Might be similar in design to a Gen IV gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor then. They encapsulate the fuel in something possibly quite similar to the proposed graphite shells used in those and harden or cover the outer layers to deal with the airflow.
Not really. A nuclear jet needs no adaptation to different atmospheres, as long as the external atmospheric pressures are the same.
Just look how many US allies and military bases are in close proximity of Russia. Potentially - POTENTIALLY - their territories could be used to deploy first-strike capabilities against Russia. And there are no Russia allies in the same proximity of USA.
Well, the Russian fear of such attack crystallized in late 1990-early 2000s, after Yugoslavia and Iraq wars demonstrated, how devastatingly efficient could be a sudden massive attack with stealth bombers, cruise missiles, ect. And it's NOT merely "elite's fears". It's basically a well-entrenched fear of "sudden invasion" amongst the general population too.
The problem is that Russia is vulnerable to a conventional first strike as well, with their bulk of nuclear forces being TELs which are not deployed all the time during peacetime. The Russian silos are also a tempting first-strike targets since they have heavily MIRVed SS-18s. A single Ohio could potential take out most of the Russian silos.
That is an unrealistic view of the U.S., but I will not begrudge a country its security concerns.
Its not whether its a realistic vulnerability, its whether Russia believes it is.
Exactly. For historical example - all Cold War US military feared the possibility of sudden Soviet nuclear attack against US nuclear forces. There were never coherent reasoning why USSR might want to do that - at most, some mumbling about "Soviet leadership just might be hell-bent on spreading Communism, because, well, they are communists, and Lenin wrote something about world revolution" - but the US military feared such technical possibility enough to took drastic measures to ensure retaliation capability.
But what's the big difference in intercept difficulty between that and the 5500km-ranged Kh-102?
Is it definitely closed cycle?
GMTI satellites will render mobile launchers irrelevant before the end of this decade.
The fact that it is easier to track the takeoff of a strategic bomber than the launch of a cruise missile from the ground of intercontinental range
Fully agree!
To get to MAYBE using this monstrosity for flying through extraterrestrial atmospheres from its current purpose and intent (Ntm the pace of space exploration) is the distance from earth to the galactic core.
Not really, it needs a conventional rocket booster to take off, which gives a nice thermal plume and it shows up on GMTI satellite surveillance.
That seems like a dubious assertion. The U.S. was detecting Scud launches in 1991 and now will orbit a couple dozen LEO IR tracking satellites within months. It hardly seems assured the booster launch event would go unobserved and unrecognized for what it is, even if the reactor itself manages to suppress or redirect its waste heat.
The booster launch could easily be hide behind multiple decoys. It's merely a cruise missile launch booster; not the ICBM/SLBM first stage. Small solid rocket, not very powerful, and burning only for a few seconds on low altitude. A thousand old boosters, slated to decommission, could be shot per each real "Burevestnik", to confuse satellite systems. Cloud cover & smoke screens also could be considered. And the booster itself could be made less detectable (sure, it would reduce its efficiently... but who cares, as long as its enough to do the job?)
IOW it's a single shot bomber. And one with multiple shots is... SLAM/PLUTO! Well at least it doesn't spew a trail of rads behind the butt-end.
To be exact, you win by forcing your opponent not to start it. So the idea of pre-launched missile patrolling over Arctic - for days, or weeks, if required - could be a viable last-moment deterrence.
That's the interesting thing about nuclear-powered missiles; they could be launched & stay in air as "death hand" solution. The enemy would be forced to consider the possibility, that even if he sucseed completely in his first strike, the pre-launched missiles would still hit him after their pre-set waiting period would be over. And even if the enemy would force you to surrender, he just can't be sure that you would be able to cancel the pre-launched strike; what if the enemy attacks killed anyone who have the right codes, and surrendering survivors just can't do anything to stop the retaliation? Such considerations make sucsessfull first attack even more complicated, even less likely to sucseed.
A good analysis, yep!
Apparently such capability exists, it was officially reported.
It is technically possible of course; Tomahawk blk4 has had a satellite link to allow alternate pre loaded targets to be selected or even new GpS coordinates loaded for ever a decade. But the U.S. at least trusts no external connections for its nuclear weapons; even GPS is not used (b61-mod12/13 are INS only and retain an unguided spin stabilized mode). I would be a little surprised if Russia opted for such given its incredibly junior position in satellite coverage compared to the PRC and U.S.; it seems more like a path to interference rather than a strength.
Thank you!
Time to target doesn't seem like much of an issue for Poseidon, given that in time of heightened tension it can be 'ejected' by a submarine close to enemy controlled waters and lurk there or even remain dormant. Possibly waiting for a signal being broadcasted that either then sends it off to its merry, pre-determined, way to it's target or recalls it to be recovered and reused if tensions eased again. I wouldn't be surprised if Poseidon has several ways of homing in on tactical and strategic targets via noise and electromagnetic emissions among other things. I certainly expect such a weapon to have redundancy and clever ways to find targets, given that it's a late 2010s design and not another re-warmed cold war relic. I wouldn't go as far as claiming AI guidance, as I've seen others theorize online. Certainly not with a nuclear device.
Well, the MX were supposed to have some in-flight re-targeting capability, so apparently it wasn't ironclad rule - merely the desire to reduce the chances for external interference.
