Current Nuclear Weapons Development

That is is nothing new. What would be new is the U.S. green lighting it.

New statement indicating normalization of relations with Israel is a requirement, which is a dealbreaker for both sides. So best to wait and see if the deal for the KSA to develop nuclear capability goes forward.
 
Gessler said:
I think what this shows more than anything is the slow acceptance of the fact that Iran is eventually going to nuclearize, despite everything.

Planning for a MidEast with a nuclear-armed Iran, giving the Saudis a roadmap to acquire their own deterrence to counterbalance Tehran is probably par for course at this point.
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You mean a roadmap for the Saudis to announce as a nuclear nation, they've had access to a small handful of Pakistan-made nukes in exchange for partially funding the Pakistani program.
 
Scott Kenny said:
You mean a roadmap for the Saudis to announce as a nuclear nation, they've had access to a small handful of Pakistan-made nukes in exchange for partially funding the Pakistani program.
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So it is said, but there's too much ambiguity in that arrangement.

It might have worked for a while as an implicit threat discouraging nuclearization in the region, but assuming Iran does end up obtaining nuclear weapons capability, it's a different conversation altogether. Looking at it from a Saudi perspective, I'm not sure if I'd be okay with a handful of borrowed nukes where there can be ambiguity regarding how much control I actually have over their use (or over the Chinese-bought DF-3As with which I'll have to mate these warheads, a process where I may or may not have to involve the Chinese. More ambiguity).

Not to mention, there's a fair degree of ambiguity even in a traditional umbrella agreement. If Pakistan has to promise that they'll nuke Iran if Iran nukes KSA, that would involve Pakistan having to entertain the thought of Iran potentially nuking most of the important Pakistani countervalue targets in response. Getting nuked over an Iran-KSA war while leaving India unscathed is a nightmare scenario for Islamabad, and runs counter to the entire South Asian equation, and counter to their own self-interest. It's much more likely that they will pressurize KSA to submit to Iran's will, rather than engage in nuclear brinkmanship that might risk their own destruction while leaving their primary adversary (India) fully intact.

If I was Saudi, I wouldn't really trust the Pakistanis to go through with any such pinky-promise of nuking Iran when the chips are really down. I'd very much want nukes (and delivery systems) over which I have total, sovereign control. No room for ambiguity.

I've used the word 'ambiguity' more times than I would like but there you have it.

NMaude said:
Given that SA is full Wahabi fanatics giving them such nuclear-technology is a bad idea (No doubt giving the IDF leadership pink fits).
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True, but if the decision was to either enable the Saudis to enrich under US monitoring or to let them go to China/Russia for an under-the-table deal, it's not hard to imagine why US might go through with it.

That said, it seems they're now saying KSA needs to recognize Israel in order for the deal to go through:

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwye71yq8wwo

I reckon there's still to be many flip-flops. Nothing is set in stone yet.
 
Gessler said:
So it is said, but there's too much ambiguity in that arrangement.
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My mental model for how that works is that there are some Saudi pilots and aircraft tasked with the mission, "taking a vacation" in wonderful Islamabad.

If it doesn't work like that, then you're absolutely correct that the situation is messy.



EmoBirb said:
Eh, wahabi fanatics, zionist fanatics, capitalist fanatics, socialist fanatics.

It all balances out. A world of nuclear proliferation is arguably a safer world.
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Nuclear proliferation only increases safety while people who do not look forward to dying for their cause are in possession of the nukes.

As soon as you have people who believe that they win by dying, kaboom.
 
I was hoping for S. Korea, Japan and Australia (Columbus Class #13 & 14 for the Aussies) maybe some day ;)

USJAK Pacific Nuclear Alliance

Ps pronounced “us-jack”
 
Scott Kenny said:
Nuclear proliferation only increases safety while people who do not look forward to dying for their cause are in possession of the nukes.

As soon as you have people who believe that they win by dying, kaboom.
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Plenty of people in high positions in the US, China, Russia etc. who would consider dying to achieve their overarching national goals as worthwhile. The concept of self sacrifice to achieve a goal is a universal concept.

Nuclear Saudi Arabia is by no means scarier than nuclear Pakistan, or Israel or the United States even. At least with the Saudis, as with the DPRK, one can make the argument that a very strong government structure makes instability and internal strife highly unlikely.

Nuclear exceptionalism is a disease, because if followed through, nobody can be trusted with nuclear weapons. And most proponents would never admit that it would be better for the world if they were to denuclearize as well.
 
SUPER=BUG said:
Getting China to agree is also pretty simple. In fact, all it would take is for Russia and the US to reduce their nuclear weapons to China's current level. I guess that might be even harder.
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Never going to happen. Only an idiot would be happy with your enemy being allowed to have twice as many warheads as you by treaty.
 
Scott Kenny said:
As I understand it, the outer tamper of a megaton-class thermonuclear weapon is best made from Uranium. U238, in fact. You use Pu239 in the fission primary to squeeze the fusion into ignition, and then the outer tamper gets converted from U238->Pu239 through the usual transformation under neutron bombardment from the primary and secondary before it is inertially compressed to supercritical and goes KABOOM.

TLDR?

Uranium is good for making really big booms.
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Yep. Tsar Bomba used a lead tamper to limit the yield. Also the difference in mods of W87. The normal one at 300kt could have an additional sleeve of U238 added to bump the yield to 475kt but I don't know that that variant was ever deployed.

"The warhead yield can be upgraded from 300 Kt to 475 Kt by adding rings or a sleeve of oralloy (highly enriched uranium) to the second stage. This probably entails replacing depleted uranium rings used in a cylindrical fusion tamper so that less energetic neutrons can produce additional fission."
 
