Army Equipment Modernization Strategy

I found somewhat difficult such thread, above all when there are references to the Russian Army as it seems me that they are referring to an organic structure than doesn't exist anymore or some supposed shortcomings that are more enunciated than explained.
So, when , as an example, Drejr says that "Russia will revive the divisional command level" I get really lost as AFAIK it's from when Shoigu became MoD instead of Serdyukov that they are back to divisional organization and consequently to such level of command and logistic almost as from what it concern Western and Central Military District (but actually they are reactivating divisions also in the other two).
And frankly, Jsport seeing how the Joint Chiefs of Staff (doesn't) work I would say "Prussian High Command" now, tomorrow and forever as it (or better its own general staff and main directorate) is the reason of such a fast resurgence of russian military.
Officer Heavy is not a problem in itself, their own military doctrine and history (and their educational system) work well with such a ranking system, while Serdyukov effort to "westernize" or better "britanize" it (as it was based on NCO) was devoid of any point of contact with thjem and so failed miserably.
 
while Serdyukov effort to "westernize" or better "britanize" it (as it was based on NCO) was devoid of any point of contact with thjem and so failed miserably.
Can you elaborate Marcellogo?
 
Certainly. It is about ranking and command structure in different armed forces.

When in 2008 (after the 080808 war and the decision to consider appesantement with west was not possible anymore) it was decided that armed forces would be throughly reorganized and rearmed the role of MoD was of Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian with no previous noticeable military career.
Its own reform caused a lot of dissension through armed forces, as it was decided to dismiss a lot of surplus officials (as they were in Cadre Units i.e. without most of troops assigned and to be activated after mobilization.
In order to further advance the rationalization effort he also decided to pass to a brigate organized structure, abolishing divisional level of command and in the meantime to revise the ranking system leading toward the formation of a professional (i.e. specifically trained) NCO corp that would took a good part of the roles previously assigned to lowest rank officiers.
Although necessary and rational under a purely economic point of view such decision backfired almost immediately: conservative reaction was strong but it would have not been enough if they would have produced the desired effects but they failed to achieve that.
For what it regard the organic aspect the new Brigates were just Motor Rifle (motostrelzi but it is much more similar to panzergrenadier in its meaning) regiments with a logistical depot and a part of the former divisional and Ad system attached. Former Tank regiments were to disbanded or transformed into motor rifle ones.
Alleged reason was that such formations were considered more mobile, able to better cover territory and better suited for counter insurgency tasks
It simply doesn't worked : they were not so much different from former regiments on that regard, added units had not a real operative significance and above all, when it was implemented the focus had already shifted toward confrontation with the West where concentration and optimization and not instead dispersion and autonomy of forces were deemed necessary.

Leave me time to further elaborate about rank in a successive post .
Suffice here to say that Soviet Russia has never had a professional NCO or warrant officer corp, intermediate ranks between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps came directly from the former and was made just awarding grades to the ones enlisting at the end of conscription period without any particolar schooling while about all the roles that senior NCO usually occupy in the west are reserved for (commissioned) officers.
Pretending to completely change such a structure in few years was not just risky, it was also not respectful and in some cases even cruel toward or a lot of persons.
 
Certainly. It is about ranking and command structure in different armed forces.

When in 2008 (after the 080808 war and the decision to consider appesantement with west was not possible anymore) it was decided that armed forces would be throughly reorganized and rearmed the role of MoD was of Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian with no previous noticeable military career.
Its own reform caused a lot of dissension through armed forces, as it was decided to dismiss a lot of surplus officials (as they were in Cadre Units i.e. without most of troops assigned and to be activated after mobilization.
In order to further advance the rationalization effort he also decided to pass to a brigate organized structure, abolishing divisional level of command and in the meantime to revise the ranking system leading toward the formation of a professional (i.e. specifically trained) NCO corp that would took a good part of the roles previously assigned to lowest rank officiers.
Although necessary and rational under a purely economic point of view such decision backfired almost immediately: conservative reaction was strong but it would have not been enough if they would have produced the desired effects but they failed to achieve that.
For what it regard the organic aspect the new Brigates were just Motor Rifle (motostrelzi but it is much more similar to panzergrenadier in its meaning) regiments with a logistical depot and a part of the former divisional and Ad system attached. Former Tank regiments were to disbanded or transformed into motor rifle ones.
Alleged reason was that such formations were considered more mobile, able to better cover territory and better suited for counter insurgency tasks
It simply doesn't worked : they were not so much different from former regiments on that regard, added units had not a real operative significance and above all, when it was implemented the focus had already shifted toward confrontation with the West where concentration and optimization and not instead dispersion and autonomy of forces were deemed necessary.

