Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor

I don't see how it would be any more difficult than integrating it into the F-15C Eagle, but I didn't design the thing.

If we lived in better times, and we were producing a large amount of Raptors, I am sure the USAF could eventually integrate JHMCS and make it sound like they were never wrong. ;)

Or if down the road the F-22A is resurrected as the F-22B. (Or would a new variant be F-22C because of the two seat version planned at one time?)
 
Lampshade111 said:
I don't see how it would be any more difficult than integrating it into the F-15C Eagle, but I didn't design the thing.

If we lived in better times, and we were producing a large amount of Raptors, I am sure the USAF could eventually integrate JHMCS and make it sound like they were never wrong. ;)

Or if down the road the F-22A is resurrected as the F-22B. (Or would a new variant be F-22C because of the two seat version planned at one time?)

Because of its high level of computerization and the level of technology at the time it was designed, it's sometimes more difficult to add some things to the Raptor than it is to earlier (or later) aircraft). For example, adding AIM-9X to the Marines' AH-1Z is apparently straightforward (although at present they don't have the funding to do so), yet it takes much more work to do it to Block 30 F-22s, and apparently can't be done to Block 20s at all. What I've been able to pull up, regarding JHMCS, though, is that the big issue is mapping the Raptor's cockpit. I haven't been able to dig up more detail than that so far.
 
I've read different about the AIM-9X integration, mainly that it is a cost issue, I will try to dig up the source.

There may certainly be difficulties but I think a good part of the upgrade issue is due to politics and budget reasons.
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/09/AR2009070903020.html

Premier U.S. Fighter Jet Has Major Shortcomings

F-22's Maintenance Demands Growing

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 10, 2009

The United States' top fighter jet, the Lockheed Martin F-22, has recently required more than 30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the skies, pushing its hourly cost of flying to more than $44,000, a far higher figure than for the warplane it replaces, confidential Pentagon test results show.

The aircraft's radar-absorbing metallic skin is the principal cause of its maintenance troubles, with unexpected shortcomings -- such as vulnerability to rain and other abrasion -- challenging Air Force and contractor technicians since the mid-1990s, according to Pentagon officials, internal documents and a former engineer.

While most aircraft fleets become easier and less costly to repair as they mature, key maintenance trends for the F-22 have been negative in recent years, and on average from October last year to this May, just 55 percent of the deployed F-22 fleet has been available to fulfill missions guarding U.S. airspace, the Defense Department acknowledged this week. The F-22 has never been flown over Iraq or Afghanistan.

Sensitive information about troubles with the nation's foremost air-defense fighter is emerging in the midst of a fight between the Obama administration and the Democrat-controlled Congress over whether the program should be halted next year at 187 planes, far short of what the Air Force and the F-22's contractors around the country had anticipated.

"It is a disgrace that you can fly a plane [an average of] only 1.7 hours before it gets a critical failure" that jeopardizes success of the aircraft's mission, said a Defense Department critic of the plane who is not authorized to speak on the record. Other skeptics inside the Pentagon note that the planes, designed 30 years ago to combat a Cold War adversary, have cost an average of $350 million apiece and say they are not a priority in the age of small wars and terrorist threats.

But other defense officials -- reflecting sharp divisions inside the Pentagon about the wisdom of ending one of the largest arms programs in U.S. history -- emphasize the plane's unsurpassed flying abilities, express renewed optimism that the troubles will abate and say the plane is worth the unexpected costs.

Votes by the House and Senate armed services committees last month to spend $369 million to $1.75 billion more to keep the F-22 production line open were propelled by mixed messages from the Air Force -- including a quiet campaign for the plane that includes snazzy new Lockheed videos for key lawmakers -- and intense political support from states where the F-22's components are made. The full House ratified the vote on June 25, and the Senate is scheduled to begin consideration of F-22 spending Monday.

