THE HUMAN FACTOR:
THE UNITED STATES VERSUS
THE SOVIET FIGHTER PILOT
COLONEL MIKE PRESS
Our most important advantage [over the Soviets] is our personnel.
General Creech, Armed Forces Journal, 1983
U.S. tactical forces retain a qualitative advantage over those of the Soviet Union both in aircraft and weapons and—more important—in personnel and training.
Soviet Military Power, April 1985
There seems to be a general consensus of opinion today that in a comparison of strength between the Soviet and U.S. tactical forces, the Soviet advantage in numbers is counterbalanced by the U.S. advantage in technology, personnel, training, and tactics. Since Soviets have been successful in narrowing the technology gap, some U.S. policymakers have put even more emphasis on the perceived U.S. advantage in personnel. In fact, some would argue that the U.S. fighter pilot, his training, and his tactics are so superior that even if the Soviets could catch up in technology, the U.S. fighter forces would still have an overall edge in combat capability.
This article examines that argument and provides some answers to difficult questions surfaced by this issue. Is it true that the U.S. fighter pilot is inherently better than his Soviet counterpart? Are U.S. training programs and tactics better? If the comparisons are true, how much of an advantage does the U.S. pilot maintain, and how does one measure the difference? Is this advantage widening or narrowing? Finally, and most important, once the advantage is determined, how does one go about improving the fighter force to ensure an even greater advantage?
To begin a comparison of two countries' fighter pilots' capabilities is not an easy task. While it is quite common for an analyst to compare fighter forces based on the number of aircraft and quality of weapons, it is very rare to find an objective study of pilot capabilities. In fact, most analyses quantify combat capability as a product of numerous factors, such as aircraft, logistics, maintenance, munitions, etc. But the human factor (pilot ability, training, and tactics) is rarely included because its measurement is very subjective and its impact on the equation so little understood. Few will argue, however, that differences in pilot capability do exist, and some aspects of the human factor should be included in the equation if we are to achieve accurate comparisons.
The human factor, as it relates to Soviet and U.S. combat capability, constitutes three main variables—the inherent ability of the individual pilot, his training, and his tactics. These three variables, when added together, produce a pilot or "human factor" input to the overall effectiveness of a sortie or mission. Let's look at each of these variables in turn.
The first variable is the inherent ability of the pilot, or put another way, the quality of the individual as a fighter pilot, given equal training and tactics. The pilot's inherent ability is a product of the pilot selection process and the personnel system that assigns and maintains the rated fighter-pilot force. Relative to other air forces, the U.S. Air Force does very little preselection testing of personnel prior to their entering pilot training. In other air forces, especially Israel's, numerous psychological, motor skills and other screening tests are given to measure inherent fighter pilot ability prior to selection for pilot training. By contrast, U.S. Air Force pilot selection is based on a relatively antiquated system of undergraduate academic grades, officer qualification test scores, and 20/20 vision. The pilot selection process does not differentiate between skills necessary for fighter pilots and other pilots such as airlift or bomber pilots. This distinction is made much later in the training cycle, is usually subjective, and can only select from those who have already been admitted into the program. The USAF pilot selection system still suffers from the "universally assignable pilot" concept that has been around for years.
When comparing the U.S. pilot selection system with the Soviets, one could safely say that the Soviets' competition for pilot training slots is more competitive than ours. The benefits after attaining the status of fighter pilot in the Soviet Union are some of the highest in the society. The higher aviation schools are considered among the best schools in the country, and military aviation is a highly sought-after profession. The Soviet pilot is at the top of the economic and social scale so that selection to one of the higher aviation schools is a ticket to the upper echelons of society. Lieutenant Viktor I. Belenko, the Soviet MiG pilot who defected in September 1976, related that more than 4000 applicants tested for only 360 slots to his freshman class at the Soviet Air Defense Command flight training program at Armavir in the Caucasus. And, out of the 360 that began, only 258 graduated—a 30 percent attrition rate. Thus, while it can be argued that the average Soviet high school graduate is probably less technically oriented than his U.S. counterpart, the Soviets have the advantage of large numbers of applicants to military aviation schools from which they can choose the cream of the high school crop.
When our pilots graduate, they are assigned to specific unit aircraft and are managed by the rated officer personnel system for subsequent assignments. Here again, we do not do a very good job of rated officer management if enhanced combat capability is the final objective. The personnel rated management system attempts to maintain the fighter pilot rated force at a level based on many factors, such as unit manning levels, training levels, and unit experience levels. Many reasons are used for moving fighter pilots from one air base to another, from one aircraft type to another, or from rated duties to a staff position. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the "fairness" of personnel moves, remote assignment eligibility, career broadening, manning levels, and career progression. Rarely has the personnel system explained a move by stating that it is in the best interest of increased combat capability. In fact, the rated management system would be hard pressed to move individuals based on pilot capability since there is no formal system that rates pilots according to their relative individual capabilities. Promotions are not made on pilot capabilities, but rather on officer effectiveness reports, and most assignments are made on professional career progression rather than combat capability.
