V Bombers

JohnR

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Did any other country consider adopting any of the V Bombers? Did any evaluations take place?

The most likely country I can see is Australia.

Regards.
 
It was widely reported that Australia evaluated V bombers prior to the aborted purchase of the TSR2.
In particular the HP Victor. Commentry at the time doubted the value as Australia did not have access to any atomic weapons.

Two points arise - the HP Victor had the best conventional performance, and it's just possible that there may have been a secret anex re weapons as part of the trials programmes for nuclear weapons in Australia. Given that this was still going on, to some extent, as late as 1979.

I seem to recall seeing one reference to Canadian 'interest' but cant find the reference at the moment.


Perhaps it should also be noted that in the mid to late sixties one could find dispersed V bombers in a hugh arc from the UK, through the Med, Indian Ocean, and out to Austalia and Pacific. I'm sure they weren't there for fun. So a bit of help re joint 'operations' from the two strongest members of the realm might not have gone amiss.

There was an article - SACs Kissing Cousins - in one of the magazines around then which had a diagram, if my memory is correct, showing how RAF penetration of old USSR in the event of a conflict, would be hours ahead of most US flights - and suitably soften up defenses.

Regards

Fred
 
I am certain I've read somewhere, but I can't recall where (old good Air Enthusiast perhaps), that the RAAF studied feasibility of having a V-bomber force. If my memory serves me well, they thought of two squadrons as well as a training unit. They even considered to build the aircraft under licence but the planes, if I am not mistaken, were to be rather Vulcans than Victors.

I'll try to find the source of my memories.

Best regards,
Piotr
 
fredgell said:
Two points arise - the HP Victor had the best conventional performance, and it's just possible that there may have been a secret anex re weapons as part of the trials programmes for nuclear weapons in Australia. Given that this was still going on, to some extent, as late as 1979.

You have some evidence of this? Considering that the Australian Government abandoned all effort at acquiring Nuclear Weapons with the ascension of the McMahon Government to power in 1971 when they chose to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact, I find it very unusual that they would be still attempting, according to you, to gain nuclear weapons 8 years later.

The Australian effort to gain nuclear weapons began in 1945, as part of the British Government's decision making to try and decentralise in the face of possible atomic annilation. Part of the plan was to move its own nuclear industries to the "periphery" of the Empire - Canada, Australia, Southern Africa. The Snowy Mountains Hydro Scheme and the establishment of the Australian National University were the two most visible signs, along with the acquisition of Canberra bombers in the late 1940s. Then there were the nuclear tests. Canada defected/was lured away by the Americans who wanted them to be more closely aligned with their nuclear efforts, early on. The Australians' nuclear dreams were never realised though, as a succession of British decisions to try and gain access to American nuclear technology were first thwarted and then succeeded. The Americans specifically made it a pre-condition that Canberra be denied access to their technology because of the fears (well founded as it later was known after the Petovs' Affair) of Soviet espionage downunder.
 
rickshaw said:
fredgell said:
Two points arise - the HP Victor had the best conventional performance, and it's just possible that there may have been a secret anex re weapons as part of the trials programmes for nuclear weapons in Australia. Given that this was still going on, to some extent, as late as 1979.

You have some evidence of this? Considering that the Australian Government abandoned all effort at acquiring Nuclear Weapons with the ascension of the McMahon Government to power in 1971 when they chose to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact, I find it very unusual that they would be still attempting, according to you, to gain nuclear weapons 8 years later.

The Australian effort to gain nuclear weapons began in 1945, as part of the British Government's decision making to try and decentralise in the face of possible atomic annilation. Part of the plan was to move its own nuclear industries to the "periphery" of the Empire - Canada, Australia, Southern Africa. The Snowy Mountains Hydro Scheme and the establishment of the Australian National University were the two most visible signs, along with the acquisition of Canberra bombers in the late 1940s. Then there were the nuclear tests. Canada defected/was lured away by the Americans who wanted them to be more closely aligned with their nuclear efforts, early on. The Australians' nuclear dreams were never realised though, as a succession of British decisions to try and gain access to American nuclear technology were first thwarted and then succeeded. The Americans specifically made it a pre-condition that Canberra be denied access to their technology because of the fears (well founded as it later was known after the Petovs' Affair) of Soviet espionage downunder.

