PLAN leadership must be laughing their asses off right now I imagine.

It's quite baffling how the US always pushes a haphazardly thrown together program for urgent needs, like more hulls preferably yesterday, just to axe this same program after several years, yielding no results and then having the awful habit of canceling it without a Plan B in sight. It's so terrible it ends up becoming hilarious again.

It's very probable there is a Plan B but it has not been made public.

You don't make big decisions like that without considering the alternatives.
 
It's very probable there is a Plan B but it has not been made public.

You don't make big decisions like that without considering the alternatives.
They did the same with MPF/M10 and many other programs, in a way even DDX/Zumwalt which ultimately left the Burkes without a successor to this day and up to the 2030s most likely in the form of DDG(X).

I don't doubt that they'll come up with another program for a corvette or frigate, but they clearly don't have anything tangible right now that could yield results in the near future. The program is being axed without a single alternative that's evident or has been presented. So we're also looking towards the early to mid 2030s again for a new program, that's super optimistic and assuming work starts now, and that's simply not reflective of the supposed urgency and desire to grow and modernize the fleet that the Navy allegedly feels.

Staring down the 2030s PLAN with Burkes alone, that's certainly not what the USN hoped for, but it's the utter dilemma they created for themselves over the last two decades. And you can't tell me that they expect an immediately threatened Japan and a risk averse South Korea to pick up their slack. Not to mention that among the many points of these frigates was giving them certain missions to free up Destroyers for more important tasks and theaters. So while the Ticos are going extinct (rip), LCS failed, the Zumwalts are white elephants and now Constellation being canceled, the Navy in the future still needs to commit their aging Burkes for lesser priority missions in other parts of the world.

I think I've just heard champagne bottles pop from Beijing...
 
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They did the same with MPF/M10 and many other programs, in a way even DDX/Zumwalt which ultimately left the Burkes without a successor to this day and up to the 2030s most likely in the form of DDG(X).

I don't doubt that they'll come up with another program for a corvette or frigate, but they clearly don't have anything tangible right now that could yield results in the near future. So we're also looking towards the early to mid 2030s again and that's simply not reflective of the supposed urgency and desire to grow and modernize the fleet that the Navy allegedly feels.

Staring down the 2030s PLAN with Burkes alone, that's certainly not what the USN hoped for, but it's the utter dilemma they created for themselves over the last two decades. And you can't tell me that they expect an immediately threatened Japan and a risk averse South Korea to pick up their slack.

The DDX was a disaster. The Navy designed a ship for the war on terror and a very expensive one at that. It will still be years, if ever, before these ships are ready for anything more than a niche mission.

The Booker/Booger became such a fat pig that it could not perform the intended mission.

Sometimes programs need to be canceled.

We are in an era where technology is moving very quickly. The war in Ukraine has been an eye opener for many in regards to what a war with a peer adversary would look like.

There is going to be some churn and some changed priorities.
 
The DDX was a disaster. The Navy designed a ship for the war on terror and a very expensive one at that.

Check your history. DD-21/DD(X) predates 9/11; its design features have nothing to do with the GWOT. In fact, it's the GWOT that functionally killed the Zumwalt, siphoning away Navy shipbuilding funding to help pay for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
 
Honestly, it's kinda funny looking at these comments because it's clear who read the USNI article and who didn't (myself included).

On why Fincantieri is still building two ships:
In terms of Marinette, the Navy will move ahead with the first two ships in the class to keep Marinette’s complex of three shipyards on the shores of Lake Michigan in operation. As of Tuesday, Constellation was about 12 percent complete. Doing so will enable the shipbuilder, which employs about 3,000 people across the three yards, to compete for future government work.

“It gives us a bit more ability to be flexible and to work with the shipbuilder through this period of time as we make this transition into future work,” the official said. “Maintaining this shipyard and its skilled workforce is imperative to the Navy’s long-term industrial base.”

On what's being done with the funds paid to Fincantieri for FFG(X):
The senior official did not specify what ship classes Marinette could accommodate, however the Navy is moving to accelerate the Landing Ship Medium program and larger unmanned surface vehicles both programs could be built at the yard

“The Navy will work with Congress in the coming weeks to seek the reappropriation of a portion of the unspent frigate funds on more readily producible ships in Marinette,” a senior Navy official told USNI News on Tuesday. “We do hope to retain the unspent frigate funds, as I mentioned, and have them reallocated to other ships that can be built in Marinette and delivered to the fleet faster.”

On why FFG(X) is being cancelled:
...the Navy and Marinette had to make vast changes to the design in order to meet stricter U.S. survivability standards

Sometimes, you’re just better off designing a new ship,” Navy’s former top acquisition executive Nickolas Guertin said at a conference in February. “Turns out modifying someone else’s design is a lot harder than it seems.

I'm always of the opinion that if you really wanted a class that could last well into the future, you'd go with a proprietary design. With off the shelf solutions, you're always looking at a sub-optimal solution with compromises and overall lesser capacity for current capability and future upgrades. Off the shelf solutions work well for sub systems, non critical, stopgap, or expendable/amassable items - fitting for non-combat ships, but probably not what you want in an FFG that's supposed to perform DDG functions elsewhere in the world + beef up CBGs.