The Soviet rated management system is not much better than ours, but because of their restrictive system, a fighter pilot is not moved as frequently. The Soviets, therefore, experience less turbulence in their force, and a pilot may fly the same aircraft or mission for twenty-five years. However, their promotions and assignments are based more on political reliability than pilot effectiveness. In the end, their progression is probably as equally nonrelevant to combat capability as the U.S. system.
If it is generally accepted then that the USAF has better pilots than the Soviets, it certainly is not due to any preselection criteria, screening, competitive testing, or rated management system. In fact, the individual Soviet pilot, when compared to the Soviet society as a whole, is probably one of the most highly qualified and capable individuals. He certainly seems comparable in inherent abilities with his American counterpart. It seems safe to assume that any advantage we maintain is not due to the inherent abilities of our fighter pilots. However, if one were to get serious about upgrading the pilot force and in gaining or increasing an advantage in the human factor, the pilot selection and rated management areas would certainly be good places to start.
The second variable affecting the human factor is training. If there is one area where the United States Air Force leads all countries, it is in fighter training. In the past ten years with the advent of Red Flag, Aggressor training, and Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT), the USAF has made gigantic strides toward realistic fighter training. From the lessons learned in Vietnam and the Red Baron report, U.S. fighter forces have developed the most realistic and ambitious training program in the world. However, these "new" training programs are more than ten years old now, and they have reached a plateau in progress with stagnation setting in.
The Soviets, on the other hand, were late in realizing that new generation fighters need new generation training philosophies. As stated in Soviet Military Power, published by the Department of Defense in March 1983, "the Soviets have recently made significant changes in their air combat tactics and training programs. Pilot independence and initiatives are now stressed. The continual, technological upgrading of equipment and increasing proficiency in combat employment of that equipment have resulted in greatly increased Soviet aviation capabilities." Thus, even in the area of training where the USAF fighter pilot has always excelled, Soviet initiatives dictate new and aggressive U.S. training initiatives if the United States is to maintain its present advantage in the training variable.
The third variable in the human factor to be discussed is tactics. Although tactics are not a specific human quality, they are designed and employed by the pilot and therefore impact upon how well the pilot can employ his aircraft. In 1972, the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, began experimenting with new fighter formations and tactics. These formations and tactics, called Fluid Two, were a composite of lessons learned in air-to-air combat in Vietnam, the U.S. Navy’s "loose deuce," and formations flown in the F-104 and other aircraft called "double attack." Although the formation was different from the old Fluid Four tactic, the most significant difference was the philosophical change in the wingman's duties. Fluid Two detached the wingman from a very restrictive cover position ("fighting wing") on the leader to a more active role, maneuvering independently, yet in coordination, with the leader. For the past ten years, the tactical air force has been training with and refining fluid attack tactics. In principle, U.S. fighter pilots are free to design, test, and fly almost any variation of formations and tactics that they or their squadron wish to try. However, in practice, due to limited sorties, safety restrictions, and a rated management system that always requires training to the lowest denominator, tactics development today is in fact spotty and often neglected.
As noted earlier, the Soviets are attempting to improve their tactics with each new generation of aircraft, and they are just beginning to give their pilots more independence. On the surface this appears to be a ten-year lag in tactical development. However, when one considers Soviet historical doctrine of mass, breakthrough, and strict command and control, the idea of large, inflexible, and slow maneuvering formations may be more design than simple lack of progress. What may look to the U.S. observer as an unimaginative tactic may to the Soviet commander be as sophisticated and advanced as his doctrines, force structure, and mission would dictate. And who is to say that fluid attack and independent maneuvering would work better than regimental control in their battle schemes? In either case, suffice it to say that both the U.S. and Soviet tactics will change with the advent of new aircraft, missiles, and radars. What worked yesterday in the F-86 will not work in the F-15. The tactic used to defeat the MiG-21 will probably not be the best tactic to defeat the Flanker. The USAF has always been willing to change tactics, however, tactical development, evaluation, and implementation seem to be taking more time, money, and effort these days. And the Soviets are not standing still. With their new equipment, they are experimenting with new tactics. So even in the tactics variable, the U.S. advantage has become questionable and possibly is slipping away.
Thus, in a brief examination of the variables that make up the human factor, it can be seen that although in each case no quantitative measurement can be made, there is reason to believe that the United States is equal to or slightly ahead of the Soviets. However, whereas five or ten years ago this advantage may have been quite large, the Soviets seem to be narrowing the gap in all cases. U.S. pilot selection and rated management policies have not changed, and training and tactics initiatives, while dynamic after Vietnam, have pretty much stagnated. In the meantime, the Soviets have been plodding along in their inimitable way, slowly increasing their training realism and testing new tactical philosophies to match their weapons improvements. If the United States is to maintain any advantage that it may have in the human factor, drastic steps need to be taken soon.