Interesting, Not sure about V-Bomber production, A Commonwealth deterrent based on Blue Streak LRBM was being planned, mooted middle fifties, the Australian sites were Singapore, British North Borneo and the “outback”, from memory about twenty rounds in Hard Emplacements “silos”.
The V-bombers dual purpose function was as a conventional weapon and the Vulcan was offered as a part of the TSR2 package, until Mountbatten killed it.

Why was the UK given details plans and specification s of the USA H-bombs? this agreement stopped the Commonwealth based Joint Deterrent
 
Spark said:
Interesting, Not sure about V-Bomber production, A Commonwealth deterrent based on Blue Streak LRBM was being planned, mooted middle fifties, the Australian sites were Singapore, British North Borneo and the “outback”, from memory about twenty rounds in Hard Emplacements “silos”.
The V-bombers dual purpose function was as a conventional weapon and the Vulcan was offered as a part of the TSR2 package, until Mountbatten killed it.

Interesting. According to the article here - http://www.jet-flight.net/voption.html, Vulcan was under serious consideration, not as part of the TSR2 package but before any consideration of TSR2.

Where did you hear about this Commonwealth Deterrent Package? I've never heard of it.

Why was the UK given details plans and specification s of the USA H-bombs? this agreement stopped the Commonwealth based Joint Deterrent

Yes. However it was because the UK was finding heavy weather of making their own independent nuclear weapons in a package small enough to be carried by tactical aircraft. It was also a method of tying the UK much more closely to the US defence strategy of the day.
 
No evidence - pure speculation on my part - but trials were going on long after 1970. The Australian interest in V-Bombers and TSR2 (and F-111) has always seemed a bit strange if totaly limited to conventional payloads no matter what the manufacturers may have said.

Canada was intimately involved in early nuclear weapons development and in the post war musical chairs played by US and UK. Australia let the UK test an amazing number of weapons, components and delivery vehicles. It seems likely there were, as yet unpuplished, agreements but no evidence at all that they exist.

There was a fair fuss in Australia when the trials in the 1970s became public knowledge even though not involving any nuclear testing.

Fred
 
V-Craft Exports: the 1947 Spec was to deliver nukes from E.England onto Russia West of the Urals. There was never any "Commonwealth based Joint Deterrent": the enemy and target was rather closer to Durham than Darwin. UK's Force might be a couple of hundred aircraft, which could be generated without recalling RCAF/RAAF/RNZAF crews to Bomber Command. I know of 2 notions of loan for ironwork by friends:

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?p=1333213&highlight=JDK+nuclear#post 144

"On Scherger's return to Australia, in May 1963, the
Australian Government announced that they had
authorised the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir
Valston Hancock, to evaluate the Canberra replacement.
He decided to consider the French Mirage IV, the British
TSR-2, and the US Phantom and Vigilante, in that order.
At that point the F-111 did not feature on the shortlist.
When Hancock visited the UK, it was suggested that
V-bombers could be provided to Australia as an interim
arrangement until TSR-2 deliveries were made. However,
this offer was conditional upon the force being both
crewed and under the command of the RAF—a proposal
that clearly did not appeal to the Australian Government
or the RAAF"

In 1964 UK MoD examined early/trials Vulcan B.1, but failed to identify 6-or-so which could be resurrected as operational machines for SAAF, to lead in to an order for new Buccaneer S.50. V-Craft had no non-nuclear function relevant to, say RAAF, that could not be handled by cheaper machines. There was no intent to hazard these Hi-VALU assets on iron Missions - Valiant use at Suez was in the belief/hope that EAF (?Sov-manned) MiG-17 would not rise up.

