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AVIBRAS SS-300 (prototype built)
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https://www.marinha.mil.br/egn/sites/www.marinha.mil.br.egn/files/CPEM016 CMG (FN) XERÉM.pdf
https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arq..._empresasa_dea_defesaa_avibrasa_ea_engesa.pdf
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bowen33.pdf
Anti-Weapons Activism and Arms Bans: Why Brazil Banned Anti-Personnel Mines but Not Cluster Munitions | Foreign Policy Analysis | Oxford Academic
https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/21/3/oraf019/8136451 GOOD
EXTRA
https://watermark02.silverchair.com...7Ft0c2AK8CZ2c3wIn2MBHUvAVKLS8vwdWZwNJIFvQi1aX
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https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA241068.pdf
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...ontrol_regime_(IA_brazilunitedstat00toll).pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA216958.pdf
https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/cidpwww/files/uploaded_files/OP36.pdf
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597238808460772
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PAYWALLED ttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780333982280_2
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w28h60b
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/conf/mid01/
https://core.ac.uk/reader/36718580
https://scholarsarchive.library.alb...nt.cgi?article=1002&context=honorscollege_pos
https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9780429694639_A36687113/preview-9780429694639_A36687113.pdf
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https://www.kimerius.com/app/download/5783717753/Transferencia+de+armamentos+de+alta+tecnología+y+seguridad+regional+en+América+Latina.pdf
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679329008448983
https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/dossier/die-heimliche-raketenmacht/
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http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/12739/28898284-MIT.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
ttps://www.academia.edu/11367297/The_Proliferation_of
https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/r/e/red_027.pdf
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
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http://www.atomictraveler.com/WeapMassDestruct.pdf
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems Issue 38 (2003) | PDF
EXTRA https://pt.scribd.com/document/735568004/Jane-s-Strategic-Weapon-Systems-Issue-38-2003
KINDA BAD
https://archive.org/stream/ArabTime...1987, Arab Times, #7121, Kuwait (en)_djvu.txt
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1072445/posts?page=9
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/134/134757_DPRKNAVYFeb2011.docx
Brazilian variant. Its IOC was planned for 1991, but delayed. It is larger than the Scud-B at 37 ft 9 in (11.5 m) long; 3 ft 3 in (1.0 m) in diameter; and weighs 17,637 lb (8,000 kg). It has the same range and an unknown accuracy. Under development by Avibras Aeroespacial SA, San Jose dos Campos, Brazil. There were unconfirmed reports that Iraq wished to purchase the SS-300 in 1988. A 621-mile (1,000-km) range version, the SS-1000, was also under development.
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AVIBRAS SS-600
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https://kupdf.net/download/jane-39-s-strategic-weapon-systems_58e541b6dc0d601a70da97df_pdfType
Short- and intermediate-range, road mobile, solid-propellant, single warhead ballistic missiles.
Development
This SRBM development, by Avibras SA, was initially reported to be a modification to the Soviet
SS-1C `Scud B' design that had been progressing since the early 1980s. The design work was reportedly
carried out by the Brazilian Aerospace Technology Centre, although this work might refer to the
possible longer range versions SS-600 and SS-1000, said to have ranges of 600 and 1,000 km. The
SS-300 project, with a range of 300 km, appears to have been quite different from the `Scud B', and to
be based on solid-propellant space-sounding rocket technology developed in the 1960s for the Sonda
programme. Sonda 1 and 2 were single-stage solid-propellant rockets, with Sonda 3 and 4 two stage
rockets. Sonda 1 was first launched in 1964, and Sonda 3 in 1976. A larger two-stage solid rocket,
Sonda 4 was developed in the 1980s and first launched in 1984. This rocket is believed to have been the
basis for the SS-600 ballistic missile design. Sonda 4 was used as a technology demonstrator for the
later VLS satellite-launch vehicle, and was launched four times up to 1989. The Brazilian Instituto de
Aeronautica e Espaco (IAE) is now developing the VLS (Veicula Lancador de Satelites), a four-stage
solid-propellant satellite launcher capable of placing 200 kg payloads in 750 km altitude circular orbits.
The VLS has four strap-on solid boosters clustered around the first stage, and this results in a launch
vehicle 19.8 m long with a launch weight of 50,000 kg. The SS-1000 ballistic missile design is believed
to have been made before the present VLS design, and was to have been a 15,000 kg missile with a
payload of 750 kg and a range of 1,000 km. However, there has been no confirmation that any of the
ballistic missile programmes have been continued and the Brazilian government announced the
termination of all ballistic missile projects in 1992. The Brazilian IAE has been put under civilian
control and in October 1995 Brazil formally joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Avibras
has formed a joint venture satellite-launching company, called Inscan, with the China Great Wall
Industry Corporation. It is also possible that these Brazilian ballistic missile designs, which
unconfirmed reports suggest were made in the 1970s, were considered by the Chinese before
development of the M family (M-9, M-11, M-18) of missiles.
Description
The SS-300 was believed to be based upon the design of the first stage of the Sonda 3 space-sounding
rocket, to be 8.0 m long and have a body diameter of 0.56 m. The launch weight was believed to be
2,000 kg and the payload probably 450 kg. It is reported that the missile had inertial guidance and a
single-stage solid-propellant motor. The missile was truck-mounted, which is believed to mean that the
Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle was wheeled rather than tracked, and that SS-300 was
designed to be carried by a converted Russian `Scud B' TEL vehicle MAZ 543.
SS-600 is believed to have been based upon the design of the two-stage solid-propellant Sonda 4
space launcher. This would indicate a missile 11.0 m long, with a first-stage body diameter of 1.0 m, a
second-stage diameter of 0.56 m and a launch weight of 7,270 kg. SS-600 would probably have had a
payload of about 500 kg and a range of 600 km.
SS-1000 is believed to have been a three-stage missile, based upon an extension of the SS-600
design, but it was not developed. The more recent VLS space vehicle launch programme has taken a
different design approach.
Operational Status
Initial flight tests of the SS-300 were reportedly carried out in 1987, and it was believed that the missile
might enter service around 1995. However, the Brazilian government is reported to have ceased
development of all ballistic missiles from 1992, and hence the SS-300 and the SS-600 designs will
remain undeveloped and untested. An unconfirmed US report suggested that Iraq wished to purchase
some SS-300 missiles in 1988.
