Current US hypersonic weapons projects. (General)

It is for the entire hypersonic prototyping effort with the AF. When the materials are published you can see all individual programs that are included (but likely elements of HACM and ARRW make up the largest portion of this)
 
It is for the entire hypersonic prototyping effort with the AF. When the materials are published you can see all individual programs that are included (but likely elements of HACM and ARRW make up the largest portion of this)
I think you meant HAWC and ARRW?, because it seem like HACM has separate budget of 190 mil in 2022 and 144 mil in 2023?
 
It is for the entire hypersonic prototyping effort with the AF. When the materials are published you can see all individual programs that are included (but likely elements of HACM and ARRW make up the largest portion of this)
I think you meant HAWC and ARRW?, because it seem like HACM has separate budget of 190 mil in 2022 and 144 mil in 2023?
HAWC is not funded by the AF RDT&E accounts. Its a DARPA program. Its also not a prototyping effort. The parent prototyping account has previously included HACM and ARRW (HCSW prior to that), and they've broken it up this time because Congress wanted each prototyping effort to exist separately in the reporting. So wait a week or so and go through the documents.
 
It is for the entire hypersonic prototyping effort with the AF. When the materials are published you can see all individual programs that are included (but likely elements of HACM and ARRW make up the largest portion of this)
I think you meant HAWC and ARRW?, because it seem like HACM has separate budget of 190 mil in 2022 and 144 mil in 2023?
HAWC is not funded by the AF RDT&E accounts. Its a DARPA program. Its also not a prototyping effort. The parent prototyping account has previously included HACM and ARRW (HCSW prior to that), and they've broken it up this time because Congress wanted each prototyping effort to exist separately in the reporting. So wait a week or so and go through the documents.

Keeping up with US hypersonics:

56i6z3o3uzt31.png
 
If they're going to kill it at the end of next year, why are they still funding it until then? That's like, "here, let me put this $430+m down the toilet for you."

Shouldn't an air-launched ballistic missile be simpler than air-breathing, or is it the fancy glide RV that's causing the problems?
 
If they're going to kill it at the end of next year, why are they still funding it until then? That's like, "here, let me put this $430+m down the toilet for you."

Shouldn't an air-launched ballistic missile be simpler than air-breathing, or is it the fancy glide RV that's causing the problems?
There’s a few indications why in the replies to that post.
 
If they're going to kill it at the end of next year, why are they still funding it until then? That's like, "here, let me put this $430+m down the toilet for you."
Probably pouring money into additional research hoping it will perform. But if not then it gone for good
Shouldn't an air-launched ballistic missile be simpler than air-breathing, or is it the fancy glide RV that's causing the problems?
If they have issue with the fancy glider RV that would be a huge improvement with what currently happening, they can't even get the booster to start 3 differenr times
 

This is not the correct take (I've pointed it out to Steve in comments below the tweet). The RDT&E or prototyping funding for ARRW is going away in FY-23 because it is expected to end the development and prototyping phase of the program. This would have happened in FY-22 had there been no delays. The AF has opened up an ARRRW line in its procurement budget. This currently includes $40 MM funding for tooling and AUR production but that is apparently being diverted to cover the shortfalls on the testing side to make up for the delays. However, if the program is successful over the next 12 months, the AF can request reprogramming, and the Congress can add dollars into this procurement account to avoid a gap between FY-23 RDT&E completion, and additional FY-24 funding.

All in, the AF has build a mechanism to finish ARRW development and testing, and to begin buying the missile once it is ready. Whether they do this, and at what pace, will be highly dependent on how the program is executed by the armament directorate and Lockheed Martin.

They are aiming for booster test and verifications by end of FY-2022, followed by four AUR flight tests in FY-23. That's a lot of flight test activity that they have to do and get right so it is far from certain that they'll be able to do it within this time.

View: https://twitter.com/MIL_STD/status/1517698216396918784
 
Last edited:
Which existing program are the re-branding to get "HALO"?
I think HALO is probably something like air launched SM-6 block IB :)

The Navy has for several years looked at and invested in figuring out how to take the scramjet tech from DARPA/AFRL HAWC and put it on a carrier. They have even launched a S&T effort to de-risk such a thing under its Screaming Arrow effort. So HALO appears to be basically HAWC like scramjet powered AL weapon for the Super Hornet which is basically what SciFire is accelerating (via a PDR and follow on integration and flight test activity this year and next year).
 
