Army Equipment Modernization Strategy

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http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015-04-09/?s_cid=standto

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Army Equipment Modernization Strategy

What is it?

The Army Equipment Modernization Strategy describes how the Army will modernize equipment to Win in a Complex World. The Army must be equipped to protect the homeland, foster security globally, project power and win. This strategy seeks to simplify systems, maximize reliability and reduce logistical demands and life cycle costs. The Army will invest in and deliver future-force capabilities to maintain overmatch against increasingly capable and determined adversaries. Vital modernization efforts will be balanced with end strength and readiness to mitigate mid-term risk.

What is the Army doing?

The Army Equipment Modernization Strategy nests with the Army Operating Concept to enable leaders to focus resources to maintain strategic and operational flexibility. Equipment modernization allows for an agile and more expeditionary Army to provide globally responsive and regionally engaged forces demonstrating unambiguous resolve. The objectives are to Enhance the Soldier for Broad Joint Mission Support, Enable Mission Command, and Remain Prepared for Joint Combined Arms Maneuver. To achieve these objectives, the Army must adapt current equipment and use commercially available technologies in the near-term (2016-2020) to meet current operational needs. The Army must evolve to increase the expeditionary capabilities of the force and address challenges to overmatch in the mid-term (2021-2029). Finally, the Army must innovate by investment in science and technology for affordable solutions, which provide asymmetrical advantages for the long-term (2030-2045). To mitigate risk in the uncertain fiscal environment, the Army will sustain Science and Technology investments, leverage current fleets, build new only by exception and delay the next generation of platforms until they are affordable.
 
Bigger motor, punchier warhead sought in Army's new long-range missile

Posted: October 23, 2015


The Army believes a new program is needed for
developing a missile that can travel 499 kilometers, just up to the limit of a
landmark, Cold War-era arms control treaty.

That is the conclusion -- somewhat foregone, as a
formal analysis of alternatives is not quite finished -- propagated by key
officials earlier this month at the annual convention of the Association of the
United States Army in Washington. Among the alternatives considered by the
service was restarting production of the Army Tactical Missile System, or
ATACMS, and upgrading it with higher-performing components.

The Lockheed Martin-made weapon is listed by the
Army as having a range of up to 300 kilometers. Service officials recently set
their sights on a missile that can reach targets further away. The thinking is
partly based on the projection that long-distance arms will be crucial to
overcoming the defenses of enemies more militarily powerful than the guerrilla
combatants faced by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"At the end of the day, you can only upgrade a
system so much," said Brig. Gen. Neil Thurgood, the project executive officer
for missiles and space. "Beyond its basic design, the ATACMS has a shape, form,
fit and function, and the laws of physics are just going to take over," he
added. Exactly where the tradeoff lies between motor capacity and warhead size
is a key consideration in missile design, where weight and size represent major
constraints.

"ATACMS has done a great job for what we needed it
to do," Thurgood said. The service now wants to "get out there further" while
still being able to "kill what you need . . . to kill." According to the
impending analysis of alternatives, which is "about to be completed" and
approved by the Pentagon's cost assessment and program evaluation office, the
legacy missile could not be modernized for the new distance requirement, he
said.

Col. Chris Mills, project manager for precision
fire rocket and missile systems, said additional requirements also played a
role in steering the Army toward a completely new program. One of them has to
do with the ability to deploy "more missiles more quickly" to be fired from the
M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, he said.

The upper-range limit of the new missiles is
defined by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987 by U.S.
President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet
Union. The pact forbids the development and fielding of ground-launched weapons
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Washington officials last year accused Russia of
violating the treaty, reportedly because of tests of the R-500 Iskander cruise
missile. The episode had some hawkish Republicans in Congress itching for the
United States to walk away from the agreement.

According to fiscal year 2016 budget documents
published early this year, the Army's analysis of alternatives originally was
to be finished in March. That schedule had the service find two vendors during
FY-16 to compete for design work and risk-reduction studies.