Specifications
SS-300
Length: 8.0 m
Body diameter: 0.56 m
Launch weight: 2,000 kg
Payload: Single warhead; 450 kg
Warhead: Conventional HE
Guidance: Inertial
Propulsion: Solid propellant
Range: 300 km
Accuracy: n/k
SS-600
Length: 11.0 m
Body diameter: 1st-stage 1.0 m; 2nd-stage 0.56 m
Launch weight: 7,270 kg
Payload: Single warhead; 500 kg
Warhead: Conventional HE
Guidance: Inertial
Propulsion: 2-stage solid propellant
Range: 600 km
Accuracy: n/k
MB/EE family
A family of ballistic missiles, known as MB/EE, was being developed in the 1980s by Orbita SA. The
MB/EE missiles had ranges of 150 km up to 1,000 km. Reports indicate that a 150 km range version
was flight tested around 1984. This missile was 12.0 m long, had a single-stage solid-propellant motor
and a launch weight of 4,500 kg. Libya is reported to have offered to finance the development of the
MB/EE family and an unconfirmed test launch from Libya in 1988 may have been connected with this
project. It is believed that the MB/EE programme was halted in 1989 due to a shortage of funds. Orbita
SA was linked with Iraq in reports concerning a joint air-to-air missile programme, but suggestions that
this collaboration extended to ballistic missiles have always been denied. Orbita SA ceased trading in
1991 and, following Brazil's entry into the MTCR in 1995, it is assumed that all the MB/EE ballistic
missile programmes have been terminated.
best info on them until now, even has some images of the early designed missiles, i'll keep searching for more
----------------------------------------------------
AVIBRAS SS-1000
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ORBITA MB/EE-300
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ttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA345453.pdf----------------------------------------------------
ORBITA MB/EE-600
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https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13-5-1.pdf----------------------------------------------------
ORBITA MB/EE-1000
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https://www.facebook.com/Trincheira...sões-tomadas-há-2030-anos-du/469258073473839/cancelou os projetos SS-300 e SS-1000, como condição prévia para seu ingresso no MTCR (1995)https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=958895196282473&set=p.958895196282473&type=3
Folha de São Paulo, 26 de setembro de 1988.
Míssil brasileiro causa preocupação no exterior
Os ministros da Defesa da URSS e EUA, Dimitri Yazov e Frank Carlucci, reúnem-se hoje em Washington. A principal preocupação das duas partes são as informações de que a empresa brasileira Órbita Sistemas Aeroespaciais (formada por uma associação da Engesa, Embraer, Imbel e Esca) já está desenvolvendo o projeto do míssil SS-1000 (com condições de atingir um alvo a mil quilômetros) para a década de 90, quando estará operacional. Os principais clientes para esse míssil serão alguns países árabes. Além disso, discutirão a restrição de transferência de tecnologia de ponta às indústrias nacionais do setor bélico.
O SS-1000 começou a ser projetado em 1983 no Centro Técnico Aeroespacial (CTA), órgão do Ministério da Aeronáutica, sediado em São José dos Campos (SP). Por falta de verbas, o projeto ficou parado até o final de 86. Quando à Orbita foi criada, em janeiro de 87, o vice-presidente de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento da empresa, major-brigadeiro Hugo de Oliveira Piva, reexaminou o projeto. Após um estudo de mercado, a empresa decidiu ressuscitar o SS-1000: o Iraque e a Arábia Saudita se interessaram por esse míssil de alcance médio.
A entrevista do ministro da Defesa da União Soviética ao jornal francês "Liberátion" anteontem foi considerada um recado aos países árabes que utilizam produtos bélicos do Brasil. Tanto os EUA como a URSS sempre tiveram no Oriente Médio um excelente mercado para a venda de armamentos.
https://www.facebook.com/Trincheira...is-de-washingtonontem-a-vene/456049888127991/Na prática, o MTCR foi concebido pelas potências do G-7 para impedir que países intermediários – como o Brasil – consigam alterar a divisão internacional de poder econômico e militar. Nesse contexto, Washington impunha pesados embargos ao Programa Espacial Brasileiro, razão pela qual as Forças Armadas eram levadas a reprogramar seus custos e prazos, segundo o Coronel-Aviador Antonio Carlos de Freitas Pedrosa, Diretor do Instituto de Atividades Espaciais da FAB [2]. Apesar do cerco, durante os anos 80 o País persistiu na empreitada: não renunciou aos objetivos civis do Programa Espacial (projeto VLS + satélites), nem aos seus objetivos militares (mísseis SS-300 e SS-1000, estes últimos de longo alcance).
A rendição final veio em 18/08/1995, quando o Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso assegurou, em discurso proferido na cidade de São José dos Campos, que o "Brasil não possui, não produz e não pretende produzir, importar ou exportar mísseis militares de longo alcance". Em 10/10/1995, o Brasil protocolou seu pedido de adesão ao MTCR, com apoio do governo americano, junto ao qual assumiu o compromisso de cancelar os projetos SS-300 e SS-1000 [3]. O SS-300, então na fase de protótipo, foi desmantelado, enquanto o SS-1000, que ainda estava na prancheta, voltou para a gaveta das Forças Armadas – onde permanece até hoje. Desde então, o Programa Espacial limita-se aos seus objetivos civis (projeto VLS, satélites, etc.).
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OLD MESSY VERSION (SOME INFOS AND LINKS ARE REPEATED
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AVIBRAS SS-300 (prototype built)
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AVIBRAS SS-600
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A----------------------------------------------------
AVIBRAS SS-1000
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BRAZIL’S ACCESSION TO THE MTCR
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bowen33.pdf GOOD
The central role of the military in the MECB during the 1980s, however, cast doubt over the true nature ofthe space program. The Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE), responsible for overseeing and running the MECB, was chaired by the armed forces chief of staff.3 The prominent role of the Air Force’s Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) in developing the VLS also suggested the military might have other reasons for developing space launch vehicles. Suspicion deepened in the mid-1980s when the firms Orbita and Avibras began developing ballistic missiles (the MB/EE and SS series, respectively) derived primarily from technology developed for the Sonda rocket series. Moreover, the Armed Forces Joint Command assumed responsibility for coordinating all missile development and production in Brazil in 1986.
Brazil’s missile aspirations were fueled in part by Argentina’s simultaneous effort to develop the medium range Condor-2 ballistic missile. In addition, Brazil’s profitable export of weaponry, strategic technology,and the associated technical know-how in the 1980s and early 1990s suggested that Brazil’s missile programs were also driven by financial motivations.
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Brazilian engineers reportedly assisted Iraq in extending the range of its Soviet-supplied Scud-B ballistic missiles
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlXtDpVmsrk
Avibras was also accused of working on joint missile research and development programs with Iraq. Indeed, Avibras transferred numerous Astros-2 artillery rocket systems—also derived from Sonda rocket technology—to Iraq during its war with Iran in the 1980s. Some reports even claimed that Iraq shipped a Scud missile to Brazil where Avibras replicated the missile’s components in order to provide replacement parts to the Iraqi military. In North Africa, Libya reportedly offered to conclude a$2 billion arms cooperation package with Brazil in exchange for assistance in missile development.
American concern focused on the possible diversion of this technology to states such as Iraq and Brazil’s potential development of a long-range nuclear-armed missile.The latter was of concern due to Brazil’s “parallel program” to develop a nuclear weapon. In June 1992, the U.S. Department of Commerce included the Sonda-3,Sonda-4, and VLS rockets and the SS-300, SS-1,000,and MB/EE missiles, on a list of missile projects of concern. Indeed, the MTCR embargo had succeeded in restricting considerably Brazil’s access to the technology needed to complete development of the VLS by the early 1990s. According to a 1992 U.S. Department of Defense study, the VLS program was particularly limited in the area of “inertial navigation and vehicle control systems.” This occurred despite Brazil’s efforts to acquire the necessary materials and assistance from non-MTCR members such as Russia.
