1- BAESYSTEMS preferred solution was lost with the do not proceed decision on A400m, but only after MOD has agreed to launch a Nimrod replacement program. The Nimrod re-engine proposal is hastily conceived and grows rapidly without an appropriate depth of pre study.
2 -The RAF/BAE couldn’t see beyond wanting a Nimrod to replace a Nimrod, they concluded that the air vehicle fundamentally had to be 100tons max take off weight and four engines.... that’s pretty bespoke and HMG wouldn’t approve an entirely new design.
2- (not so) Smart Procurement (introduced by political decree;- a ruthless race to the bottom)- this delivered a commercially non feasible contract. It contains excessively optimistic assumptions, known to both parties.
3- the first of these optimistic assumptions to go bad was the required engineering ramp up, it would never have worked, so via Force Majeure , a one year slip was agrees in the exchange for reducing the number of airframes delivered from 21 to 18. The actual engineering ramp up, particularly at Farnborough took two years. (CDR closure scheduled for September 98 slips to Dec 2000, but in real terms was even a bit later than that)
4- A poor decision in wing structure optimisation adds a further 6 months
5 - the production lull prior to Typhoon ramp up, vital to securing parts delivery to Woodford was missed.At the same time it was realised many parts expected to be retained would require new fabrication thus further overload the production organisation.
6 - The build of the first 3 prototypes now experiences part shortages which turn an 18 month planned build into 48 months
7- the original fixed price contract was maxed out in 2002 having delivered nothing but it’s now politically too big to fall. It’s replaced by a more traditional contract but now only nine aircraft, well below a viable fleet size.
8 - when PA1 flys (Aug 2004) it’s ailerons control forces are unacceptable, as is its yaw stability. These issues take 3 years to resolve and much of the flight testing can only be completed with the final control system design standard. A flight test program originally scheduled at 24 months, takes nearly 60 months. The aileron issue was due to the insistence on old technology but newly designed cable operated control system installed inside a new wing structure. Poor decision making (Both BAE and MOD) on the technology choices forced a lengthy re-learning of old design methods. FBW ailerons might have had greater upfront cost but could have saved 36months and the massive cost incurred by this delay.
9 - Due to delays on MR4 the MR2 has now been pushed too hard, too much, ref Hadden Cave.
10 - it’s discovered that part of MRA4 safety case for Air to Air refuelling is based on the flawed case of MR2 which would lead to yet more delays.
11 - a cash strapped government finally pulls the plug
