VSS - VSTOL Support Ship - exotic air group

[zen]

A hanger tends not to have a opening forward through which the ships motion drives fresh air....well not on a modern one anyway.

But yes fire in a hanger is always a nightmare.

However a second flight deck, which is what your design has, has a lot of openings which would need to close to counter the risks of fire. Closing them off requires a lot of metal.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Some good reasons why double-decker carriers might not be a good idea..

Master, i didn’t understand what you mean. What’s diference betwen both decks to get fire ??? Both decks exist independent of under deck be a flyIng deck. In the same case, both decks be a lot of aircrafts with the same equipaments, conventional deck or not.

What is this trying to solve?Having both a catapult and a ski jump?

The older flying off decks of pre WW2 did not extend very far back because the take off run was pretty much the open bit. On yours it would make more sense to put the catapult on the lower deck. That would at least solve airflow problems from having the ramp in front of that tunnel. The catapult flying off bit could then be screened to the rear with a door.

Wouldn’t a split bow be far easier? Catapult to one side (starboard in front of island) and runway + ramp to other (port)?

Your lower flight deck would be impossible by the way. Structurally you just cannot have that much open the full length with that much on top of it. And you need at least a full deck if not two between the two for the carapult kit.

Where is the hangar? I assume underneath the lower flight decl in which case this is a very tall ship with significant rolling on the top deck. Landing on that will be a challenge even if well stabilised.

Again I think a split bow would achieve combined cat/stovl ops much more easily, although notable that even natioks with both types (India) didn’t try to adopt that.

 

[Purpletrouble]

A fire in a tunnel is even worse

But, the CVF´s lower deck is closed too, isn´t it?

All aircraft carrier has a lower deck closed with many aircrafts storaged

They also have fire curtains that break it into sections and which can close the lift wells.

The key thing is that they aren’t trying to fly the aircraft in these closed areas or even run the engines, thus minimising the risk of accident/fire.

 

[SSgtC]

Some good reasons why double-decker carriers might not be a good idea..

Master, i didn’t understand what you mean. What’s diference betwen both decks to get fire ??? Both decks exist independent of under deck be a flyIng deck. In the same case, both decks be a lot of aircrafts with the same equipaments, conventional deck or not.

I am no expert on fires but a fire in a contained space is a far worse case than one on an open deck, where planes can be pushed over the edge into the sea. Suffice be it to say that no Navy has adopted a closed flying deck

A fire in a tunnel is even worse

See the current fire on Bon Homme Richard (LHD-6) for proof of why this isn't a very good idea...

 

[Archibald]

I was wondering something... had Convair 200 been picked instead of the Rockwell XFV-12 in May 1972, GD-Convair would have found themselves in a weird situation soon.

Since the GD F-16 was competiting for LWF the same year 1972 and it won - along the YF-17.

Basically GD-Convair would have found themselves with two single-seat single-jet fighters: the Convair 200/201 versus the GD F-16.

Ain't that a little weird ? Some kind of amicable treaty: Convair 200/201 for the USN, F-16 for USAF ?

...and things would have gotten even weirder had the Convair 201 screwed the F-17 / F-18 for the Navy... I mean, had two prototypes Convair 200s been build in place of Rockwell XFV-12; then, instead of a naval F-16, GD could have pitched, against the naval F-17, the Convair 201 CTOL variant !

Overall, starting from Zumwalt SCS fighter - the Convair 200 - the CTOL 201 could have played havoc with both F-16 and F-18 competitions. What a troublemaker it would have been !

Thought ?

 

[zen]

201 CTOL variant could have swept up a lot of export and licensed production. Not just F16 orders, but contesting Mirage F1, Jaguar, Harrier, etc....

 

[Archibald]

A F-35 all but in name

frack, I've just found this.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vfax-nacf-projects-pre-f-a-18-concepts.1326/

For VFAX - General Dynamics submitted two designs; a stretched YF-16 called Model 18 from Fort Worth ; and the Model 218 from Convair San Diego based on the Model 200 VSTOL fighter.

ha ha, I knew it ! At some point the CTOL-200 (be it 201 or 218 doesn't matter) clashed with the F-16.