Although Brazil was not required to sacrifice its space launch program, membership was approved on condition that the SS series of ballistic missile projects (SS-300,SS-600, and SS-1,000) had been terminated.
ASTROS https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/astros.htm BAD
Brazil emerged as one of the leading armaments exporters in the early 1980s. The largest regional market was the Middle East, to which Brazil sold roughly half of its arms from 1977 through 1988, with nearly half of all Brazilian arms transfers from 1985 to 1989 going to Iraq. In the late 1980s, Avibrás was involved in the development of the SS-150 (based on the Astros-II), the SS-300, and the SS-1000 (based largely on the Sonda rockets). However, with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decline in state support, the Brazilian arms industry collapsed in the late 1980s, and by the mid-1990s had virtually disappeared. All Avibrás programs were "put on hold" in January 1990, when the company filed for bankruptcy. Its employee roster had fallen from 6,000 to 900, and the company had US$90 million worth of unsold rockets. Avibrás has paid off much of its debt, and is the most viable of the three large companies. Today, it is involved in the production of primarily civilian products, and seemingly is a successful case of conversion.
Anti-Weapons Activism and Arms Bans: Why Brazil Banned Anti-Personnel Mines but Not Cluster Munitions | Foreign Policy Analysis | Oxford Academic
https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/21/3/oraf019/8136451 GOOD
For example, when joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994–1995, Brazil terminated projects to comply with the regime's 300 km range and 500 kg payload limits. In the 1980s, Brazil had a partially executed ballistic missile project (SS-300) and two planned ones (SS-600 and SS-1000) beyond the MTCR's limits. These projects were based on Avibras’ Sonda program, under which a family of rockets was to be developed (Tollefson 1990; Bowen 1996). These projects had been suspended in the early 1990s—before Brazil announced its intent to join the MTCR—but could have been revived if Brazil decided not to join it.
Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the MTCR: a Ten Year Review
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/conf/mid01/ GOOD
Target States - MTCR successes.
Since the MTCR's advent, six states - Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Egypt - have curbed their ballistic missile development aspirations. Further, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa have gone on to become MTCR members, thus strengthening the regime. A number of domestic and external political and economic factors, as well as MTCR restrictions and US pressure, were behind the cancellation of the above mentioned missile programs.
Argentina and Brazil embarked upon missile programs from the early 1980s onwards for national security reasons (stemming from mutual threat perceptions between the two states) and also with the intention of acquiring foreign exchange from missile exports. In 1984, Argentina embarked on the Condor II missile project in collaboration with Egypt and Iraq, and with German and Italian firms. Brazil's missile program was undertaken in the 1980s by two firms - Orbita, which worked on MB/EE-150, -350, -600 and -1000 missiles based on Sonda sounding rockets, and Avibras, which was developing SS-300 and SS-1000 missiles (numbers correspond to the system's range in kilometers).
A transition to civilian democratic regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s played an important role in Argentina and Brazil's eventual decision to scrap their missile programs. Civilian governments placed greater emphasis on economic reforms than on military power, and were therefore willing to curb missile programs. The newly installed civilian governments also undertook a number of confidence building initiatives (particularly nuclear confidence building agreements signed in 1990-91) that greatly improved bilateral relations, thereby removing the national security reasons for continuing with missile programs.
Further, difficulty in obtaining the necessary technology (due to MTCR restrictions) considerably hindered the missile programs of Argentina and Brazil and raised the costs of production. The Condor project was hampered by the failure to develop accurate guidance systems, and the missile reportedly failed a launch test. Brazil's missile programs encountered technical difficulties in building guidance and control components, liquid fuel propulsion systems, and the technology for igniting and separating rocket stages. 24 A decrease in the demand for missiles after the Iran-Iraq war further reduced the economic viability and profit-making potential of these missile projects. US diplomatic pressure on Argentina and Brazil caused economic aid (in the form of investment, technology and credit from the West) to be linked to a reduction in their military budgets and the scrapping of their missile programs, measures which civilian governments were willing to undertake for reasons cited above.
Argentina announced the suspension of the Condor II project in April 1990, and finally declared the termination of the project in May 1991. Argentina then adopted export controls consistent with MTCR guidelines in April 1992, and turned over to Spain components from the Condor II program for destruction; Argentina's application for membership was approved by MTCR member states in March 1993. 25 While Brazil continues to develop artillery rockets (Avibras produces and exports the SS-series of rockets, having ranges varying from 30- 80 km), Brazil scrapped its ballistic missile programs and announced its desire to adhere to MTCR guidelines in December 1994. In Brazil's case, two additional factors were influential in its final decision to accede to the MTCR - the need to acquire technology for its VLS space launch vehicle (the MTCR technology embargo had brought this project to a virtual standstill), and Brazil's desire to be seen as a responsible international actor because of its aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 26 Brazil formally acceded to the MTCR in October 1995, retaining its space program which now avails of and benefits through technology transfers from MTCR members.
BRAZIL THE UNITED STATES AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Brazil,_the_United_States,_and_the_missile_technology_control_regime_(IA_brazilunitedstat00toll).pdf GOOD
Avibras is now developinq a series of ballistic missiles.The SS-150, with a ranqe of 150 kilometers, was projected to be operational by 1987, but may only be available in the early 1990s. The SS-300, perhaps the most important ballistic missile being developed in Brazil, is based on the solid-fuel Sonda IV rocket, with an indigenously-designed inertial guidance system.It will have a range of 300 kilometers (185 miles) , and will be capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram (2,200 pound) warhead. TheSS-300 missile would be purchased by the Brazilian Army, but its major market is likely to be the Middle East. Libya and Iraqhave already expressed interest in the SS-300. A full-scale prototype of the SS-300 has already been completed, but it willnot be operational until the late-1990s.
Some mention has been made of an SS-1000, based on the Sonda rocket and with a range of 1,200 kilometers (740 miles). The SS1000, to be designed by the CTA, has yet to be funded. If research and development funds were made available and the production were effected, the project would be controversial,because its expanded payload capability would enable it to carry a nuclear warhead. If developed and later sold, such a missile in the hands of the Libyans or Iraqis could have serious implications for Israeli, U.S., and North Atlantic Treaty Organization interests in the region. Furthermore, the SS-1000 could reach any target in South America from Brazil. No timetable has been officially set for the SS-1000, but even if a political decision were made to produce the missile, it is unlikely that it would become available prior to the turn of the century.
Orbita inherited the MB/EE-150 project from Engemissil, a subsidiary of Engesa. As a result of Orbita 's financial constraints, the MB/EE-150 has not been developed, nor is it under active research and development at this point. The MB/EE-150 was to have been only the first in a series of missiles, including the MB/EE-350 (with a 350 kilometer range)the MB/EE-600 (600 kilometers), and the MB/EE-1000 (1,000 kilometers) - all based on the Sonda series of experimental rockets.