After deciding to cancel the program, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates called the $65 billion fleet a "niche silver-bullet solution" to a major aerial war threat that remains distant. He described the House's decision as "a big problem" and has promised to urge President Obama to veto the military spending bill if the full Senate retains F-22 funding.

The administration's position is supported by military reform groups that have long criticized what they consider to be poor procurement practices surrounding the F-22, and by former senior Pentagon officials such as Thomas Christie, the top weapons testing expert from 2001 to 2005. Christie says that because of the plane's huge costs, the Air Force lacks money to modernize its other forces adequately and has "embarked on what we used to call unilateral disarmament."

David G. Ahern, a senior Pentagon procurement official who helps oversee the F-22 program, said in an interview that "I think we've executed very well," and attributed its troubles mostly to the challenge of meeting ambitious goals with unstable funding.

A spokeswoman for Lockheed added that the F-22 has "unmatched capabilities, sustainability and affordability" and that any problems are being resolved in close coordination with the Air Force.

'Cancellation-Proof'

Designed during the early 1980s to ensure long-term American military dominance of the skies, the F-22 was conceived to win dogfights with advanced Soviet fighters that Russia is still trying to develop.

Lt. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III, director of the Air National Guard, said in a letter this week to Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) that he likes the F-22 because its speed and electronics enable it to handle "a full spectrum of threats" that current defensive aircraft "are not capable of addressing."

"There is really no comparison to the F-22," said Air Force Maj. David Skalicky, a 32-year-old former F-15 pilot who now shows off the F-22's impressive maneuverability at air shows. Citing the critical help provided by its computers in flying radical angles of attack and tight turns, he said "it is one of the easiest planes to fly, from the pilot's perspective."

Its troubles have been detailed in dozens of Government Accountability Office reports and Pentagon audits. But Pierre Sprey, a key designer in the 1970s and 1980s of the F-16 and A-10 warplanes, said that from the beginning, the Air Force designed it to be "too big to fail, that is, to be cancellation-proof."

Lockheed farmed out more than 1,000 subcontracts to vendors in more than 40 states, and Sprey -- now a prominent critic of the plane -- said that by the time skeptics "could point out the failed tests, the combat flaws, and the exploding costs, most congressmen were already defending their subcontractors' " revenues.

John Hamre, the Pentagon's comptroller from 1993 to 1997, says the department approved the plane with a budget it knew was too low because projecting the real costs would have been politically unpalatable on Capitol Hill.

"We knew that the F-22 was going to cost more than the Air Force thought it was going to cost and we budgeted the lower number, and I was there," Hamre told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April. "I'm not proud of it," Hamre added in a recent interview.

When limited production began in 2001, the plane was "substantially behind its plan to achieve reliability goals," the GAO said in a report the following year. Structural problems that turned up in subsequent testing forced retrofits to the frame and changes in the fuel flow. Computer flaws, combined with defective software diagnostics, forced the frequent retesting of millions of lines of code, said two Defense officials with access to internal reports.

Skin problems -- often requiring re-gluing small surfaces that can take more than a day to dry -- helped force more frequent and time-consuming repairs, according to the confidential data drawn from tests conducted by the Pentagon's independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation between 2004 and 2008.

Over the four-year period, the F-22's average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from 20 hours to 34, with skin repairs accounting for more than half of that time -- and more than half the hourly flying costs -- last year, according to the test and evaluation office.

The Air Force says the F-22 cost $44,259 per flying hour in 2008; the Office of the Secretary of Defense said the figure was $49,808. The F-15, the F-22's predecessor, has a fleet average cost of $30,818.

'Compromises'

Darrol Olsen, a specialist in stealth coatings who worked at Lockheed's testing laboratory in Marietta, Ga., from 1995 to 1999, said the current troubles are unsurprising. In a lawsuit filed under seal in 2007, he charged the company with violating the False Claims Act for ordering and using coatings that it knew were defective while hiding the failings from the Air Force.

He has cited a July 1998 report that said test results "yield the same problems as documented previously" in the skin's quality and durability, and another in December that year saying, "Baseline coatings failed." A Lockheed briefing that September assured the Air Force that the effort was "meeting requirements with optimized products."

