Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP, Victoria-class replacement)

With a 60 million CAD estimated cost, the RCN is proposing conventional subs. This sounds low to me considering the Australian Attack Class SSK program was going to cost 90 million AUD for 12 boats.

If the Canadian govt actually funds this, I think Naval Group would be in a strong position to win the bid. Production of the first few boats would most likely need to happen in France if the RCN doesn’t want to have a capability gap if domestic production is part of the plan.
 
Babcock and HHI sign a technical cooperation agreement for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project

https://www.navalnews.com/event-new...nt-for-the-canadian-patrol-submarine-project/
Click to expand...

When they were Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., LTD., Hanwa helped build 2 of the 3 Batch I KSS-III submarines (SK-modified Type 214 subs) and will build a similar number of improved Batch II subs (6 planned).

Hanwa and HHI (Hyundai Heavy Industries) jointly designed the KSS-III in co-operation with HDW.

So Canada does seem to have a viable industrial design team available.
 
news.usni.org

Canada Announces Plan to Buy 12 Under Ice Submarines - USNI News

With the high-profile backdrop of the NATO summit in Washington, D.C., Canada announced it will acquire 12 conventionally-powered submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy. The announcement does not come as a surprise, as the government formally established the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project...
news.usni.org news.usni.org

www.telegraph.co.uk

Canada says it will get a powerful under-ice sub force. Its money isn’t where its mouth is

It’s a sensible plan, but basically unfunded
www.telegraph.co.uk www.telegraph.co.uk
 
Initially it seemed like the focus lied on the competition between the Korean and Japanese offer, but now it actually seems like the German-Norwegian 212CD is in front of the pact both capability-wise and politics-wise. Iirc there's a new arctic defence agreement in place and the 212CD itself is intended for such role. Further, the German MoD putting new interest in arctic operations, and arctic operations is always mentioned with the RCN submarine missioms, apart from specops support and deployment to far-east.
 
Maro.Kyo said:
... Iirc there's a new arctic defence agreement in place and the 212CD itself is intended for such role...
Click to expand...

Not really. In May 2024, Boris Pistorius visited Ottawa. There, Pistorius floated the vague notion of a "trilateralen strategischen maritimen Partnerschaft" for Germany, Norway, and Canada. Canadian MND Bill Blair was non-committal (other than in ensuring delivery of IRIS-T rounds for Ukraine). But, its also important to know that the Minister of National Defence is a comparatively minor Cabinet posting in Canada.

I'm curious as to what you intended when saying that the Typ 212CD was "intended for such role". Did you mean that the 212CD was to be a patrol submarine or that it was designed for extended under-ice operations?
 
I'd want both AIP and lithium batteries for under ice ops in a conventional sub, able to spend 4 weeks or more submerged. Nuclear power greatly preferred up there.

And in general I'd rather have Stirling engines that burn diesel than hydrogen fuel cells. Because working with hydrogen sucks that much.
 
Apophenia said:
Not really. In May 2024, Boris Pistorius visited Ottawa. There, Pistorius floated the vague notion of a "trilateralen strategischen maritimen Partnerschaft" for Germany, Norway, and Canada. Canadian MND Bill Blair was non-committal (other than in ensuring delivery of IRIS-T rounds for Ukraine). But, its also important to know that the Minister of National Defence is a comparatively minor Cabinet posting in Canada.

I'm curious as to what you intended when saying that the Typ 212CD was "intended for such role". Did you mean that the 212CD was to be a patrol submarine or that it was designed for extended under-ice operations?
Click to expand...
Thanks for the clarification.

As for your question, it's the latter I'm trying to say.
 
Scott Kenny said:
And in general I'd rather have Stirling engines that burn diesel than hydrogen fuel cells. Because working with hydrogen sucks that much.
Click to expand...
Scott Kenny said:
Japan has found them enough of a game changer that they ripped out the AIP systems from the last couple of Soryu class boats and replaced that space with more lithium batteries, in addition to replacing all the lead-acid batteries with lithium. I believe that they are using a spaced cell system with individual cell temperature monitoring and at least mass cell cooling.