The notion of Blue Streak in FEAF is risible. One of the many reasons for chopping it was that its modest range meant that for its Donetz Basin targets it must be sunk East of the Pennines in dodgy geology, rather than the easier West. From Brunei it would have nicely splattered on barren Hainan I, far, far from anything that PRC might have cared about. Late-1960s' rotations of Mk.2 V-Craft to Tengah/Butterworth had much the same problem, even one-way - China: "big, very big" (N.Coward).

US/UK on 4 August,1958 made the Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes because Sputnik, 11/57 gave US motive to share with UK the pain of Deterrence.
 
Actually there were early on plans for a Joint Commonwealth deterrent force, as part of the effort to decentralise the Empire/Commonwealth's nuclear industries and retaliation, as I pointed out several posts ago. This is detailed in Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb by Wayne Reynolds. While it concentrates primarily on the early period (1942-1959) of Australia's efforts to gain access to British nuclear technology, it does mention several times in passing one of the reasons why the RAF was keen for the RAAF to gain access to Canberras. Richard Broinowski on this webpage, takes the story up and provides more detail about the later period. Further research found this pdf on Blue Streak, which confirms Spark's contention that Australia was interested beyond being merely a testing range for the weapon. Although, I have to ask what was the point in acquiring a 2,300 nm range IRBM. Even from Darwin, it would only be able to reach as far as the southern tip of Indochina. While Australia's major fear at the time was Indonesian aggression, initially Canberra, then later TSR2 and finally F-111 addressed that, more than adequately addressed that problem (coupled with RAF plans during Konfrontasi to commit most of the V-Bomber force in a conventional role, if that war had gone "hot") IMO.
 
rickshaw said:
Actually there were early on plans for a Joint Commonwealth deterrent force, as part of the effort to decentralise the Empire/Commonwealth's nuclear industries and retaliation, as I pointed out several posts ago. This is detailed in Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb by Wayne Reynolds. While it concentrates primarily on the early period (1942-1959) of Australia's efforts to gain access to British nuclear technology, it does mention several times in passing one of the reasons why the RAF was keen for the RAAF to gain access to Canberras. Richard Broinowski on this webpage, takes the story up and provides more detail about the later period. Further research found this pdf on Blue Streak, which confirms Spark's contention that Australia was interested beyond being merely a testing range for the weapon. Although, I have to ask what was the point in acquiring a 2,300 nm range IRBM. Even from Darwin, it would only be able to reach as far as the southern tip of Indochina. While Australia's major fear at the time was Indonesian aggression, initially Canberra, then later TSR2 and finally F-111 addressed that, more than adequately addressed that problem (coupled with RAF plans during Konfrontasi to commit most of the V-Bomber force in a conventional role, if that war had gone "hot") IMO.

I must admit in 1960 I was conned by the government canards at the time of cancellation
In following months it became clear that every Government reason given for cancelling the UK LRBM was in simple terms a symphony of barefaced lies and is referred to as such in “Parliament Speak” in debates recorded in Hansard. 1960

May one correct several serious misconceptions that are commonly held about the UK LRBM deterrent and Blue Streak?
First there were originally two parallel programmes planned with a duality of purpose as SOB/SLV/LRBM. Primary and secondary with mix and match systems