"When I got into this thing . . . I could not believe the compromises" made by Lockheed to meet the Air Force's request for quick results, said Olsen, who had a top-secret clearance. "I suggested we go to the Air Force and tell them we had some difficulties . . . and they would not do that. I was squashed. I knew from the get-go that this material was bad, that this correcting it in the field was never going to work."

Olsen, who said Lockheed fired him over a medical leave, heard from colleagues as recently as 2005 that problems persisted with coatings and radar absorbing materials in the plane's skin, including what one described as vulnerability to rain. Invited to join his lawsuit, the Justice Department filed a court notice last month saying it was not doing so "at this time" -- a term that means it is still investigating the matter, according to a department spokesman.

Ahern said the Pentagon could not comment on the allegations. Lockheed spokeswoman Mary Jo Polidore said that "the issues raised in the complaint are at least 10 years old," and that the plane meets or exceeds requirements established by the Air Force. "We deny Mr. Olsen's allegations and will vigorously defend this matter."

There have been other legal complications. In late 2005, Boeing learned of defects in titanium booms connecting the wings to the plane, which the company, in a subsequent lawsuit against its supplier, said posed the risk of "catastrophic loss of the aircraft." But rather than shut down the production line -- an act that would have incurred large Air Force penalties -- Boeing reached an accord with the Air Force to resolve the problem through increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air Force.

Sprey said engineers who worked on it told him that because of Lockheed's use of hundreds of subcontractors, quality control was so poor that workers had to create a "shim line" at the Georgia plant where they retooled badly designed or poorly manufactured components. "Each plane wound up with all these hand-fitted parts that caused huge fits in maintenance," he said. "They were not interchangeable."

Polidore confirmed that some early parts required modifications but denied that such a shim line existed and said "our supplier base is the best in the industry."

The plane's million-dollar radar-absorbing canopy has also caused problems, with a stuck hatch imprisoning a pilot for hours in 2006 and engineers unable to extend the canopy's lifespan beyond about 18 months of flying time. It delaminates, "loses its strength and finish," said an official privy to Air Force data.

In the interview, Ahern and Air Force Gen. C.D. Moore confirmed that canopy visibility has been declining more rapidly than expected, with brown spots and peeling forcing $120,000 refurbishments at 331 hours of flying time, on average, instead of the stipulated 800 hours.

There has been some gradual progress. At the plane's first operational flight test in September 2004, it fully met two of 22 key requirements and had a total of 351 deficiencies; in 2006, it fully met five; in 2008, when squadrons were deployed at six U.S. bases, it fully met seven.

"It flunked on suitability measures -- availability, reliability, and maintenance," said Christie about the first of those tests. "There was no consequence. It did not faze anybody who was in the decision loop" for approving the plane's full production. This outcome was hardly unique, Christie adds. During his tenure in the job from 2001 to 2005, "16 or 17 major weapons systems flunked" during initial operational tests, and "not one was stopped as a result."

"I don't accept that this is still early in the program," Christie said, explaining that he does not recall a plane with such a low capability to fulfill its mission due to maintenance problems at this point in its tenure as the F-22. The Pentagon said 64 percent of the fleet is currently "mission capable." After four years of rigorous testing and operations, "the trends are not good," he added.

Pentagon officials respond that measuring hourly flying costs for aircraft fleets that have not reached 100,000 flying hours is problematic, because sorties become more frequent after that point; Ahern also said some improvements have been made since the 2008 testing, and added: "We're going to get better." He said the F-22s are on track to meet all of what the Air Force calls its KPP -- key performance parameters -- by next year.

But last Nov. 20, John J. Young Jr., who was then undersecretary of defense and Ahern's boss, said that officials continue to struggle with the F-22's skin. "There's clearly work that needs to be done there to make that airplane both capable and affordable to operate," he said.

