Current Nuclear Weapons Development

Not SLBM, sub launched cruise missile. Congress never the less gave it limited funding for this year despite the nuclear posture review and the fact that the USN has no interest in it. I've heard anecdotally that carrying special weapons was despised by the surface fleet and fast attack force and I suspect no one at the navy is in a rush to have to have nukes occupy weapon space and desk time outside the boomer force.
 
Not SLBM, sub launched cruise missile. Congress never the less gave it limited funding for this year despite the nuclear posture review and the fact that the USN has no interest in it. I've heard anecdotally that carrying special weapons was despised by the surface fleet and fast attack force and I suspect no one at the navy is in a rush to have to have nukes occupy weapon space and desk time outside the boomer force.
Got to correspond with a former Leahy class XO before he died. They hated the nuclear Terrier for exactly that reason. I suspect that might have changed had they actually had to use them though.
 
Not SLBM, sub launched cruise missile. Congress never the less gave it limited funding for this year despite the nuclear posture review and the fact that the USN has no interest in it. I've heard anecdotally that carrying special weapons was despised by the surface fleet and fast attack force and I suspect no one at the navy is in a rush to have to have nukes occupy weapon space and desk time outside the boomer force.
I thought so, but the quote was:
The decision to terminate the nuclear SLBM program will be of particular concern to Japan. As far back as 1965, Japan told the U.S. that, “We expect the United States to retaliate immediately using nuclear weapons” if there is a war with China. Japan preferred the strikes to be launched from the sea.
 
Which is why instead of SLCM, I would have converted the Zumwalts to nuclear strike platforms with a nuclear IR-CPS, giving them a clear mission and the ability to use them for signaling, which you can't do with a submarine.
 
I feel alert B-52s could handle the signaling mission. You could even given them call signs on FlightRadar24 like ALERT1, ALERT2, etc. (clearly they'd want to remember to turn off the transponder if it was go time).

As for an IR weapon, it isn't clear that a W-80 type warhead would fit/be compatible with CPS, particularly as CPS hasn't been tested successfully end to end yet. Size could be an issue and I would think a lot of testing would have to be done to confirm the warhead could tolerate the acceleration and thermal conditions.
 
Got to correspond with a former Leahy class XO before he died. They hated the nuclear Terrier for exactly that reason. I suspect that might have changed had they actually had to use them though.
What's not to like with NORI's and NSI's (AF speak, don't know what the squids call them)
 
Espionage is a very intricate affair. Reminds me of this:
 
What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."
 
What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."

Probably not, but clearly an increase is warranted and will almost certainly occur. I suspect there is some upper limit after which there are enough weapons to absolutely destroy both opponents, though lots of people will disagree with exactly what that magic number is.

US missiles are downloaded such that nearly doubling the number of warheads on existing launchers is an achievable goal.
 
China has the luxury of concealing its growing nuclear weapon stockpiles, which makes the US an easier target for nuclear watchdogs if they increase theirs in response. Although if the US really wanted to put a lot of pressure on China and make a better case for a new START, they'd be best served by providing the public with what they know about those stockpiles.
 
What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."
You need as many for China as for Russia approximately. So it would need to be at least twice the minimum amount required to deter one, which means 2 x 2,000 strategic warheads (not including slow bomber delivered ones), and they need to be MaRVs. Beyond that point there is no point pursuing an arms race unless the ABM factor becomes considerable. 1996 deployed levels would be reasonable. Not too interested in stockpiling beyond what is deployed.


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The current plan probably would probably see a net drop in SLBMs, a similar number of ICBMs (though likely of greater throw weight) and an increase in nuclear cruise missiles. Though presumably so long as new launch platforms were in production (and there should be new bomber, ICBM, and SSBN lines by the end of the decade) more could be purchased if necessary. An ICBM force larger than 450 missiles would require new silo construction (or some other deployment method).

The current ICBM force is 400 single warhead missiles, half W78 and half W87. The W87 missiles were apparently heavily re-engineered and more or less permanently de-MIRV'd; the W78 missiles could accept two more warheads. The 50 empty silos could presumably be filled with MMIIIs with three more W78s a piece. So roughly 650 additional warheads could be fielded, with 200 missiles retaining single warheads. The Sentinel likely will also have up to three warheads, though we could hold out hope for more.

The SLBM force is 14 boats with 12 "deployed" at any given time for 240 deployed missiles and roughly 900-1000 warheads at any given time. This works out to ~4 warheads on average, so that number could be almost doubled (presumable some missiles would still be down loaded to provide alternate strategic options; if nothing else the W-76 mod 2 is likely loaded only 1-2 warheads per missile). The Columbia class would reduce this to twelve boats of 16 launchers, though perhaps since it will be fueled for life it won't have 1-2 boats in years long overhauls to help alleviate the downward trend. Additional boats could always be purchased if necessary, though there would probably be a capability gap at this point as Ohio's were retired.