Thurgood characterized the upcoming program as a
"traditional acquisition," inviting industry to ready potential offerings. --
Sebastian Sprenger
 
I blogged about this years ago already

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2009/11/tacair-of-future.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2010/07/first-week-of-peer-vs-peer-air-war.html

I doubt that the published ATACMS range is correct, it's likely a bit longer. The same is almost certainly true for LORA, an Israeli missiles that's military off-the-shelf.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LORA_%28missile%29
http://www.military-today.com/missiles/lora.htm
https://youtu.be/l0I6rLbz_Lc?t=1m32s
http://www.deagel.com/Ballistic-Missiles/LORA_a001920001.aspx
http://missilethreat.com/missiles/lora/
http://defense-update.com/products/l/lora.htm
http://www.iai.co.il/Sip_Storage//FILES/3/41273.pdf

440 kg warhead and 280 or 300 km published range
The real figure with a 500 lbs warhead would likely be in excess of 400 km.
 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/precision-guided-weapons-come-to-the-infantry/?utm_source=WOTR+Newsletter&utm_campaign=a040f8aece-WOTR_Newsletter_8_17_158_15_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8375be81e9-a040f8aece-82917021
 
http://www.army.mil/article/158453/

New type of rocket assisted projectile
 
http://defense-update.com/20151210_perm.html#.Vmo5AP90zMo

Raytheon, IMI to Provide Guided Bombs for Marine Corps Mortars
 
http://www.waaytv.com/redstone_alabama/missiles-helicopters-and-cyber-security-its-been-a-busy-year/article_7327bcbe-a409-11e5-b4c0-4b3d2e0ec73c.html
 
http://www.military.com/video/guns/machine-guns/could-the-bear-replace-the-m4-carbine/1094438436001
 
It sounds like LORA can now be sold as "Combat proven", based on what's happening in Armenia/Azerbaijan.
 
Mind boggling to see the Big Army right back to square one with a Division-centric mindset; I wonder what Gen. Shinseki thinks of it?

DivArty is back by stripping the BCT's, but no organic MLRS like Army 86' or Force XXI...

I do think the incorporation of the Stryker BCT's into the Armored Divisions was a smart move.

The "Penetration Division" is the star of the show with its separate Division Cavalry squadron, 3x ABCT's, and 4 battalions under DivArty with one of them being ERCA equipped. Something to take note of is the Cavalry Squadrons Troops featuring 2 tank and 2 scout platoons like the "good ole' days" i.e. Desert Storm. 1st Cavalry will be the first Penetration Division come 2023.

In comparison to the previous Army after Next studies, the "Objective Force" studies from FCS, and the Marine Corps Enhanced Company Operations/Distributed Operations it is oddly refreshing to see something so "conservative" come out of the Futures Command. Would have love to seen the Armored Cavalry Regiment make a comeback vs the new "Penetration Division" but oh well.
 
It's about time too.
You think so? I'd be curious about your thoughts on the matter.

In light of the Russian "Battalion Tactical Groups" I would have imagined the Army going down a similar rout with a rehash of FCS's Unit of Action and Unit of Employment. Combine the Division and Corps headquarters and attachment functions, and place more trust in Brigade commanders to make decisive actions as needed; especially when fighting degraded without GPS and COMMs being jammed. But no, we're back to Brigades being reliant on higher headquarters for orders and attachments to complete their objectives. More headquarters and staff at every level with a larger chance for those orders to get lost once the Russians start blanketing the whole Theatre with jamming and EW.

If DivArty had a HIMARS or MLSR battalion for the General Support mission, I'd be much more in favor of this new arrangement; at the very least let's get back to eight tubes per artillery battery.
The 101st needs their second Aviation Brigade back too!

Just for fun, here's what the Army of 20 years ago was thinking their future force would look like right about now...

Screen Shot 2021-12-25 at 2.01.32 PM.png

slide_4.jpg
 
blanketing the whole Theatre with jamming and EW.
and indirect fire

w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.
 
In light of the Russian "Battalion Tactical Groups" I would have imagined the Army going down a similar rout with a rehash of FCS's Unit of Action and Unit of Employment.

The BTG has a number of weaknesses which make groups of them unsuitable for fighting divisions.

blanketing the whole Theatre with jamming and EW.
and indirect fire

w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.

One of these disadvantages is poor C2 capabilities requiring maneuver units to co-locate with headquarters personnel in tactical assembly areas so the BTG is quite bad in this respect.

A division isn't a big blob, it's the HQ capacity to coordinate and sustain multiple maneuver units, which the current Russian army sorely lacks.
 