If the navy was looking for stopgap solutions, they shoulda/coulda just bought the baseline frigate or maybe even a few Mogamis while designing a new frigate from the ground up. If the navy was looking for a long term solution, proprietary design is still the only answer.

Hopefully these shit eating experiences would lead the navy to do better for DDG(X).

As a side note, sometimes these things remind me of how some middle/upper management people I know embrace AI, automation, software - or any new idea like this as the end all be all solution of all their problems without realizing that everything has their own set of problems that come with the solution. The "off the shelf" fad makes sense in some situations but if you drink the koolaid too hard then I can see this being an end result.
 
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Check your history. DD-21/DD(X) predates 9/11; its design features have nothing to do with the GWOT. In fact, it's the GWOT that functionally killed the Zumwalt, siphoning away Navy shipbuilding funding to help pay for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Design studies started earlier but it morphed into something that was going to stand offshore and bombard guys in bathrobes with it's massive cannon.

There is no way the money was ever going to be there to build the number of these things the Navy wanted.

The Navy, but not the Navy alone, has often engaged in optimistic planning, meaning hoping the money would somehow appear to pay for their vision.

The era that brought the LCS and DD-21 was not a good one for the Navy.
 
Navy needs to go with some HI Patrol Frigate 4921's without the NAVSEA standards. The ships work, the CG already uses them. Just build enough to relieve stress on the Burkes and free up the Burkes for higher intensity missions, while a new frigate is designed from the ground up. Perfect is the enemy of good enough.
 
Design studies started earlier but it morphed into something that was going to stand offshore and bombard guys in bathrobes with it's massive cannon.

There is no way the money was ever going to be there to build the number of these things the Navy wanted.

The Navy, but not the Navy alone, has often engaged in optimistic planning, meaning hoping the money would somehow appear to pay for their vision.

The era that brought the LCS and DD-21 was not a good one for the Navy.
It wasn't even that big of a gun. I'm still mystified why they didn't just use MCLWG.
 
It wasn't even that big of a gun. I'm still mystified why they didn't just use MCLWG.

Because 155mm was the largest tooling readily available and MCLWG was >30 years old.

That was the age of transformational. Everything was new, new, new.

New gun. New VLS. New Combat Manegement System, ....

Zumwalt predated the Shinseki/Rumsfeld "Transformation" by nearly a decade. It's from 1994.

It was actually just a fairly well thought out general combatant with a heavier emphasis on strike, like the Spruances, than the Burkes.
 
Gibbs and Cox likely write a huge chunk of the NAVSEA survivability standards. They essentially designed the DDG-51 and are design agents for DDG(X). I don't think they need to be taught anything here.

The problem lies in the fact that the Navy lacks the preliminary design expertise to understand what the impact of their changes are. Having G&C working from the Navy again, instead of as a competitor, may help on DDG(X).
Gibbs & Cox have their hands all over the Constellation class debacle and should share responsibility with NAVSEA.

G&C were NAVSEA’s designated design lead and signed off on all the major design changes from the original FREMM plans provided by Fincantieri (since DoD wouldn’t allow a foreign design team to work on FFG-62). Many of these design changes were questionable, like modifying the bow shape and removing the sonar dome, ripping out the Italian platform management system, installing an old school tripod mast with increased radar cross section etc. But every change that brought FFG-62 away from the FREMM baseline brought it closer to G&C’s own DDG-51 design… something that NAVSEA and G&C were comfortable with. And meant extra billable dollars and more profit for G&C...

So it would be interesting to know if G&C ever advised NAVSEA to stop making so many changes to the baseline design, or about the design tradeoffs, increased weight and increased risk that G&C’s own changes were causing.

I bet Fincantieri’s Italian design teams could have designed a minimum change FREMM with fixed face radar mast for EASR (much like FREMM EVO), with no « help » from Navsea, G&C, Lockheed Martin etc, and for a lot cheaper. That frigate would be in the water by now.

As for Navsea’s vaunted survivability standards, I think we’re allowed to be skeptical considering how poorly their designs perform in other areas such as manning, radar cross section, maintainability etc. Also worth remembering that there are some Euro navies who take survivability extremely seriously, like the Royal Navy and the Marine Nationale. If you look at every frigate since the Type 23 and La Fayette they are built to strict damage standards against missiles, mines etc that incorporate the lessons of the Falklands and tanker wars.
 
Gibbs & Cox have their hands all over the Constellation class debacle and should share responsibility with NAVSEA.

G&C were NAVSEA’s designated design lead and signed off on all the major design changes from the original FREMM plans provided by Fincantieri (since DoD wouldn’t allow a foreign design team to work on FFG-62). Many of these design changes were questionable, like modifying the bow shape and removing the sonar dome, ripping out the Italian platform management system, installing an old school tripod mast with increased radar cross section etc. But every change that brought FFG-62 away from the FREMM baseline brought it closer to G&C’s own DDG-51 design… something that NAVSEA and G&C were comfortable with. And meant extra billable dollars and more profit for G&C...