Faster to recharge, and potentially traveling farther between charges as well.

But for under ice operations like Canada needs, I'd require some flavor of AIP if not nuke power. I personally prefer Stirling engines over hydrogen fuel cells even though the Stirling engines aren't as quiet. I hate working with hydrogen.
Click to expand...
Before you continue, I should encourage you to look a bit further into why Japan opted to remove stirling AIP all-together in favor of going all-Li-ion. If anything, FCs, be it hydrogen or any other substance (with reformer if need) is vastly superior to stirling engines, or any kind of AIP that involves combustion under water. It causes much more operational limitation than that caused by any hydrogen system. This is especially true for JMSDF operating enviroment and their submarine forces' CONOPs. There's a reason why basically every single AIP builders are going the fuel-cell way instead of burning something under water. Case in point, NG also pivoted from their MESMA to FC-2G.

I'd agree that H2 kinda sucks, mostly because of all the pain with the storage and especially the storage density, but I don't think that makes stirling any better. If anything, it is still a vastly worse solution for submarine AIP applications.
 
Maro.Kyo said:
Before you continue, I should encourage you to look a bit further into why Japan opted to remove stirling AIP all-together in favor of going all-Li-ion. If anything, FCs, be it hydrogen or any other substance (with reformer if need) is vastly superior to stirling engines, or any kind of AIP that involves combustion under water. It causes much more operational limitation than that caused by any hydrogen system. This is especially true for JMSDF operating enviroment and their submarine forces' CONOPs. There's a reason why basically every single AIP builders are going the fuel-cell way instead of burning something under water. Case in point, NG also pivoted from their MESMA to FC-2G.

I'd agree that H2 kinda sucks, mostly because of all the pain with the storage and especially the storage density, but I don't think that makes stirling any better. If anything, it is still a vastly worse solution for submarine AIP applications.
Click to expand...
Stirling means you carry liquid oxygen, usually. Though these days I'd use Nytrox, N20+LOx, because it's liquid at much higher temperatures and that means you can use larger tanks with less insulation for the same external size. IIRC the Stirling engines recycle their exhaust, adding boiled gaseous oxygen to it until the engine is running at sea pressure, to make it trivial to push the exhaust overboard.

H2 is freaking dangerous to work with. Charging the (lead-acid) batteries on an Ohio? No smoking allowed anywhere in the ship. Not even in the aft smoke pit in the engine room! And we had hydrogen gas detectors that alarmed everywhere.
 
Scott Kenny said:
IIRC the Stirling engines recycle their exhaust, adding boiled gaseous oxygen to it until the engine is running at sea pressure, to make it trivial to push the exhaust overboard.

H2 is freaking dangerous to work with. Charging the (lead-acid) batteries on an Ohio? No smoking allowed anywhere in the ship. Not even in the aft smoke pit in the engine room! And we had hydrogen gas detectors that alarmed everywhere.
Click to expand...

If you really believe it is "trivial", you really areb't in the know. The reason JMSDF ditched the Stirling AIP, that I've mentioned above, is exactly because of this exhaust problem, coupled eith power density problem.

Also, regardless of if you like it or not, a lot of the navies out there are adopting hydrogen PEM FC, because it works. Not to add it is not really convincing to compare lead-acid batteries potentially generating hydrogen to stored hydrogen within storage tank purposefully designed for that purpose.
 
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Not sure how I missed this.
Maro.Kyo said:
If you really believe it is "trivial", you really areb't in the know. The reason JMSDF ditched the Stirling AIP, that I've mentioned above, is exactly because of this exhaust problem, coupled eith power density problem.