First was the English Electric LRBM .with Bristol Delta 3 (RPE Westcott) engines 187,500lbf thrust engines Range circa 5,000 n.miles, conventional monocoque tanks/airframe, Celestial navigator guidance, and the advanced re-entry head aero-shell.
The type of head which was transferred to the other alternative LRBM tasked to de Havilland Propellers because the English Electric tasked Head was the very best solution and was also adopted/adapted to use by the USA for all subsequent missile warheads.
The “weapon re-entry vehicle” plus decoys started with an estimated mass in 1954 of about 7,000lb by 1959 with or without American assistance it was to be a very small fraction of the original estimate.
I was told by (Professor) Ian Smith that the potential performance of Blue Streak as it stood in 1959 was such that it could reach any were in the Soviet Union i.e. in excess of 6,000n.miles in American terms an ICBM. The Guidance issue had not been decided at the point of cancellation but given this fact the substitution of the EE tasked celestial guidance system optimised for the longest ranges seems obvious.
That the RZ2 only needed a turn of a screw to alter and increase the performance setting if needed.
According to Charles Martin the RZ2 was finally tested, passed at 165,000lbf when it was cancelled
(Still got the correspondence)
The engine for the missile round was to have been the RZ13 NOT the RZ12 this saved about a quarter of a ton for similar or better performance and greater range.
How ever Ian Smith stated the Rolls Royce had already started work on an engine for Blue Streak using storable propellants.
To quote from Roy Dommet’s “The Blue Streak Weapon”
“The Australians even considered that it could defend them because, before the 1958 Anglo-American Agreement for Cooperation on the Use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, there were signs of the UK's nuclear force becoming a Commonwealth one in conjunction with Canada and Australia”

. Digression.
The Bristol Delta 3. 187,500 lbf per chamber. A single chamber exists in the Science Museum store
Bristol contract April 1955; work ceased at Bristol on Delta 3 December 1957
Development work continued at RPE Westcott until 1966
Planned Eight engine cluster 1,500,000 lb thrust for proposed RAF Heavy SLV.
Planned Four engine cluster 750,000 lb thrust for English Electric proposed RAF Standard man rated SLV
The above were alternatives in case of de Havilland failing to produce equivalent successful SOB/SLV family. ( SOB= Sub-Orbital Booster)
The Tanks were planned as conventional monocoque substitute to the Pressurised Balloon “Atlas/BIS” type tasked to De Havilland
The English Electric LRBM was to have been a bigger missile with longer range. Hence the early Vickers V1000 type 1004 Transport or the later Short Britannic/Belfast were expected to carry either this larger weapon or RAF Titan 1 rounds for deployment or practise or trial rounds to Woomera
The irony is that because of a Short or de Havilland design cock-up the smaller Blue Streak (with same specified Ten foot Diameter also common to Atlas and Titan) was never transported by the Short Belfast although both the French and German stages were airlifted to Woomera by a Belfast.

Remember a two Stage Blue Streak was actively looked at, at one point and the possibility of substituting other missiles in the Hard Emplacement (silo) including a solid propellant missile, sorry no details, was looked at.
In the USA there was open speculation 1958 in their press as to where in the Commonwealth the Blue Streak Hard Emplacements (silos) were to be placed.

The V-Force with the V-1000 tanker and the Radio Warfare V-1000 force would have had a very long reach
 
Argentina was reported to have shown a close interest in second hand Vulcans as the fleet was starting to be wound down in the late 70's/early 80's.

They were the first South American nation with a long range bombing arm (Lancasters and Lincolns), I don't know how far the discussions went but I recall that officers visited the UK to look over some airfames.
 
Rickshaw rightfully points out Reynold’s book – Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb – It is the best source on the strategic concepts behind Australian bomber project decisions up to the 70s (Lincoln, Canberra and F-111). There are other sources that focus more on the decision behind choosing the F-111 including the cabinet papers that are available online from the Australian National Archive.

In short the Canberra was chosen in the late 1940s to be the Australian nuclear bomber. Early and strong support from Australia for this aircraft is why it was named after the Australian capital city… Otherwise it might have been the English Electric Warton...

The Canberra’s payload and range performance was sufficient for the RAAF’s nuclear bomber requirement as they would have operated more as theatre bombers from Pacific Islands and South East Asian bases against enemy lines of communications (regional ports, etc). Unlike the V Bombers that had a longer payload/range capability to operate from national homelands against enemy capital cities (UK to Moscow). For the RAAF a bomber able to do that would have needed at least a 10,000 mile range (Darwin to Beijing).