So it would be interesting to know if G&C ever advised NAVSEA to stop making so many changes to the baseline design, or about the design tradeoffs, increased weight and increased risk that G&C’s own changes were causing.

I bet Fincantieri’s Italian design teams could have designed a minimum change FREMM with fixed face radar mast for EASR (much like FREMM EVO), with no « help » from Navsea, G&C, Lockheed Martin etc, and for a lot cheaper. That frigate would be in the water by now.

As for Navsea’s vaunted survivability standards, I think we’re allowed to be skeptical considering how poorly their designs perform in other areas such as manning, radar cross section, maintainability etc. Also worth remembering that there are some Euro navies who take survivability extremely seriously, like the Royal Navy and the Marine Nationale. If you look at every frigate since the Type 23 and La Fayette they are built to strict damage standards against missiles, mines etc that incorporate the lessons of the Falklands and tanker wars.

That's just the thing. Nobody is ever held responsible for these disastrous programs.
 
Design studies started earlier but it morphed into something that was going to stand offshore and bombard guys in bathrobes with it's massive cannon.

There is no way the money was ever going to be there to build the number of these things the Navy wanted.

The Navy, but not the Navy alone, has often engaged in optimistic planning, meaning hoping the money would somehow appear to pay for their vision.

The era that brought the LCS and DD-21 was not a good one for the Navy.

Man, this is beyond wrong in so many ways.

The guns were part of DD-21 long before GWOT. They were part of a Marine Corps-led concept for strategic raiding (Operational Maneuver From the Sea or Ship-to-Objective Maneuver) that was premised on being able to strike deeply at enemy positions using helicopters, light armor, and fast landing craft. It was largely influenced by USMC operations in GW1 and a desperate desire to find some way for the Corps to be relevant in a post-Cold War environment where regimental Marine landings just did not seem plausible. (Force Design 2030 has the same goal, just with different emphasis.) That's what the guns were for.

The real main design task for DD(X) was to defeat access denial forces (diesel submarines, shore artillery, coastal antiship missile batteries, etc.) The publicly identified threat scenario here (again years before 9/11) was Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, but China was also clearly on planners' minds as.well. IMO, DD(X) was and is well suited for operating inside the Chinese First Island Chain, hunting PLAN subs in the South China Sea.
 
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Zumwalt or LCS.

Zumwalt was curtailed at three hulls the third of which hasn't even been commissioned yet and its weapon system AGS was then cancelled because limited hulls made the ammunition unaffordable, each one has therefore cost around $6bn, not far off the cost of an aircraft carrier. LCS they have already begun decommissioning and mothballing them after they were judged to be of little military use against anything larger than a speed boat and their multi-mission module system was abandoned, the Freedom class had a major transmission design defect that meant they couldn't reliably achieve the speeds they were designed for while the Independence class have an aluminium structural fatigue issues and cracking that limits how fast and how rough a sea they can sail in. The LCS were offered free to allies along with offering to pay for the transmission replacements and refurbishment but all the allies have turned them down, they literally couldn't give them away.
 
With the cancellation of the FFG-62 program, I’m now seeing people advocate for a high-low frigate fleet (Constellation being the high end, an NSC derivative being the low end). The proposed CONOPs for this concept is something roughly analogous to the pre-FFG(X) SSC concept, and operate as second-line ASW frigates behind the main fleet. I have no objections to this. However, an NSC derivative would be a very, very poor option for the Patrol Frigate role.

There's several different procurement options for a NSC derivative. One option would be to build NSCs as designed for the USN, another would be to build a Sea Control Frigate derivative. Both of thse are ridiculously cost ineffective. The final NSC hull (that was actually completed) was ordered in FY18 for $500M, (~$650M in FY25). I think it's fair to say that a series production Sea Control Frigate would come in around $800M. For comparison, series production of a Constellation is expected to be $1.2B.
But even using the Sea Control Frigate as our capability benchline, you're paying 2/3s the cost for optimistically half the capability. It still lacks EASR, only carries PD missiles, and lacks an electric drive. It would also eat all the SLA, and result in another Perry situation. The cost:capabiltiy comparison for a fully outfitted NSC (no redesign) is even worse, as you're limited to 12 Mk56 cells.

Additionally, the time required to produce a contract design for a Sea Control Frigate will likely take 2-3 years, and build time will be another 3-4 years. Additionally, the construction line for these vessels has already been recycled since the 11th hull was cancelled, and experience has shown restarting these lines is not trivial. I have no doubt that HII can deliver this on time and on cost, they've proven themselves to be very capable in the past decade, but the math isn't mathing. 5-6 years delivery time at the earliest.