Leave me time to further elaborate about rank in a successive post .
Suffice here to say that Soviet Russia has never had a professional NCO or warrant officer corp, intermediate ranks between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps came directly from the former and was made just awarding grades to the ones enlisting at the end of conscription period without any particolar schooling while about all the roles that senior NCO usually occupy in the west are reserved for (commissioned) officers.
Pretending to completely change such a structure in few years was not just risky, it was also not respectful and in some cases even cruel toward or a lot of persons.
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.
 
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.
Yes, every country has their own.
Russia in particular has from Tsarist times a strong connection between the educational system, the society and the military structure.
Cadet schools and military institutes formed not just the officer corps but more broadly the future administrative class of the Empire and Soviet Union gave an extensive pre-military education to its own citizens.
So, Serdyukov reform was not just dramatic in itself, leading to the dismissions of a lot of officers (and Praporoshniks, the senior NCO rank, introduced just in 1972) but envisioning the creation of a professional class of contracted NCO, was seen (and with reason) as the introduction of an a alien and above all inspired by both western and civilian mentality, model.
Creation of such a corp was set at a 3-4 year span i.e. something absolutely impossible to achieve and even more it was to be linked to a complete reform of military educational system that would led to a reduction and centralization of it, passing from 65 to 10.
Now, in this part the divide between a civilian mentality, aimed at rationalization and economical efficiency, and the military one literally exploded: such new institution would have been organized on territorial basis and not anymore on combat arms, something that called for a lot of outrage.
And it was nothing compared to the one that came when according to such a reform it was decided to exclude the members of Suvorov and Nakhimov institutes (i.e.the military pre-graduate high schools) from military parades...
SERIOUSLY, WHAT THE ... such an hateful thing could have anything to do with a better efficiency?

Naturally, as soon as the actual minister Sergey Shoigu, although also he was not coming from a (strictly) military background (but was the extremely popular Ministry of Emergency situation), took office his first decision was to cancel such a a gross and petty decision.
Naturally the most of Serdyukov decision remained but the one about military institutes of education was completely overthrown and instead from that moment the opposite path was decided: instead of going toward professionalized (in western sense) armed the army they went back the russian way extending the "militarization" of the society.
 
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.
Yes, every country has their own.
Russia in particular has from Tsarist times a strong connection between the educational system, the society and the military structure.
Cadet schools and military institutes formed not just the officer corps but more broadly the future administrative class of the Empire and Soviet Union gave an extensive pre-military education to its own citizens.
Limited pre military is probably ok but not too much as the comtemporary context requires alot of other skills.
So, Serdyukov reform was not just dramatic in itself, leading to the dismissions of a lot of officers (and Praporoshniks, the senior NCO rank, introduced just in 1972) but envisioning the creation of a professional class of contracted NCO, was seen (and with reason) as the introduction of an a alien and above all inspired by both western and civilian mentality, model.
..thinkin I remember hearing about massive dismissals...very disruptive about like de-baathification the way it was done...not astute
Creation of such a corp was set at a 3-4 year span i.e. something absolutely impossible to achieve and even more it was to be linked to a complete reform of military educational system that would led to a reduction and centralization of it, passing from 65 to 10.
hard to beleive you can reduce 65 to 10 w/o alot of loss.
Now, in this part the divide between a civilian mentality, aimed at rationalization and economical efficiency, and the military one literally exploded: such new institution would have been organized on territorial basis and not anymore on combat arms, something that called for a lot of outrage.
military efficiency and local socio-econ-political goals generally dont mix, if that is what you are eluding to.
And it was nothing compared to the one that came when according to such a reform it was decided to exclude the members of Suvorov and Nakhimov institutes (i.e.the military pre-graduate high schools) from military parades...
SERIOUSLY, WHAT THE ... such an hateful thing could have anything to do with a better efficiency?