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In light of the Russian "Battalion Tactical Groups" I would have imagined the Army going down a similar rout with a rehash of FCS's Unit of Action and Unit of Employment.

The BTG has a number of weaknesses which make groups of them unsuitable for fighting divisions.

blanketing the whole Theatre with jamming and EW.
and indirect fire

w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.

One of these disadvantages is poor C2 capabilities requiring maneuver units to co-locate with headquarters personnel in tactical assembly areas so the BTG is quite bad in this respect.
What is your proof of such requirements?

Even post Soviet Russian C2 networks are not as necessary as Western Armies.. Ops are quite preset...do or die direction pre planning according ops in Georgia and Leavenworth's understanding of their doctrine. That may be a disadvantage, but in high tempo ops, a culmination point may be reached before any Western tricks unfurl.

They are quite aware of Western dependance on PGMs and therefore are likely to disperse. (Of, course abandoning the A-10 will limit that capabilty. Ironically, the Army continues to push Jointness in doctrine while the AF abandons them.)

Every formation a Recon/Strike complex. They saturate the zone w/ Recon/Strike and react/swarm to contact or not as needed. Locally outnumbering Western armies is assumed and plays into this tactic as seen in Georgia. The Russian dominance in UAS numbers around 2028 certainly assists this reaction. Ukraine has proven UAS assisted recon/Strike out for the Russians. Even adhoc reactions to contact are rehearsed uncreative drills. There is little respect for creative cdrs in the Russian army.
A division isn't a big blob, it's the HQ capacity to coordinate and sustain multiple maneuver units, which the current Russian army sorely lacks.
If one is tied to the same old formations one is not forcing modularization and dispersion like USMC into the mind of every plt and above. Blob tgts will then happen.

Even if the Russians can not coordinate for change very well, they beleive it will be over before they need to.
 
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Even post Soviet Russian C2 networks are not as necessary as Western Armies...

And this is fine if you intend to mirror very real Russian weaknesses. But buzzwords like "high tempo ops," "every formation a recon/strike complex," and "swarming" are quite information- and support-intensive if you don't.

Even if the Russians can not coordinate for change very well, they beleive it will be over before they need to.

Yes, this is the cruz of the matter. Realistically the bulk of the US Army is never going to be able to react fast enough to prevent a fait accompli grab, yet its probably the only military on the planet capable of dislodging one once it happens. The choice would seem to be making the Army a giant rapid-reaction force (historically this has worked out well!) or optimizing it to take advantage of its near-term advantages.
 
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Even post Soviet Russian C2 networks are not as necessary as Western Armies...

And this is fine if you intend to mirror very real Russian weaknesses. But buzzwords like "high tempo ops," "every formation a recon/strike complex," and "swarming" are quite information- and support-intensive if you don't.
Whether degraded comms are a disadvantage to Western or Eastern Armies is yet to be determined.

There would not appear to a difference between "high tempo ops," and a fait accompli grab. Recon/strike complexes has been part of the Soviet and now Russian doctrine so well defined in their own writing for sometime. The Chinese used dismounted swarm tactics against the US in the Korean war ie not buzzwords but practiced.
Even if the Russians can not coordinate for change very well, they beleive it will be over before they need to.

Yes, this is the cruz of the matter. Realistically the bulk of the US Army is never going to be able to react fast enough to prevent a fait accompli grab, yet its probably the only military on the planet capable of dislodging one once it happens. The choice would seem to be making the Army a giant rapid-reaction force (historically this has worked out well!) or optimizing it to take advantage of its near-term advantages.
Counter anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ie dislodgement will apparently be the Army's job as the USMC seems to have forsaken it. Both the USA and USMC dispersed early access and dispersed "penetration" holds extreme risk of encirclement and defeat in detail. The Russians plan the same dispersed "penetration" in the form of saturating the zone w/ variously capable Spetsnaz/ambush/recon troops from Bn to Army Group Level especially to hunt long rg miisiles like they had planned to hunt Pershing IIs.

The USA might better plan on 'delay and push back' like the Warsaw Pact days rather "Penetration" ops, but of course that can not be publicly stated as it is appears passive.
 
w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.

Both the USA and USMC dispersed early access and dispersed "penetration" holds extreme risk of encirclement and defeat in detail

This is a real headscratcher. Perhaps there should be multiple echelons to ensure some kind of coordination between dispersed units?