However, there's currently 27 ships in the fleet can can deliver 80% the Sea Control Frigate capability; the 27 LCSs. Integrating a VLS module with ESSM would be trivial compared to a Sea Control Frigate design. Additionally, both production lines likely still exist as of writing, so new construction could theoretically begin next week. Price would be similar to the Sea Control Frigate, LCS 38 was ordered for $584M in FY18 ($755M in FY25). The only capability it couldn't deliver is ASW. Another option available in a few years is MMSC, which restores the ASW capability via CAPTAS-IV. No idea how effective that would be with ship noise, or the cost on that though.
However, I'd suggest handing the ASW mission off to UxVs regardless to spread DoN contracts across the wider shipbuilding industry, rather than further feeding HII's near monopoly on surface ship construction.

But if we absolutely must build a low-end frigate, and $800M/hull is our budget, I would suggest a T31 derivative or partnering with BAE on the Adaptable Strike Frigate. With those you can integrate FXR, expand VLS capacity, and the workshop space lets them act as UxV motherships, adding a new capability to the fleet (something neither an NSC, Sea Control Frigate or an LCS derivative does). HII has been deepening ties with Babcock, and began work on a T31 derivative for FFG(X). It may take an extra year or two, but if we’re going to spend $800M/hull on a low-end frigate, at least get something out of it.
 
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So it would be interesting to know if G&C ever advised NAVSEA to stop making so many changes to the baseline design, or about the design tradeoffs, increased weight and increased risk that G&C’s own changes were causing.

This is important.

A private design firm has a perverse incentive to keep charging DOD and never advising them in a way that keeps costs down. A NAVSEA in-house team, built from G&C's nationalized remains or something, wouldn't have this incentive. It would keep them honest and retain their skills. USN could then just send cost optimized ship designs straight to yards, and they would make them, like how MARAD did with transport ships.

Sadly, this sort of common sense government expertise/design bureau is now a lost art in favor of the efficient market hypothesis. It'll also have to wait until after a US-PRC war happens to change, if it does.

Zumwalt was curtailed at three hulls

This has nothing to do with its design. The ship itself was a successful clean sheet design, albeit lacking in manning, and TSCE needs fixed.
 
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However, an NSC derivative would be a very, very poor option for the Patrol Frigate role.
Define what you want from a patrol frigate first, then we can better assess the dollar value of each hull.

It still lacks EASR, only carries PD missiles, and lacks an electric drive. It would also eat all the SLA, and result in another Perry situation. The cost:capabiltiy comparison for a fully outfitted NSC (no redesign) is even worse, as you're limited to 12 Mk56 cells.
I fundamentally object to the assertion that these are all utterly detrimental given they are patrol frigates, not frontline surface combatants.

However, there's currently 27 ships in the fleet can can deliver 80% the Sea Control Frigate capability; the 27 LCSs. Integrating a VLS module with ESSM would be trivial compared to a Sea Control Frigate design. Additionally, both production lines likely still exist as of writing, so new construction could theoretically begin next week. Price would be similar to the Sea Control Frigate, LCS 38 was ordered for $584M in FY18 ($755M in FY25). The only capability it couldn't deliver is ASW. Another option available in a few years is MMSC, which restores the ASW capability via CAPTAS-IV. No idea how effective that would be with ship noise, or the cost on that though.
However, I'd suggest handing the ASW mission off to UxVs regardless to spread DoN contracts across the wider shipbuilding industry, rather than further feeding HII's near monopoly on surface ship construction.
This is comical for the reasons Corp outlined to you earlier. You have no real proof that fitting ESSM would be any less costly, both in time and money, than doing so to NSC. Secondly, the UxVs which you mention are an excellent idea but don’t exist yet. You’re building a ship for a capability that may or may not come in following years. Remember when they did that with LCS mission modules..?
But if we absolutely must build a low-end frigate, and $800M/hull is our budget, I would suggest a T31 derivative or partnering with BAE on the Adaptable Strike Frigate. With those you can integrate FXR, expand VLS capacity, and the workshop space lets them act as UxV motherships, adding a new capability to the fleet (something NSC, Mogami or an LCS derivative does). HII has been deepening ties with Babcock, and began work on a T31 derivative for FFG(X). It may take an extra year or two, but if we’re going to spend $800M/hull on a low-end frigate, at least get something out of it.
And thus we repeat the errors of the Constellation program. You end up with a design that is not built to American standards or for the American mission. A whole lot of money will be spent bringing it to the American standards which will overload the hull and/or cut into T31 capability. Not to mention T31 is CODAD and as you have oft repeated, IEP is a bare minimum to ensure DEW integration in future.

Furthermore I see no accounting for political will and direction in your plan. Why would the government be any happier to buy a T31 derivative than Connie given the program issues? Frankly how can we be assured they will replace it at all?
 
Define what you want from a patrol frigate first, then we can better assess the dollar value of each hull.
I'm going to start with Convoy Escort, which means able to deal with Oscar-class AShM volleys. 24x P700 missiles. Or these days, Yasen-class, which means 32x P800 or 3M54 Klub missiles. Per single submarine. (once the average merchant ship does 20 knots, that greatly reduces the need to convoy up)

It also means going someplace the natives are restless to show that you are paying attention, say like the Red Sea when the Houthis are having a hissy-fit. Which would mean having enough magazine depth to handle several incoming weapons per day for a week or two.