Naturally, as soon as the actual minister Sergey Shoigu, although also he was not coming from a (strictly) military background (but was the extremely popular Ministry of Emergency situation), took office his first decision was to cancel such a a gross and petty decision.
Naturally the most of Serdyukov decision remained but the one about military institutes of education was completely overthrown and instead from that moment the opposite path was decided: instead of going toward professionalized (in western sense) armed the army they went back the russian way extending the "militarization" of the society.
"militarization" of the society would seem to be a regressive move. the Russian Army is big enough :)
 
Not, allow me to clarify: in our actual, western society, we have professionalized armed forces that have to form into service persons that have not any prior experience related to military life: so you have to take an adult person and teach him/her anything from scratch as the normal educational system gives nothing in that sense except some physical education.

In eastern societies there was a much more definite set of practical skills teachings that have a direct connection to military or technical matters into the general educational system. Even without imagining coming to the Pioneers (that war more politically-oriented) there were some organizations also in pre-socialist states like the Sokol that gave both physical and military teachings to their adherents. So even a simple conscript went to their military service with a basic knowledge among those matters.
Going a step further there are organizations like DOSAAF that give to its own members training in paramilitary sports, from sharpshooting to even airdrops or basic piloting.
Guess from where famous female pilots and sharpshooter of WWII came from? And most of VDV and GRU scouts actually.
The apex were however the cadets in Tsarist times and the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools that were/are true military pre-graduate schools.
So a civilian, western style reform trying to create a professional NCO corp, under those premises I said in the beginning, is apparently more rational and economically efficient but in a society organized like this is, first e foremost, a waste of already existing educational resources.
Russian oversized (commissioned) officer corps was the result not of a sort of "Khaki Privilege" but from the fact that previous Soviet army was basically a mobilization based army with a first echelon of high readiness forces at almost full complements, a second one with a smaller preparedness and a third one of cadre units,also them fully staffed but with almost no soldier.
So what Shoigu have done is just to revitalize institutions that already existed and had a strong tradition and history and are so quite beloved by the general public.
Also because the society in Russia is in the whole State-centered: it doesn't get any outrage from the perspective of a strong government intruding in the people's lives but instead of a weak and corrupted one, incapable of getting things done.
It worked greatly as the previous structure, once mercilessly relieved by the excess of old cadres that blocked the system, proved able anyway to form new ones at a fast pace, both for what concern the contract servicemen now making the two thirds of the enlisted personnel than for what it come to the officer corp.

And no, the modern soviet/ russian armed forces were/re not big because of troop numbers (like it was instead in WWII ) a.t.c. they are powerful because have a lot of weaponries manned by comparatively less personnel than the average of other countries.
 
Not, allow me to clarify: in our actual, western society, we have professionalized armed forces that have to form into service persons that have not any prior experience related to military life: so you have to take an adult person and teach him/her anything from scratch as the normal educational system gives nothing in that sense except some physical education.
..apologize, never meant to assume or accuse the Russian society of being militarized. just said militarized was regressive. physical education must be a priority to any society.
In eastern societies there was a much more definite set of practical skills teachings that have a direct connection to military or technical matters into the general educational system. Even without imagining coming to the Pioneers (that war more politically-oriented) there were some organizations also in pre-socialist states like the Sokol that gave both physical and military teachings to their adherents. So even a simple conscript went to their military service with a basic knowledge among those matters.
Going a step further there are organizations like DOSAAF that give to its own members training in paramilitary sports, from sharpshooting to even airdrops or basic piloting.
paramilitary sports is also good for societies.
Guess from where famous female pilots and sharpshooter of WWII came from? And most of VDV and GRU scouts actually.
The apex were however the cadets in Tsarist times and the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools that were/are true military pre-graduate schools.
So a civilian, western style reform trying to create a professional NCO corp, under those premises I said in the beginning, is apparently more rational and economically efficient but in a society organized like this is, first e foremost, a waste of already existing educational resources.
Russian oversized (commissioned) officer corps was the result not of a sort of "Khaki Privilege" but from the fact that previous Soviet army was basically a mobilization based army with a first echelon of high readiness forces at almost full complements, a second one with a smaller preparedness and a third one of cadre units,also them fully staffed but with almost no soldier.
So what Shoigu have done is just to revitalize institutions that already existed and had a strong tradition and history and are so quite beloved by the general public.
nothing wrong w/ revitalized institutions and strong tradition and history, especially if beloved by the general public.
Also because the society in Russia is in the whole State-centered: it doesn't get any outrage from the perspective of a strong government intruding in the people's lives but instead of a weak and corrupted one, incapable of getting things done.
It worked greatly as the previous structure, once mercilessly relieved by the excess of old cadres that blocked the system, proved able anyway to form new ones at a fast pace, both for what concern the contract servicemen now making the two thirds of the enlisted personnel than for what it come to the officer corp.
the 2/3s contract soldiers and many headed to the officer corp it sounds like the Russian Army has a strategy.
And no, the modern soviet/ russian armed forces were/re not big because of troop numbers (like it was instead in WWII ) a.t.c. they are powerful because have a lot of weaponries manned by comparatively less personnel than the average of other countries.
 