When Gates decided this spring to spend $785 million on four more planes and then end production of the F-22, he also kept alive an $8 billion improvement effort. It will, among other things, give F-22 pilots the ability to communicate with other types of warplanes; it currently is the only such warplane to lack that capability.

The cancellation decision got public support from the Air Force's top two civilian and military leaders, who said the F-22 was not a top priority in a constrained budget. But the leaders' message was muddied in a June 9 letter from Air Combat Cmdr. John D.W. Corley to Chambliss that said halting production would put "execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term." The right size for the fleet, he said, is 381.

Fatal Test Flight

One of the last four planes Gates supported buying is meant to replace an F-22 that crashed during a test flight north of Los Angeles on March 25, during his review of the program. The Air Force has declined to discuss the cause, but a classified internal accident report completed the following month states that the plane flew into the ground after poorly executing a high-speed run with its weapons-bay doors open, according to three government officials familiar with its contents. The Lockheed test pilot died.

Several sources said the flight was part of a bid to make the F-22 relevant to current conflicts by giving it a capability to conduct precision bombing raids, not just aerial dogfights. The Air Force is still probing who should be held accountable for the accident.


With this, I think the US should just ask Europe if we can get the Eurofighter, perhaps fund that upgraded version with TVC.
 
Demon Lord Razgriz said:
With this, I think the US should just ask Europe if we can get the Eurofighter, perhaps fund that upgraded version with TVC.

Why on earth would we do that? ???
 
When was the last time the US adopted a European fighter? Nieuport 17s? ;D
For better or for worse, the USAF is stuck with F-22s. It's hard to say if it's shortcomings are really as pronounced as these articles make it to be.
It is however troubling that early batches will lack WVR capabilities found in other opposing fighters. Wasn't the whole point of the F-22 building the most expensive (BUT capable) fighter in the world?
How likely is it that all engagements will be BVR (ROE anyone?)?
 
The F-22 isn't exactly an aged cripple in WVR combat. Just ask anybody who's gone up against it. Seriously people, get a grip.
 
Agreed. The problem is that we expect the F-22 not so much to hold its own, but to absolutely wipe out opposition in the skies.
The whole point of selling a fighter that costs 3+ times the other guy's fighter is that it guarantees at least an exchange ratio of that order. Not having all the WVR bells and whistles is not a good place to start.
 
The aircraft's radar-absorbing metallic skin

I seriously consider if we should read this *experd* beyond this point.
 
Lampshade111 said:
I've read different about the AIM-9X integration, mainly that it is a cost issue, I will try to dig up the source.

There may certainly be difficulties but I think a good part of the upgrade issue is due to politics and budget reasons.

To my understanding, Block 35s will have AIM-9X integration, because they will have Increment 3.2 level capability. 3.2 is what enables HOBS. Block 30 F-22s do not have HOBS and for unspecified "hardware" reasons can not go to Increment 3.2, although some of the 3.2 capability is to be incorporated into them. I do not know what parts, though.
 
I have read in a few sources that Block 40 F-22As would have an "advanced helmet mounted display"
 
Lampshade111 said:
I have read in a few sources that Block 40 F-22As would have an "advanced helmet mounted display"

Would certainly like to hear more about this. Haven't seen any reference to a Block 40 F-22, which is not unreasonable given that as of now F-22 production is supposed to end with Block 35. Lacking the computing power of the F-35, one has to wonder what kind of advanced display that would be. Also, producing a custom system just for the F-22 would be horribly expensive. If F-22 really can't accommodate JHMCS, a simpler system such as DASH might be an option.
 
sferrin said:
The F-22 isn't exactly an aged cripple in WVR combat. Just ask anybody who's gone up against it. Seriously people, get a grip.

This is certainly true, it is a formidable opponent in WVR. F-22 really excels, though, at BVR, getting into WVR forces it to give up some of its advantages, and if an opponent had HOBS and HMCS capabilities the Raptor's advantage is further reduced. I believe (although I could be wrong) that all "kills" against F-22s were WVR.
 
