Britain abandons nuclear weapons

[uk 75]

The UK nuclear deterrent has become after the NHS a political commitment for both Tory and Labour PMs to show their metal. But an earlier Tory PM, Harold Macmillan had his doubts as did Sir Winston Churchill.
Macmillan got on well with the new young US President. Kennedy for his part saw the UK and French nuclear deterrents as "dangerous distractions".
The worsening state of the UK economy in the early 60s and the need to deliver the Tory vote "you've never had it so good" led to the most radical rethink of British defence policy since.World War Two.
Difficult defence programmes ranging from the Army's Blue Water and the RAF's TSR2 and Skybolt to the RN's CVA01 aircraft carrier were slashed in the now infamous "Day of the Long Knives".
The RAF V Bombers would go over to a purely conventional role from 1965.
Britain would only retain US supplied nuclear weapons for its maritime patrol aircraft and P1154 tactical aircraft to be based in West Germany. The US supplied Thor missiles would be withdrawn by 1964.
Macmillan's "Winds of Change" speech delivered on a visit to Singapore committed the UK to withdraw from East of Suez and its remaining commitments in Africa and the Middle East by 1968.
The massive savings in the Defence Budget came just in time to allow investment in Industry, Infrastructure, Health and Education.
Macmillan's successor RAB Butler went on to win the 1964 General Election from Harold Wilson's.Labour. In his memoirs Wilson wrote "typical bloody Tories pinched all our best tunes".

 

[zen]

Why the 60's?

Why keep V-Bombers when their purpose was nuclear weapons delivery?

Why fund P1154?

Wouldn't such withdrawal and obvious weakness invite more trouble?
Indonesia over Sarawak and Brunei.
And Singapore....
China sensing an easy victory over Hong Kong.
Saudi and Iran over Bahrein.
Iraq and Kuwait.
North Yemen and Aden.

Uganda, Kenya.

And the Chagos BIOT
And Argentina over the Falklands
And Spain still under Franco over Gibraltar.
Cyprus.

Northern Ireland.

Once you start retreat and disarmament, you are signalling major weakness. This effectively invites any and every state with a grudge real or imagined to try their luck.
Under these circumstances would we have UKUSA intelligence sharing?

And beyond the global troubles, do you think constant humiliation has no consequences domestically?

 

[kaiserd]

How many of those scenarios;
- Would have really been any different given likely that the US would have stepped in with equivalent guarantees instead in the more obvious examples, and;
- nuclear weapons (having them or not having them) have nothing to do with the “less obvious” example (Northern Ireland - that’s just a ridiculous suggestion. And the Argentinians did actually invade the Falklands.).

There’s not too many actual real-world instances where you can point to the UK nuclear deterrent in isolation having that much impact. That’s not intended as a general anti-nuclear point, an argument can be made that UK and French National deterrents have a wider impact re: NATO, US etc.

However it is just anti-historical to propose there was a long string of UK “national humiliations” prevented by the UK national nuclear deterrent and which would inevitably occurred in the absence or abandonment of that UK national nuclear deterrent.

 

[uk 75]

Zen
The 60s because 1962 is when Macmillan and his Cabinet have to face the reality that the UK deterrent relies on the US.. The budgetary problems and Kennedy force a hard choice.
P1154 is always seen as a P1127 forest clearing jet. It wasnt. Like Jaguar it was intended for roads around an airfield.. It would carry US nukes in Germany.
The hard decisions on Britain's world role all fell in the 60s. Macmillan had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and knew better than most our limitations after Suez.
The refocus on our NATO role was in line with US policy..We do it anyway in 1967.
All I have done is have Macmillan bite the bullet in 1962 rather than kick the can down the road.
Northern Ireland is unaffected by this scenario.