Also, regardless of if you like it or not, a lot of the navies out there are adopting hydrogen PEM FC, because it works. Not to add it is not really convincing to compare lead-acid batteries potentially generating hydrogen to stored hydrogen within storage tank purposefully designed for that purpose.
Click to expand...
There's more than a little difference in the amount of H2 produced when charging batteries versus the amount that will leak out of a megaliter H2 tank...
 
Apologies for the bit of a necro but I thought it would be appropriate to share relevant information provided by the September 2024 RFI released by the Canadian Govt for the CPSP.

Please excuse the many quotes and long post but the RFI is 31 pages, so I will split the quotes up somewhat regarding their relevancy to each other. If you are not interested in reading the entire post here, here is my summary of some important points.

CPS will have the contract awarded by 2028, delivery of first submarine no later than 2035 and initial operational capability achieved no later than 2037.

Respondents to the RFI must have an in-production submarine or an in-service submarine alongside the capability to deliver no later than 2035.

Requirement of 6 simultaneously operational submarines.

Endurance minimum of 7000nm at 8kts & minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations on station. Minimal capability of 60 days self-sustained operation.
Ability to use heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Will operate near and in ice, with potential to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

Core crew of no more than 40 personnel, must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel in permanent bunks.

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) assesses that the most efficient means to procure a replacement fleet is to pursue foreign built Military off-the-Shelf (MOTS) submarines that meet Canada’s requirements. However, Canada wishes to receive information on how partnerships with Canadian industry could be leveraged to include Canadian technology and industrial capacity/capability in submarine production, including opportunities and risks. The CPSP will leverage Canadian industrial capacity/capability and create economic benefits in Canada through the life of the submarine, as appropriate, by requiring that in-service support over the life cycle of the fleet be done in Canada.

The following is the potential scope of work of CPSP:

a) Acquisition of submarines and systems that have all required capabilities and meet the HLMRs (High Level Mandatory Requirements);
b) Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), including publications, maintenance plans, sparing, training and training systems and simulators;
c) In-Service Support (ISS), including 3rd line maintenance; and
d) Infrastructure that may be required to support platform and systems.

CPSP has set target dates for critical milestones that will be necessary to ensure the first Canadian Patrol Submarine (CPS) are delivered before the VCS fleet is retired. The CPSP targeted milestones are:

  • Contract Award -Commence Acquisition Implementation in 2028
  • Delivery of first replacement submarine no later than 2035
  • Achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) no later than 2037
  • Achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) (TBD)
Click to expand...

Draft High Level Mandatory Requirements

HLMR #1 - Urgency, Availability, and Sustainment

Ability to deliver submarine, maintenance facilities and training systems to achieve Initial Operating Capability no later than 2037.

Explanation: The anticipated reduced availability of the VCS will directly impact force generation and the production of key qualifications within the submarine force. To avoid a capability gap and to ensure that crews can be generated as the CPS fleet is delivered the requirement is to have the first of class CPS delivered no later than 2035. IOC is defined as the first CPS being fully operational with requisite infrastructure and In-Service-Support in place.

HLMR #2 – Fleet Size

Ability to perform lines of tasking as follows: 3 submarines for continental defence/global deployment, 3 submarines for national and international exercises and force generation simultaneously.

Explanation: In accordance with ONSAF, CPSP is exploring the renewal and expansion of the CAF’s submarine fleet to enable the RCN to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines. The CPS fleet size must be sufficient to complete assigned missions and roles throughout its service life. In order to achieve 6 simultaneously operational submarines as described above, it is acknowledged that the total fleet size must be larger to accommodate submarines in various levels of maintenance.

HLMR #3 – Endurance and Persistence

Ability to operate discretely without external support for minimum transits of 7000nm (2x 3500nm) at 8kts, and a minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations while on station. Capable of no less than 60 days self-sustained operation.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of conducting continental defence missions including Arctic patrols from home ports in Halifax and Esquimalt. The absence of support facilities in the Arctic mean that the submarine must be able to conduct such patrols unsupported.