In August 1974, Congress redirected funds for the Navy’s VFAX program to a new Navy Air Combat Fighter (NACF) program that would essentially be a navalized variant of ACF.

So from this point on, Convair-GD option was a naval LWF, that is, a naval F-16, the one with Vought that lost to the future F-18.

Now, had the Convair 200 screwed the Rockwell design back in 1972, and being build much faster...

Maybe the 201 / 218 could have saved VFAX, being anchored to an aircraft being already build (the 200).

The Navy could have argued "no need to navalize the LWF into the NACF, thanks; I already have the Convair 201/218 for VFAX. Can get it much faster than a navalized F-17 by just removing the lift jets out of the 200 being build for Zumwalt ships..."

In a few word: the Convair 201 could have, all by itself, saved VFAX and prevented NACF that is, the F-18.

------------

In turn that change Northrop fate enormously... they are not screwed by MDD over the F-18L, and then re-screwed over the entire F-20 adventure.

But they could very much end screwed over the F-17 nonetheless; it is an "orphan" (like the F-20 OTL !) since it lost to the F-16 and the F-18 never exists to "save" it.

 

[H_K]

Continuing the discussion here from the “real” VSS thread.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...s-and-vstol-support-ship-vss.7635/post-590263

I was curious about the max achievable air group for the larger VSS designs. Some of the numbers quoted seemed too high (“50 aircraft or more”, spotting for 72 A-7E equivalents etc).

So here’s an attempt to determine an early 80s, real world F/A-18 air group… Answer: about 30 F/A-18s + 2-3 AEW + 3-4 helos.

First, here are the 2 large VSS designs, compared to Clemenceau. I consider Clemenceau to be the best real world baseline, with ~54 A-7 spots.



Next I “tweaked” the VSS-2 design to increase aircraft parking, with 1) a deck edge elevator (+2 spots) and 2) a 7.5deg angled deck instead of 5.5 degrees (+2 spots). This leads to a “VSS-2 mod” with 60 A-7E spots:



Last, I replaced the 60 A-7s with F/A-18s in a more operational spot of ~33 F/A-18s, with some space left over for helos. In real life 2-3 F/A-18s would be replaced by E-2Cs or another AEW aircraft.

So there you go, VSS should have been able to operate ~30 F/As-18s.

 

[uk 75]

Countries in the 70s and 80s balanced the neef to give work to national industry with the wish to get as good a fixed wing carrier as they could afford.
At the top end the USSR and France built a single carrier with a sister to follow.
Spain had a mini US navy of Knox and Perry design ships and chose the SCS design as a single ship it could afford. Thailand tried to operate a smaller version with ex Spanish Navy AV8s.
Italy (denied fixed wing jets by law) and the UK(denied carriers by political decision) designed ASW helicopter carriers around the Seaking helicopter but with the ability to operate Harriers.
Australia, Canada and the Netherlands opted for escorts (though Australia tried to buy Invincible).
The total of ships built was not impressive.
I dont think any alternative designs would have faired much better.
Given the US lack of success with VSTOL aircraft designs I am not sure Convair 200 would have been much better. Looking good on paper does not necessarily translate to working planes.

 

[Firefinder]

Given the US lack of success with VSTOL aircraft designs I am not sure Convair 200 would have been much better. Looking good on paper does not necessarily translate to working planes.

Needs to be pointed out that the Yak-141/41 used the same design.

By all accounts was a solid design only let down by the timing.

With the F35b using a very similar set up as well.

So it should have done VTOl stuff more then well enough.

Now the kinematics may be different but tge Harrier isn't that high of a bar to jump over...

 

[uk 75]

The Yak 141 had issues around the heat of its engine. F35 works because of modern tech not available in the 1970s.
We shall never know if Convair 200 could have worked but the fact that the disapoointing XFV12 was selected over it speaks volumes.

 

[zen]

Continuing the discussion here from the “real” VSS thread.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...s-and-vstol-support-ship-vss.7635/post-590263

I was curious about the max achievable air group for the larger VSS designs. Some of the numbers quoted seemed too high (“50 aircraft or more”, spotting for 72 A-7E equivalents etc).

So here’s an attempt to determine an early 80s, real world F/A-18 air group… Answer: about 30 F/A-18s + 2-3 AEW + 3-4 helos.