 

[uk 75]

There is enough consensus about the UK nuclear deterrent to know that its main importance is to the UK as a sign of national resolve.
The US military are and were much more supportive of the UK deterrent than their Political Masters. That is why we get Polaris and Trident. Where Congress did have some say, we were told not to ask for Poseidon.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Nuclear weapons are basically a way of 'thinking' we are bigger than we really are, ditto the 'French' deterrent. During those times the only way we would use nuclear weapons would be if the US/NATO did. Looking at the overkill level of nuclear weapons just between the USSR and the USA, the weapons we have are a side show and irrelevant imho.

 

[uk 75]

The Butler Government Defence Review of 1965
The Blue Steel Vulcans and Victors will stand down by 1967. At this point the UK national deterrent criteria of destroying.Moscow and other major cities will be met by the US and NATO siop.
A force of 50 Vulcan B2s will be assigned to SACEUR in the conventional role..However, Britain is continuing to develop its own tactical nuclear weapon (WE177) for RAF and RN use. In the meantime US nuclear weapons will be assigned by NATO.
The P1154 will enter service in 1968 as a tactical support aircraft replacing some RAF Germany aircraft.
F4 Phantom aircraft originally planned for the Royal Navy will replace Javelin squadrons. The RAF will also take over the RN Buccaneer squadrons.
Development of a UK national fighter/attacker aircraft for the 70s to join the 1154 and replace Buccaneer, Lightning, Phantom and Vulcan will be based on studies done by Industry.
The Royal Navy will relinquish its carrier force in 1970 when the Sea Vixen FAW2 retires from service on Hermes and Eagle.
Hermes will be converted for service as an Anti Submarine Carrier (CVS) in the 70s. She will operate a P1154 variant if trials prove successful. Two to three CVS derived from.the Hermes design but using gas turbines will join her. If successful two additional ships will replace Bulwark and Albion as Commando Ships.
The nuclear hunter killer submarine will become the Capital Ship of the Fleet. One a year will be laid down to an eventual total of 16 by 1980. A long range missile system for these vessels is under development.
The withdrawal of UK Land Forces outside Western Europe (except Cyprus and Hong Kong) will be complete by 1968. At this point the three Divisions of BAOR in Germany will be brought up to NATO three brigade levels like their US and West German counterparts.
The UK Strategic Reserve will comprise a mixture of Brigade size units including armour, mechanised, paratroop and air portable infantry brigades.
The successful conclusion of operations in Malaysia/Singapore will permit a UK/Australian/NZealand force to conduct reinforcement exercises annually.
The continuing unrest in Aden means that some Strategic Reserve infantry, armoured car, artillery and support units may not return to UK as early as planned.
The Prime Minister told the House of Commons that HM Government believes that this plan for our Armed Forces will meet both our NATO commitment and any additional crises that may emerge in this "dangerous decade".

 

[zen]

Now this is really not making sense.
1962....
Give up strategic nukes, rely on the US. V-bomber drawdown for the 70's?
Give up on tactical missiles?
Give up on CVA-01....
Still buy F4?
And fund P1154?

And develop tactical freefall?
develop CVS at 28,000ton with GTs?

Use expensive V-Bombers for conventional bombing?

develop national fighter/attack machine for the 70's? Not Tornado?

Then...develope a long range missile for launch from submarines? Not Polaris?

 

[starviking]

I’m a bit busy, so this is a bit of a post-and-go.

Still strong in UK’s mind Kruschev’s claim to have caused UK pullout from Suez with nuclear threat. No one wants to be, or even appear to be, subject to nuclear blackmail.

Still questions in UK’s mind: how can we guarantee US nuclear umbrella will be available if push-comes-to-shove? Multilateral Force only reinforces that question - US holds the leash. Independent deterrent answers the question.

 

[Hood]

Are there any real savings to be had anyway?

Once the V-Force/Yellow Sun was operational the massive costs of the 1950s had a result.
Skybolt was dead before we funneled any hard cash into it.
Polaris wasn't cheap but we weren't exposed to massive R&D costs, only for warheads and AWRE is already working on WE.177 etc., so the infrastructure is already there.
Yes we had to build four SSBNs, arguably that means losing 4 SSNs that could be built instead, but Resolution/Polaris is one of the few examples of delivery on time and on budget.