IMHO, given the Byzantine (Roman) legacy, Russia should be considered one of the first Western societies.
 
Certainly. It is about ranking and command structure in different armed forces.

When in 2008 (after the 080808 war and the decision to consider appesantement with west was not possible anymore) it was decided that armed forces would be throughly reorganized and rearmed the role of MoD was of Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian with no previous noticeable military career.
Its own reform caused a lot of dissension through armed forces, as it was decided to dismiss a lot of surplus officials (as they were in Cadre Units i.e. without most of troops assigned and to be activated after mobilization.
In order to further advance the rationalization effort he also decided to pass to a brigate organized structure, abolishing divisional level of command and in the meantime to revise the ranking system leading toward the formation of a professional (i.e. specifically trained) NCO corp that would took a good part of the roles previously assigned to lowest rank officiers.
Although necessary and rational under a purely economic point of view such decision backfired almost immediately: conservative reaction was strong but it would have not been enough if they would have produced the desired effects but they failed to achieve that.
For what it regard the organic aspect the new Brigates were just Motor Rifle (motostrelzi but it is much more similar to panzergrenadier in its meaning) regiments with a logistical depot and a part of the former divisional and Ad system attached. Former Tank regiments were to disbanded or transformed into motor rifle ones.
Alleged reason was that such formations were considered more mobile, able to better cover territory and better suited for counter insurgency tasks
It simply doesn't worked : they were not so much different from former regiments on that regard, added units had not a real operative significance and above all, when it was implemented the focus had already shifted toward confrontation with the West where concentration and optimization and not instead dispersion and autonomy of forces were deemed necessary.

Leave me time to further elaborate about rank in a successive post .
Suffice here to say that Soviet Russia has never had a professional NCO or warrant officer corp, intermediate ranks between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps came directly from the former and was made just awarding grades to the ones enlisting at the end of conscription period without any particolar schooling while about all the roles that senior NCO usually occupy in the west are reserved for (commissioned) officers.
Pretending to completely change such a structure in few years was not just risky, it was also not respectful and in some cases even cruel toward or a lot of persons.
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.
 
Certainly. It is about ranking and command structure in different armed forces.

When in 2008 (after the 080808 war and the decision to consider appesantement with west was not possible anymore) it was decided that armed forces would be throughly reorganized and rearmed the role of MoD was of Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian with no previous noticeable military career.
Its own reform caused a lot of dissension through armed forces, as it was decided to dismiss a lot of surplus officials (as they were in Cadre Units i.e. without most of troops assigned and to be activated after mobilization.
In order to further advance the rationalization effort he also decided to pass to a brigate organized structure, abolishing divisional level of command and in the meantime to revise the ranking system leading toward the formation of a professional (i.e. specifically trained) NCO corp that would took a good part of the roles previously assigned to lowest rank officiers.
Although necessary and rational under a purely economic point of view such decision backfired almost immediately: conservative reaction was strong but it would have not been enough if they would have produced the desired effects but they failed to achieve that.
For what it regard the organic aspect the new Brigates were just Motor Rifle (motostrelzi but it is much more similar to panzergrenadier in its meaning) regiments with a logistical depot and a part of the former divisional and Ad system attached. Former Tank regiments were to disbanded or transformed into motor rifle ones.
Alleged reason was that such formations were considered more mobile, able to better cover territory and better suited for counter insurgency tasks
It simply doesn't worked : they were not so much different from former regiments on that regard, added units had not a real operative significance and above all, when it was implemented the focus had already shifted toward confrontation with the West where concentration and optimization and not instead dispersion and autonomy of forces were deemed necessary.