First, here are the 2 large VSS designs, compared to Clemenceau. I consider Clemenceau to be the best real world baseline, with ~54 A-7 spots.

View attachment 697716

Next I “tweaked” the VSS-2 design to increase aircraft parking, with 1) a deck edge elevator (+2 spots) and 2) a 7.5deg angled deck instead of 5.5 degrees (+2 spots). This leads to a “VSS-2 mod” with 60 A-7E spots:

View attachment 697714

Last, I replaced the 60 A-7s with F/A-18s in a more operational spot of ~33 F/A-18s, with some space left over for helos. In real life 2-3 F/A-18s would be replaced by E-2Cs or another AEW aircraft.

So there you go, VSS should have been able to operate ~30 F/As-18s.
View attachment 697715

Deck edge elevator doesn't change much there and imposes on waterline beam. An extension of the flight deck behind the island however does improve it.

 

[H_K]

a manpower saver might be a combined steam-and-gas turbine power plant. The steam could provide range and power the catapults, the gas turbines giving boost for high speed maneuvers

I was thinking exactly along the same lines. HMS Bristol’s COSAG plant had 74,000hp and could have been boosted to 80,000hp with uprated Olympus GTs.

Based on Clemenceau’s trial results, that should be sufficient for 27-28kts sprint, 25-25.5kts sustained, 20kts on steam-alone with the GTs disengaged. Just add a 3rd boiler to allow for the catapults’ steam consumption.

 

[Firefinder]

The Yak 141 had issues around the heat of its engine. F35 works because of modern tech not available in the 1970s.
We shall never know if Convair 200 could have worked but the fact that the disapoointing XFV12 was selected over it speaks volumes.

It speaks far less volumes, unless you decide to run off cursing, once you know the history of it.

Which can be summed up as navy office politics in not wanting the VSS/SCS design to go through and the Admiral inchamge may or may not have had a lot of Rockwell stock that when he retired he became head of their board.

In one of the threads dealing with one of the parts of the entire Sea Control Ship sage there is a massive post detailing the entire snafu...

 

[Archibald]

In one of the threads dealing with one of the parts of the entire Sea Control Ship sage there is a massive post detailing the entire snafu...

@Pyrrhic victory (username changed ??!!!)

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rockwell-nr-356-sea-control-ship-scs-v-stol-fighter-xfv-12a.2081/#post-33069

and the Admiral inchamge may or may not have had a lot of Rockwell stock that when he retired he became head of their board.

Rear Admiral Thomas Davies

That's the man.

Continuing the discussion here from the “real” VSS thread.

Be my guest !

 

[Archibald]

a manpower saver might be a combined steam-and-gas turbine power plant. The steam could provide range and power the catapults, the gas turbines giving boost for high speed maneuvers

I was thinking exactly along the same lines. HMS Bristol’s COSAG plant had 74,000hp and could have been boosted to 80,000hp with uprated Olympus GTs.

Based on Clemenceau’s trial results, that should be sufficient for 27-28kts sprint, 25-25.5kts sustained, 20kts on steam-alone with the GTs disengaged. Just add a 3rd boiler to allow for the catapults’ steam consumption.

It's a pity the USN couldn't bought the Clemenceau blueprints from France to replace their Essex CVAs after the Vietnam war... it was good enough for aircraft up to the size and mass of A-7 Corsair II.

 

[Archibald]

@H_K

Perhaps the ideal would have been a VSS 2 derivative with C13s but a more Clemenceau-like flight deck layout.

This post of yours reminded me that CdG actually uses C13 catapults cut down from the Nimitz 90 m to 75 m. In fact the CdG (much like the aborted PA58 Verdun six decades ago) is kind of Clemenceau design pushed to its limits, a bit above 40 000 tons. The reason in both case it to get longer catapults.
In the case of PA58 Verdun: the Ark & Eagle 199 ft BS-5A (Clems had cut-down 171 ft variants)
In the case of CdG: a cut down C13: the Nimitz catapult.

In both case, they took catapults from longer and bigger carriers (Audacious and... Nimitz !) and tried ramming them into an enlarged Clemenceau hull.