Everybody knows the advantages of the Russian military and that buzzwords are practiced to some extent - in fact, as your Korean example illustrates they often obscure very old problems. But they also have serious weaknesses and as currently organized are hardly the paradigm of 21st century firepower and survivability.

The main problem they face is the lack of qualified personnel to fill out the combat arms, let alone supporting echelons. This particularly affects their high-end systems, but it also means current Russian formations are more prone to defeat in detail due to limited coordination, especially in maneuver, poor logistics, and a general lack of resiliency.

This is fine when providing occasional heavy support to proxy forces but the likelihood is that Russia will revive the divisional command level themselves as the risk of direct confrontation with NATO increases.
 
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w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.

Both the USA and USMC dispersed early access and dispersed "penetration" holds extreme risk of encirclement and defeat in detail

This is a real headscratcher. Perhaps there should be multiple echelons to ensure some kind of coordination between dispersed units?
Satcom works for dispersed units. The WWII German "Wandering Pockets" seemed to operate in a dispersed environment.
Everybody knows the advantages of the Russian military and that buzzwords are practiced to some extent - in fact, as your Korean example illustrates they often obscure very old problems. But they also have serious weaknesses and as currently organized are hardly the paradigm of 21st century firepower and survivability.
Buzzwords do not apply, and exercises are large and apparently often, so what defiencies ..classified.
The main problem they face is the lack of qualified personnel to fill out the combat arms, let alone supporting echelons. This particularly affects their high-end systems, but it also means current Russian formations are more prone to defeat in detail due to limited coordination, especially in maneuver, poor logistics, and a general lack of resiliency.
Ones doctrine should not be a reflection of potentially transient characteristics and weaknesses. The USArmy is going backward because it appears to be fearful of next generation capabilty.

Likwise, never underestimate an adversary especially the PLA.
This is fine when providing occasional heavy support to proxy forces but the likelihood is that Russia will revive the divisional command level themselves as the risk of direct confrontation with NATO increases.
The bloated, highly officer heavy, "Prussian High Cmd" organization needs to evolve to a more operational independant concept including logistics and LOC security to a low echelon. Utilize one's terrian awareness to exploit maneuver success where it unfurls with modular reinforcement..
 
Have not been able to find literature on them so further references would be appreciated. Wandering Pockets were a Eastern Front characterization and independance was largely forced by the Russian on the Germans, yes

Von Manstein was genius in the active withdrawal though.


As a military advisor to the West German government in the mid-1950s, he helped re-establish the armed forces.
 
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w/o a dispersed indirect fire APS or DEW more like a "pummeled" Armored Div. large units present big tgts.

Both the USA and USMC dispersed early access and dispersed "penetration" holds extreme risk of encirclement and defeat in detail

This is a real headscratcher. Perhaps there should be multiple echelons to ensure some kind of coordination between dispersed units?
Satcom works for dispersed units. The WWII German "Wandering Pockets" seemed to operate in a dispersed environment.

Germany lost WW2 so I don't know how much credibility they have TBF.

Have not been able to find literature on them so further references would be appreciated. Wandering Pockets were a Eastern Front characterization and independance was largely forced by the Russian on the Germans, yes

Von Manstein was genius in the active withdrawal though.


As a military advisor to the West German government in the mid-1950s, he helped re-establish the armed forces.

Yeah he was good at losing I suppose.
 

Very much worth a listen..
implied is NATO will be in fall back position for a least the first mnth and Russian IADS will prevent any necessary NATO aircover (a high NATO dependance, commentor mentions dependance on ISR and that Predator class and wide bodies {JTARS,AWACS} are not survivable) from gaining a foothold for a mnth. Therefore the Penetration Armor Div concept is .... NATO will by default survive in Wandering Pockets and the German experience in WWII should be studied as it was during the Warsaw Pact "overwhelming" days.

The commentator claims Russian operational ambition is only 150km as they are push logistics and armor hvy dependant. Likely, pull logistics is a bit harder for them, but no great shakes.

A commentator expresses rightly they know what NATO wants them to do, so they wont do that so...Paris and Brussels not Warsaw.. The commentors do not address all the whld vehicles of late being produced in Russia. It is hard to beleive these are all for export. European tarbound roads improve by the day...Yes?
 
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