I fundamentally object to the assertion that these are all utterly detrimental given they are patrol frigates, not frontline surface combatants.
Would you agree that you should be able to send a Patrol Frigate to the Red Sea as an escort to keep the Houthis honest?

That means you need fairly long ranged missiles to be able to guard ships that are between you and the shooter, or at awkward geometries to intercept in general.

It also means enough missile cells to be there for a week or two before you need to leave and reload.

Needing to be able to deal with Yasen-class volleys that are not necessarily targeted at the Patrol Frigate needs 12-16x ESSM (3-4 cells worth of quad-packs) and 28x+ SM2(equivalent). 32 missile cells minimum, and 40 or 48 would be better so you could also have ASROCs. Note that there's not a single Tomahawk on this ship right now, and no SM3, SM6, or GPI Glide Breakers for AShBMs or hypersonics, either.

Now we really are up to our minimum need being 48x Mk41 cells to give you 16x ESSM, 28x SM2, 6x ASROC, and 10x SM3/SM6/GPI.
 
I'm going to start with Convoy Escort, which means able to deal with Oscar-class AShM volleys. 24x P700 missiles. Or these days, Yasen-class, which means 32x P800 or 3M54 Klub missiles. Per single submarine. (once the average merchant ship does 20 knots, that greatly reduces the need to convoy up)
Your logic is kinda problematic there. First of all, merchant convoys aren't likely. Most of merchant marine nowadays is under neutral flags, and usually carry a mixed cargo from multiple countries, so they aren't exactly a likely target for submarine attacks (too high risk of hitting your own country cargo - or angering neutrals). So the convoys in question would likely be a rare cases of either operating against rogue state that did not care about neutrals (like Houtists), or specifically a US-flagged cargo ships, brought or chartered by US government to provide military logistic capability.

Secondly, you don't exactly need SM-3 or SM-6 to protect a convoy. It's highly unlikely that it would be attacked by long-range ballistics or hypersonics (and if it would, it's likely would be a saturating salvo, that frigate would not be able to stop anyway). And against lesser threats, you could just use ESSM and/or SM-2 Block C (with active seekers). Both of those missiles could fit into tactical length Mk-41. And in case you would need the anti-ballistic defense - you could just use PAC-3 MSE.

(and in case of convoys being under very serious threat of attack with high-performance weapons, they would likely be supported by destroyers anyway)

Thidly - why concentrate all weapons on one frigate, instead of having several smaller units? You could have several small frigates with, say, 16 Mk-41 - 8 x SM-2, 4 x VL-ASROC, 16 x ESSM - to work together. Alternatively, you could include sort-of improvised arsenal ship (drone ship with missile containers) to provide additional missile supply. Or, you could just put Mk-70 containerized launchers directly on escorted cargo ships, so they would carry missiles for frigate to aim.
 
I'm going to start with Convoy Escort, which means able to deal with Oscar-class AShM volleys. 24x P700 missiles. Or these days, Yasen-class, which means 32x P800 or 3M54 Klub missiles. Per single submarine. (once the average merchant ship does 20 knots, that greatly reduces the need to convoy up)
This is different to the mission assigned to Connie, it seems you are applying OHP logic. If that is seriously assessed as the threat to merchants then DDGs need to be assigned.
Would you agree that you should be able to send a Patrol Frigate to the Red Sea as an escort to keep the Houthis honest?
As part of a larger force, sure. You'd want DDG support if the area gets redhot anyway because the PF lacks strike depth (and rightfully so, it doesn't require it).
Needing to be able to deal with Yasen-class volleys that are not necessarily targeted at the Patrol Frigate needs 12-16x ESSM (3-4 cells worth of quad-packs) and 28x+ SM2(equivalent). 32 missile cells minimum, and 40 or 48 would be better so you could also have ASROCs. Note that there's not a single Tomahawk on this ship right now, and no SM3, SM6, or GPI Glide Breakers for AShBMs or hypersonics, either.
ESSM would be the majority, it's a PF. VLA, TLAM, SM-3 or 6, or exotic strike weapons are not a worthwhile investment for a PF. AShM capability would be NSM.

What you are describing is the Bath FFG(X) though, funny because I always thought it was the best option
 
ESSM would be the majority, it's a PF. VLA, TLAM, SM-3 or 6, or exotic strike weapons are not a worthwhile investment for a PF. AShM capability would be NSM.
ESSM and SM-2 of modern models (with active seeker), IMHO. They could provide area defense AND they could fit into a tactical-length VLS. And PAC-3 MSE as anti-ballistic solution.

Also, a matter of drones. Frigate should have excessive capability to handle the possibility of massive drone strikes. I.e. big supply of low-cost missiles/drone interceptors, and probably several small guns instead on one big one.