A Clemenceau could throw 17 tons aircraft to 110 kt. 171 feet catapults is a bit more than 50 m long. Barely enough for an A-7: not enough for Phantoms, Hornets or Rafales (or only with little fuel and a couple of IR missiles)

Verdun must have been slightly above 20 tons: 199 ft is 60 m long. Would have allowed Phantoms and Hornets much more practically.

CdG can throw 25 mt Rafales with a 75 m long C13, even at a lower top speed of 27 kt versus 30+ for the older designs.

 

[Archibald]

About "A-7 density" of 54 : makes some sense. During GW1 the Foch or Clem went to war as "giant LPH for the Army" and fit 40 choppers of varied sizes (Gazelles are small but Pumas are pretty big).
I've also seen 72 A-4s as the absolute maximum a Clem could carry... at the cost of a complete paralysis of air ops (much like a Nimitz with 130 aircraft or 150).

So, 54 A-7s falls right between the two numbers and seems realistic.

 

[H_K]

CdG actually uses C13 catapults cut down from the Nimitz 90 m to 75 m. In fact the CdG (much like the aborted PA58 Verdun six decades ago) is kind of Clemenceau design pushed to its limits, a bit above 40 000 tons. The reason in both case it to get longer catapults.

Yes. The 33,000-35,000t VSS designs also use the same 75m C13 catapults as CdG, so it’s apparently possible to design a slightly smaller carrier than CdG with those C13 catapults.

(VSS had the cats in the bows, but in my “VSS mod” I moved one C13 to the angled deck and it seems to fit).

 

[SSgtC]

a manpower saver might be a combined steam-and-gas turbine power plant. The steam could provide range and power the catapults, the gas turbines giving boost for high speed maneuvers

I was thinking exactly along the same lines. HMS Bristol’s COSAG plant had 74,000hp and could have been boosted to 80,000hp with uprated Olympus GTs.

Based on Clemenceau’s trial results, that should be sufficient for 27-28kts sprint, 25-25.5kts sustained, 20kts on steam-alone with the GTs disengaged. Just add a 3rd boiler to allow for the catapults’ steam consumption.

It's a pity the USN couldn't bought the Clemenceau blueprints from France to replace their Essex CVAs after the Vietnam war... it was good enough for aircraft up to the size and mass of A-7 Corsair II.

I don't think that would work for the USN. They didn't want ships that could "only" launch an A-7. They wanted to launch F-4s and A-6s off of them. And that's something that an Essex could do. There were reasons they never operated those types outside of training or in emergency situations, but they could physically launch, recover and maintain the types. The Clems flat out couldn't handle them period. And with the Navy moving to bigger and bigger CVAs, there was zero chance they would go to one even smaller than the Essex.

The long term plan for the Essex was to convert them all to anti-submarine carriers. Vietnam changed that by wearing out the CVA fleet much faster than expected. But, had they been converted, they would have retired with air groups made up of E-2 Hawkeyes, S-3 Vikings, and probably a flight of Phantoms for anti-snooper work (plus helicopters). I don't think the Clems could operate any of those types.

 

[H_K]

The Clemenceau’s main problem was their short / weak catapults. The minimum to operate all the USN types mentioned was the 75m / 250ft C13 catapult… no surprise this was also what was specified for VSS.

So in fact a 33,000-35,000 ton USN carrier was possible (it just wouldn’t be a Clemenceau). Zumwalt knew it and that’s what he wanted… whether anyone else in the navy thought it was a good idea is another question. Even assuming you could trade VSS 2-for-1 for each CVN, with ~40% the air wing (32 vs. 80 fixed wing), it would still end up being more expensive to run for less capability. Unless you cut down the escort groups or operated VSS in pairs.

Even then there would have to be an “X-factor” to justify VSS, e.g. the need for more decks to be in more places at once, a lessened Soviet threat, concerns about putting all eggs in one basket, nuclear safety concerns etc. In the end none of these things transpired and CVNs have served very well (though arguably offering only a marginal improvement over the CV-63 class before them).