F-14D said:
I believe (although I could be wrong) that all "kills" against F-22s were WVR.

If they couldn't detect the F-22 BVR why wouldn't all kills be at WVR?
 
sferrin said:
F-14D said:
I believe (although I could be wrong) that all "kills" against F-22s were WVR.

If they couldn't detect the F-22 BVR why wouldn't all kills be at WVR?

That was kinda my point; F-22s were only "killed", when they gave up their advantages and came WVR.

Now, USAF has not been a fan of IRST and doesn't include it in their games, but I would wager that the various units out there could detect the F-22. In fact, I'll go out on a limb to opine that in addition to its IRST, the APG-71 of the F-14D could have detected it (at substantially reduced ranges) on radar. However, since AIM-7 would have zero chance of tracking a Raptor and existing AIM-120 wouldn't do much better (I can't find enough data on AIM-54C to speculate), being able to detect it wouldn't mean that much unless the F-22 chose to engage in WVR combat.
 
F-14D said:
That was kinda my point; F-22s were only "killed", when they gave up their advantages and came WVR.

Yeah but it's not like it's night and day difference. It's like I said, listen to what the pilots of those who have fought against it in exercises are saying.
 
Pardon my ignorance, but have there been engagements between F-22 and HOBS and HMCS-equipped fighters?
 
sferrin said:
F-14D said:
That was kinda my point; F-22s were only "killed", when they gave up their advantages and came WVR.

Yeah but it's not like it's night and day difference. It's like I said, listen to what the pilots of those who have fought against it in exercises are saying.

Actually, I have. Frankly, you and I are saying the same thing. In BVR, no one's killing Raptors. It's only WVR that other guys (at least in exercises) seem to have a chance. It's not like WVR suddenly the F-22 is a sitting duck, it's just that when fighting WVR F-22 gives up some of its key advantages and that's where what few "kills" that are occurring happen. Lack of HOBS and HMCS capabilities does add additional penalties in this arena, but Raptor is still the best pure fighter around.
 
People seem to forget the foundation in which the f-22 is built upon: stealth, superior situational awareness, and supercruise. These things weren't added as seperate capabilities, but rather to realize a specific air to air engagement vision. With stealth and situational awareness, the aircraft will detect the enemy first, vector itself to a advantageous position, shoot the enemy (altitude and supercruise also play greatly into missile's PK), then simply fade away. If the enemy somehow detects the aircraft, supercruise will give the raptor the ability to outrun the opponent, and before long, the opponent loses sight of the f-22 again, while the raptor positioning itself for another round of attack from an unseen angle. This is a vision of a top predator, stalking your enemy, launch a surprise attack, and quickly disappear. So I seriously don't see why the raptor would throw away this advantage to come into a WVR engagement. It's like if you have a gun against an enemy with a knife, but no, you not gonna use it. So you throw your gun away to enter into a knife fight with the enemy. It doesn't what upgrade the raptor gonna get, HMD with aim-9x, etc. for within WVR, that will not take away the risk of mutual kill one bit. If one raptor down for one su-27, I'm sorry, but we're lost big time.
 
I'm sure F-4 drivers would have wanted nothing but stay at long range and take Sparrow potshots at MiGs in Vietnam, but rules of engagement or special circumstances forced them to tangle with them and surrender their advantage.
Now, i'm not saying that history always repeats itself, but war is unpredictable...so you try to cover your bases (superlative stealth/supercruise/awareness BUT ALSO the WVR tools) because you can't count on all future engagements being on your favorite terms.
 
Have anyone ever saw photos of Raptor with pink-color primer applied (not traditional 'zink chromate' or low-VOC lime-green, or brown)? I know that there were some (and pilots didn't like the color)...
 
flateric said:
Have anyone ever saw photos of Raptor with pink-color primer applied (not traditional 'zink chromate' or low-VOC lime-green, or brown)? I know that there were some (and pilots didn't like the color)...