HLMR #4 – Lethality

Ability to perform precision attacks to include the use of the following weapons systems: heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of detecting, targeting, engaging, and destroying threats, both at sea (surface and subsurface) and ashore. To achieve this, the CPS must be capable of carrying and employing an appropriate combination of sensors and weapons to detect and deter maritime threats, control Canada’s maritime approaches, and hold distant adversaries at risk with the capability to project power ashore.

HLMR #5 – Operating Environment

Ability to operate worldwide throughout the year, both by day and by night, in temperatures ranging from tropical to Arctic. Ability to operate near, in and if necessary, under ice (for limited periods of time).

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of global deployment. Arctic operations will predominantly take place within navigable waters, which are expected to expand in the coming decades. CPS will operate near and in ice, and on occasion, will be required to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

HLMR #6 – Environmental Compliance

Ability to operate in compliance with the environmental regulations in all areas of operation, including the Arctic.

HLMR #7 – Crew Size

Ability to minimize crew size using automation and remote monitoring.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to be operated with a core crew of no more than 40 personnel. In addition, the submarine must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel (riders) in permanent bunks.

HLMR #8 – Survivability (Stealth)

Ability to operate in contested environments while maintaining tactical advantage with low acoustic (passive and active), magnetic, and Infrared (IR) signatures to prevent counter-detection.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to maintain tactical advantage over new and developing detection systems including airborne magnetic anomaly detection, electric field detection and acoustic detection through reduced signature and low target echo strength. Stealth should also be enabled by operational signature management that allows the submarine to manage its signature to meet operational conditions.

HLMR #9 – Interoperability

Ability to communicate and share information and data within mission frameworks utilizing high-assurance cryptographic capabilities (algorithms and protocols) compliant with the US Crypto Modernization Program to ensure a high degree of security for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of data and information flow with organizations, submarines, systems and applications necessary to complete its missions. This includes all aspects of being able to work with others in a robust, secure and sustainable manner, both integrated and networked. More specifically, it includes regulatory compliance and standardization to ensure operational and tactical interoperability.

HLMR #10 – GBA+

Ability to create an inclusive environment in which all crew members have equitable opportunity for employment.

Explanation: DND and the CAF are dedicated to creating an inclusive and safe environment for a diverse defence team, including aboard vessels. As people will be central to submarine operations for the foreseeable future, intersectional considerations will be included in the overall requirements for the project. Specifically, these considerations will be integrated in the submarine selection process through the inclusion of a High-Level Mandatory Requirement requiring a “safe and inclusive environment for all crew members”. For reference, this requirement would evaluate how each submarine meets the “5-95th percentile” criteria. Specifically, this means ensuring that submarines are adapted to bodies which are found between the anthropometric measurements of the 5th percentile female and the 95th percentile male. This will ensure that the submarine and its amenities are adapted to the vast majority of men, women, and gender-diverse individuals, therefore increasing the meaningful participation and operational effectiveness of all submariners.

HLMR #11 – Extended Operational Effectiveness

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems to extend the sensor reach and deliver effect to the underwater battlespace.

Explanation: As a “system of systems,” modern submarines are equipped to employ and support crewed and uncrewed vehicles, in addition to other armaments and intelligence gathering capabilities – making submarines a true force multiplier. The CPS must be capable of contributing to seabed warfare.

HLMR #12 – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Ability to conduct multi-domain, multi-spectral sensing and to process, analyze and store data from onboard systems and external sources for real or near real-time exploitation and dissemination.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of sensing across maritime surface and sub-surface domains and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, locate, classify, identify, track and collect intelligence on targets of interest in all conditions, day and night. It also includes the use of automation, data fusion, decision support tools and advanced algorithms and methods (e.g. machine learning and artificial intelligence) to lower operator workload and increase effectiveness in processing sensor data.

HLMR #13 - Infrastructure

Provide infrastructure and equipment on both East and West Coasts to meet operational support requirements, including all levels of maintenance, and training requirement.