 

[TomS]

So in fact a 33,000-35,000 ton USN carrier was possible (it just wouldn’t be a Clemenceau). Zumwalt knew it and that’s what he wanted… whether anyone else in the navy thought it was a good idea is another question. Even assuming you could trade VSS 2-for-1 for each CVN, with ~40% the air wing (32 vs. 80 fixed wing), it would still end up being more expensive to run for less capability. Unless you cut down the escort groups or operated VSS in pairs.

VSS was strictly an ASW ship; <300 tons of air ordnance meant it could never sustain strike ops, even if they cleared out all the ASW weapons.

Even more traditional CVS designs like SCB 100.71 or the later 1967 CVS had only 600 tons of air ordnance, about half of CVV (~1200 tons) on nearly the same displacement. And CVV was considered to have unacceptably small magazines for the size of her airwing -- Nimitz has more like 2.5 times as much (~3000 tons) for about 50% more aircraft.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The Clemenceau’s main problem was their short / weak catapults. The minimum to operate all the USN types mentioned was the 75m / 250ft C13 catapult… no surprise this was also what was specified for VSS.

So in fact a 33,000-35,000 ton USN carrier was possible (it just wouldn’t be a Clemenceau). Zumwalt knew it and that’s what he wanted… whether anyone else in the navy thought it was a good idea is another question. Even assuming you could trade VSS 2-for-1 for each CVN, with ~40% the air wing (32 vs. 80 fixed wing), it would still end up being more expensive to run for less capability. Unless you cut down the escort groups or operated VSS in pairs.

Even then there would have to be an “X-factor” to justify VSS, e.g. the need for more decks to be in more places at once, a lessened Soviet threat, concerns about putting all eggs in one basket, nuclear safety concerns etc. In the end none of these things transpired and CVNs have served very well (though arguably offering only a marginal improvement over the CV-63 class before them).

This isn't what Zumwalt wanted at all. What he wanted was the Sea Control Ship (SCS) as a replacement for the CVS force that had been reduced rapidly from the late 1960s, and he was willing to accept that initially this would have Harriers and SH-3s only. Congress refused to fund it and told the Navy to come back with more capable alternatives, including a look at small carriers with catapults so they could operate existing aircraft, specifically the S-3 as this had been funded to fly from the CVS force in the first place. The navy came back with three alternatives, which would have been generated right at the end of Zumwalt's tenure as CNO, possibly even after. It seems to me that the Navy was still pushing for the pure V/STOL solution, the significantly greater size and cost of the catapult ships having been emphasised to Congress in contrast to the much enhanced capability of VSS No.1 compared to the original Sea Control Ship (SCS) concept. These certainly weren't intended as replacements for the CVAs.

 

[TomS]

he navy came back with three alternatives, which would have been generated right at the end of Zumwalt's tenure as CNO, possibly even after.

VSS was apparently requested by Admiral Holloway, who was CNO after Zumwalt, from 1974 to 1978.

 

[uk 75]

Maybe we need a thread called replacing US CVS.. We do have an Alt USN 60s thread in which CVS could be discussed.

 

[riggerrob]

As an aside. what about Carrier Onboard delivery for the smaller ASTVOL carriers envisioned in this thread?
If the second-world navy could not afford dedicated COD airplanes (Grumman C-1Traders or C-2 Greyhounds), what about using a variation on the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) except replacing the drag parachutes with an arrest or hook?
The pseudo-COD flies low over the deck with an extended arrest or hook which snags the regular arrest or cables and drags the cargo off the ramp (C-119, C-123, C-130, Nordatlas, etc.)
Since most COD missions are about one-way delivery of cargo (e.g. spare engines, there is little need to lift cargo off of a carrier at sea. Timed-out engines can just be stowed in a dark corner until the he next port visit.

A Fulton extraction harness could be used to evacuate medical casualties. If you hang Fulton gear off the starboard side of the island, you could extract casualties while still keeping the main flight deck in operation.

 

[apparition13]

As an aside. what about Carrier Onboard delivery for the smaller ASTVOL carriers envisioned in this thread?
If the second-world navy could not afford dedicated COD airplanes (Grumman C-2 Traders or C-3 Greyhounds), what about using a variation on the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) except replacing the drag parachutes with an arrest or hook?
The pseudo-COD flies low over the deck with an extended arrest or hook which snags the regular arrest or cables and drags the cargo off the ramp (C-119, C-123, C-130, Nordatlas, etc.)
Since most COD missions are about one-way delivery of cargo (e.g. spare engines, there is little need to lift cargo off of a carrier at sea. Timed-out engines can just be stowed in a dark corner until the he next port visit.
A STABO extraction harness could be used to evacuate medical casualties. If you hang STABO gear off the starboard side of the island, you could extract casualties while still keeping the main flight deck in operation.