Which existing program are the re-branding to get "HALO"?
I think HALO is probably something like air launched SM-6 block IB :)

The Navy has for several years looked at and invested in figuring out how to take the scramjet tech from DARPA/AFRL HAWC and put it on a carrier. They have even launched a S&T effort to de-risk such a thing under its Screaming Arrow effort. So HALO appears to be basically HAWC like scramjet powered AL weapon for the Super Hornet which is basically what SciFire is accelerating (via a PDR and follow on integration and flight test activity this year and next year).
Would it be cheaper to just use HACM instead of start another separate program?
 
Which existing program are the re-branding to get "HALO"?
I think HALO is probably something like air launched SM-6 block IB :)

The Navy has for several years looked at and invested in figuring out how to take the scramjet tech from DARPA/AFRL HAWC and put it on a carrier. They have even launched a S&T effort to de-risk such a thing under its Screaming Arrow effort. So HALO appears to be basically HAWC like scramjet powered AL weapon for the Super Hornet which is basically what SciFire is accelerating (via a PDR and follow on integration and flight test activity this year and next year).
Would it be cheaper to just use HACM instead of start another separate program?

If HACM is HAWC derived then it will not fit the carrier weapon elevators because at around 20 ft in length it is about 5 ft longer than what works on a carrier. The Navy has stated as much in its budgets in prior years and has been looking to get it down to 15 ft. HALO is likely to roll out of the SciFire effort which is effectively taking over the HAWC work and moving it forward. I expect there to be significant commonality between HAWC, SciFire, HACM and HALO to a point where HALO will not be a completely fresh new look but rather using the same parent tech and design work and moving it into a naval carrier use environment. In fact SciFire will most likely fly a scramjet prototype off of a Super Hornet so the Navy effort probably relates more closely to it than HACM does.
 

This is not the correct take (I've pointed it out to Steve in comments below the tweet). The RDT&E or prototyping funding for ARRW is going away in FY-23 because it is expected to end the development and prototyping phase of the program. This would have happened in FY-22 had there been no delays. The AF has opened up an ARRRW line in its procurement budget. This currently includes $40 MM funding for tooling and AUR production but that is apparently being diverted to cover the shortfalls on the testing side to make up for the delays. However, if the program is successful over the next 12 months, the AF can request reprogramming, and the Congress can add dollars into this procurement account to avoid a gap between FY-23 RDT&E completion, and additional FY-24 funding.

All in, the AF has build a mechanism to finish ARRW development and testing, and to begin buying the missile once it is ready. Whether they do this, and at what pace, will be highly dependent on how the program is executed by the armament directorate and Lockheed Martin.

They are aiming for booster test and verifications by end of FY-2022, followed by four AUR flight tests in FY-23. That's a lot of flight test activity that they have to do and get right so it is far from certain that they'll be able to do it within this time.

View: https://twitter.com/MIL_STD/status/1517698216396918784
Would help if you put up his reply to you.

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/TheDEWLine/status/1517698682497519616
 
And also subsequent replies? Folks can scroll down and read it as has been pointed out. The funding being re-programmed is to make up for shortfalls due to test delays and retest requirements. That doesn't mean that the procurement account is being done away with alltogether.

To put it more simply, the AF anticipated program completion and end of the five year OTA R&D phase and created a "home" for the ARRW in its procurement budget. This is the first time its done it as previous test rounds were being bought via the existing RDT&E budget. The entire program is in turmoil because they are stuck at the booster testing and integration phase and as such can't really go into AUR testing until that is completed. This required the AF to divert procurement money from FY-22 and FY-23 to fix these issues. However since there is now a home for it in the procurement budget, Congress can be asked, and can also unilaterally add funding there if the program does well enough in testing, and quick enough that they end up in a situation that leads to a gap in funding because they've completed testing but have to wait for FY-24 funding to produce more (a production gap).

The final chapter on this will likely be written early-mid next year once AUR testing gets going (assuming it does). If they don't show success none of it will matter because they'll have to wait for additinoal R&D to make up for delays by either seeking additional FY-23 R&D funding or waiting for FY-24. But this doesn't mean an end to the program. Only that the RDT&E program is ending in FY-23 when it is expected to complete all its work (or fail) and transition to production.

When the program started this was to happen with an operational fielding by September 2022 (FY-22) and right now EOC is not going to be possible till at least September 2023 or later.

"FY 2023 funding decreased compared to FY 2022 by $203.706 million due to program ramping down to MTA completion"
This is the standard ramp down on a five year MTA program.

Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) is a rapid acquisition interim approach that focuses on delivering capability in a period of 2-5 years with rapid prototypes and rapid fielding with proven technology.
 