If you still have tac nukes then you still need TSR.2, 1154 (or F-4s, Jags, Harriers), Lance etc. Having strategic nukes doesn't really alter the situation for CVA-01. You could argue saving one budget means you can spend more on conventional defence EoS but not sure the savings from cancelling Polaris etc. would enable the MoD to spend that much more on BAOR or EoS or overcome the political decisions to withdraw.

 

[zen]

Tactical doesn't need TSR.2. Tactical needs just Scimitar and or Buccaneer.

F4 isn't needed for QRA (Lightning does this and much cheaper) and not needed for Tactical laydown. Scimitar can do NOW (1958), Buccaneer Tomorrow (1965), P1154 without RN FAW requirements dragging things out can be by '66 to '68.
Without Carrier future, Sea Vixen is last FAW for Carrier air.
Future Carrier dies '62, then dreams of OR.346 in the 70's die with it.
AW.406 will emphasise operation from extent fleet IF the requirement is allowed as ISD is so late. Only if CV fleet is OSD in late 70's does it make sense to spend the cash.

If GT powered CVS is future (1970's) with navalised P1154 or Next Gen aircraft. This is open to question and cancellation for obvious reasons by '66.

 

[uk 75]

The timeline is based on what we know from Peter Hennessy and others of Macmillan's attitude to the deterrent.
McNamara and Kennedy did not want the UK to have Polaris. So in this timeline they get their way. There is no Nassau Agreement.
Without Skybolt and Polaris and with an earlier appreciation by Macmillan that the UK is massively in a bad way financially, the facesaver is to accept the NATO deterrent.
The Vulcan B2s are still new aircraft. As in our timeline they have many years of service left as conventional and freefall bombers.
P1154 was a perfectly valid aircraft as long as you go for the RAF version and accept it is more a stol than vtol aircraft. Without TSR2 and 681 it is affordable.
The RAF version could operate from Hermes and co without cats.
The RN F4s had been signed up for so we get stuck with them but fewer than in our timeline. Sufficient arrive to take over from the Jav. Not wedded to this.
They could get chopped leaving just Lightnings and Sea Vixens.
The BAC swing wing fighter/attacker is what Tornado MRCA is in ours. Without Polaris and TSR2/F111 we get it in 1975 not 1982.
There is no Labour Government in 1966 because Macmillan hands over to RAB Butler not Lord Home and has taken the hard decisions taken by Labour in 64-6.
So the RN gets carriers rather than through deck cruisers for the NATO ASW role. The 1154 could just as easily be the 1127.
The missile for the SSNs is mainly a long range anti ship missile. This was planned in real life but not realised until Sub Harpoon.

 

[zen]

Just deleted a long answer.

Cut to the chase. Dates.
'62-'63 POD?
No F4 on order. P1154
'64 F4 on order?
Why it doesn't meet AW.406.
Why relax requirements?
When CVA-01 is dead, and the future is CVS even if it's a 28,000ton GT powered carrier with P.1154 aircraft.

At this juncture, AI.18 work can extend range to double existing sets. AMTI functionality deemed good enough is priced up and Red Top II along with Radar Red Top is, as a complete package on Sea Vixen.... Cheaper than F4 and good enough until P1154RN ISD.

Your argument is actually favouring F8, at half the price of F4 and good enough for performance yet within limits to keep operating from Hermes, Victorious as well as Ark Royal and Eagle.....and much easier to integrate on CVS as CATOBAR alternative to STOVL P.1154.

Because AI.24 (not Foxhunter) has projected ISD 1972. So P1154RN is not ISD until at least then.

 

[alertken]

Skybolt to Polaris, 1963 is taken by some as PoD, but try 1957.

General of the Army, Pres. Ike would warn in his Farewell Address of need for vigilance against "unwarranted influence of the military-industrial complex". (He had exploited a non-existent Bomber Gap to help get Elected and his Party in 1960 would be hoist as Kennedy's team invented an equally chimerical Missile Gap). Defense was costing too much. So he had focused, not on UK, but on the site of the boots+tanks battle: FRG, and in 1955 had re-Armed them in NATO, thus provoking USSR's copy as WarPac.
How, then to share the dying with them, in a nuclear exchange, without an FRG finger on the button?