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Sferrin said:
Yep. Tsar Bomba used a lead tamper to limit the yield.
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It had a 100MT design yield that was derated to 50MT for the test (A few Tsar Bombas were built but they used the derated yield) and as it was the Tu-95 that dropped it almost got swatted out of the sky by the blast (IIRC it was permanently grounded due to the structural damage its' airframe suffered, I hope it has been preserved in a museum).​
 
Sferrin said:
Never going to happen. Only an idiot would be happy with your enemy being allowed to have twice as many warheads as you by treaty.
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It'll happen naturally, just at a higher bar.
Hopefully, the current one.
 
China thinks it can simply out produce the U.S. and will not settle for anything less than near parity. The U.S. probably has enough dead cat bounce left to upload its existing delivery systems well beyond current. It might perhaps revive its nuclear industry if a Chinese build up is sustained, which seems likely.

So I expect good old fashioned arms race, where Russia is simply left behind by China and the U.S.
 
Well, it will all come down to details.

But what I read suggests increasing the risk of nuclear war, by extending the Deterrent's 'cover' to include Ukraine.......which has an active war on it's territory.
Which is a bad idea.
 
zen said:
Well that would play into certain hands!
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To certain hands which definitely, absolutely, certainly aren't small by any measure. Actually, they're tremendously big. Some would even say yuge!

On a more serious tone, the EU would probably not allow access to the single market without freedom of movement under any condition, so the whole point is moot.
 
Maybe in the future they will have nuclear warheads that will enter the earth at high speed from a high altitude in order to cause an underground nuclear explosion in order to create earthquakes and reduce radiation.
 
UK wants to re-establish HEU fuel production, supppsedly £1.5 billion allocated. This for AUKUS reactor fuel and existing HEU stocks refinement out of decay products, to new weapons grade fuel which becomes possible once that facility be established.

Germany has IP (Urenco) and money.....
If it wants to help, there is the obvious way.

The more tricky part would be a land based ballistic missile using Astrea. Not in engineering or design terms, but US nuclear entanglement.
A missile of similar range capability to Trident is possible at various numbers of RVs lofted.

That said a new RV to carry the package is also possible....

But UK domestication isn't German interest if their providing funds. They'd want workshare and that means sharing technology......Which 'maybe' impossible as previous efforts to separate out UK and US IP has sort of proven.

What UK can offer is production/maintenance of warheads through scaling up and a potential alternative to US dual key weapons under NATO command.
Resurrection options be WE.177 manufacturing or TASSM warhead that was cancelled in the 90's.

Longer term a new, UK only warhead is possible, but staff needs scaling up in any of these scenarios and industry brought into the pipeline.
Some of that could be German......

What Germany might think ot can do is bring UK and FR together on a European industrial pipeline of components.....

Overly ambitious and frought with problems that make a UK-BRD relationship much more achievable.

Sorry Germany, it's us or the French probably never both.
 
I’ll have to put this here as the dedicated Sarmat thread on here appears to be locked.

From B. Hendrickx on NSF:

  • Authorities in the Tyumen region in western Siberia have published a rocket stage impact warning for a launch on 3 September (with 4 September given as a back-up date). No further details are given. The zone in question has earlier been used for launches of the UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19 Mod 2 "Stiletto") from Dombarovskiy. The last time it was announced was in December 2018, when the missile was used to launch the nuclear-capable Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

    Indications are that it is also used by the first stage of the Sarmat ICBM (although it wasn't publicly announced for the Sarmat launches from Dombarovsky in November 2025 and May 2026). This can be inferred from NOTAMs published for these launches as well as an environmental impact assessment report discussed earlier in this thread. So the most likely candidate for the upcoming launch would appear to be Sarmat. Incidentally, Sarmat is reportedly also intended to launch Avangard vehicles.

    The launch comes just a few days after that of a Yars ICBM from Plesetsk. Both Sarmat and Yars were also launched last May (with a 9-day interval) as part of a large-scale Russian nuclear drill.
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bobbymike said:
https://newsreleases.sandia.gov/atr...KdKg2xDKnFX6FdgVWg_aem_xVG2tq-OnWTURQbGn7RHDg
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Here's the first three paragraphs:

Sounding rocket test helps design components for new weapon system​

Publication Date:AUGUST 31, 2026

The Atrax sounding rocket test at Sandia National Laboratories’ Kauai Test Facility is providing valuable environmental data that will help with the design of nonnuclear components for the W93, which is under development.
​
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — A sounding rocket flight test is giving engineers at Sandia National Laboratories real-world reentry vibration data they can use to improve modeling and help drive nonnuclear component designs for the United States’ first new nuclear weapon under development in nearly 30 years.


“The Atrax sounding rocket flight test is helping us improve credibility and confidence in our modeling and simulation tools in preparation for the W93 warhead,” said Ross Wagnild, an aerospace engineer at Sandia. “Getting confidence in our toolset earlier allows more time to inform the design of components.”

Engineers and scientists are developing the W93 warhead for the sea-based leg of the triad, alongside a reentry vehicle that safeguards and carries the warhead to its target.​
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This work is being used in the development of the W93/Mk7

W93/MK7 ACQUISITION PROGRAM

OVERVIEW

The W93 is a new program of record being established to meet requirements set by the DoD. The Navy’s ballistic missile submarine force is the most survivable leg of the Triad and is currently equipped with two warhead types: the W76 and W88. These warheads provide approximately two-thirds of the total U.S. deployed force. The W93 will reduce current over-reliance on the W76 system and will allow the U.S. to keep pace with future adversary threats.
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