(I still think that Italian 76/62 Sovraponte would be a best solution - a non-penetrating gun mount that could just be bolted on anywhere you want).
 
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Define what you want from a patrol frigate first, then we can better assess the dollar value of each hull.
I’ll do you one better; I’ll give you Sea Control Frigate capabilities for the same price tag as a new build, series construction baseline NSC.
$650M for a towed array and COMBATSS-21. Half the price tag of a Constellation for not even half the capability.

This is comical for the reasons Corp outlined to you earlier. You have no real proof that fitting ESSM would be any less costly, both in time and money, than doing so to NSC.
That’s not what I said. I very clearly said the cost of a new build LCS is the same as a series construction Sea Control Frigate.
The price tag to retrofit a pre-existing ship (LCS or NSC) with ESSM is minimal, and nearly identical.

Secondly, the UxVs which you mention are an excellent idea but don’t exist yet. You’re building a ship for a capability that may or may not come in following years.
Well we just cancelled the entire Constellation line on this theory.

And thus we repeat the errors of the Constellation program. You end up with a design that is not built to American standards or for the American mission. A whole lot of money will be spent bringing it to the American standards which will overload the hull and/or cut into T31 capability. Not to mention T31 is CODAD and as you have oft repeated, IEP is a bare minimum to ensure DEW integration in future.
Strongly disagree with you here. As much as I don’t like furthering HII’s monopoly on surface ship construction, they’ve proven themselves remarkably dependable in the past decade.
The Flight III redesign was a colossal undertaking, and that delivered on budget and roughly on time. The LPD transition has also gone rather smoothly.
British standards are also higher than the Italians, and thus closer to what we need.
Given Ingall’s track record, and the much, much larger size of the yard relative to FMM, I believe the yard would be able to deliver a contract design on time and on schedule.

Not to mention T31 is CODAD and as you have oft repeated, IEP is a bare minimum to ensure DEW integration in future.
You had no objection to NSC’s direct drive plant. But that said, given the second-line nature of these ships, and the potential to install stored energy solutions in the mission bays, I don’t think this is a super huge deal.

Furthermore I see no accounting for political will and direction in your plan. Why would the government be any happier to buy a T31 derivative than Connie given the program issues? Frankly how can we be assured they will replace it at all?
Politics aren’t the real world.
 
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The price tag to retrofit a pre-existing ship (LCS or NSC) with ESSM is minimal, and nearly identical.
Yes but, as was explained to you, that's still a few years of work to make all the systems work and more money in RnD.
Well we just cancelled the entire Constellation line on this theory.
Did we..? I'd like a source
Strongly disagree with you here. As much as I don’t like furthering HII’s monopoly on surface ship construction, they’ve proven themselves remarkably dependable in the past decade.
The Flight III redesign was a colossal undertaking if that delivered on budget and roughly on time, and the LPD transition has also gone rather smoothly.
British standards are also higher than the Italians, and thus closer to what we need.
Given Ingall’s track record, and the much, much larger size of the yard relative to FMM, I believe the yard would be able to deliver a contract design on time and on schedule.
Ok, on what timeline will you work the HII guys? A 5 year timeline? 10? And, beyond DC standards, what actually prevents the T31 from becoming another bloated and overburdened hull in need of a redesign not dissimilar to a brand new design? I like HII as you know but you're asking them to work miracles
Politics aren’t the real world.
Nicole's ur whole world
 
This is different to the mission assigned to Connie, it seems you are applying OHP logic. If that is seriously assessed as the threat to merchants then DDGs need to be assigned.
Connies were assigned ASW missions. While Dilandu insists that Oscars and Yasens would be assigned to hunt carriers, the possibility exists that they could be targeted on a convoy, if different political decisions get made.

(Yes, this does mostly imply a situation of conventional WW3)


As part of a larger force, sure. You'd want DDG support if the area gets redhot anyway because the PF lacks strike depth (and rightfully so, it doesn't require it).
I'm assuming that the highest level of attack the Houthis produced should require a DDG, but you're likely to not have a DDG present when the Houthis roll out another large attack again.



ESSM would be the majority, it's a PF. VLA, TLAM, SM-3 or 6, or exotic strike weapons are not a worthwhile investment for a PF. AShM capability would be NSM.
VLA is required because it's an ASW combatant.

TLAMs aren't happening because the ship needs the cells for SAMs. Maybe if you somehow gave the new FFG 96x cells.

SM3 is a nice-to-have, or if the Houthis get serious AShBMs from the Chinese.

SM6 is needed to defend against lower end AShBMs and hypersonics, and is also needed for the occasional shot that the ship is just in the wrong spot to be able to respond to with anything less. It is required, not a nice-to-have.


Also, a matter of drones. Frigate should have excessive capability to handle the possibility of massive drone strikes. I.e. big supply of low-cost missiles/drone interceptors, and probably several small guns instead on one big one.
Absolutely!



(I still think that Italian 76/62 Sovraponte would be a best solution - a non-penetrating gun mount that could just be bolted on anywhere you want).
It's also the same weight as a Phalanx CIWS!
 
