Current Nuclear Weapons Development

[Scott Kenny]

PAL?

Permissive Action Link, basically a very fancy set of locks. One of the few pieces of US Nuclear Weapons Tech that was deliberately given to the Russians, since it makes it a lot harder for the local commander to launch without orders.

I believe that there's an open offer to all other nuclear weapon states as well, for the same reason.

 

[NMaude]

.Snip.

That is an absurd paranoid off-topic red-herring.

 

[Forest Green]

...all I'm going to say is this. If we saw the chinese communist analogues of Vicky Nuland and John Kerry at sudden protests to topple the current Cuban regime what would we do? Say that new Cuban government started preparing for and discussing the retaking of Guantanamo bay what would we do? Well I can tell you this. A star spangled cowboy boot of freedom would be so far up Cuba's hind quarters it wouldn't even be funny. Why should we expect foreign nations to behave any differently?

Has the current Cuban regime ever held elections? Do Cuban nationals regularly immigrate to the US? That's why it isn't the same. Russia is fighting againsty a majority with an elected government in Ukraine, whereas I'm not entirely sure Cubans wouldn't like the US to invade them and replace the current Castro regime given the choice. And as regards sponsoring proxy wars, what was Russia doing in the Donbass between 2014 and 2022 in between shooting down airliners? Except it wasn't just a proxy war since it had troops and mercenaries there the whole time, which violated all Minsk agreements BTW.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1756341882639016131

 

[Josh_TN]

Permissive Action Link, basically a very fancy set of locks. One of the few pieces of US Nuclear Weapons Tech that was deliberately given to the Russians, since it makes it a lot harder for the local commander to launch without orders.

I believe that there's an open offer to all other nuclear weapon states as well, for the same reason.

PAL is actually a little more than just security; my understanding is that there are a number of unlock codes that will work because each one not only enables the weapon but also sets the parameters of its use. IE, a particular code might specify air burst with max yield. There is also a PAL code that will deliberately self destruct the weapon to the point of needing a complete rebuild of the electronics, at least for the B-61 series. Three incorrect code entries will allegedly have the same effect.

 

[Scott Kenny]

PAL is actually a little more than just security; my understanding is that there are a number of unlock codes that will work because each one not only enables the weapon but also sets the parameters of its use. IE, a particular code might specify air burst with max yield. There is also a PAL code that will deliberately self destruct the weapon to the point of needing a complete rebuild of the electronics, at least for the B-61 series. Three incorrect code entries will allegedly have the same effect.

I believe that's correct, at least for B61s. I don't remember running across any of that stuff in my Required Reading for Tridents, but I wouldn't be able to confirm it if I had.

But the reason PALs were given to the Soviets was because it made it very hard for the local commander to go rogue and successfully launch.

 

[bobbymike]

Pay site

STRATCOM may accelerate, increase LRSO buy, commander says - ExchangeMonitor

WASHINGTON — U.S. Strategic Command may accelerate and increase its buys of Raytheon-made AGM-181 Long Range Standoff Weapon cruise missiles beyond the

www.exchangemonitor.com

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/02/28/the_congressional_strategic_posture_commissions_report_1014686.html?mc_cid=a3c17b2634&mc_eid=307947a252

 

[bobbymike]

Redirecting

 

[Josh_TN]

Redirecting

I am just not a fan of diluting launch tubes with several nukes and making SSN crews have to fucking deal with special weapons paperwork rather than their primary jobs. I think any money anyone wants to throw at designing another SLCM-N should be thrown at just building another SSBN. Deterrence is not going to happen just because someone clutches their pearls at the thought of several cruise missiles coming off a Virginia class attack boat.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Redirecting

I'm not sure I agree with that.