Using UK as dress rehearsal, 1/2/57, he settled Principles for AW target co-ordination, effective in UK as Project E loan of weapons (1/10/58) and full integration of RAF Medium Bomber (1/7/58) and Strategic Missile (1/7/60) Forces with USAF/SAC, then 1961 SIOP. He then extended bits of that to Allies, starting with Honest John SSM, Italian Army 3/59, Turkish 29/7/59, Belgian 1/10/59, then France, FRG et al.

Only 2 reasons then remained for UK to endure the cost of solo-creation of warheads:
spoken: deployment outside NATO land Main Bases (the problem of US custodials awaiting Presidential Release Authority);
unspoken: what if the Alliance crumbled?

The unspoken one was simply ignored pre-Trump, France then resurrecting 1952's European Defence Community notion.
The spoken one lapsed when UK decided to integrate BAOR/2TAF in Saceur (so no need for Blue Water SSM/UK-warhead): yet we persisted in a sense of exceptionalism, accepting some targets for CENTO+SEATO and at sea for Saclant, all entirely within US' scope, and, like MBF/SMF's, doubled up except where trebled up (making the rubble bounce). UK could have ditched its solo AW pretensions on 2/2/57 and applied all AEA resources to electricity. UK was brought to the brink of chaos by the Suez revenge of ME oil producers manipulating supply in 1957.

The reasons successive PMs spent atomically were...you never can tell...and it was comparatively cheap. I would probably have accepted this insurance premium if you had put me in charge. But if I had decided to take the risk...I would have reduced the Defence Budget by the visible cost of AWRE/ROF. No saving would have been available to Chiefs to spend elsewhere. RN SSBNs, 1963, were only accepted by Mountbatten because they were extra-to-current RN budget.

So my A to OP's Q is: zilch. If UK had abandoned solo-AW...absolutely nothing would have changed: UK Forces would take the iron role before (?and after) an AW exchange, USSR: US, some weapons crewed by Allies inc. us.

 

[uk 75]

As ever Alertken has given us a detailed run down of the situation which is very interesting and is why these alt threads are so useful.
My point of departure is slightly looser and I know I am naughty in conflating the nuclear issue with the Budget but Macmillan is the central person.
I had the F4 decision being taken in 1962 rather than 1963 so that P1154RAF moves ahead more smoothly than in our timeline.
Love it or loath it, P1154 is the only UK supersonic military aircraft after Lightning and TSR2 to start being built in this era.
TSR2 dies because it is just too expensive. P1154 is a lot simpler and if as was envisaged it is stovl not vstol it is quite feasible.
Happy to have the RN told no Sea Vixen replacement in the Day of the Long Knives so no F4 F8 or anything else.
My rather optimistic Butler Government Defence Review takes most of what actually happened.
As Alertken suggests the loss of the deterrent and the 1962/3 cuts plus abandoning East of Suez would probably have just led to what we did in real life. But I wanted to explore possibilities.

 

[uk 75]

Let me try and explain the carrier situation.
Once CVA01 goes and East of Suez as well there is no need for the big three carriers to be kept on after 1968. They leave service with their Sea Vixens scrapped and their Bucs joining the RAF.
The RN is now focussed on its NATO roles which still include the Med (Malta kicks us out in the 70s).
Hermes becomes an ASW carrier in 1968 as the Seakings enter service. The three Tigers are not converted and are scrapped along with the carriers.
Additional ASW/Commando carriers based on Hermes rather than the 1966 Escort Cruiser are laid down from 1968. Three eventually enter service replacing Albion, Bulwark and finally Hermes. Predictably one of the new ships is called Ark Royal.
The ships are not given a catapult as this requires steam.
The 1154 is available as a basic fighter ground attack like the 1127 but supersonic. If 1154 attracts US interest (it is still stovl which is better than F4/A4) so much the better.
Whether it becomes a Sea Harrier in the 70s is less clear.