The Iraqis are especially interested in the SS-300 missile, and may be partially funding that program. According to one report,the SS-3 00 could be a direct copy of the Soviet SS-1 Scud B that Iraq may have supplied to Brazil. In March 1989 Globo reported that Brazil and Iraq may join in a wide-ranging program of scientific and technological cooperation to train Iraqi engineers and researchers, and to develop aircraft, rockets,satellites, and weapons. .. .As of now, the most promising part of the program is the joint development of satellites and missiles. ... Iraq is also interested in acquiring technologies relating to rockets and missiles capable of launching satellites, and is disposed to finance part of the Brazilian Space Program in exchange for the technology.
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[URL]https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA282107.pdf
GOOD
[URL]https://core.ac.uk/reader/36718580
PAYWALLED ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679329008448983
[URL]https://scholarsarchive.libr...nt.cgi?article=1002&context=honorscollege_pos
[URL]https://api.pageplace.de/pre...A36687113/preview-9780429694639_A36687113.pdf
PAYWALLED ttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780333982280_2
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DPRKNAVYFeb2011
Bush bullied CIA in order to dupe us (do you need the BARF Alert?)
[URL]https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1072445/posts?page=9
The best known is Hugo de Oliveira Piva, who has been called "Brazil's Dr. von Braun." A former head of CTA (Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial) (Aerospace Technical Center), Brazil's premier missile lab, he was caught in Iraq with a team of Brazilian missile experts when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Piva then humiliated his government by taking as long as he could to come home. "Piva's name comes up a lot," the U.S. official says. In a recent interview with the Brazilian newspaper Istoe, Piva said he would view the resumption of Brazilian missile projects with satisfaction. "I regard these projects as my children whom I used to hold on my lap." Piva's "children" may be the MB/EE and SS-series missiles Brazil was working on during the 1980s. A consortium of Brazilian firms known as Orbita was trying to develop a medium-range missile based on the Sonda-IV space rocket with foreign financing. As a missile, the rocket could carry a 500 kilogram payload up to 1,800 kilometers, almost as far as the U.S. Pershing II missile. Avibras, Brazil's largest weapon exporter, was also working on a line of surface-to-surface missiles known as the SS-300 and the SS-1000
Nº 027 1990 Mayo
[URL]https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/r/e/red_027.pdf
[URL]https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/dossier/die-heimliche-raketenmacht/
TRANSLATED
The civilian SONDA versions correspond to military ballistic missiles, whereby the required accuracy is achieved by the installation of an inertial guidance system. Thus, the Brazilian battlefield missiles SS-07, SS-40, and SS-60 (the Army designations of the latter two types are FTG X-20 and FTG X-40) are the direct counterparts to the SONDA-I, SONDA-II, and SONDA-III and even carry the same payload masses. These artillery rockets, with ranges of less than 100 km, are fired from the mobile ASTROS I and II rocket launchers, with a caliber of 127 mm corresponding to the diameter of the Sonda-I's motor. 51In addition, Avibras is developing two longer-range ballistic missiles. The mobile SS-300 (300 km range) is based on the Sonda-IV and, with its 1,000 kg warhead, is designed to deliver a variety of submunitions precisely against personnel, tanks, or fortifications. The 1,200 km range SS-1000 is likely a further development of the SONDA-IV and shares certain similarities with the Pershing Ia. Orbita is also developing a family of short- and medium-range missiles from the SONDA series: a 150 km range mobile tactical missile designated MB/EE-150, as well as missiles designated MB/EE-350, MB/EE-600, and MB/EE-1000 with ranges of 350, 600, and 1,000 km. All of these missiles use inertial guidance systems, and the use of terminal guidance systems is even planned.
PAYWALLED ttps://www.academia.edu/17851827/Forças_Armadas_defesa_e_segurança
1200 km
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ORBITA MB/EE-300
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A----------------------------------------------------
ORBITA MB/EE-600
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A----------------------------------------------------
ORBITA MB/EE-1000
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A[URL]https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/brazil.htm
[URL]https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_99pns03.html
[URL]https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA261959.pdf
[URL]http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/12739/28898284-MIT.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA222455.pdf
[URL]https://upload.wikimedia.org...ient_country._(IA_brazilianaerospa00silv).pdf
AVIBRAS has several facilities around Sao Jose dos Campos thatrepresent a total area over 13 million square meters of floor space, employing more than 5000 people. The group has three subsidiary companies: TECTRANS.A., TECTRONIC S.A., and TRANSVIP S.A. Defense products include rocket engines of several calibers, a wide range of single and multiple charge warheadsand fuses, self-propelled and towed-driven multiple launchers, and short medium,and long-range systems for the ASTROS II (Artillery Saturation Rocket System)multiple-rocket-launching systems (with SS-30, SS-40, and SS-60). Its electronic antiaircraft system is called FILA (Fighting Intruders at Low Altitudes)'^. Its air-to ground defense systems include twin machine-gun pods for light aircraft, several types of reusable and disposable rocket multiple launchers, and general purpose,incendiary, and special applications bombs. Its surface-to-surface missiles include the Barracuda (SM-70) anti-ship missile, an Exocet type. The company's conceptual project is an anti-aircraft missile named SOLAR by the Army
AVIBRAS is also at the heart of the Brazilian space program building the SONDA line rockets. It is developing a series of missiles (the SS-150, SS-300, and SS-1000 with ranges of 150, 300, and 1000 km respectively). They are perhaps the most important ballistic missiles being developed in Brazil today. The SS-300 missile is based on solid-fuel SONDA IV rocket, with an indigenously designed inertial guidance system. AVI BRAS is hoping to achieve extreme accuracy, precluding the requirement for a nuclear warhead
ORBITA was created in February 1987 to coordinate Brazil's missile program. It is owned by Engenheiros Associados - ENGESA (40%), EMBRAER(40%), Engenharia de Sistemas de Controle de Automacao - ESCA (11%),Industria de Material Belico do Brasil - IMBEL (5%), and Participacoes e Consultoria - PARCON (4%). Initially ORBITA was developing guided missiles aswell as rockets and satellite launchers for the space program. However, the Armyand Air Force have transferred to them some missile projects developed insidetheir research centers.ORBITA has four simultaneous missile projects. The first, namely LEO, will be an anti-tank, laser guided missile based on Italian technology from OTO MELARA company and is being developed for the Brazilian Army'®^. Thesecond project includes British Aerospace for the production of a missile incorporating technology used in the Thunderbolt. The Brazilian version (MSA-3.2) will be in the Mach 3 class but it's likely to be extremely agile, possibly incorporating British thruster and television guidance technology. The third project is the MAA-1 (called MOL in honor to the Aeronautics Ministry Brigadier Moreira Lima) air-to-air missile, originally developed by the CTA research program called PIRANHA. It is an infra-red, thermal-attracted air-to-air missile for "dog fight" combat designed under contract for the Aeronautics Ministry to fit the AMX and its other fighters. The last project, the MB/EE-150 and maybe the most important, had been under development by Engemissil, a subsidiary of ENGESA. It is a mobile tacticalmissile, fired from a dual launcher chassis, and capable of carrying a 500 kg warhead to a range of 150 km. This missile generated a family of other missiles such as the MB/EE-350, the MB/EE-600, and the MB/EE-1000 with ranges of350, 600, and 1000 km, respectively.