Quick back of the envelope calculations here:​

The US has roughly 45 attack subs out of major overhauls right now. That means that roughly 15 are at sea at any given moment. For sake of argument, the subs will carry 4-6 nuclear and 6-8 conventional cruise missiles. (688i and preVPM Virginia class with 4x, VPM boats with 6x, due to security with the VPMs only having one hatch over 6 missiles. Block 5 Virginia class we will assume to have 12x nukes, with the other 28 conventional, but there aren't any Block 5 boats in service yet.)​

​

At present, assuming effectively instantaneous adoption (or digging out the old nuclear Tomahawks from whatever storage they got buried in), we'd have 60something SLCM-Ns available (and a total production run of maybe 200-250). As the rest of the 688i leave service, that will go closer to 90 and may even exceed 90 once Block 5s are in service.​

Due to the range of the missiles, any SLCM shooter needs to be relatively close to shore. And close to shore means vulnerable to MPA and subchasers.

Same analysis as with the UK's proposal to use nuclear Tomahawks instead of Trident. Subs need to be closer to their targets to be able to launch, which means they need to spend more time in transit to those "alert areas".

So of those 15 SSNs out and about, you might have 5 in position to launch immediately (well, within a couple hours, given how long it takes to raise alert levels and get things ready to go). Oh, but that's one or two up north around Russia/Eastern Europe, one in the Med or Red, and one or two around China.

If the trouble requiring a nuclear response is not where an SSN is able to reach it, well, send the Air Force or a Trident.

 

[Josh_TN]

I agree, it is solution looking for a problem, and a very, very specific problem at that. Just spend more money on the real solution.

 

[bobbymike]

Putin Warns West of Nuclear War Risk

Russia's President Vladimir Putin warned of a "real" risk of nuclear war if the West escalates the conflict in Ukraine.

www.thedefensepost.com

 

[Forest Green]

I agree, it is solution looking for a problem, and a very, very specific problem at that. Just spend more money on the real solution.

US had 320 SLCMs at the turn of the century.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.2968/057002024

In other news:

Return To ICBMs Armed With Multiple Warheads Suggested By STRATCOM Boss

U.S. Minuteman III ICBMs are currently loaded with just one warhead, and so will future Sentinel ICBMs, as a result of arms control deals.

www.twz.com

Putin Warns West of Nuclear War Risk

Russia's President Vladimir Putin warned of a "real" risk of nuclear war if the West escalates the conflict in Ukraine.

www.thedefensepost.com

So start a war, get into difficulty, threaten use of nuclear weapons.

 

[Josh_TN]

US had 320 SLCMs at the turn of the century.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.2968/057002024

But how many were deployed at any given time, and were they in range of anything of value? A n LA class in the IO won’t be in a position to do anything. Realistically, how many deployed nuclear cruise missiles would be in range of something?

 

[Desertfox]

SLCM-N is political at best, there is a specific need it fields, but its far from the best option for it. Better alternatives would be to qualify LRSO on F-15Es, navalize the B61 and qual it on the F-35C, or develop a warhead for the hypersonics on the Zumwalts, or bring back GLCM.

 

[Forest Green]

But how many were deployed at any given time, and were they in range of anything of value? A n LA class in the IO won’t be in a position to do anything. Realistically, how many deployed nuclear cruise missiles would be in range of something?

The nuclear ones had a 2,800km range, as per GLCM, so any in the Med, Baltic Sea, Bering Sea, Sea of Japan, North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, Bering Sea, SCS or ECS, Philippine Sea (off Guam), or Gulf would likely be in range of potential targets.

And that's working off GLCM and lets face it, GLCM was back in the days when the conventional missile had a range of only 1,300km, so a modernised version could offer ranges of ~3,500+km, assuming a similar range increase % from conventional to nuclear.

 

[Josh_TN]

The nuclear ones had a 2,800km range, as per GLCM, so any in the Med, Baltic Sea, Bering Sea, Sea of Japan, North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, Bering Sea, SCS or ECS, Philippine Sea (off Guam), or Gulf would likely be in range of potential targets.