Generally my idea of "light frigate" - a networked ship, that mainly serve as radar platform & data processing center for distributed missile containers (placed on unmanned ships, escorted cargo ships, ect.) A Japanese OPY-2 radar seems to be a good choice. Or, if we go for a cheaper solution - a Sea Giraffe 4A from SAAB might be used.

The armament of light frigate should be optimized for its escort duty only. No need for "tactical length" VLS. A sixteen self-defense length Mark-41 cells would provide enough space for:

* 8 x SM-2 Block C (with active seekers) - for area defense/ PAC-3 MSE for anti-ballistic defense, if needed

* 4 x VL-ASROC - for anti-submarine area defense

* 16 x ESSM - for self-defense and close area defense

The additional missiles should be carried by other units - by drone ships, dedicated arsenal ships (a small container ship, brough by Navy and modified to carry missile containers), or by protected merchant units. The Mark-70 containerized launcher allowed to put missile containers on cargo ships themselves, without the need to put every missile onboard frigate.

In terms of artillery armament, I vote for 2-3 OTO Melara guns in 76/62 Sovraponte mounts. Those mounts are bolt-on, non-penetrating type (i.e. they could be placed anywhere on the ship, without the need for underdeck magazine), and proven themselves efficient against small boats and drones.

Of course, a MASSIVE anti-drone setup would also be required - including probably laser mount, electronic counter-measures and cheap anti-drone missiles/interceptor drones.
 
Yes but, as was explained to you, that's still a few years of work to make all the systems work and more money in RnD.
No, it’s very likely not. ESSM is already compatible with COMBATSS-21, greatly simplifying the required work. The only thing left to do is put a Mk41 in a LCS MM shaped housing.
Did we..? I'd like a source
“The senior official did not specify what ship classes Marinette could accommodate, however the Navy is moving to accelerate the Landing Ship Medium program and larger unmanned surface vehicles both programs could be built at the yard.”
Ok, on what timeline will you work the HII guys? A 5 year timeline? 10?
A Sea Control Frigate will take 6-7 years minimum from authorization to delivery; 2-3 years of redesign, 3-4 years of construction. For a Type 31 derivative, tack on another 2 years. I’ve already expressed my concern with planning shipbuilding around 3-4 year intervals.
And, beyond DC standards, what actually prevents the T31 from becoming another bloated and overburdened hull in need of a redesign not dissimilar to a brand new design?
We’ve seen deepening ties between HII and Babcock, and it’s apparently been quite succesful.
I like HII as you know but you're asking them to work miracles
HII has already pulled off two miracles in the past decade. It’s kind of their thing.
 
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Connies were assigned ASW missions. While Dilandu insists that Oscars and Yasens would be assigned to hunt carriers, the possibility exists that they could be targeted on a convoy, if different political decisions get made.
Er, no. My point was, that there wouldn't be many convoys in traditional, WW2-esque style. The absolute majority of world goods are transported by convenient flag ships; most of those goods are heavily intermixed. So attacking cargo ships in sea is rather pointless and politically dangerous (since you would be hitting cargos for neutral nations also). And so not much need for convoys to protect general cargo.

Of course, SOME convoys would still exist - chartered/brought cargo ships, transporting military cargo and/or personnel (albeit I think personnel would likely be airlifted). Such convoys would be a high-value targets, and thus could validate massive attacks.
 
Generally my idea of "light frigate" - a networked ship, that mainly serve as radar platform & data processing center for distributed missile containers (placed on unmanned ships, escorted cargo ships, ect.)
Directly order Taiwanese ones at this point:) TC-2 will have to be replaced by slant amraams,but this capabilities isn't new.
It's less capability than what you want upfront, but not terribly so.
 
Generally my idea of "light frigate" - a networked ship, that mainly serve as radar platform & data processing center for distributed missile containers (placed on unmanned ships, escorted cargo ships, ect.) A Japanese OPY-2 radar seems to be a good choice. Or, if we go for a cheaper solution - a Sea Giraffe 4A from SAAB might be used.

The armament of light frigate should be optimized for its escort duty only. No need for "tactical length" VLS. A sixteen self-defense length Mark-41 cells would provide enough space for:
Self defense means ESSM only while tactical allows for VLA and SM-2
* 8 x SM-2 Block C (with active seekers) - for area defense/ PAC-3 MSE for anti-ballistic defense, if needed

* 4 x VL-ASROC - for anti-submarine area defense

* 16 x ESSM - for self-defense and close area defense

The additional missiles should be carried by other units - by drone ships, dedicated arsenal ships (a small container ship, brough by Navy and modified to carry missile containers), or by protected merchant units. The Mark-70 containerized launcher allowed to put missile containers on cargo ships themselves, without the need to put every missile onboard frigate.
Then for what is all the anti drone stuff?
In terms of artillery armament, I vote for 2-3 OTO Melara guns in 76/62 Sovraponte mounts. Those mounts are bolt-on, non-penetrating type (i.e. they could be placed anywhere on the ship, without the need for underdeck magazine), and proven themselves efficient against small boats and drones.
Or just use 57mm at front and then some 30 in the future maybe even 50mm guns
Of course, a MASSIVE anti-drone setup would also be required - including probably laser mount, electronic counter-measures and cheap anti-drone missiles/interceptor drones.
Means lot of space and electricity needed

Your whole concept also ignores one of Connies main tasks. ASW
 
Self defense means ESSM only while tactical allows for VLA and SM-2
Ah, my mistake. I meant, tactical Mk-41. Still far lighter and more compact than strike one (required for SM-6).