Explanation: Recapitalization of existing and construction of new submarine support infrastructure will be required to enable and support the operations of the future submarine fleet. The physical characteristics of the future submarines and their designed operation, maintenance and training philosophy will be assessed against the existing infrastructure portfolio to determine a comprehensive set of submarine support infrastructure requirements.

HLMR #14- Training

Conduct shore-based operational and technical training on the East Coast and West Coast.

Explanation: Individual and collective training must be available to submariners on both the East and West Coasts. This can be a combination of real, virtual and augmented reality training with an aim to end the requirement for submariners to be away from home for extended periods of time for shore-based training.

HLMR #15 – Upgradeability and Growth Potential

Ability to upgrade submarine capability to maintain an operational advantage for the CPS service life.

Explanation: The CPS must maintain an operational advantage by keeping pace with technological change to counter and/or leverage disruptive technologies, as well as being prepared for rapid technical insertion through Continuous Capability Sustainment (CCS). To help achieve this, the CPS must possess the ability to upgrade existing systems and payloads. It must also have the growth potential to integrate new systems and payloads. This drives the requirement for sufficient excess margin for size (volume), weight, workstations, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), power, data busses, computational nodes, etc. The ability to integrate new systems and payload is also required to support special operations, by integrating mission tailored capabilities within an acceptable level of effort and in short timescales. This justifies the consideration for a modular open architecture approach that facilitates individual sensor updates and additions of new sub-systems and sensors on shorter timescales.
Click to expand...

There is a set of procurement, construction, delivery and operational questions for interested parties as well. They provide some important information as well.

CPS will operate in and near ice, and potentially under ice for short periods. There is no intent to modify the submarine to be routinely through ice capable. What are the structural or equipment changes needed for this operating environment (i.e. upward looking sonar, ice deflectors for masts, hull valve covering, HVAC, etc.)? Identify any specific materials or systems required to operate in extreme cold temperatures that would result in design changes.

CPS will have a mixed arsenal of weapons, including heavyweight torpedoes (HWT), anti-ship cruise missiles and land attack missiles. Can the submarine support all these weapon systems? Can the current MOTS weapon control and discharge systems support these types of weapons?
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www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs - The Hill Times

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
 
Rainbow1910 said:
www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs - The Hill Times

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
Click to expand...
Unfortunate, the Soryu and Taigei class subs would probably be really good for Canada's needs.
 
Rainbow1910 said:
www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs - The Hill Times

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
Click to expand...

So for 12 operational subs....using existing designs....they need fleet size of 18????

Or is it 12 with 'operational' having a very wide meaning?
 
Scott Kenny said:
Unfortunate, the Soryu and Taigei class subs would probably be really good for Canada's needs.
Click to expand...
On paper, that is very much true from what I have heard. Pulling back to consider the larger scale logistics of the endeavor though, I think that ultimately Japan was never a great partner for Canada. Japan is generally inexperienced with any sort of large scale cooperative defense export contracts abroad, let alone one with a partner was....potentially troublesome as Canada. With their current style of continuous improvement and building throughout their own domestic fleet as well, a very large Canadian 12 boat order would either not be able to meet Canadian timelines or would directly impact domestic defence.

timmymagic said:
So for 12 operational subs....using existing designs....they need fleet size of 18????

Or is it 12 with 'operational' having a very wide meaning?
Click to expand...
12 submarines is the maximum and current order size that every source has discussed, given they would be tasked with Arctic deployments alongside deployments to Europe and Asia. Such a fleet size gives a good base to uphold the tempo of these operations while also keeping the fleet upkept and modernized.
 
TomS said:
The requirement doc seems to say 6 deployed/deployable at any one time. That would argue for a total inventory of 12 or thereabout.
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6 deployed at any one time means 18 boats if they're single crewed. If you double crew you could get it down to about 9.

Edit: and a total fleet of 12 means 4 at sea and maybe 3-5 more available to surge.
 