We can increase tactical combat capability vis-?-vis the Soviet Union in a number of ways: buy more aircraft, build newer aircraft, radars, and missiles, increase the spares, etc. The one factor, however, that could have the greatest impact, and yet is probably the least expensive and most easily changed, is the human factor. By launching an aggressive and dynamic program to upgrade the fighter pilot force, the USAF could drastically alter the combat equation in its favor for years. Simple initiatives and policy changes affecting the human factor variables could make U.S. fighter combat capability increase exponentially.
The inherent ability of the fighter pilot is one of the most important variables in the human factor, the easiest to change, and yet the most neglected. As an old fighter pilot once eloquently remarked, "You can train a hamburger, but when you're through, you still get hamburger." Fighter pilot training today is a demanding process and without a good product to start with, no amount of excellent training will produce a quality fighter pilot. Therefore, the selection process must be changed to be more aggressive, competitive, and highly selective. Large groups of candidates should be screened with sophisticated, modern testing procedures. Large attrition rates should be experienced in the early phases of training. Needless to say, specialized fighter training should begin early. At every stage of training, competition, and ratings based on fighter pilot performance should be used for selection to top fighter pilot positions.
The rated management system needs a thorough review. Personnel assignment policies need to be changed so they can respond to the needs of combat capability and not to an arbitrary "good deal/bad deal" list. In other words, if a forward air controller job needs filling, you don't take the best F-15 pilot to fill it just because he's due a "bad deal." More sensitivities need to be paid to the policies that force early rotations and create turbulence in the units. In today's fighter force, it takes two to three years to upgrade a flight lead and another two to three years to get good at it. Most new fighter pilots don't stay in their first squadron more than two to three years, and many don't remain in their first assignment aircraft longer than five years. The result is that most operational fighter squadrons are continually upgrading new pilots, and very few squadrons reach a level of high combat capability. What is required by the rated management system is a conscious effort to keep good fighter pilots in the same aircraft, same mission, same unit for longer periods of time. Gone are the days when we can afford a universally assignable pilot, or even a "generic fighter pilot."
To make these changes in the pilot selection process and rated management system requires major policy changes but should cost relatively little. When it comes to improving the training variable, however, costs do enter into the picture. Quality training is expensive, but expensive training is usually cheaper in the long run due to increased combat capability and a more efficient and effective fighting force. New, innovative methods of training need to be developed to stay ahead of the Soviets. State-of-the art combat simulators that rival the most advanced air-to-air training are available today. More air combat maneuvering instrumentation and electronic combat ranges are needed. More flying time, range time, realistic scenarios, and composite force training are all high priorities. Combat is not the time to discover that you need more training.
At first glance, one would assume that tactics, unlike training, would be very cheap to change and would simply require a tactics manual change. However, tactics like the other variables are very difficult to measure, and in order to quantify the advantage of one tactic over another, testing is required. In-depth tactics testing is very time-consuming and costly. Conducting a valid tactics evaluation may take up to two years and hundreds of sorties. Here again "state-of-the-art" combat simulators can be extremely helpful in speeding up this process. The combat simulator used in evaluating the AMRAAM is a prime example of how combat simulators were used to simulate realistic combat engagements better than could have been done in the real aircraft because of range and safety restrictions. Tactics development, testing, and evaluation are too important to continue in the slow pace of only live mission testing. A realistic state-of-the-art combat simulator similar to the one used in the AMRAAM tests should be devoted full time to tactics testing and evaluations. Like training, tactics development is expensive, but it needs to be improved if the USAF is to increase its advantage over the Soviets.
THE U.S. fighter pilot community is at a critical crossroad. While the Soviets outnumber the United States and are slowly catching up in technology, our one remaining advantage is our fighter pilots. As has been shown, however, that human advantage is very fragile and even here the Soviets show signs of progress. Unfortunately, the human factor is one of the factors of the combat capability equation that has gained little attention in the U.S. Air Force and also little support in the budget battles. I believe that with some renewed high-level interest and a moderate infusion of money, the human factor can be significantly altered in the proper direction. It seems only natural that a fighter force with the most highly advanced aircraft, missiles, and radars should also have pilots to fly them who are second to none. In the air-to-air arena there is an old saying, "there is a time for energy and time for action." It's time for action!
Zaragoza, Spain
Contributor
Colonel Michael C. Press (B.S., University of Oregon; M.S., Army Command and General Staff College) is Deputy Commander for Operations, 406th Tactical Fighter Training Wing, Zaragoza, Spain. He is a fighter pilot with more than 4000 hours and 480 combat missions in Vietnam who has served as the 65th Aggressor Squadron Commander at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and as Chief of Fighter Requirements, Hq USAFE, Ramstein AB, Germany. Colonel Press is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.