[URL]https://np3.augie.edu/digital/api/collection/p16078coll6/id/4541/download
[URL]https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4810551.pdf
[URL]https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13-5-1.pdf
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https://www.facebook.com/Trincheira...sões-tomadas-há-2030-anos-du/469258073473839/[/URL]
cancelou os projetos SS-300 e SS-1000, como condição prévia para seu ingresso no MTCR (1995)
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=958895196282473&set= p.958895196282473&type=3
Folha de São Paulo, 26 de setembro de 1988.
Míssil brasileiro causa preocupação no exterior
Os ministros da Defesa da URSS e EUA, Dimitri Yazov e Frank Carlucci, reúnem-se hoje em Washington. A principal preocupação das duas partes são as informações de que a empresa brasileira Órbita Sistemas Aeroespaciais (formada por uma associação da Engesa, Embraer, Imbel e Esca) já está desenvolvendo o projeto do míssil SS-1000 (com condições de atingir um alvo a mil quilômetros) para a década de 90, quando estará operacional. Os principais clientes para esse míssil serão alguns países árabes. Além disso, discutirão a restrição de transferência de tecnologia de ponta às indústrias nacionais do setor bélico.
O SS-1000 começou a ser projetado em 1983 no Centro Técnico Aeroespacial (CTA), órgão do Ministério da Aeronáutica, sediado em São José dos Campos (SP). Por falta de verbas, o projeto ficou parado até o final de 86. Quando à Orbita foi criada, em janeiro de 87, o vice-presidente de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento da empresa, major-brigadeiro Hugo de Oliveira Piva, reexaminou o projeto. Após um estudo de mercado, a empresa decidiu ressuscitar o SS-1000: o Iraque e a Arábia Saudita se interessaram por esse míssil de alcance médio.
A entrevista do ministro da Defesa da União Soviética ao jornal francês "Liberátion" anteontem foi considerada um recado aos países árabes que utilizam produtos bélicos do Brasil. Tanto os EUA como a URSS sempre tiveram no Oriente Médio um excelente mercado para a venda de armamentos.
[URL]https://www.facebook.com/Trinc...is-de-washingtonontem-a-vene/456049888127991/
Na prática, o MTCR foi concebido pelas potências do G-7 para impedir que países intermediários – como o Brasil – consigam alterar a divisão internacional de poder econômico e militar. Nesse contexto, Washington impunha pesados embargos ao Programa Espacial Brasileiro, razão pela qual as Forças Armadas eram levadas a reprogramar seus custos e prazos, segundo o Coronel-Aviador Antonio Carlos de Freitas Pedrosa, Diretor do Instituto de Atividades Espaciais da FAB [2]. Apesar do cerco, durante os anos 80 o País persistiu na empreitada: não renunciou aos objetivos civis do Programa Espacial (projeto VLS + satélites), nem aos seus objetivos militares (mísseis SS-300 e SS-1000, estes últimos de longo alcance).
A rendição final veio em 18/08/1995, quando o Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso assegurou, em discurso proferido na cidade de São José dos Campos, que o "Brasil não possui, não produz e não pretende produzir, importar ou exportar mísseis militares de longo alcance". Em 10/10/1995, o Brasil protocolou seu pedido de adesão ao MTCR, com apoio do governo americano, junto ao qual assumiu o compromisso de cancelar os projetos SS-300 e SS-1000 [3]. O SS-300, então na fase de protótipo, foi desmantelado, enquanto o SS-1000, que ainda estava na prancheta, voltou para a gaveta das Forças Armadas – onde permanece até hoje. Desde então, o Programa Espacial limita-se aos seus objetivos civis (projeto VLS, satélites, etc.).
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GENERAL INFOhttps://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arq..._empresasa_dea_defesaa_avibrasa_ea_engesa.pdf
Em entrevista à Folha de São Paulo, o diretor de relações oficiais da Avibrasanunciava que a empresa deveria efetuar cortes em seu quadro de pessoal paraevitar problemas financeiros. Pedro Vial declarava que apesar de a Avibras aindamanter a posição de maior exportador brasileiro de produtos de defesa nãosignificava que a situação da empresa fosse boa. “Tem que existir uma taxa cambialestável. Isso é uma questão de justiça com os exportadores brasileiros”, dizia ele.Na mesma entrevista, Vial comentava que a empresa estava tendo grandes perdas121com investimentos em projetos que ainda não haviam trazido retornos financeiros,como o do míssil SS-300 para o Exército e do míssil Barracuda para a Marinha,ambos sem nenhuma encomenda.
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bowen33.pdf
https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/21/3/oraf019/8136451
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...ontrol_regime_(IA_brazilunitedstat00toll).pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA241068.pdf
Brazil: RPBM-Re!ated Missile Develooment
Brazil, like Argentina, has a relatively advanced aerospace technology base for a regional power and has several Interrelated missile development programs that are contributing to the proliferation of RPBM-related technology. Brazil aggressively markets Its military missileexports and does not place any lend user' restrictions on subsequent transfers of missiles among potentially hostile regional powers. (7:88,94)
With French and West German assistance, Brazil produced hundreds of the 'SONDA" series of suborbital scientific sounding rockets with progressively increasing payload and altitude capablilt!'. The latest SONDA-IV version is credited with a 500 kg payload and a surface-tosurface range estimated at 625 km. (43:432; 44:15; 7:88-92) The SONDAs were two stage vehicles which gave Brazil initial experience with multistage design approaches required for longer range solid propellant RPBMS.
Brazil's Avibras company used the civilian SONDA rocket motor designs as the basis for the military "ASTROS-'I' unguided artillery rockets which have been exported in large numbers to Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Iraq, Brazil's best military customer, used the ASTROS-II extensively in the Iran-Iraq War. (26:293; 7:94)
Two Brazilian RPBM development programs had been highlighted in earlier missile proliferation studies. (7:89,90; 26:293) Avlbras has conducted preliminary ground tests of the rocket motor for a missile designated the SS-300 with a design range of 300 km. In addition, Avibras and the Brazilian government's Aerospace Technical Center collaborated on the design of a missile designated the SS-1000 with a nominal range of 1200 km, but development of that longer range design has apparently not been approved. (7:89,90; 26:293; 44:16) Therefore. these Brazilian programs are in much earlier stages of the development cycle that the comparable Iraqi, Chinese, North Korean, and Indian programs which have already progressed into flight test or even into production.