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Scott Kenny said:
6 deployed at any one time means 18 boats if they're single crewed. If you double crew you could get it down to about 9.
Click to expand...

If I'm reading it right, there are 3 boats for actual forward deployment and 3 for exercises and "force generation" which I understand to mean basically pre-deployment training. So they are really talking about 1:4 overall, which is pretty conservative.
 
TomS said:
If I'm reading it right, there are 3 boats for actual forward deployment and 3 for exercises and "force generation" which I understand to mean basically pre-deployment training. So they are really talking about 1:4 overall, which is pretty conservative.
Click to expand...
Probably better in terms of "maintenance ran long" emergent issues than the classic 1:3, but more expensive.
 
Scott Kenny said:
There's more than a little difference in the amount of H2 produced when charging batteries versus the amount that will leak out of a megaliter H2 tank...
Click to expand...
Since when did hydrogen storage tanks actively generate unwanted hydrogn like lead acid batteries under normal operations? Sure, the amount of hydrogen at any given moment is largely different, but we are also talking about largely different situations. Also, then it's a good thing they are transitioning from pressurized H2 gas tanks to other storage options like hydrates with reformers or metal hydrides. Less reason to not use hydrogen I guess?

Like I've said, still all new AIPs are FCs. It's accept it or leave matter. Hydrogen's a bitch but all the 212, 214 and 218 users are using it. There are more navies joing them, not leaving the club. They cross the seas with those things and go to RIMPAC.

You said the Japanese got rid of Sterling all because replacing that space with Li-ion was better. True, but you completely got the nuance behind that decision wrong. They did so because Sterling sucked that much, to the point that the pros of using a non-AIP diesel electric design with Li-ion was better.

Mind you, KSS-III batch II, 212 NFS, 212CD, all designs with Li-ion are employing hydrogen FC in parallel.

You said Stirling is a better option than hydrogen. I'm again telling you they are ditched for a reason. If anything, every CPSP candidates bar SAAB C71 are offered with a FC system involving hydrogen. End of the story.
 
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Rainbow1910 said:
On paper, that is very much true from what I have heard. Pulling back to consider the larger scale logistics of the endeavor though, I think that ultimately Japan was never a great partner for Canada. Japan is generally inexperienced with any sort of large scale cooperative defense export contracts abroad, let alone one with a partner was....potentially troublesome as Canada. With their current style of continuous improvement and building throughout their own domestic fleet as well, a very large Canadian 12 boat order would either not be able to meet Canadian timelines or would directly impact domestic defence.


12 submarines is the maximum and current order size that every source has discussed, given they would be tasked with Arctic deployments alongside deployments to Europe and Asia. Such a fleet size gives a good base to uphold the tempo of these operations while also keeping the fleet upkept and modernized.
Click to expand...
The Japanese withdrawal probably has more to do with the likelihood of cancellation of any submarine requirement or contract in Canada, based on historical precedents and grim fiscal and political realities. The Japanese were entirely correct to back away from the Australian contest as well, considering the fate the winning French bid. At a certain point, there’s probably more money to be made from artfully written contract cancellation penalties than actually fulfilling a submarine order from Australia or Canada.
 
Maro.Kyo said:
Since when did hydrogen storage tanks actively generate unwanted hydrogn like lead acid batteries under normal operations?
Click to expand...
Since they leak like a damned sieve. Which means you have loose hydrogen gas floating around in your hull. Loose hydrogen gas that is explosive at 4% in air.


Maro.Kyo said:
Also, then it's a good thing they are transitioning from pressurized H2 gas tanks to other storage options like hydrates with reformers or metal hydrides. Less reason to not use hydrogen I guess?
Click to expand...
Significantly less reason not to use hydrogen.

But it's still a scary ass explosion risk.


Maro.Kyo said:
Hydrogen's a bitch
Click to expand...
Understatement of the year.


Maro.Kyo said:
You said the Japanese got rid of Sterling all because replacing that space with Li-ion was better. True, but you completely got the nuance behind that decision wrong. They did so because Sterling sucked that much, to the point that the pros of using a non-AIP diesel electric design with Li-ion was better.
Click to expand...
I have never seen a take on the Taigei class ditching AIP entirely as because Sterling engines suck that bad.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Since they leak like a damned sieve. Which means you have loose hydrogen gas floating around in your hull. Loose hydrogen gas that is explosive at 4% in air.

Significantly less reason not to use hydrogen.

But it's still a scary ass explosion risk.

Understatement of the year.

I have never seen a take on the Taigei class ditching AIP entirely as because Sterling engines suck that bad.
Click to expand...
Since we are drifting off topic, moved to a more apropriate thread.
 
Giving the full article title would be useful. On my display, at least, it reads as a 'done deal' = "...naval-new...-canada-to-join-type-212cd-submarine-project/"

But, of course, the full title is: Germany, Norway advocate for Canada to join Type 212CD submarine project. In other words, Boris Pistorius is shilling for TKMS again ... just as he did during his previous visit to Ottawa.

As for the source, I would trust Naval News a smidge more on this particular subject if they had a single staffer (or other contributor) from Canada. All Naval News is telling me here is that TKMS would like to make a sale. Breaking news! :rolleyes:
 
Apophenia said:
Giving the full article title would be useful. On my display, at least, it reads as a 'done deal' = "...naval-new...-canada-to-join-type-212cd-submarine-project/"
Click to expand...
Don't know why it was like this. Normaly the whole article is shown.
Apophenia said:
But, of course, the full title is: Germany, Norway advocate for Canada to join Type 212CD submarine project. In other words, Boris Pistorius is shilling for TKMS again ... just as he did during his previous visit to Ottawa.

As for the source, I would trust Naval News a smidge more on this particular subject if they had a single staffer (or other contributor) from Canada. All Naval News is telling me here is that TKMS would like to make a sale. Breaking news! :rolleyes:
Click to expand...
Again sorry for that i don't know why the link was formated like this. The source was from https://www.hartpunkt.de/pistorius-wirbt-fuer-einstieg-der-kanadier-bei-u-212-cd/ i should have posted both then it may had helped you guys.
 
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kqcke for you said:
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-new...-canada-to-join-type-212cd-submarine-project/
Click to expand...
It is beginning to look like "too little, too late" in my opinion for the Germans, the Korean's have been making agreements with companies and pitching their offsets for months with the help of their own government. For the German and Norwegian governments to start making their public moves at this point in the game (in a program where many expect a contract awarded by the end of the year/early 2026) seems like desperation.

Some of the claims made for "offsets" are really reaching, like Bombardier Global jets and CMS-330 purchases. Germany has been considering CMS-330 on their upcoming warships for years at this point, since atleast 2024 if not earlier. Germany has already also been interested in the Global business jet platform previously as it already has multiple platforms in service as VIP transport, and was already looking at AWACS platforms that almost all utilize Global base jets.

According to him, Germany is also interested in cooperation with Canada in the areas of raw materials, hydropower, and liquefied natural gas. “Several areas of cooperation are currently being explored with our Canadian friends” Pistorius said. The minister pointed out that Germany is already the fifth or sixth largest investor in Canada and would like to further improve this position.

As Pistorius explained, TKMS has also offered the Canadians the prospect of supplying components or even building entire batches of the new submarines in the country, if they so wish. He pointed out that TKMS boats are also in operation in Singapore and thus in the Indo-Pacific, which could be incorporated into a cooperation.
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If the program is going to succeed, this is likely where it will do so. PM Carney is a Europhile and wants closer economic cooperation with Europe however, these claims are pretty vague and not comprehensive at all. The offer to build components in the country isn't unreasonable, the Koreans have talked about building a lithium battery facility in Canada however, trying to set up domestic submarine production entirely in Canada is the exact opposite goal of the program at this point and reeks of a desperate hail mary throw.

The Type 212CD program is on schedule and on budget, the minister said in response to a question pointing out that the Koreans had promised short-term delivery within budget. TKMS had also announced that it would be able to produce three to four boats per year starting in 2027. The company is therefore ramping up its production capacity, Pistorius said. “The Koreans build excellent submarines, but we build better ones,” he said. Among the outstanding features of the Type 212CD, he said, are stealth characteristics, which have real military added value. “The Koreans cannot offer this. Furthermore, it uses a propulsion system that allows it to remain submerged for long periods, longer than food can last. Furthermore, the boats are said to feature state-of-the-art technology for combating other submarines”.

In principle, Canada’s entry into the submarine project would mean a very long-term cooperation between the three countries, spanning 40 to 50 years, the minister said. They could jointly build, maintain the submarines, manage logistics, further develop them, and even exchange crews, including in the Indo-Pacific.

Norway is also very interested in Canadian participation and is also offering offset services, said Defense Minister Tore Sandvik. His country is interested in AI solutions from Canada. Furthermore, Norway could leave the blueprint for the submarine maintenance center currently under construction in Bergen to the Canadians to save costs. Germany has so far ordered six Type 212CD submarines, Norway four, with an option for two more still pending confirmation.
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This is a bit misleading as well because it unlike the Koreans, the Germans have to build boats simultaneously for themselves, Norway, Canada and other customers like Poland if all of these contracts make it through. Last I saw, the offers were Korea delivering first sub by 2032, three more by 2035 and the whole order by 2043. The Germans said they could deliver the first sub by 2034, second by 2036, third in 2037 and no firm date for entire program delivery. It seems like the Koreans have a better delivery schedule and potentially better offsets/domestic work, while the Germans likely have the political advantage and the more advanced submarine design.

Cooperation with NATO partners operating the same submarine design as well is also fairly valuable, although there is no reason that this cannot be done with Korea and cross training has been extensively offered by them as well. Norway tossing us a design/construction contract for a European site is very weird as well.

Germany actually plans on procuring 9 Type 212CD, and Norway another 6. There is going to be a pretty plugged up procurement pipeline, especially with Europe desperate to rearm in the face of Russian aggression and historic underspending. They have talked about giving up boats or production slots to Canada to meet our timelines better, but I find this a bit hard to believe given the political landscape and how feasible long term it would be.
 
kqcke for you said:
Don't know why it was like this. Normaly the whole article is shown.

Again sorry for that i don't know why the link was formated like this. The source was from https://www.hartpunkt.de/pistorius-wirbt-fuer-einstieg-der-kanadier-bei-u-212-cd/ i should have posted both then it may had helped you guys.
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Anyway if this happens we Like will see more Pegasus, GlobelEye and probaly even LuWES on it. Seems to me like a good development but if thats enough to get the deal? Hanwha is very aggressive after the public
 
I think TKMS has a strong case if Canada is also buying into other German/European defense programs, like associated weapons systems, missiles etc.

The issue I see with the Korean offer is that it relies in large part on Korean weapons. And Korean ordnance isn't as widespread and in large scale use as European systems. And adapting it to use US made systems would probably be politically unviable and using European weapons? Well then might as well buy the 212CD. So Canada could benefit and participate in the development and production of ordnance and systems for the submarines and future systems, in essence they would have the chance to join the European sphere of naval systems and weapons. Which is a very broad and lucrative market with many international customers and participants. And I don't see the Korean industry on that level really, as they mostly serve the Korean Domestic Market.

Yes, the 212CD isn't constructed yet, but the 212A has been and in general German submarines have a serious track record especially on the export market, even the Koreans themselves have/had Type 214 subs. So I don't think there is really any risk attached to this development, given the track record and both Germany and Norway firmly committed to the project.

Both are serious offers however and in either case the Canadians would end up with capable subs, the question is just which is the better deal and I'd argue it's the 212CD all things considered.
 

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