Last edited:
I think HALO is probably something like air launched SM-6 block IB :)

The Navy has for several years looked at and invested in figuring out how to take the scramjet tech from DARPA/AFRL HAWC and put it on a carrier.
A shame they let this die. It's pretty much exactly what they're looking for:

asalm-top.jpg
 
The Navy has clarified in its Screaming arrow program that it is willing to accept a non scramjet air breather if it can demonstrate Mach 5 or better sustained powered cruise. This will be inefficient compared to scramjets especially now given we have demonstrated two working scramjet engines but I suppose someone can always bid with a non scramjet configuration.
 
The Navy has clarified in its Screaming arrow program that it is willing to accept a non scramjet air breather if it can demonstrate Mach 5 or better sustained powered cruise. This will be inefficient compared to scramjets especially now given we have demonstrated two working scramjet engines but I suppose someone can always bid with a non scramjet configuration.
I guess it just depends on how much boost they need to get to speed. ASALM was designed for the rotary launchers in bombers, so it was short enough, but IIRC the booster only got it up to about Mach 2.
 
Last edited:
I think HALO is probably something like air launched SM-6 block IB :)

The Navy has for several years looked at and invested in figuring out how to take the scramjet tech from DARPA/AFRL HAWC and put it on a carrier.
A shame they let this die. It's pretty much exactly what they're looking for:

View attachment 677290
Agree, if they actually pursuit it, they would have something that can out range and probably out speed any air defense
 
If they have issue with the fancy glider RV that would be a huge improvement with what currently happening, they can't even get the booster to start 3 differenr times
I think that can only be described as technological regress. To me that sounds like the easiest part, but what do I know?
 
The booster issue has been root caused on the ARRW and isn't a problem with the booster from what I understand (the booster has completed static testing). Anyhow, if one is going to beat up on them on this then might as well cancel HAWC, HACM, HALO and all other programs that need a booster. Let's get serious here, the real problem with ARRW long term is going to be its $10 Million a shot price tag due to the glider and the very high speed. That's what is going to eventually determine its fate and whether the air force decides to buy much or any of it compared to slower (top and cruise speed), smaller, and shorter ranged scramjet powered cruise missiles which could cost less than half of what the ARRW AUR is expected to cost.

The ARRW’s delays so far haven’t revealed a fundamental problem but rather difficulty with how the weapon works with the B-52H bombers that would launch it. After it’s dropped by the bomber, the ARRW is supposed to be accelerated by its booster motor before a solid glide body separates and flies at hypersonic speeds to its target. The December failure, for example, was caused by a design interface issue resulting in a “voltage instability during transfer from aircraft power to missile batteries” that led to a mission abort, according to the Air Force.

 
The booster issue has been root caused on the ARRW and isn't a problem with the booster from what I understand (the booster has completed static testing). Anyhow, if one is going to beat up on them on this then might as well cancel HAWC, HACM, HALO and all other programs that need a booster. Let's get serious here, the real problem with ARRW long term is going to be its $10 Million a shot price tag due to the glider and the very high speed. That's what is going to eventually determine its fate and whether the air force decides to buy much or any of it compared to slower (top and cruise speed), smaller, and shorter ranged scramjet powered cruise missiles which could cost less than half of what the ARRW AUR is expected to cost.

The ARRW’s delays so far haven’t revealed a fundamental problem but rather difficulty with how the weapon works with the B-52H bombers that would launch it. After it’s dropped by the bomber, the ARRW is supposed to be accelerated by its booster motor before a solid glide body separates and flies at hypersonic speeds to its target. The December failure, for example, was caused by a design interface issue resulting in a “voltage instability during transfer from aircraft power to missile batteries” that led to a mission abort, according to the Air Force.

Any word on it's range and payload? $10 million might sound expensive but not if it's taking out a billion dollar carrier or an ICBM silo.
 
Range is claimed to be in excess of 500 nautical miles. I think the price tag is a barrier because its acquisition would have to coincide with a huge increase in USAF's munition buy-rates across the board looking at JASSM, Air to Air inventory, SDB-II, and other smart munitions. So its very much going to be a case of trades involved and depending on how supportive Congress is this could be a barrier. Remember, the ARRW was to be the very first fielded hypersonic weapon among the three services and given this it had a lot of support when the program was initiated. Now it appears that it will the very last fielded so Congressional support to buy a lot of these rapidly might not be forthcoming unless they absolutely knock it out of the park in the next year as far as testing is concerned.
 