And that's working off GLCM and lets face it, GLCM was back in the days when the conventional missile had a range of only 1,300km, so a modernised version could offer ranges of ~3,500+km, assuming a similar range increase % from conventional to nuclear.

Fuel densities and engine efficiency has not dramatically changed. Unless you are talking about forcing the Blk Vs to be cruise missile platforms or putting special weapons on Burkes, only token numbers of SLCMs could be based on attack boats. An SSN can carry twelve if it forfeits any conventional VLS capability; a single B-52 can carry twenty. What exactly is the purpose or mission? What niche is filled by not firing a ballistic missile but not waiting for a B-52 strike?

 

[bobbymike]

Was on this morning’s Teams call of the National Institute of Deterrence Studies discussion of the Strategic Posture Commission report and Peter Huessy, who’s been a strong supporter of the nuclear deterrent for 40 years, said he’s going to keep doing it until the last Columbia is launched but now with “two more boats” that’s the 2040s. So 12 to 14 now?

I haven’t heard or read anything about this and Google says 12 still??

 

[Forest Green]

Fuel densities and engine efficiency has not dramatically changed. Unless you are talking about forcing the Blk Vs to be cruise missile platforms or putting special weapons on Burkes, only token numbers of SLCMs could be based on attack boats. An SSN can carry twelve if it forfeits any conventional VLS capability; a single B-52 can carry twenty. What exactly is the purpose or mission? What niche is filled by not firing a ballistic missile but not waiting for a B-52 strike?

At the same time conventional (1000lb warhead) Tomahawk range has increased from 1,300km to 1,700km, so nuclear Tomahawk with a 130-150kg warhead should go further than the old 2,800km too. Some scope to stretch the length also. How many can 4 SSGNs carry or Virgina Class VPMs? Surprise low altitude attack from an unpredictable direction. Increases the number of mobile nuclear strike assets. Increases the number of warheads without adding to START limited quantities.

 

[Scott Kenny]

At the same time conventional (1000lb warhead) Tomahawk range has increased from 1,300km to 1,700km, so nuclear Tomahawk with a 130-150kg warhead should go further than the old 2,800km too. Some scope to stretch the length also. How many can 4 SSGNs carry or Virgina Class VPMs? Surprise low altitude attack from an unpredictable direction. Increases the number of mobile nuclear strike assets. Increases the number of warheads without adding to START limited quantities.

Ohio SSGNs are getting retired, remember that Ohio came back into service as an SSGN in 2006, with a ~20 year service life remaining, and there's already an announcement from 2020 about scrapping in 2026. All 4 Ohio SSGNs will decomission about the same time.

So those are effectively out of the discussion, they'll all be retired before a new SLCM-N is available.

Block V Virginia class are still under construction, 3 of the first 6 have had their keels laid. First block V to commission is looking like USS Arizona SSN-803, and that will be early 2026 assuming that it doesn't take any longer to assemble than a Block IV.

 

[Forest Green]

Ohio SSGNs are getting retired, remember that Ohio came back into service as an SSGN in 2006, with a ~20 year service life remaining, and there's already an announcement from 2020 about scrapping in 2026. All 4 Ohio SSGNs will decomission about the same time.

So those are effectively out of the discussion, they'll all be retired before a new SLCM-N is available.

Block V Virginia class are still under construction, 3 of the first 6 have had their keels laid. First block V to commission is looking like USS Arizona SSN-803, and that will be early 2026 assuming that it doesn't take any longer to assemble than a Block IV.

Early 2026 is just as the SSGNs are retiring, so that works quite well, which is the way it was intended anyway. They can carry 28 missiles each, and there are due to be 66 Virginia Class in total with 22 Block IVs alrteady built. Use the 12 VLS tubes for nuclear and the 28 tube VPM module for conventional, or go 20+20.

 

[Josh_TN]

Was on this morning’s Teams call of the National Institute of Deterrence Studies discussion of the Strategic Posture Commission report and Peter Huessy, who’s been a strong supporter of the nuclear deterrent for 40 years, said he’s going to keep doing it until the last Columbia is launched but now with “two more boats” that’s the 2040s. So 12 to 14 now?