Some months ago an article on the F-22 paint system troubling the aircraft was buzzing the web, but do not remember to read there that they are using something pink. Not much details revealed there anyway. World best aircraft coating developers like the PPG Aerospace or ANAC offer stealth coatings, but they will not speak to you about it unless you make deal with them. Most of paint systems today are low-VOC(the paint is not thinned, but activated only) fulfilling the REACH legislation and there already exists some new paint systems offering zink chromate primer replacements. Correct me when I;m wrong but I think the most of the inner and outer structure/skin of the F-22 is not from Al alloys but mostly from composite materials (except those titanium spars), so using zinc-chromate primers would be unwise, bcs there are mostly used to provide the corrosion protection for the aluminum parts. The pink tinted primer could be the epoxide primer for composite structures, but who knows it is certainly a classified paint system.
 
XP67_Moonbat said:
So Mary K. gives out pink Raptors now? Guess pink Cadillacs were starting to seem kinda lame.
I thought Starscream went Hollywood and came out of the closet. But seriously, interesting explanation mrdetonator.
 
Ian33 said:
http://www.airliners.net/photo/USA---Air/Lockheed-Martin-F-22A/1283295/L/&sid=c089e5a6475314db83b40eed155f716a

Pink, not a drop of green to be seen.

Ahh, it is not a primer rather an intermediate coating which is used in case the aircraft has to perform test flights or a/c storage before final painting for to the customer. Look the white Mig-29 during air2air refueling tests. I have seen a picture from early nineties of a whole line up of white Migs-29 at production plant in Lukhovitsy town. Here we call it "a transport coating" as well.
 

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Doesn't really look pink to me. More sand-ish, like a desert camouflage color.
THIS is what I call a pink aircraft:
 

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http://www.richard-seaman.com/Aircraft/AirShows/Edwards2005/Highlights/F22DisplayingWeaponsBays_1.jpg

Hi guys - browsing through some F-22 images I found this one thats left me wondering. Can any one shed light on the function (if any) of this red 'box' in the weapons bay? is it to do with the CG of the aircraft, because i have seen this before with a Raptor having two AMRAAM in left bay and one of these 'red boxes' in the right bay.

Any help would be appreciated greatly.
 
Just a guess on my part but if this picture was taken at an airshow it might just be a storage/equipment holder. I was at an airshow where beside a F-15 and F-16 were four things that looked "just like bombs" I asked the mechanic if those were "mockups" of ordinance and he said; to paraphrase, "travelling around the US from airshow to airshow we take advantage of all means to carry our equipment" they were simply hollow "bombs" that could store everything from tools to suitcases.
 
Thats what I thought it would be - that or some thing like the old drill rounds F-4 Phantoms carried to keep the CG within limits. makes sense too to carry stores about like that.
 
Test gear? any ideas what for? The missile release system? the electrics / electronics? simulations? calculating and monitoring the pressure / air flow through the weapons bay?

Could it be a spare fuel tank? are the weapons bays plumbed for fuel?
 
from f-16.net

Btw I have Jay Miller's book on the F-22, but there is only one pic of the orange box (on page 122), and it says here it is a "Test Instrumentation Package". I'm not sure but I think somewhere else in the book it says that one of the things tested during the program was weapons-bay acoustics, and the box may serve that purpose. Combat ready Raptors do not have these. They either have the 3 AVELs for the AMRAAMs or the SDB rack. The box has flown at several airshows.

On flight test airplanes, all special gear related to test instrumentation is orange, to distinguish it from production parts. That includes wiring, transducers, mounting brackets, power supplies, recorders, telemetering transmitters, etc. That weapon bay box is large enough to house the power supplies, recorder, and transmitters, so I suspect that is what it is. On a high density fighter, it is difficult to find a place to put all the test instrumentation, so the F-22 weapon bay is a good location. The F-111 test instrumentation package was also in its weapon bay. On many F-16 test airplanes, the gun and ammo drum were removed to make room for the data system.
 

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