CL-84 is in the original post. A larger variant (CL-84-8) was proposed with COD, ASW, AEW, etc. variants that would work with smaller carriers.

 

[TomS]

As an aside. what about Carrier Onboard delivery for the smaller ASTVOL carriers envisioned in this thread?
If the second-world navy could not afford dedicated COD airplanes (Grumman C-2 Traders or C-3 Greyhounds), what about using a variation on the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) except replacing the drag parachutes with an arrest or hook?
The pseudo-COD flies low over the deck with an extended arrest or hook which snags the regular arrest or cables and drags the cargo off the ramp (C-119, C-123, C-130, Nordatlas, etc.)
Since most COD missions are about one-way delivery of cargo (e.g. spare engines, there is little need to lift cargo off of a carrier at sea. Timed-out engines can just be stowed in a dark corner until the he next port visit.
A STABO extraction harness could be used to evacuate medical casualties. If you hang STABO gear off the starboard side of the island, you could extract casualties while still keeping the main flight deck in operation.

LAPES on deck sounds like a recipe for broken stuff. I mean, it's basically an in-flight arrestment with no landing gear, which would be really, really hard on both the cargo and the deck equipment. And without thrust after the arrestment, I'm not confident the load goes straight ahead consistently.

For extraction, STABO needs a hovering helicopter, in which case just land on the deck already. I suspect you're thinking of a Fulton extraction instead, which is done by fixed-wing planes. But it is far too violent to use for either medical casualties or the routine personnel swaps that COD usually does.

You'd just use heavy lift helos for COD to any aviation ship that can't handle a regular Greyhound. That's a big chunk of that the Navy's MH-53s do these days anyway; they're not all dedicated to MCM. (BTW, Greyhound is the C-2, the Trader was the C-1, despite being derived from the S-2)

Besides, if the Navy is really is really all-in on STOVL, the next COD is probably something like a C-142 anyway.

 

[1635yankee]

I was wondering - what kind of post-WWII world POD would it take, to get more navies with 35 000 tons carriers ?
Such as
- VSS
- second-hand Essex, post 1960
- Bunker Hill & Franklin rebuild
- Centaurs
- Clemenceau class

If crews could be cut to approximately 1000 - 1500, could more navies afford such ships ?

Perhaps having the US support -- or at least be neutral[1] -- France and the UK in the Suez Crisis would do that. The UK, at least, would not have had the loss of prestige.



[1] Instead of threatening the UK with severe financial repercussions if they continue the battle with Egypt.

 

[uk 75]

The problem with small carriers is that they are still expensive to crew and operate. By the 1980s the RN had only enough resources for two deployed small carriers. Today it is normally only possible to keep one CV at sea.
For the United States the Forrestal and then the Nimitz classes ruled out diverting resources to smaller platforms except for the US Marines LHA/LHD which were bigger than some Euro carriers.
France faced the same problem. It could usually only keep Clemenceau or Foch at sea rather than both. It now only has De Gaulle.
Spain and Italy have single small carriers.
So there would have to be a situation where a low key war with the Soviet Union meant that even the UK had conscription and other countries had more national service crews for ships.

We have covered small carriers in various Alt history threads and their limitations outweigh any cost savings.

 

[Firefinder]

And even their best use case example, the Falklands, show small carriers issues extremely well.

In that they had to get far closer to the danger zone due to the Harrier range.

More then a few times did the Arginitions, who was at the edge of their range themselves, nearly got them.

Which will not have been a issue with say a F4 or even the Vixens. Even as little as little as 50 more kilometers will have made them all but invulnable to attack.

Heck if the Argies time it better or did just slightly better maintaince, that Colossus-class they had would have really messed the RN up unless that Sub got her. As is they nearly did launch a strike using their Trackers since those didn't need the broken cats to launch. Before they lost them in a storm then got scared off by the sub attack.