Brazil's most ambitious missile program is the 'VLSI satellite launch vehicle being developed under the Indigenous civilian "Total BraziliAn Space Program'. The design of the four stage, solid propellant"VLS is based on technology from the SONDA rocket series. (44:15; 7:90) This large booster weighs approximately 49 tonnes. Although Brazil denies that It has military applications, the VLS could have an IRBM-classsurface-to-surface range of approximately 3,000 km If equipped with a reentry vehicle. (7:90,91; 26:293) However, the VLS program has been repeatedly delayed. In March 1968, Brazil announced that the first launch had again been postponed because of MTCR restrictions. (7:90) Although a subscale prototype was launched In 1989, development of the full scale VLS has been delayed by MTCR constraints on the availability of guidance components, and the first launch is now not scheduled until 1992. (46:8)
Avibras has formally announced formation of a joint venture with China for launch of a Brazilian Earth observation satellite on a Chinese booster and collaboration in satellite and booster technologies. (45)Reportedly, the Brazilians are transferring western solid propellant technology to China in return for Chinese liquid propulsion and guidance technologies. (7:93) This Chinese technical assistance could help Brazil's VLS booster progress into flight test. (7:90,94; 26:293)
https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/brazil.htm
ttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780333982280_2
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA216958.pdf
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597238808460772
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w28h60b
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/conf/mid01/
https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/cidpwww/files/uploaded_files/OP36.pdf
https://core.ac.uk/download/36718580.pdf
https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-pdf/21/3/oraf019/63227553/oraf019.pdf
https://scholarsarchive.library.alb...nt.cgi?article=1002&context=honorscollege_pos
https://www.kimerius.com/app/download/5783717753/Transferencia+de+armamentos+de+alta+tecnología+y+seguridad+regional+en+América+Latina.pdf
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679329008448983
https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/dossier/die-heimliche-raketenmacht/
ttps://www.academia.edu/11367297/The_Proliferation_of
https://ru.dgb.unam.mx/server/api/core/bitstreams/4268ca59-52be-426e-ae89-0ace24daa01f/content
http://www.atomictraveler.com/WeapMassDestruct.pdf Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems Issue 38 (2003) | PDF | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile | Anti Ballistic Missile
https://pt.scribd.com/document/735568004/Jane-s-Strategic-Weapon-Systems-Issue-38-2003
https://archive.org/stream/ArabTimes1987KuwaitEnglish/Dec 17 1987, Arab Times, #7121, Kuwait (en)_djvu.txt
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1072445/posts?page=9
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/134/134757_DPRKNAVYFeb2011.docx
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https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP93T00451R000100010001-9.pdfhttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA261959.pdf
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus6.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA339413.pdf
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597238808460772
ttps://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4810551.pdf
https://www.rbth.com/defence/2014/07/14/the_scud_a_missile_destined_for_universal_cloning_38185.html
ttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/283796560_Dual_Use_of_Missiles_and_Space_Technologies
http://etd.lib.jnu.ac.in/TH5934.pdf
ttps://www.academia.edu/111821348/Scud_Alert_The_History_Development_and_Military_Significance_of_Ballistic_Missiles_on_Tactical_Operations
https://cdn.manchesterhistory.org/News/Manchester Evening Hearld_1988-03-28.pdf
https://www.wisconsinproject.org/brazils-rockets-and-missiles-update-2000/
https://www.wisconsinproject.org/brazils-rockets/
https://acervodigital.ufpr.br/xmlui...Z-DOMINGOS-MARTINI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/12739/28898284-MIT.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
https://pt.scribd.com/document/557398051/Forcas-de-Defesa-07
anunciou o desenvolvimento de um
míssil superfície-superfície com guiagem
inercial, capaz de atingir um
alvo a 300km de distância. Este míssil
tinha como propósito ser o “Scud
nacional”, pois seu desempenho assemelhava-
se ao do míssil soviético
Scud-B (R-17 Elbrus).
Esse projeto ia de encontro à proposta
de outra empresa, a Engesa,
cujo MB/EE-150 possuía metade do
alcance do concorrente (150km), porém
prometido como o primeiro de
uma “família” que objetivava outro
com alcance de 300km, a ser fabricado
pela então recém-criada Órbita.
Não é segredo que a Avibras e a
Engesa nunca estiveram em sintonia.
A concorrência entre as duas era evidente
na época. O projeto da Avibras
chegou ao estágio de “mock-up” nas
instalações da empresa em São José
dos Campos. Porém, por falta de apoio
mais explícito, o projeto foi abandonado.
O MB/EE-150, assim como as suas
variantes propostas, morreu junto
com a extinção da Órbita.
----------------------------------------------------
AVIBRAS SS-300 (prototype built)
----------------------------------------------------
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bowen33.pdfSuspicion deepened in the mid-1980s when the firms Orbita and Avibras began developing ballistic missiles (the MB/ EE and SS series, respectively) derived primarily from technology developed for the Sonda rocket series.4 Moreover, the Armed Forces Joint Command assumed responsibility for coordinating all missile development and production in Brazil in 1986. Brazil’s missile aspirations were fueled in part by Argentina’s simultaneous effort to develop the mediumrange Condor-2 ballistic missile. In addition, Brazil’s profitable export of weaponry, strategic technology, and the associated technical know-how in the 1980s and early 1990s suggested that Brazil’s missile programs were also driven by financial motivations. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Brazilian engineers reportedly assisted Iraq in extending the range of its Soviet-supplied Scud-B ballistic missiles.5 Avibras was also accused of working on joint missile research and development programs with Iraq.6 Indeed, Avibras transferred numerous Astros-2 artillery rocket systems—also derived from Sonda rocket technology—to Iraq during its war with Iran in the 1980s.7 Some reports even claimed that Iraq shipped a Scud missile to Brazil where Avibras replicated the missile’s components in order to provide replacement parts to the Iraqi military.8 In North Africa, Libya reportedly offered to conclude a $2 billion arms cooperation package with Brazil in exchange for assistance in missile development.9 Missile proliferation concerns subsequently drove Washington to persuade its MTCR partners to stop exporting space launch and other strategic technologies to Brazil. For example, the Bush administration initiated a successful campaign to dissuade the French government from approving an Arianespace-proposed transfer to Brazil of rocket-motor technology for the VLS that could potentially be used in the development of ballistic missiles.10 Arianespace had offered liquid-fueled Viking rocket-motors, and the capability to manufacture them indigenously, in an attempt to sweeten its bid for a contract to launch two Brazilian satellites.11 White House officials asserted, however, that such a transfer would set back the international effort to stem missile proliferation because of Brazil’s history of developing military rockets using technology from its civilian space program.12 American concern focused on the possible diversion of this technology to states such as Iraq and Brazil’s potential development of a long-range nuclear-armed missile. The latter was of concern due to Brazil’s “parallel program” to develop a nuclear weapon. In June 1992, the U.S. Department of Commerce included the Sonda-3, Sonda-4, and VLS rockets and the SS-300, SS-1,000, and MB/EE missiles, on a list of missile projects of concern.13 Indeed, the MTCR embargo had succeeded in restricting considerably Brazil’s access to the technology needed to complete development of the VLS by the early 1990s. According to a 1992 U.S. Department of Defense study, the VLS program was particularly limited in the area of “inertial navigation and vehicle control systems.”14 This occurred despite Brazil’s efforts to acquire the necessary materials and assistance from non-MTCR members such as Russia.15
https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/21/3/oraf019/8136451
Between 1995 and 1998, Brazil joined various WMD and missile control regimes, sacrificing potential military power and arms trade revenues for benefits in other areas. For example, when joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994–1995, Brazil terminated projects to comply with the regime's 300 km range and 500 kg payload limits. In the 1980s, Brazil had a partially executed ballistic missile project (SS-300) and two planned ones (SS-600 and SS-1000) beyond the MTCR's limits. These projects were based on Avibras’ Sonda program, under which a family of rockets was to be developed (Tollefson 1990; Bowen 1996). These projects had been suspended in the early 1990s—before Brazil announced its intent to join the MTCR—but could have been revived if Brazil decided not to join it.
ttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA241068.pdf
Avlbras has conducted preliminary ground tests of the rocket motor for a missile designated the SS-300 with a design range of 300 km. In addition, Avibras and the Brazilian government's Aerospace Technical Center collaborated on the design of a missile designated the SS-1000 with a nominal range of 1200 km, but development of that longer range design has apparently not been approved. (7:89,90; 26:293; 44:16)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Brazil,_the_United_States,_and_the_missile_technology_control_regime_(IA_brazilunitedstat00toll).pdf
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w28h60b
ORBITA was created in 1987 as a joint venture among private firms (including Engesa) and
Embraer, although it never materialized from the planning stages. It was originally designed to
consolidate missile-development activities: to convert the Sonda-IV space rocket into a missile
with the help of extensive technical assistance from West German and French firms, and to develop
the Leo anti-tank missile and the Piranha air-to-air missile, which never entered the production
stage. By the latter half of the 1980s Brazil's efforts in this area included the development of
ground-based SS-300 missiles (which never came into being) and Barracuda sea-launched missiles
for tactical warheads. The Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV ), capable of launching a 440 lb payload
into a 435-mile orbit, was scheduled to be ready by early 1996, but was eventually cancelled. In
1993, about 200 Brazilian companies (including Avibras and Embraer) joined in the Aerospace
Industries Association of Brazil, in order to promote exports.
ttps://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/cidpwww/files/uploaded_files/OP36.pdf
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/conf/mid01/
Since the MTCR's advent, six states - Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Egypt - have curbed their ballistic missile development aspirations. Further, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa have gone on to become MTCR members, thus strengthening the regime. A number of domestic and external political and economic factors, as well as MTCR restrictions and US pressure, were behind the cancellation of the above mentioned missile programs.
Argentina and Brazil embarked upon missile programs from the early 1980s onwards for national security reasons (stemming from mutual threat perceptions between the two states) and also with the intention of acquiring foreign exchange from missile exports. In 1984, Argentina embarked on the Condor II missile project in collaboration with Egypt and Iraq, and with German and Italian firms. Brazil's missile program was undertaken in the 1980s by two firms - Orbita, which worked on MB/EE-150, -350, -600 and -1000 missiles based on Sonda sounding rockets, and Avibras, which was developing SS-300 and SS-1000 missiles (numbers correspond to the system's range in kilometers).
A transition to civilian democratic regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s played an important role in Argentina and Brazil's eventual decision to scrap their missile programs. Civilian governments placed greater emphasis on economic reforms than on military power, and were therefore willing to curb missile programs. The newly installed civilian governments also undertook a number of confidence building initiatives (particularly nuclear confidence building agreements signed in 1990-91) that greatly improved bilateral relations, thereby removing the national security reasons for continuing with missile programs.
Further, difficulty in obtaining the necessary technology (due to MTCR restrictions) considerably hindered the missile programs of Argentina and Brazil and raised the costs of production. The Condor project was hampered by the failure to develop accurate guidance systems, and the missile reportedly failed a launch test. Brazil's missile programs encountered technical difficulties in building guidance and control components, liquid fuel propulsion systems, and the technology for igniting and separating rocket stages. 24 A decrease in the demand for missiles after the Iran-Iraq war further reduced the economic viability and profit-making potential of these missile projects. US diplomatic pressure on Argentina and Brazil caused economic aid (in the form of investment, technology and credit from the West) to be linked to a reduction in their military budgets and the scrapping of their missile programs, measures which civilian governments were willing to undertake for reasons cited above.
Argentina announced the suspension of the Condor II project in April 1990, and finally declared the termination of the project in May 1991. Argentina then adopted export controls consistent with MTCR guidelines in April 1992, and turned over to Spain components from the Condor II program for destruction; Argentina's application for membership was approved by MTCR member states in March 1993. 25 While Brazil continues to develop artillery rockets (Avibras produces and exports the SS-series of rockets, having ranges varying from 30- 80 km), Brazil scrapped its ballistic missile programs and announced its desire to adhere to MTCR guidelines in December 1994. In Brazil's case, two additional factors were influential in its final decision to accede to the MTCR - the need to acquire technology for its VLS space launch vehicle (the MTCR technology embargo had brought this project to a virtual standstill), and Brazil's desire to be seen as a responsible international actor because of its aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 26 Brazil formally acceded to the MTCR in October 1995, retaining its space program which now avails of and benefits through technology transfers from MTCR members.
ttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780333982280_2
ttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597238808460772
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA216958.pdf
ttps://core.ac.uk/reader/36718580
https://lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/10247/000591742.pdf?sequence=1
Durante a “Guerra das Cidades”, em 1987, os dois países computavam, segundo Dilip Hiro (1991), 277 mísseis lançados nas principais cidades iraquianas e iranianas. Os mísseis Al-Hussein iraquianos começavam, gradativamente, a substituir os Scuds B soviéticos. O Iraque dispunha de mísseis soviéticos, também disporia de mísseis brasileiros, pois técnicos iraquianos vieram a São José dos Campos para acompanhar o teste do SS-300, segundo Timmerman (1992) cumpria a mesma tarefa do artefato soviético. Estruturava-se, naquela cidade paulista, uma operação com auxílio de técnicos franceses e alemães ocidentais para modificar os Scud-B e abastecê-los com combustível sólido.