Then for what is all the anti drone stuff?
Not sure I understood your question.

Or just use 57mm at front and then some 30 in the future maybe even 50mm guns
I don't think those guns are optimal. 3-inch gun seems to be the best choice for now.

Your whole concept also ignores one of Connies main tasks. ASW
Anti-submarine warfare, you means? Well, I'm not insisting on excluding the helicopters or sonars)
 
Man, this is beyond wrong in so many ways.

The guns were part of DD-21 long before GWOT. They were part of a Marine Corps-led concept for strategic raiding (Operational Maneuver From the Sea or Ship-to-Objective Maneuver) that was premised on being able to strike deeply at enemy positions using helicopters, light armor, and fast landing craft. It was largely influenced by USMC operations in GW1 and a desperate desire to find some way for the Corps to be relevant in a post-Cold War environment where regimental Marine landings just did not seem plausible. (Force Design 2030 has the same goal, just with different emphasis.) That's what the guns were for.

The real main design task for DD(X) was to defeat access denial forces (diesel submarines, shore artillery, coastal antiship missile batteries, etc.) The publicly identified threat scenario here (again years before 9/11) was Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, but China was also clearly on planners' minds as.well. IMO, DD(X) was and is well suited for operating inside the Chinese First Island Chain, hunting PLAN subs in the South China Sea.

Indeed...the Navy Institute's 'Proceedings' issues from the early to mid-90's were full of articles on 'From the Sea'....'Littoral Warfare' etc etc. They're really worth looking at for a view on what was planned at the time and why, they're a great read in hindsight, painful if you're a US taxpayer or navalist though....from there the Streetfighter (that led to LCS), EFV, NLOS-M, Virginia Class all flowed...with the addition of the already existing V-22, LPD-17, DDG-1000 & AGM.

All based around the post Cold War USN, now shorn of any credible Blue Water adversary with the collapse of the Soviet Union, desperately seeking to protect its size, budget and some existing programme but seeking relevance in the post Desert Storm world...
 
Make a graph. The x-axis is cost, the y-axis is capability. The starting point of the graph is the lowest capability ship that can be viable. We will simplify the graph by saying that the lines are straight. The graph starts with a high slope. Adding a relatively small cost to the bare minimum ship raises capability relatively more than the small cost. This continues until the maximum viable ship in that category is reached. The graph is then a low slope straight line. The graph continues at low slope until the next category of ship is reached. The graph is again high slope until the maximum vessel for this category is reached, and the graph becomes low slope. It goes until the next category is reached and becomes high slope again.

The minimum WW2 destroyer would be 4 guns, 3TT, 35 knots, a dozen DCs, a few light flak. This might be around 1500 tons. You can see that adding even a small amount of displacement (cost) would allow it to grow a lot in capability. This is true until you reach 8 guns 8-10 TTs, 36-38 knots, lots of flak, etc. Anything larger than that and it's kind of a light cruiser kind of a super destroyer. Note that few ships between cruiser and destroyer were built. The minimum WW2 cruiser would be about 5000 tons, 6X6", 6 TT's a few AA, 32 knots, 1-1.5" armor. Adding just a bit of displacement makes it much stronger until you get to the maximum cruiser. Note that the plans for really heavy cruisers, other than the Alaska class, were not built.

Today, the categories are based on what kind of air defense system the ship has. LCS has the minimum self defense suite. European frigates tend to be more capable in self defense and can defend ships close to them. Aegis destroyers can defend a task force. Where did the Constellation sit on the graph? They were at too expensive for what they offered. The best place to put the ship on the graph is at the end of a high slope regions, not in the beginning or middle. The ship is either a patrol vessel that can do ASW in a lower air threat environment, an ASW vessel that can survive a higher air threat but not protect a task force, or it can protect a task force from the top level air threat. There is no reason to build anything else. ASW that has a watered down high end AAW suite is a waste of money.

Building the hulls to take a hit from modern weapons is a huge cost. Check out the photos of the USS Cole. There's the mild steel that looks like a tin can and then there's the armor steel that needed a new paint job. Armor steel is expensive and is very difficult (expensive) to weld. That is where the cost savings is. Build cheaper category 1 and 2 vessels that do not have names, they just have numbers so they can be risked. Enough battle damage resistance to survive collisions and small arms/light weapons/small drones. Category 3 should be an evolved Burke.
 

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