I haven’t heard or read anything about this and Google says 12 still??

I think 12 is the plan now but by the time we get to that number, won’t it be the mid 2030s? Who can say what the requirements will be by then. Current trends would probably require more, unless there is a major posture change by Russia or China.

 

[Josh_TN]

At the same time conventional (1000lb warhead) Tomahawk range has increased from 1,300km to 1,700km, so nuclear Tomahawk with a 130-150kg warhead should go further than the old 2,800km too. Some scope to stretch the length also. How many can 4 SSGNs carry or Virgina Class VPMs? Surprise low altitude attack from an unpredictable direction. Increases the number of mobile nuclear strike assets. Increases the number of warheads without adding to START limited quantities.

As far as I know the engine in Tomahawk has not changed. Range differences are predominantly due to fuel fraction changes, not technical advancement, IMO. In any case, cruise missile ranges are dramatically shorter than SLBMs and even if a sub can reach the border or an opponent country, it might struggle to hit anything of value

AGM-86/181 also have a low altitude profile.
START expires in two years, fulll stop. Non issue.

The argument for SLCM-N just seems to be more for the sake of more, not for any operationally sound reason or mission that the SLCM could uniquely fulfill. If more warheads or missiles or desired, then build more Columbia or life extend Ohio. Do not handicap the non SSBN force with a token capacity that takes away from their primary job.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Early 2026 is just as the SSGNs are retiring, so that works quite well, which is the way it was intended anyway.

Except that's commissioning in 2026, not ready for deployment. First deployment probably won't happen till 2028 due to sea trials, maybe 2029 since there's a lot of extra stuff that needs to be tested on the Block Vs.

They can carry 28 missiles each, and there are due to be 66 Virginia Class in total with 22 Block IVs alrteady built. Use the 12 VLS tubes for nuclear and the 28 tube VPM module for conventional, or go 20+20.

Due to how the tubes work, it'd probably be 19+21 at max. Each VPM gets either all nukes or all conventional due to security rules.

The argument for SLCM-N just seems to be more for the sake of more, not for any operationally sound reason or mission that the SLCM could uniquely fulfill. If more warheads or missiles or desired, then build more Columbia or life extend Ohio. Do not handicap the non SSBN force with a token capacity that takes away from their primary job.

There is a small argument for subs whose missions take them close to the shores of a hostile country anyway to have some nukes onboard. We usually call those "Projects boats", things like USS Parche or USS Jimmy Carter. They're snooping around in places we never were.

But honestly, if we're going to put nukes back on fast-attack subs, I want a new SUBROC/Sea Lance/RPK-2/RPK-6 before SLCM-Ns. An urgent-target, long range standoff weapon, armed with either nuclear warhead or a Mk54 torpedo.

 

[NMaude]

But honestly, if we're going to put nukes back on fast-attack subs, I want a new SUBROC/Sea Lance/RPK-2/RPK-6 before SLCM-Ns.

In that case the best bet would be for Boeing to dust off the UUM-125 Sea Lance design and update it with 21st century tech.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In that case the best bet would be for Boeing to dust off the UUM-125 Sea Lance design and update it with 21st century tech.

Being able to swap payloads in the boat would be very nice. Carry 2x Sea Lances, and you can have them normally armed with a Mk54mod, but if the boss sends you the codes you can swap over to a 200kt nuke. This would obviously require some space set aside for the big booms in their locker, however, and that'd probably take up an entire weapon stow. Edit: So having 2x Sea Lances would take up 3x stows, taking a Virginia class down to 23 stows inside the torpedo room and 12 stows in the VLS.

 

[publiusr]

So 25 W53s have been kept in reserve for planetary defence? I suppose that's for an asteroid deflection mission? Either way if this is the case then I hope they've remanufactured the warheads primaries giving them new HE-lenses.