 

[Hood]

Macmillan was a spendthrift when it came to military R&D.
Can you imagine the 1957 POD Ken raises, the Sandys cuts could have been seriously brutal.
- no need to fund the Mk.2 V-bombers, probably going to see HP's Victor B.2 orders gone
- Avro 730 was already toast
- no Blue Streak - dies in the cradle
- do you even need to bother defending the V-bomber bases anymore? Does that mean a reprieve for Fighter Command to protect the rest of the UK or does it mean lets not bother with fighters or SAM belts and so we ditch Bloodhound too? Technically the air defence plan was reduced to protecting the bombers, with no strategic role in theory there is nothing preventing Sandys chucking away all but a token fighter force.

The big problem is how the government can publicly sell this. In 1955 the government tells Britain in a H-Bomb War its total annihilation of the nation, in 1957 Macmillan says "we're not going to renew our strategic deterrent, the USA will provide", Britain still on the Soviets target list - all those juicy USAF airfields and any dual/key Thor bases or whatever UK/US missile successor arrives. Now it looks like Britain could be wiped out and no means of retribution if the USA skips off into the sunset. The Cuban Crisis would have been even more of a squeaky bum time. For CND the only possible campaign left is simple - all US nukes out. That would be an interesting chain of events, especially for Wilson.

What about NATO? The trip wire looks broken, does this bring in flexible response a decade sooner? Would NATO stump up extra conventional forces? As Ken points out, temptation is for HM Treasury to pocket the saved cash - try prising open their fists to get the money back for conventional forces.
How can Britain maintain their leadership of CENTO and SEATO given such a climbdown?

Then we have Washington. Dual key of tac nukes is ok, but Polaris is coming, the IRBM declines in importance, Pershings in W.Ger, are they needed in Britain? Why risk all their tac nukes within War Pac striking distance. Better to rely on single-key Polaris and Minuteman. Little incentive to use it unless the USA is directly threatened. No incentive for Kennedy to offer a NATO MLF. MLF was a means to gain control of potential Anglo-French loose H-bomb cannons, if London has no loose cannon then little need to worry.

Envious eyes at France? They have the Frappe and Brits have... some hand-me downs.

 

[zen]

Unsellable,
'45 humiliation
Korea
Suez

No government would last such a climbdown back then.

 

[Archibald]

General of the Army, Pres. Ike would warn in his Farewell Address of need for vigilance against "unwarranted influence of the military-industrial complex". (He had exploited a non-existent Bomber Gap to help get Elected and his Party in 1960 would be hoist as Kennedy's team invented an equally chimerical Missile Gap).

Fun facts
- Ike ordered 24 USSR overflights by U-2s between spring 1956 and spring 1960, when that business violently exploded in its face. That's 6 per year, average. Each one expressly authorized by the President, and sometimes refused.
- early overflights (1956) screwed the BOMBER gap for good, when U-2s overflew Tupolev and Myasischchev (goddam freakkin' name !) plants and saw zilch, nada in the airstrips
- so the BOMBER gap was dead
Alas for Ike
a) he couldn't reveal his sources (the U-2s) so the debate carried on unabated
b) then as the BOMBER gap died out mid-1957, Sputnik happened and the MISSILE gap was born.

U-2s went looking for ICBMs but they proved even more elusive than bombers, and thus more risks, more flights needed, more lies from the CIA.

- the CIA successively lied to Eisenhower on many essential points
a) that Soviet radars could not catch a U-2 over 65 000 feet (they did from day 1)
b) that even then, the pilot would not survive (Power did)
c) that even then, Project RAINBOW would make the U-2 "stealth" (it failed miserably)
d) that even then, SA-2s could not reach U-2 heights (they could: on October 7, 1959 at least, they screwed a ROCAF RB-57D at 60 000 feet)

They were in full kettle logic mode.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kettle_logic

Eisenhower ended trapped between a rock and a hard place.

a) Kennedy was pestering him with the MISSILE gap
b) the CIA was lying to him over all the points above he needed to assess risk and authorize overflights.