Leave me time to further elaborate about rank in a successive post .
Suffice here to say that Soviet Russia has never had a professional NCO or warrant officer corp, intermediate ranks between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps came directly from the former and was made just awarding grades to the ones enlisting at the end of conscription period without any particolar schooling while about all the roles that senior NCO usually occupy in the west are reserved for (commissioned) officers.
Pretending to completely change such a structure in few years was not just risky, it was also not respectful and in some cases even cruel toward or a lot of persons.
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.

Conscript soldiers, my pair of ball: Russia has reached actually two thirds of their troops (not including officers) being contract servicemen and conscripts are used only in logistical and non-front line troops.
From Platoon commander up they are all commissioned officiers with a post-graduate degree, so also the not being close to soldier thing is an absolute bullshit.
Same with the Fire over Manoeuvre: in their own artillery battery and battaillon commander's place is in the Forward Observation units, all made up with contract servicemen and NCO while the actual gun units are led by subordinates.

https://www.revistaejercitos.com/2022/01/23/la-artilleria-rusa/
 
Certainly. It is about ranking and command structure in different armed forces.

When in 2008 (after the 080808 war and the decision to consider appesantement with west was not possible anymore) it was decided that armed forces would be throughly reorganized and rearmed the role of MoD was of Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian with no previous noticeable military career.
Its own reform caused a lot of dissension through armed forces, as it was decided to dismiss a lot of surplus officials (as they were in Cadre Units i.e. without most of troops assigned and to be activated after mobilization.
In order to further advance the rationalization effort he also decided to pass to a brigate organized structure, abolishing divisional level of command and in the meantime to revise the ranking system leading toward the formation of a professional (i.e. specifically trained) NCO corp that would took a good part of the roles previously assigned to lowest rank officiers.
Although necessary and rational under a purely economic point of view such decision backfired almost immediately: conservative reaction was strong but it would have not been enough if they would have produced the desired effects but they failed to achieve that.
For what it regard the organic aspect the new Brigates were just Motor Rifle (motostrelzi but it is much more similar to panzergrenadier in its meaning) regiments with a logistical depot and a part of the former divisional and Ad system attached. Former Tank regiments were to disbanded or transformed into motor rifle ones.
Alleged reason was that such formations were considered more mobile, able to better cover territory and better suited for counter insurgency tasks
It simply doesn't worked : they were not so much different from former regiments on that regard, added units had not a real operative significance and above all, when it was implemented the focus had already shifted toward confrontation with the West where concentration and optimization and not instead dispersion and autonomy of forces were deemed necessary.

Leave me time to further elaborate about rank in a successive post .
Suffice here to say that Soviet Russia has never had a professional NCO or warrant officer corp, intermediate ranks between the enlisted personnel and the officer corps came directly from the former and was made just awarding grades to the ones enlisting at the end of conscription period without any particolar schooling while about all the roles that senior NCO usually occupy in the west are reserved for (commissioned) officers.
Pretending to completely change such a structure in few years was not just risky, it was also not respectful and in some cases even cruel toward or a lot of persons.
Certainly attempting to change into a structure w. a NCO corp would take time, and depending on the military culture may not work.

Conscript soldiers, my pair of ball: Russia has reached actually two thirds of their troops (not including officers) being contract servicemen and conscripts are used only in logistical and non-front line troops.
From Platoon commander up they are all commissioned officiers with a post-graduate degree, so also the not being close to soldier thing is an absolute bullshit.
Same with the Fire over Manoeuvre: in their own artillery battery and battaillon commander's place is in the Forward Observation units, all made up with contract servicemen and NCO while the actual gun units are led by subordinates.

https://www.revistaejercitos.com/2022/01/23/la-artilleria-rusa/
Thank you for the update. Interesting knowledge.
 

According to information published by the United States Department of Defense on April 25, 2022, the U.S. State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Ukraine of various rounds of non-standard ammunition for Soviet-made artillery systems and weapons in service with the Ukrainian army for an estimated cost of $165 million.


Army Recognition Global Defense and Security news
 
Basically, a mechanism for the US to buy whatever ammunition the Ukrainian military needs and supply it via FMS. Pretty sure we don't have any way to make most of these items in the US right now so in the near term we'll probably be scrounging around various Third World arms depots to see who has stuff they'll let go of for a premium.
 

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