That was looked at

NASA Developing Asteroid Interceptor to Fend off Armageddon

On Friday Wired News profiled a "lonely" former astronaut, Rusty Schweickart, who is leading a campaign to protect the earth from the possibility of an asteroid crashing into Earth and killing millions of people. Turns out he wasn’t so lonely. While we said in the Q&A that NASA was doing little...

www.wired.com

Better than this

NASA anti-asteroid spacecraft 'won't save us from huge rock which could hit Earth in 2135'

It would explode with more force than all the nuclear weapons detonated in history

uk.news.yahoo.com

 

[Forest Green]

As far as I know the engine in Tomahawk has not changed. Range differences are predominantly due to fuel fraction changes, not technical advancement, IMO. In any case, cruise missile ranges are dramatically shorter than SLBMs and even if a sub can reach the border or an opponent country, it might struggle to hit anything of value

The difference between the nuclear and conventional tomahawk is warhead weight. So now that the conventional one goes further, due to higher fuel fraction and smaller guidance section, the nuclear one will too.

AGM-86/181 also have a low altitude profile.

B-52s don't though.

START expires in two years, fulll stop. Non issue.

Well that's something I guess.

The argument for SLCM-N just seems to be more for the sake of more, not for any operationally sound reason or mission that the SLCM could uniquely fulfill. If more warheads or missiles or desired, then build more Columbia or life extend Ohio. Do not handicap the non SSBN force with a token capacity that takes away from their primary job.

I've already explained why it isn't. Once you launch an SLBM the enemy knows it's coming.

 

[Josh_TN]

So it sounds like you are specifically looking for a first strike option. I would argue LRSO or B-21, or B-21 with LRSO, thoroughly cover any “not see it coming” nuclear mission.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I've already explained why it isn't. Once you launch an SLBM the enemy knows it's coming.

So? It will land in less than 30 minutes if you're talking a max range shot. Depressed trajectory lands in 5-8 minutes for shorter range.

Why are you looking for another First Strike weapon on top of the Minuteman/Sentinel missiles?

 

[Forest Green]

So it sounds like you are specifically looking for a first strike option. I would argue LRSO or B-21, or B-21 with LRSO, thoroughly cover any “not see it coming” nuclear mission.

Except when all the B-21s suddenly disappear from the runway.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Except when all the B-21s suddenly disappear from the runway.

Even with ICBMs, you have a ~30min window from "launch detected" to "impact".

What do you think an "Elephant Walk" drill is?

 

[NMaude]

What do you think an "Elephant Walk" drill is?

That's the first time I've heard of this drill.

 

[Josh_TN]

I personally think that a U.S. first strike that somehow does not involve SLBMs and also excludes bombers is such a weird strategic situation that the U.S. does not need to build a weapon system around it at the expense of conventional capabilities.

 

[Josh_TN]

That's the first time I've heard of this drill.

It is a common slang for minimal interval take off (MITO) exercises going back as far as the 50s I think.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That's the first time I've heard of this drill.

Load up every plane with max carry then minimum interval takeoffs, harkening back to the old circus elephants parading around holding the tail of the elephant in front of them.

Depending on the aircraft and airbase, it may include formation takeoffs if you can squeeze more than one plane onto the runway.

 

[kaiserd]

I’m not sure in what scenarios the US would want to undertake a nuclear first strike, hopefully not too many as the US would be the one instigating a nuclear exchange/ war killing multiple millions/ billions and quite possibly ending the human race.

IF the US had to instigate a first strike it appears likely to use a portion of their Trident armed subs from relatively close-in launches to minimise warning times. These would give the least warning, be the most difficult for the defences to deal with, and would be among the most accurate of the US nuclear forces. They would also likely throw in their bomber and land based ICBM forces (but timed to not give warning of the initial Trident strikes) as they would not survive the likely opponents retaliatory strikes. Given the likely targeting of navy and sub based and infrastructure by an opponent’s retaliatory strike there would also be a certain logic to throwing the full available Trident force into that first strike (you’ve just lost your ability to sustain them anyway).