The B-52 force is to remain at 76 (only 11 spares are available at AMARG). Only around ~48 of these are cleared for nuclear weapons currently; the rest count as "undeployed". The only actively deployed strategic weapons are at Minot and are suspected to be some ~250 AGM-86s, with a similar number in storage at Kirtland. B-52s apparently don't train to deploy nuclear free fall bombs any more so none are stored at Minot (best OSINT guess). The B-2s would have access to B-61/83 stored at Whiteman. The B-1s have completely denuclearized for some time. Presumably post New START the rest of the B-52s could be re-nuclearized and B-21s will be as well, though I believe I've read that the first planes will not have this capability initially. But certainly the US bomber fleet will eventually grow, especially in terms of nuclear capable bombers. The AGM-181 LRSO I believe is to be a purchase of up to 1,000 (vs ~500 surviving AGM-86 now) and apparently will be compatible with the B-21 as well as B-52.
 
What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."
Aside from our inability to produce them, I'm having trouble seeing the problem with that strategy.
 
The current plan probably would probably see a net drop in SLBMs, a similar number of ICBMs (though likely of greater throw weight) and an increase in nuclear cruise missiles. Though presumably so long as new launch platforms were in production (and there should be new bomber, ICBM, and SSBN lines by the end of the decade) more could be purchased if necessary. An ICBM force larger than 450 missiles would require new silo construction (or some other deployment method).

The current ICBM force is 400 single warhead missiles, half W78 and half W87. The W87 missiles were apparently heavily re-engineered and more or less permanently de-MIRV'd; the W78 missiles could accept two more warheads. The 50 empty silos could presumably be filled with MMIIIs with three more W78s a piece. So roughly 650 additional warheads could be fielded, with 200 missiles retaining single warheads. The Sentinel likely will also have up to three warheads, though we could hold out hope for more.

The SLBM force is 14 boats with 12 "deployed" at any given time for 240 deployed missiles and roughly 900-1000 warheads at any given time. This works out to ~4 warheads on average, so that number could be almost doubled (presumable some missiles would still be down loaded to provide alternate strategic options; if nothing else the W-76 mod 2 is likely loaded only 1-2 warheads per missile). The Columbia class would reduce this to twelve boats of 16 launchers, though perhaps since it will be fueled for life it won't have 1-2 boats in years long overhauls to help alleviate the downward trend. Additional boats could always be purchased if necessary, though there would probably be a capability gap at this point as Ohio's were retired.

The B-52 force is to remain at 76 (only 11 spares are available at AMARG). Only around ~48 of these are cleared for nuclear weapons currently; the rest count as "undeployed". The only actively deployed strategic weapons are at Minot and are suspected to be some ~250 AGM-86s, with a similar number in storage at Kirtland. B-52s apparently don't train to deploy nuclear free fall bombs any more so none are stored at Minot (best OSINT guess). The B-2s would have access to B-61/83 stored at Whiteman. The B-1s have completely denuclearized for some time. Presumably post New START the rest of the B-52s could be re-nuclearized and B-21s will be as well, though I believe I've read that the first planes will not have this capability initially. But certainly the US bomber fleet will eventually grow, especially in terms of nuclear capable bombers. The AGM-181 LRSO I believe is to be a purchase of up to 1,000 (vs ~500 surviving AGM-86 now) and apparently will be compatible with the B-21 as well as B-52.
You can make 240 SLBMs and 450 silos work.

240x8 warheads and 450x5 warheads, plus a total of 1,000 (ALCMs, nuclear-tipped ARRWs and LRHWs). There is the option of renovating Titan II silos or mobile launchers.
 
I don't think there is a shortage, at least not yet. The US will have new SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers in production soon...that should put it in a good position to expand the nuclear deterrent if needed. In the short term it is bound by New START until Feb 2026, and there after it could fairly drastically increase it's deployed warheads just with existing inventory and launchers (short short version of my previous post).
 
I don't think there is a shortage, at least not yet. The US will have new SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers in production soon...that should put it in a good position to expand the nuclear deterrent if needed. In the short term it is bound by New START until Feb 2026, and there after it could fairly drastically increase it's deployed warheads just with existing inventory and launchers (short short version of my previous post).
Very true, and the UK and France have some scope to do the same. But ultimately I think the US needs to aim for about 4,000 warheads deployed on SLBMs and ICBMs, and about 500 each for France and UK. That would leave 1,250 each for Russia and China assuming that 50% get intercepted or fail. That's a workable deterrent, without competing on numbers.
 
I don't hate the number 4000. It might be necessary. That would probably require either additional SSBNs, additional silos, or for Sentinel to have 4-5 warheads vice MM3's three. I do not think the US will go with mobile launchers due to the security issues of moving them and the much bigger security issue of ubiquitous satellite surveillance with AI filtering being able to locate a mobile ICBM. The size of the vehicle along with its security element makes it incredibly hard to hide without a warehouse sized amount of overhead cover. There's also the issue with drones, both small and local or high altitude and persistent. The Russians already have ground based laser dazzlers deployed with their mobile ICBM elements to address the problem; getting into the mobile missile biz later this decade seems like stepping onto a sinking ship.
 