 

[Archibald]

But proper AEW would have helped solving those issues. SHAR without AEW guidance (only from ships limited by earth curvature) wasted a lot of an already limited fuel supply.

Hermes in particular could have handled a few Gannet AEW 3... had its catapults not being removed for the ASW / Commando carrier / LPH / whatever role post 1970.
To me that's one of the most infuriating aspect of the Falklands AEW issue. To think they had Hermes and they had tracked down a few remaining Gannet AEW... yet they couldn't do anything about it.
We need a specific "Gannet AEW / Hermes / Falklands " thread.

 

[1635yankee]

That the major use of USN carriers since the end of WW2 was tactical support of land operations, I think that the individual capacity vs number of carriers equation was skewed in a way that would not happen were there to have been a potential peer fleet since 1945. While the Soviet Navy may have been large and possibly even as capable as some feared[1], its primary offensive capability was in its submarine force; its surface fleet was largely defensive[2]. In the Atlantic, this was countered (at least in theory) by land-based aircraft and ship-based ASW, including helicopters[3]. In other words, for the RN, carriers became an expense that was very hard to justify[4] as they were not needed for the RN's primary role of ASW in the North Atlantic. France probably had the largest fleet it could afford[5].

Positing a fleet required to contest a peer navy throughout the World would, I think result in a very different USN. It would also result in very different navies among the other nations of the World. For this, one possibility[6] would be a Sino-Japanese rapprochement and ensuing alliance, starting in the mid-1920s, with no subsequent WW2 in the Pacific[7]. This would leave a large and powerful fleet in the Pacific operated by a country for which the US had no love lost[8]. The war in Europe could go on as historical[9], so there would be similar developments in nuclear and aircraft technologies[10].

--------------
1: In some areas, the Soviet Navy seemed to have risen to the level of "competent," but the number of peacetime accidents would indicate that this was not consistently true.
2: In that a major role was trying to keep USN and RN submarines away from its ballistic submarines. I don't know how well this worked.
3: How effective ASW is against modern submarines is moot.
4: Had the Argentinian junta waited a few months, Thatcher's defense review would have eliminated the carriers.
5: After having much of WW2 fought in its territory, it's infrastructure wasn't in the best of shape.
6: This is incredibly unlikely.
7: Although a state of peace, especially an alliance, between China and Japan would make quite a few Americans expand their lynching activities and other forms of state-endorsed terrorism against the Asian communities.
8: See 7. Also, see the Chinese Exclusion Acts.
9: Kaiser Wilhelm got the US to declare war in 1917. Hitler and Ribbentrop would have been even better at pissing off the US, especially as FDR wasn't as constitutionally isolationist (and racist) as Wilson. The US would be at war with Germany by mid-1942, at the latest.
10: Historically, nuclear weapons development was aimed at Germany. Aircraft technological advancement was based on science that had been universally known in the 1930s.

 

[PMN1]

But proper AEW would have helped solving those issues. SHAR without AEW guidance (only from ships limited by earth curvature) wasted a lot of an already limited fuel supply.

Hermes in particular could have handled a few Gannet AEW 3... had its catapults not being removed for the ASW / Commando carrier / LPH / whatever role post 1970.
To me that's one of the most infuriating aspect of the Falklands AEW issue. To think they had Hermes and they had tracked down a few remaining Gannet AEW... yet they couldn't do anything about it.
We need a specific "Gannet AEW / Hermes / Falklands " thread.

Or have the Sea King AEW developed earlier

http://warships1discussionboards.yu...kland-s-aircraft-carriers-another-option.html