The proposed reintroduction of a low-yield nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile into US service was not “sold” as relating to US first strike capability. Nor are cruise missiles necessarily inherently good first strike weapons or likely not to be detected and identified relatively early by a peer nuclear power, certainly earlier than versus a close-in Trident launch.

The “sales pitch” for the nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile coming back was that it would supposedly give a lower point of escalation, a more easily identifiable/ distinguishable/ acceptable counter/ retaliation to potential Russian first use of tactical nuclear weapons, versus, say, a single trident missile launch with a dialled-back warhead. A lot of people (including, probably least significantly, me) don’t really buy that supposed rationale (appears to be buying into rather than blatantly refuting Russia’s massively flawed ideas around supposedly threatening or undertaking nuclear escalation to somehow de-escalate crisis/ conflicts). It appears to make first use of nuclear weapons more acceptable/ palatable, which is a very bad idea.

 

[Josh_TN]

I think there should be flexibility in nuclear response options as a deterrent to low yield or tactical nuclear first use by an opponent. I am just not at all convinced sub launched cruise missiles are how the U.S. should go about achieving that.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The “sales pitch” for the nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile coming back was that it would supposedly give a lower point of escalation, a more easily identifiable/ distinguishable/ acceptable counter/ retaliation to potential Russian first use of tactical nuclear weapons, versus, say, a single trident missile launch with a dialled-back warhead. A lot of people (including, probably least significantly, me) don’t really buy that supposed rationale (appears to be buying into rather than blatantly refuting Russia’s massively flawed ideas around supposedly threatening or undertaking nuclear escalation to somehow de-escalate crisis/ conflicts). It appears to make first use of nuclear weapons more acceptable/ palatable, which is a very bad idea.

So the response to a Russian tactical nuke is to commence SIOP and nuke Russia till it glows?

I think there should be flexibility in nuclear response options as a deterrent to low yield or tactical nuclear first use by an opponent. I am just not at all convinced sub launched cruise missiles are how the U.S. should go about achieving that.

Exactly.

I want an option to say, "this is your last warning, the next nuke results in full SIOP."

 

[kaiserd]

So the response to a Russian tactical nuke is to commence SIOP and nuke Russia till it glows?


Exactly.

I want an option to say, "this is your last warning, the next nuke results in full SIOP."

Why can’t that last warning be a B61 or a single Trident launch?
Why field/ reintroduce a class of sea based nuclear weapons apparently specifically for this purpose?

And isn’t it quite possible that more of this “more usable” class of nuclear weapon is in itself destabilising and specifically plays into Russia’s stated and extremely dangerous “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, rather than refuting it and publicly clearly indicating that you are playing a very different game.

It gives Russia greater comfort (a degree of certainty?) that the maximum they are going to get back for instigating a tactical nuclear attack is one of these “limited” weapons” back. It potentially makes the start of a chain of nuclear escalation more not less likely, in exchange for a likely illusory self-deceptive idea that theoretically having this particular extra step could make it more likely that such a chain of nuclear escalation could actually be stopped in practice.

Out of weakness the post-USSR Russia has liked to pretend that it can compensate for relative convention arms weakness with greater reliance on the supposed threat/ use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia’s relative failure in the Ukraine conflict so far (and their clear inability to really use tactical nuclear weapons in the real world in anything but the most extreme circumstances where the Russian leadership is willing to accept the likely risk of a chain of nuclear escalation) shows the self-deception and relative bankruptcy of their doctrine; why now should the US and/ or NATO start buying-in/ pandering to it? And wouldn’t the money to be spent on these sea based nuclear tipped cruise missiles be better spent on updating the specific US and/ or NATO conventional forces deterring further Russian “adventurism” (or in supporting Ukraine holding back this current manifestation)?