The current plan probably would probably see a net drop in SLBMs, a similar number of ICBMs (though likely of greater throw weight) and an increase in nuclear cruise missiles. Though presumably so long as new launch platforms were in production (and there should be new bomber, ICBM, and SSBN lines by the end of the decade) more could be purchased if necessary. An ICBM force larger than 450 missiles would require new silo construction (or some other deployment method).

The current ICBM force is 400 single warhead missiles, half W78 and half W87. The W87 missiles were apparently heavily re-engineered and more or less permanently de-MIRV'd; the W78 missiles could accept two more warheads. The 50 empty silos could presumably be filled with MMIIIs with three more W78s a piece. So roughly 650 additional warheads could be fielded, with 200 missiles retaining single warheads. The Sentinel likely will also have up to three warheads, though we could hold out hope for more.

The SLBM force is 14 boats with 12 "deployed" at any given time for 240 deployed missiles and roughly 900-1000 warheads at any given time. This works out to ~4 warheads on average, so that number could be almost doubled (presumable some missiles would still be down loaded to provide alternate strategic options; if nothing else the W-76 mod 2 is likely loaded only 1-2 warheads per missile). The Columbia class would reduce this to twelve boats of 16 launchers, though perhaps since it will be fueled for life it won't have 1-2 boats in years long overhauls to help alleviate the downward trend. Additional boats could always be purchased if necessary, though there would probably be a capability gap at this point as Ohio's were retired.

The B-52 force is to remain at 76 (only 11 spares are available at AMARG). Only around ~48 of these are cleared for nuclear weapons currently; the rest count as "undeployed". The only actively deployed strategic weapons are at Minot and are suspected to be some ~250 AGM-86s, with a similar number in storage at Kirtland. B-52s apparently don't train to deploy nuclear free fall bombs any more so none are stored at Minot (best OSINT guess). The B-2s would have access to B-61/83 stored at Whiteman. The B-1s have completely denuclearized for some time. Presumably post New START the rest of the B-52s could be re-nuclearized and B-21s will be as well, though I believe I've read that the first planes will not have this capability initially. But certainly the US bomber fleet will eventually grow, especially in terms of nuclear capable bombers. The AGM-181 LRSO I believe is to be a purchase of up to 1,000 (vs ~500 surviving AGM-86 now) and apparently will be compatible with the B-21 as well as B-52.
You can make 240 SLBMs and 450 silos work.

240x8 warheads and 450x5 warheads, plus a total of 1,000 (ALCMs, nuclear-tipped ARRWs and LRHWs). There is the option of renovating Titan II silos or mobile launchers.
Titan II silos are long gone. And mobile launchers? In the US? Democrats would never allow that.
 
Titan II silos are long gone. And mobile launchers? In the US? Democrats would never allow that.
There's still one that's used for tours I think. It's probably large enough to quad pack sentinels.
One silo? I doubt they'd bother. That'd almost be like rolling the XB-70 out of the Air Force museum to put into service. ;)
 
If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.
 
If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.
I'd prefer silos with a short range ABM co-located.
 
If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.

How many resources do you think China has invested in keeping tabs of where US Boomers are? That's the frightening part with over-reliance on the boomers and where I disagree with those looking to tear down the ICBM arm of the Triad. We want to live in a world where the boomers are virtually undetectable but if the Fat Leonard scandal showed us anything, it's how compromised Navy leadership and some of our contractors can be. And that's not even counting the dedicated subsurface resources that China has tasked with tracking them down. The best comfort most Americans have right now is truly not knowing how compromised a lot of things are, we just take for granted that since we are a dominant power, that everything is peachy and we are untouchable.
 
If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.

How many resources do you think China has invested in keeping tabs of where US Boomers are? That's the frightening part with over-reliance on the boomers and where I disagree with those looking to tear down the ICBM arm of the Triad. We want to live in a world where the boomers are virtually undetectable but if the Fat Leonard scandal showed us anything, it's how compromised Navy leadership and some of our contractors can be. And that's not even counting the dedicated subsurface resources that China has tasked with tracking them down. The best comfort most Americans have right now is truly not knowing how compromised a lot of things are, we just take for granted that since we are a dominant power, that everything is peachy and we are untouchable.
Yep. Half a dozen VERY easy to sink baskets when located. And I guarantee you they'd be much more willing to sink an SSBN than attack 24 missile silos on US soil.
 
If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.

How many resources do you think China has invested in keeping tabs of where US Boomers are? That's the frightening part with over-reliance on the boomers and where I disagree with those looking to tear down the ICBM arm of the Triad. We want to live in a world where the boomers are virtually undetectable but if the Fat Leonard scandal showed us anything, it's how compromised Navy leadership and some of our contractors can be. And that's not even counting the dedicated subsurface resources that China has tasked with tracking them down. The best comfort most Americans have right now is truly not knowing how compromised a lot of things are, we just take for granted that since we are a dominant power, that everything is peachy and we are untouchable.
Probably very few, given that almost nothing they have is suitable to the task. The PacFleet Ohios outnumber PLAN's SSNs, even were they acoustically and technically up to the task.

I'm not advocating for removal of ICBMs; I'm simply stating that 450 silos is an adequate number and form of basing.
 

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