Obi Wan Russell

The Sea King AEW variant was proposed for the Invincible class in the late 70s, so preliminary studies into the feasibility of the design must have been sitting on a shelf at the MOD at the start of the war. The Sea King AEW was opposed by the RAF prior to 82 because they claimed their Shackleton AEW2s could provide the RN with all the cover they needed (in the NORTH Atlantic). Remember the RAF was resistant to the Invincible/SHAR combination from the start (some things never change) and only grudgingly acquiesced to the Sea Harriers because the intended five aircraft sqns for the Invincibles were seen as too few to allow the RN to return to serious overseas deployments of the kind they excelled in during the 50s and 60s. Interestingly, although the RN first commissioned the SHAR sqns with five aircraft complements, they always intended to increase the size during wartime (to at least 8 aircraft each on an Invincible drawing pilots and planes from the HQ sqn 899) as the mathematics of maintaining a two aircraft CAP round the clock were well known. Keeping them to five aircraft (albeit with at least 8-10 pilots aboard ship) was 'for show' in peacetime. Also according to 'Sharkey' Ward's book, just prior to the Falklands war 801 sqn was already operating with six aircraft, so perhaps the RN was already trying to creep up the sqn sizes slowly so as not to draw attention (from the RAF!).

 

[zen]

We have covered small carriers in various Alt history threads and their limitations outweigh any cost savings.

I don't think we can just assume cost is the only factor.
Carriers, despite their airwing, suffer from a ship's indivisible nature.
One ship can only be in one place.

So the argument for these VSS type carriers is more one of having some airpower available in multiple locations.

 

[Archibald]

France probably had the largest fleet it could afford[5].

100% agree. You (correctly) blame WWII devastation, but the roaring 1944-1974 decades of prosperity helped reparing the damage. Main issue after De Gaulle return in '58 was Force de Frappe. France had to fund a fourth army with expensive new weapons and it cost the country half the cost of Apollo and 5 times Concorde: $10 billion dollar. For a medium power recovering from WWII, fighting dirty colonial wars and having important NATO committments (even after 1966) that was a lot. The French Navy gained boomers, but the surface fleet took a beating, made worse by the 1973 oil shock. Clearly three full size carriers was never affordable - Arromanches filled a lot of roles like a good Swiss knife but was gone by 1974. And PH75 went nowhere before ballooning into PA75 - nowadays know as CdG.

 

[uk 75]

The three Invincibles and Hermes were designed to be an ASW group for the NATO Striking Fleet in the North.Atlantic not a relief force to recover imperial outposts lost by a careless government
The Falklands loss could have been avoided by not penny pinching about Endurance and ensuring SSN assets were operating in the area earlier. Gannets stay in a museum where they belong .

 

[1635yankee]

The three Invincibles and Hermes were designed to be an ASW group for the NATO Striking Fleet in the North.Atlantic not a relief force to recover imperial outposts lost by a careless government
The Falklands loss could have been avoided by not penny pinching about Endurance and ensuring SSN assets were operating in the area earlier. Gannets stay in a museum where they belong .

There were more political issues than that, one of which had to do with the Tories placing more severe restrictions on which overseas possessions' people could move to the UK. IIRC, it was limited to those from Gibraltor (the target, if I remember the news reports of the time, was to keep people from Hong Kong from moving to the British Isles); those from the Falklands could not. Since the Falklanders couldn't move to the UK, the Argentinians may have considered the British government to be less than concerned with the Falklanders' welfare.

I'm not sure if the Argentinian junta in power at that time was sufficiently rational to be deterred by much less than most of the RN, especially considering the misogyny common to people of the age and political persuasion of the junta's members. After all, the head of state and head of government are both women.

 

[uk 75]

I think even a single SSN could have sunk key elements of the seaborne invasion force thus denying it the chance to land.
As you say the crisis was caused by politics.
But my main point is that the RN focussed rightly on the main threat to Britain which came from Moscow not Buenos Aires

 

[Lascaris]

France probably had the largest fleet it could afford[5].

100% agree. You (correctly) blame WWII devastation, but the roaring 1944-1974 decades of prosperity helped reparing the damage. Main issue after De Gaulle return in '58 was Force de Frappe. France had to fund a fourth army with expensive new weapons and it cost the country half the cost of Apollo and 5 times Concorde: $10 billion dollar. For a medium power recovering from WWII, fighting dirty colonial wars and having important NATO committments (even after 1966) that was a lot. The French Navy gained boomers, but the surface fleet took a beating, made worse by the 1973 oil shock. Clearly three full size carriers was never affordable - Arromanches filled a lot of roles like a good Swiss knife but was gone by 1974. And PH75 went nowhere before ballooning into PA75 - nowadays know as CdG.

Do we have any data how said 10 billion spread 9ver the years? Or what cost what?