was a decision made by the Administration.

And the River class is more Americanised, you could always use the aft VLS for counter-drone missiles and add the fourth mk41 unit up front.

Both the River and Hunter class are pretty Americanised, Hunter has a little more topweight margins to play with.

 

[Felocie]

Both the River and Hunter class are pretty Americanised, Hunter has a little more topweight margins to play with.

Potentially also DC standards that are closer to American DC standards

 

[SK2]

Maybe the ideal would be a merger with DDG(X) and have a modular design that can be built in large and medium-sized forms.


That's pretty damming. The folks who designed the Burke are probably long retired in the old folks home at best. Tinkering with a nearly 50 year-old design is not exactly a source of street cred (shades of Boeing 737NG).

Seems may not be the problem of G&C but the ever changing/updating requirement of the US Navy
G&C was able to provide various naval design to other navies over the years