tps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679329008448983
https://www.kimerius.com/app/download/5783717753/Transferencia+de+armamentos+de+alta+tecnología+y+seguridad+regional+en+América+Latina.pdf
ttp://www.capcomespace.net/dossiers/bresil/VLS.htm
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/12739/28898284-MIT.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Joao Verdi (the Avibras President) says Avibras still uses imported gyros
https://pt.scribd.com/document/273333203/134757-DPRKNAVYFeb2011-3
Brazilian variant. Its IOC was planned for 1991, but delayed. It is larger than the Scud-B at 37 ft 9 in (11.5 m) long; 3 ft 3 in (1.0 m) in diameter; and weighs 17,637 lb (8,000 kg). It has the same range and an unknown accuracy. Under development by Avibras Aeroespacial SA, San Jose dos Campos, Brazil. There were unconfirmed reports that Iraq wished to purchase the SS-300 in 1988. A 621-mile (1,000-km) range version, the SS-1000, was also under development.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/The_Brazilian_aerospace_industry-_a_case_study_of_the_technological_impact_of_offset_agreements_in_a_recipient_country._(IA_brazilianaerospa00silv).pdf
ttp://www.atomictraveler.com/WeapMassDestruct.pdf
ttps://www.academia.edu/17851827/Forças_Armadas_defesa_e_segurança
https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/dossier/die-heimliche-raketenmacht/
https://pt.scribd.com/document/735568004/Jane-s-Strategic-Weapon-Systems-Issue-38-2003
https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/r/e/red_027.pdf
ttps://archive.org/stream/ArabTimes1987KuwaitEnglish/Dec%2017%201987%2C%20Arab%20Times%2C%20%237121%2C%20Kuwait%20%28en%29_djvu.txt
https://tesiunamdocumentos.dgb.unam.mx/pmig2017/0070383/0070383.pdf
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1072445/posts?page=9
----------------------------------------------------
ORBITA MB/EE-150
----------------------------------------------------
ttps://www.yumpu.com/pt/document/view/32254899/foguetes-e-ma-sseis-no-exacrcito-brasileiro-1949-funcebttps://pt.scribd.com/document/557398051/Forcas-de-Defesa-07
https://www.kimerius.com/app/download/5783717753/Transferencia+de+armamentos+de+alta+tecnología+y+seguridad+regional+en+América+Latina.pdf
Scud Alert: The History, Development, and Military Significance of Ballistic Missiles on Tactical Operations
ttps://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Press%20Cuttings/1988%20June.pdf
ttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA339413.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA345453.pdf
AVIBRAS, ENGESA MISSILE PROJECTS DESCRIBED PY140023 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 11 Jan 87 p A-8 [Text] The Brazilian Aerospace Industry, Avibras, will present to the Armed Forces and the international market its first two missiles sometime between July 1988 and January 1989. These missiles will be the SS-300 [surface-tosurface], and the "Barracuda," which will come in two versions, surface-to-sea, and sea-to-sea. Also, by mid-1988, the "MOL (formerly "Piranha") missile will be tested for the first time. It will be air-launched against guided or towed targets. Meanwhile, ENGESA [Specialized Engineers, Inc] directors expect to present their MD/EE-150 missile in 1990. This missile is meant to be used by land, troops. ENGESA experts believe that by 1990—possibly working in the facilities of the Orbita Company (to be formed by ENGESA, EMBRAER [Brazilian Aeronautics Company] and four smaller companies specifically to manufacture missiles)—the prototypes of the antitank missiles ordered by the Army will be in the advanced testing phase. These missiles will be based on Italian technology. The following is a summary of each of the missile projects developed by the Brazilian weapon industry: SS-300—This is currently the most important Avibras project. Its characteristics are similar to those of the Soviet "Seud B," long used by the Warsaw Pact (Eastern European Alliance headed by the USSR) troops. It will have a 300-km range, and will be guided to its target by the SIS, Inertial Solidarity System [Sistema Inercial Solidario]. The SIS was developed by Avibras, and based on American technology but it is descfibed as relatively uncomplicated. In order to test this missile in Brazil, Avibras will certainly have to be on better terms with the Aeronautics Ministry, which operates the only testing ground for this sort of weapon: The Barreira do Inferno Launching Center in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte State. Another testing site that could be used is the Restinga do Marambaia Army Testing Ground in Rio de Janeiro State. This areas, however, is surrounded by much passenger ship and airplane traffic. 90 MB/EE-150—Is ENGESA's counterpart of the Avibras SS-300. It will have a 150- km range, and be the first of a "family" that is expected to include the MB/EE-300 by 1995 (with a 300-km range). This weapon will be for tactical use, and the first ballistic missile to be developed by the new Orbita Company. SM_70~This is the "Barracuda" version developed by Avibras for coastal defense. During the first half of 1985, two Army officers visited military installations on the coast of Sweden, northwestern Europe, and drafted a flattering report of the Swedish defense system, based on small battalionsized units, which are extremely mobile. These units combined sophisticated radar with powerful coastal defense missiles and cannons with a rapid firing rate. During the second half of 1986, Army Minister General Leonidas Pires Goncalves went to Sweden to inspect the system closely. Brazilian coastal artillery still uses heavy British and American cannons made before the Second World War". m_70--This is the naval "Barracuda" launched from a ship at surface targets. Avibras expects its performance to be comparable to that ofthe MM-40 Exocet, built by the French Aerospatiale. Each "Barracuda" will weigh nearly 800 kg (of which 150 or 300 kg will be the explosive charge), and have a maximum range of 70 km. The plans for this missile have already been sent to the Navy Staff, which has not yet officially expressed interest in it. t^oi/'—For the past 6 years the FAB has been working on the development of this missile. The former "Piranha" will not be the last of its type when it is ready for use in 1989. Its manufacture, which was entrusted to ENGESA in 1986, will help, especially, in the training of technicians and specialized workers in the sector. The "MOL" was designed to perform similarly. to the U.S. "Sidewinder," of which over 50,000 units in 9 different verions have already been manufactured. The "MOL" will be 15 cm shorter and 1 kg lighter than the U.S. missile. Nevertheless, its guidance system will be less sophisticated than that of the Sidewinder" AIM-9M model. The main drawback of the "MOL" (with which Aeronautics Minister Octavio Moreira Lima plans to equip the AMX jet fighter which is being built within the framework of an Italian-Brazilian joint venture) is its inability to carry out what in military terms is referred to as "frontal interception, that is, the destruction of an enemy plane in a frontal strike. This is because the "MOL" is guided by infrared rays released by the heat of the turbines in the rear of the target plane. "Leo"--This is an antitank missile assigned to ENGESA. Its basic technology is Italian, produced by the Oto-Melara Company. It was originally conceived to penetrate armor approximately 80 cm thick at a distance ranging from 91 500 to 2,500 meters. Nevertheless, this missile, which is known in Italy as the MAF (antitank missile), can be used only against targets at a range of between 300 meters and 3 km. The Army's decision to choose this missile was the subject of a discreet controversy. The Leo has not yet been fully developed (not even in Italy), and the Oto-Melara missile technology js npt ap traditional as U.S., British or German missile technology. The Army intends to acquire 400 Leo missiles, which is believed to be a small quantity. In addition to the antitank missile, Minister Leonidas Pires Goncalves is determined to make more viable the manufacture of antiaircraft missiles for low-altitude targets.
ttps://sgp.fas.org/othergov/doe/lanl/ota-bp-isc-115.pdf
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt13-5-1.pdf
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