The Army LRHW, Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, a boost-glide hypersonic missile (as opposed to the less costly type scramjet powered hypersonic missiles) Bloomberg reported last November that the Pentagon cost office estimated LRHW cost as $4.4 Bn in development plus $2.5 Bn production, for total 66 missiles, 48 development and only 18 production models by 2025, $6.9 Bn (averages out at near $400 million per production missile as so few by 2025). InsideDefense now reporting Army wanting to add the ability to strike moving targets, so assuming costs will increase.

PS The same boost-glide hypersonic missile for the Navy, CPS, development and production funded separately.

https://insidedefense.com/daily-new...pon-new-feature-ability-strike-moving-targets
 
Prices will come down as the technology is perfected, though I suspect /LRHW/CPS is going to always exist in very small numbers for very high priority targets. I doubt the DF-17 is significantly less expensive. The HACM program is IMO where the US will will make a big break through in cost effective hypersonics.
 
Prices will come down as the technology is perfected, though I suspect /LRHW/CPS is going to always exist in very small numbers for very high priority targets. I doubt the DF-17 is significantly less expensive. The HACM program is IMO where the US will will make a big break through in cost effective hypersonics.
Would expect the DF-17 to be an order of magnitude less expensive as its Chinese :)

Possible affordable options

1) Based on cost of the the Army PrSM ballistic missile, >500 km, in FY2023 budget 120 for $213.2 million, ~ $1.8 million each
(PrSM Spiral 1 will add new seeker to track moving targets; PrSM Spiral 2 will add enhanced lethality; PrSM Spiral 3 will add extended range, 700/800 km)
2) Hypersonic SRAM missile

The LRHW production cost estimate excluding development $2.5 Bn for 18, assuming post 2025 manage to bring cost down to $100 million each missile including new seeker for movable targets, consider that unaffordable for targeting such a small number of high priority targets in such a big country as China and would expect to have little effect. Based on PrSM the costs of ballistic missile with similar range ~$5 million?, SRAM hypersonic similar? Think 1 or 2 much the better choice than the LRHW boost glide as “Quantity has a quality all its own"

PS Has the LRHW glide vehicle been successfully tested as yet?, at moment currently remain skeptical after the failures of the other boost glide missile, the Air Force ARRW, but remain anti LRHW and CPS due to their massive costs.
 
Prices will come down as the technology is perfected, though I suspect /LRHW/CPS is going to always exist in very small numbers for very high priority targets. I doubt the DF-17 is significantly less expensive. The HACM program is IMO where the US will will make a big break through in cost effective hypersonics.
Would expect the DF-17 to be an order of magnitude less expensive as its Chinese :)

Possible affordable options

1) Based on cost of the the Army PrSM ballistic missile, >500 km, in FY2023 budget 120 for $213.2 million, ~ $1.8 million each
(PrSM Spiral 1 will add new seeker to track moving targets; PrSM Spiral 2 will add enhanced lethality; PrSM Spiral 3 will add extended range, 700/800 km)
2) Hypersonic SRAM missile

The LRHW production cost estimate excluding development $2.5 Bn for 18, assuming post 2025 manage to bring cost down to $100 million each missile including new seeker for movable targets, consider that unaffordable for targeting such a small number of high priority targets in such a big country as China and would expect to have little effect. Based on PrSM the costs of ballistic missile with similar range ~$5 million?, SRAM hypersonic similar? Think 1 or 2 much the better choice than the LRHW boost glide as “Quantity has a quality all its own"

PS Has the LRHW glide vehicle been successfully tested as yet?, at moment currently remain skeptical after the failures of the other boost glide missile, the Air Force ARRW, but remain anti LRHW and CPS due to their massive costs.

Are the 48 development missiles part of the 4.4 billion figure and the 2.5 only buying 18 weapons? In any case, a production run of 18 weapons is clearly going to be inherently cost ineffective. There would need to be a much larger buy for the program to get any economies of scale, and I suspect ultimately we will see buys in the hundreds (Army and Navy combined) as Virginia Block Vs start hitting the water and more multi domain TFs are built out. As for hitting high priority targets, I think just effect of being able to hold a small number of targets at risk still forces changes to PLA movements and plans. AFAIK China would have no ability to intercept those missiles at all; outside of mechanical failures each one should be able to engage a target a couple thousand miles with a flight time of < 30 minutes. I could easily see that being a huge problem for the PLAN in a Taiwan invasion scenario - anybody with binoculars and a sat phone could record the position of a major container or Ro/Ro ship making port, and even singular hits to such would penetrate multiple decks of very flammable cargo. Ships in port in China probably also would be in range, if the political decision was made to engage targets on the mainland.

The LRHW glide vehicle has been successfully tested several times, albeit on surrogate boosters (I think old Polaris motors) and not on the booster intended for deployment.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom