Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP, Victoria-class replacement)

With a 60 million CAD estimated cost, the RCN is proposing conventional subs. This sounds low to me considering the Australian Attack Class SSK program was going to cost 90 million AUD for 12 boats.

If the Canadian govt actually funds this, I think Naval Group would be in a strong position to win the bid. Production of the first few boats would most likely need to happen in France if the RCN doesn’t want to have a capability gap if domestic production is part of the plan.
 
Babcock and HHI sign a technical cooperation agreement for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project

https://www.navalnews.com/event-new...nt-for-the-canadian-patrol-submarine-project/
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When they were Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., LTD., Hanwa helped build 2 of the 3 Batch I KSS-III submarines (SK-modified Type 214 subs) and will build a similar number of improved Batch II subs (6 planned).

Hanwa and HHI (Hyundai Heavy Industries) jointly designed the KSS-III in co-operation with HDW.

So Canada does seem to have a viable industrial design team available.
 
news.usni.org

Canada Announces Plan to Buy 12 Under Ice Submarines - USNI News

With the high-profile backdrop of the NATO summit in Washington, D.C., Canada announced it will acquire 12 conventionally-powered submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy. The announcement does not come as a surprise, as the government formally established the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project...
news.usni.org news.usni.org

www.telegraph.co.uk

Canada says it will get a powerful under-ice sub force. Its money isn’t where its mouth is

It’s a sensible plan, but basically unfunded
www.telegraph.co.uk www.telegraph.co.uk
 
Initially it seemed like the focus lied on the competition between the Korean and Japanese offer, but now it actually seems like the German-Norwegian 212CD is in front of the pact both capability-wise and politics-wise. Iirc there's a new arctic defence agreement in place and the 212CD itself is intended for such role. Further, the German MoD putting new interest in arctic operations, and arctic operations is always mentioned with the RCN submarine missioms, apart from specops support and deployment to far-east.
 
Maro.Kyo said:
... Iirc there's a new arctic defence agreement in place and the 212CD itself is intended for such role...
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Not really. In May 2024, Boris Pistorius visited Ottawa. There, Pistorius floated the vague notion of a "trilateralen strategischen maritimen Partnerschaft" for Germany, Norway, and Canada. Canadian MND Bill Blair was non-committal (other than in ensuring delivery of IRIS-T rounds for Ukraine). But, its also important to know that the Minister of National Defence is a comparatively minor Cabinet posting in Canada.

I'm curious as to what you intended when saying that the Typ 212CD was "intended for such role". Did you mean that the 212CD was to be a patrol submarine or that it was designed for extended under-ice operations?
 
I'd want both AIP and lithium batteries for under ice ops in a conventional sub, able to spend 4 weeks or more submerged. Nuclear power greatly preferred up there.

And in general I'd rather have Stirling engines that burn diesel than hydrogen fuel cells. Because working with hydrogen sucks that much.
 
Apophenia said:
Not really. In May 2024, Boris Pistorius visited Ottawa. There, Pistorius floated the vague notion of a "trilateralen strategischen maritimen Partnerschaft" for Germany, Norway, and Canada. Canadian MND Bill Blair was non-committal (other than in ensuring delivery of IRIS-T rounds for Ukraine). But, its also important to know that the Minister of National Defence is a comparatively minor Cabinet posting in Canada.

I'm curious as to what you intended when saying that the Typ 212CD was "intended for such role". Did you mean that the 212CD was to be a patrol submarine or that it was designed for extended under-ice operations?
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Thanks for the clarification.

As for your question, it's the latter I'm trying to say.
 
Scott Kenny said:
And in general I'd rather have Stirling engines that burn diesel than hydrogen fuel cells. Because working with hydrogen sucks that much.
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Scott Kenny said:
Japan has found them enough of a game changer that they ripped out the AIP systems from the last couple of Soryu class boats and replaced that space with more lithium batteries, in addition to replacing all the lead-acid batteries with lithium. I believe that they are using a spaced cell system with individual cell temperature monitoring and at least mass cell cooling.

Faster to recharge, and potentially traveling farther between charges as well.

But for under ice operations like Canada needs, I'd require some flavor of AIP if not nuke power. I personally prefer Stirling engines over hydrogen fuel cells even though the Stirling engines aren't as quiet. I hate working with hydrogen.
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Before you continue, I should encourage you to look a bit further into why Japan opted to remove stirling AIP all-together in favor of going all-Li-ion. If anything, FCs, be it hydrogen or any other substance (with reformer if need) is vastly superior to stirling engines, or any kind of AIP that involves combustion under water. It causes much more operational limitation than that caused by any hydrogen system. This is especially true for JMSDF operating enviroment and their submarine forces' CONOPs. There's a reason why basically every single AIP builders are going the fuel-cell way instead of burning something under water. Case in point, NG also pivoted from their MESMA to FC-2G.

I'd agree that H2 kinda sucks, mostly because of all the pain with the storage and especially the storage density, but I don't think that makes stirling any better. If anything, it is still a vastly worse solution for submarine AIP applications.
 
Maro.Kyo said:
Before you continue, I should encourage you to look a bit further into why Japan opted to remove stirling AIP all-together in favor of going all-Li-ion. If anything, FCs, be it hydrogen or any other substance (with reformer if need) is vastly superior to stirling engines, or any kind of AIP that involves combustion under water. It causes much more operational limitation than that caused by any hydrogen system. This is especially true for JMSDF operating enviroment and their submarine forces' CONOPs. There's a reason why basically every single AIP builders are going the fuel-cell way instead of burning something under water. Case in point, NG also pivoted from their MESMA to FC-2G.

I'd agree that H2 kinda sucks, mostly because of all the pain with the storage and especially the storage density, but I don't think that makes stirling any better. If anything, it is still a vastly worse solution for submarine AIP applications.
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Stirling means you carry liquid oxygen, usually. Though these days I'd use Nytrox, N20+LOx, because it's liquid at much higher temperatures and that means you can use larger tanks with less insulation for the same external size. IIRC the Stirling engines recycle their exhaust, adding boiled gaseous oxygen to it until the engine is running at sea pressure, to make it trivial to push the exhaust overboard.

H2 is freaking dangerous to work with. Charging the (lead-acid) batteries on an Ohio? No smoking allowed anywhere in the ship. Not even in the aft smoke pit in the engine room! And we had hydrogen gas detectors that alarmed everywhere.
 
Scott Kenny said:
IIRC the Stirling engines recycle their exhaust, adding boiled gaseous oxygen to it until the engine is running at sea pressure, to make it trivial to push the exhaust overboard.

H2 is freaking dangerous to work with. Charging the (lead-acid) batteries on an Ohio? No smoking allowed anywhere in the ship. Not even in the aft smoke pit in the engine room! And we had hydrogen gas detectors that alarmed everywhere.
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If you really believe it is "trivial", you really areb't in the know. The reason JMSDF ditched the Stirling AIP, that I've mentioned above, is exactly because of this exhaust problem, coupled eith power density problem.

Also, regardless of if you like it or not, a lot of the navies out there are adopting hydrogen PEM FC, because it works. Not to add it is not really convincing to compare lead-acid batteries potentially generating hydrogen to stored hydrogen within storage tank purposefully designed for that purpose.
 
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Not sure how I missed this.
Maro.Kyo said:
If you really believe it is "trivial", you really areb't in the know. The reason JMSDF ditched the Stirling AIP, that I've mentioned above, is exactly because of this exhaust problem, coupled eith power density problem.

Also, regardless of if you like it or not, a lot of the navies out there are adopting hydrogen PEM FC, because it works. Not to add it is not really convincing to compare lead-acid batteries potentially generating hydrogen to stored hydrogen within storage tank purposefully designed for that purpose.
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There's more than a little difference in the amount of H2 produced when charging batteries versus the amount that will leak out of a megaliter H2 tank...
 
Apologies for the bit of a necro but I thought it would be appropriate to share relevant information provided by the September 2024 RFI released by the Canadian Govt for the CPSP.

Please excuse the many quotes and long post but the RFI is 31 pages, so I will split the quotes up somewhat regarding their relevancy to each other. If you are not interested in reading the entire post here, here is my summary of some important points.

CPS will have the contract awarded by 2028, delivery of first submarine no later than 2035 and initial operational capability achieved no later than 2037.

Respondents to the RFI must have an in-production submarine or an in-service submarine alongside the capability to deliver no later than 2035.

Requirement of 6 simultaneously operational submarines.

Endurance minimum of 7000nm at 8kts & minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations on station. Minimal capability of 60 days self-sustained operation.
Ability to use heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Will operate near and in ice, with potential to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

Core crew of no more than 40 personnel, must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel in permanent bunks.

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) assesses that the most efficient means to procure a replacement fleet is to pursue foreign built Military off-the-Shelf (MOTS) submarines that meet Canada’s requirements. However, Canada wishes to receive information on how partnerships with Canadian industry could be leveraged to include Canadian technology and industrial capacity/capability in submarine production, including opportunities and risks. The CPSP will leverage Canadian industrial capacity/capability and create economic benefits in Canada through the life of the submarine, as appropriate, by requiring that in-service support over the life cycle of the fleet be done in Canada.

The following is the potential scope of work of CPSP:

a) Acquisition of submarines and systems that have all required capabilities and meet the HLMRs (High Level Mandatory Requirements);
b) Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), including publications, maintenance plans, sparing, training and training systems and simulators;
c) In-Service Support (ISS), including 3rd line maintenance; and
d) Infrastructure that may be required to support platform and systems.

CPSP has set target dates for critical milestones that will be necessary to ensure the first Canadian Patrol Submarine (CPS) are delivered before the VCS fleet is retired. The CPSP targeted milestones are:

  • Contract Award -Commence Acquisition Implementation in 2028
  • Delivery of first replacement submarine no later than 2035
  • Achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) no later than 2037
  • Achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) (TBD)
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Draft High Level Mandatory Requirements

HLMR #1 - Urgency, Availability, and Sustainment

Ability to deliver submarine, maintenance facilities and training systems to achieve Initial Operating Capability no later than 2037.

Explanation: The anticipated reduced availability of the VCS will directly impact force generation and the production of key qualifications within the submarine force. To avoid a capability gap and to ensure that crews can be generated as the CPS fleet is delivered the requirement is to have the first of class CPS delivered no later than 2035. IOC is defined as the first CPS being fully operational with requisite infrastructure and In-Service-Support in place.

HLMR #2 – Fleet Size

Ability to perform lines of tasking as follows: 3 submarines for continental defence/global deployment, 3 submarines for national and international exercises and force generation simultaneously.

Explanation: In accordance with ONSAF, CPSP is exploring the renewal and expansion of the CAF’s submarine fleet to enable the RCN to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines. The CPS fleet size must be sufficient to complete assigned missions and roles throughout its service life. In order to achieve 6 simultaneously operational submarines as described above, it is acknowledged that the total fleet size must be larger to accommodate submarines in various levels of maintenance.

HLMR #3 – Endurance and Persistence

Ability to operate discretely without external support for minimum transits of 7000nm (2x 3500nm) at 8kts, and a minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations while on station. Capable of no less than 60 days self-sustained operation.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of conducting continental defence missions including Arctic patrols from home ports in Halifax and Esquimalt. The absence of support facilities in the Arctic mean that the submarine must be able to conduct such patrols unsupported.

HLMR #4 – Lethality

Ability to perform precision attacks to include the use of the following weapons systems: heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of detecting, targeting, engaging, and destroying threats, both at sea (surface and subsurface) and ashore. To achieve this, the CPS must be capable of carrying and employing an appropriate combination of sensors and weapons to detect and deter maritime threats, control Canada’s maritime approaches, and hold distant adversaries at risk with the capability to project power ashore.

HLMR #5 – Operating Environment

Ability to operate worldwide throughout the year, both by day and by night, in temperatures ranging from tropical to Arctic. Ability to operate near, in and if necessary, under ice (for limited periods of time).

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of global deployment. Arctic operations will predominantly take place within navigable waters, which are expected to expand in the coming decades. CPS will operate near and in ice, and on occasion, will be required to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

HLMR #6 – Environmental Compliance

Ability to operate in compliance with the environmental regulations in all areas of operation, including the Arctic.

HLMR #7 – Crew Size

Ability to minimize crew size using automation and remote monitoring.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to be operated with a core crew of no more than 40 personnel. In addition, the submarine must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel (riders) in permanent bunks.

HLMR #8 – Survivability (Stealth)

Ability to operate in contested environments while maintaining tactical advantage with low acoustic (passive and active), magnetic, and Infrared (IR) signatures to prevent counter-detection.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to maintain tactical advantage over new and developing detection systems including airborne magnetic anomaly detection, electric field detection and acoustic detection through reduced signature and low target echo strength. Stealth should also be enabled by operational signature management that allows the submarine to manage its signature to meet operational conditions.

HLMR #9 – Interoperability

Ability to communicate and share information and data within mission frameworks utilizing high-assurance cryptographic capabilities (algorithms and protocols) compliant with the US Crypto Modernization Program to ensure a high degree of security for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of data and information flow with organizations, submarines, systems and applications necessary to complete its missions. This includes all aspects of being able to work with others in a robust, secure and sustainable manner, both integrated and networked. More specifically, it includes regulatory compliance and standardization to ensure operational and tactical interoperability.

HLMR #10 – GBA+

Ability to create an inclusive environment in which all crew members have equitable opportunity for employment.

Explanation: DND and the CAF are dedicated to creating an inclusive and safe environment for a diverse defence team, including aboard vessels. As people will be central to submarine operations for the foreseeable future, intersectional considerations will be included in the overall requirements for the project. Specifically, these considerations will be integrated in the submarine selection process through the inclusion of a High-Level Mandatory Requirement requiring a “safe and inclusive environment for all crew members”. For reference, this requirement would evaluate how each submarine meets the “5-95th percentile” criteria. Specifically, this means ensuring that submarines are adapted to bodies which are found between the anthropometric measurements of the 5th percentile female and the 95th percentile male. This will ensure that the submarine and its amenities are adapted to the vast majority of men, women, and gender-diverse individuals, therefore increasing the meaningful participation and operational effectiveness of all submariners.

HLMR #11 – Extended Operational Effectiveness

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems to extend the sensor reach and deliver effect to the underwater battlespace.

Explanation: As a “system of systems,” modern submarines are equipped to employ and support crewed and uncrewed vehicles, in addition to other armaments and intelligence gathering capabilities – making submarines a true force multiplier. The CPS must be capable of contributing to seabed warfare.

HLMR #12 – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Ability to conduct multi-domain, multi-spectral sensing and to process, analyze and store data from onboard systems and external sources for real or near real-time exploitation and dissemination.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of sensing across maritime surface and sub-surface domains and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, locate, classify, identify, track and collect intelligence on targets of interest in all conditions, day and night. It also includes the use of automation, data fusion, decision support tools and advanced algorithms and methods (e.g. machine learning and artificial intelligence) to lower operator workload and increase effectiveness in processing sensor data.

HLMR #13 - Infrastructure

Provide infrastructure and equipment on both East and West Coasts to meet operational support requirements, including all levels of maintenance, and training requirement.

Explanation: Recapitalization of existing and construction of new submarine support infrastructure will be required to enable and support the operations of the future submarine fleet. The physical characteristics of the future submarines and their designed operation, maintenance and training philosophy will be assessed against the existing infrastructure portfolio to determine a comprehensive set of submarine support infrastructure requirements.

HLMR #14- Training

Conduct shore-based operational and technical training on the East Coast and West Coast.

Explanation: Individual and collective training must be available to submariners on both the East and West Coasts. This can be a combination of real, virtual and augmented reality training with an aim to end the requirement for submariners to be away from home for extended periods of time for shore-based training.

HLMR #15 – Upgradeability and Growth Potential

Ability to upgrade submarine capability to maintain an operational advantage for the CPS service life.

Explanation: The CPS must maintain an operational advantage by keeping pace with technological change to counter and/or leverage disruptive technologies, as well as being prepared for rapid technical insertion through Continuous Capability Sustainment (CCS). To help achieve this, the CPS must possess the ability to upgrade existing systems and payloads. It must also have the growth potential to integrate new systems and payloads. This drives the requirement for sufficient excess margin for size (volume), weight, workstations, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), power, data busses, computational nodes, etc. The ability to integrate new systems and payload is also required to support special operations, by integrating mission tailored capabilities within an acceptable level of effort and in short timescales. This justifies the consideration for a modular open architecture approach that facilitates individual sensor updates and additions of new sub-systems and sensors on shorter timescales.
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There is a set of procurement, construction, delivery and operational questions for interested parties as well. They provide some important information as well.

CPS will operate in and near ice, and potentially under ice for short periods. There is no intent to modify the submarine to be routinely through ice capable. What are the structural or equipment changes needed for this operating environment (i.e. upward looking sonar, ice deflectors for masts, hull valve covering, HVAC, etc.)? Identify any specific materials or systems required to operate in extreme cold temperatures that would result in design changes.

CPS will have a mixed arsenal of weapons, including heavyweight torpedoes (HWT), anti-ship cruise missiles and land attack missiles. Can the submarine support all these weapon systems? Can the current MOTS weapon control and discharge systems support these types of weapons?
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www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
 
Rainbow1910 said:
www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
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Unfortunate, the Soryu and Taigei class subs would probably be really good for Canada's needs.
 
Rainbow1910 said:
www.hilltimes.com

Japan not taking part in procurement bid for Canadian Navy's new subs

With billions of dollars at stake and Arctic security concerns, Canada’s submarine procurement competition is poised to be one of the decade's most sought after deals.
www.hilltimes.com www.hilltimes.com

Japan also made it clear in late November, 2024 that it was not interested in competing with its various designs for the CPSP tender. This brings the realistic contenders down to Germany, France and South Korea, with the Swedish and Spanish trailing behind.
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So for 12 operational subs....using existing designs....they need fleet size of 18????

Or is it 12 with 'operational' having a very wide meaning?
 
Scott Kenny said:
Unfortunate, the Soryu and Taigei class subs would probably be really good for Canada's needs.
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On paper, that is very much true from what I have heard. Pulling back to consider the larger scale logistics of the endeavor though, I think that ultimately Japan was never a great partner for Canada. Japan is generally inexperienced with any sort of large scale cooperative defense export contracts abroad, let alone one with a partner was....potentially troublesome as Canada. With their current style of continuous improvement and building throughout their own domestic fleet as well, a very large Canadian 12 boat order would either not be able to meet Canadian timelines or would directly impact domestic defence.

timmymagic said:
So for 12 operational subs....using existing designs....they need fleet size of 18????

Or is it 12 with 'operational' having a very wide meaning?
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12 submarines is the maximum and current order size that every source has discussed, given they would be tasked with Arctic deployments alongside deployments to Europe and Asia. Such a fleet size gives a good base to uphold the tempo of these operations while also keeping the fleet upkept and modernized.
 
TomS said:
The requirement doc seems to say 6 deployed/deployable at any one time. That would argue for a total inventory of 12 or thereabout.
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6 deployed at any one time means 18 boats if they're single crewed. If you double crew you could get it down to about 9.

Edit: and a total fleet of 12 means 4 at sea and maybe 3-5 more available to surge.
 
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Scott Kenny said:
6 deployed at any one time means 18 boats if they're single crewed. If you double crew you could get it down to about 9.
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If I'm reading it right, there are 3 boats for actual forward deployment and 3 for exercises and "force generation" which I understand to mean basically pre-deployment training. So they are really talking about 1:4 overall, which is pretty conservative.
 
TomS said:
If I'm reading it right, there are 3 boats for actual forward deployment and 3 for exercises and "force generation" which I understand to mean basically pre-deployment training. So they are really talking about 1:4 overall, which is pretty conservative.
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Probably better in terms of "maintenance ran long" emergent issues than the classic 1:3, but more expensive.
 

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