No surprise it ended in a giant screw up.

Note: I'm not defending Eisenhower, just sayin' the U-2 overflight business was crazy dangerous and doomed sooner or later.

 

[kaiserd]

Unsellable,
'45 humiliation
Korea
Suez

No government would last such a climbdown back then.

For the UK there was no ‘45 humiliation’.

A part from heightening Cold War tension and greatly increased defence spending Korea had remarkably limited lasting impact on the UK (despite have troops etc fighting) and it was certainly not considered a humiliation.

Suez was a very different matter, certainly deserving of the “humiliation” moniker.
But again Uk nuclear weapons has no real barring to the Suez debacle and it’s impact (both immediate and over time) can be exaggerated.

However it may well be true that abandonment of the UK national nuclear deterrent has been consistently politically unpalatable and unachievable.

 

[uk 75]

The various points made above are all well taken.
The only occasion on which the UK might and then only might have abandoned the deterrent is on Macmillan's watch in the early 60s and then only if Kennedy and Mcnamara had said no to giving us Polaris.
Without Skybolt the V force could not carry out the Moscow criteria role beyond 1965. A three year gap until Polaris was already bad enough.
I make it more likely by giving Macmillan the bad news that Britain is broke two years early.
But Nassau did happen and unless Biden decides he dislikes the UK as much as some claim it will gives us the missiles for the Dreadnoughts.

 

[Jerry_B]

Note: I'm not defending Eisenhower, just sayin' the U-2 overflight business was crazy dangerous and doomed sooner or later.

U2 flights were not the largest part of overall picture. C-130s running along the borders of the USSR and overflights by the RAF made up the largest part of the intelligence gathering. For an overview see here. The US lost a fair few C-130s to Soviet action (aircraft and SAMs) before Powers was shot down. A lot of crew are still listed as missing, 60+ years later.

 

[alertken]

Khrushchev made a technology transfer/barter deal with PRC, inc. fission gravity Bomb and its Badger platform. It was abruptly terminated 5/60 when TTMao called him out on U-2: all Sov personnel decamped clutching as much eqpt/documentation as poss., so it took PRC to 16/10/64 to first A-test. PRC successfully reversed it all and moved on to solo-competence, such that some Sovs wondered in which direction all this kit might be pointed.

Do we know any other tech. transfer or dual key AW schemes in War Pac? If none, why? Czech/Polish industry was quite as capable as India et al to handle AW. Think through the implications of Sov suspicion of its colonies' loyalty when ordure hits fan. If DDR were expected to collapse like Afghan has...NATO could have spent less and differently.

Red Storm...Deflated?

 

[zen]

Certainly I've read somewhere that Polish forces intended to be......tardy at the least with support and supplies.

There was a theory that's why Soviet Commanders had authority for tactical use, as they feared supply lines through Eastern Europe would be cut if there was a delay in progress.

 

[Nick Sumner]

Unsellable,
'45 humiliation
Korea
Suez

No government would last such a climbdown back then.

For the UK there was no ‘45 humiliation’.

Well... There was the ruinous terms of the Breton Woods agreement. BW was 44, admittedly, but 'humiliating' is one way to describe the UK's financial state in 45. Perhaps zen could clarify precisely what he means by that?

 

[zen]

Unsellable,
'45 humiliation
Korea
Suez

No government would last such a climbdown back then.

For the UK there was no ‘45 humiliation’.

Well... There was the ruinous terms of the Breton Woods agreement. BW was 44, admittedly, but 'humiliating' is one way to describe the UK's financial state in 45. Perhaps zen could clarify precisely what he means by that?

Yalta.
"Lets hand Europe to the Soviets"
War stop.
Loans stop.
Debt.
Loan.
"As HM FCO Minister I never want to be spoken to by the Americans like that again. We absolutely have to have The Bomb".

In the corridors of power it was clear what was happening, even if yhe public was kept from the full consequences.