One of the factors influencing the replacement of the Canberra was an ultimately wrong belief by the RAAF that the Canberra was not going to be airworthy after the mid 1960s. So the two main developmental options – the TFX (later F-111) and the TSR.2 – included two squadrons of (~20) interim bombers to fill the gap until the new bomber was ready. USAF was going to supply B-47s and the RAF one of the V-Bombers. The RAF offered the V-Bombers with their crews which the British thought was a deal sweetener (free aircrews). Anyway the RAAF quickly backed out of the B-47 supply when they discovered there was a lot more life in the Canberra and flying B-47s was not a business you really wanted to be in.

To avoid all this interim bomber complexity and the inevitable in service delays of the TFX and TSR.2 the RAAF wanted to buy the A3J-2 of the production line and have them in service by 1965-66. This decision was declined by the Government as they didn’t want to have to pay for the replacement the Vigilante in the 1970s (as its useful life was seen as less than TFX or TSR.2). Of course by selecting the TFX they ended out paying much more than they thought and not even getting the new bomber until the 1970s!
 
work on an Australian nuclear capability might have been simple chest banging to impress those unruly people who might attempt try to keep "rightful owners" out of the unsettled continent .That the planes would not reach the "theatre" does not matter . And even if they did what would they bomb does not matter either . In any case the V-Bombers with 2 out of 3 in 1982 ,did fight in the prelude of what might have been .
 
Spark,

You seem to have an exceptional knowledge of the British IRBM/ICBM programme. Would you be able to post a piece about it in the missiles section with some additional detail and sources? I am especially interested in the EE ICBM design?

Thank you in advance sealordlawrence.
 
I'll second that motion, Spark
Fascinating bit of info on Bristol and EE.

many thanks

Fred
 
I found the following statement in the Flight Global archive:

'English Electric are now reported to be in production with a
land-based anti-aircraft missile and to have been working on at
least one other project, including a "celestial" ballistic missile
having a very high trajectory and a range of 1,000 miles or
more and possibly using a form of star tracking. Napier might
provide the rocket motor and Marconi the guidance system.
'

Source: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1956/1956%20-%201236.html

Lots of mights and maybes but the theme confirms what Spark said in his previous post which is that EE was working on a ballistic missile with celestial navigation at least up to 1957. Is it the case that this programme dies under the same review that buried the almost equally secretive Avro 730?
 
Having looked at the Skomer site I believe that the EE project was code named Blue Moon. The Book a Vertical Empire states that the Delta 3 was a research engine for the LRBM. However it does not state that a specific program missile program was being worked on. However one would assume that if very large and powerful rocket motors are being developed a missile would not be far behind.

Combined with the Flight Global reference this certainly reinforces what Spark said. I would love to see an image and be able to confirm the range figures that have been mentioned here. The UK seems to have expressed little desire to strike beyond the Urals during the first phase of the Cold War.

The starting point for the UK Deterrent seems to have been ambitious, a combination of RN carriers striking primarily at naval bases to try and ensure Sea Control, 240 V-bombers striking into European Russia and 60+ IRBM's targetted at a similar area (although these seem to have been a later consideration and might be better considered as a contemporary to the Avro-730 rather than the V-Bombers) whilst the Army focussed on preventing a Soviet breakthrough into western Europe through massed tank formatations, nuclear land mines, SRBM's and RAF tactical bombers equipped with Red Beard...................no wonder East of Suez looked so financially unviable.
 
Sources are: M.Gowing: Independence and Deterrence(Vols.1/2), Macmillan, 1974; S.R.Twigge, Early Development of GW in UK, Harwood, 1993; C.N.Hill, A Vertical Empire, Imperial C.Press,2001; L.Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, Palgrave,2001; R.Bud/P.Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, Harwood,1999.

1. Oz nukes. Canberra licence for GAF was 1949: it could not carry 62ins. dia/10 ton Blue Danube. UK began light Red Beard in 1952 (deployed, 9/60, Canberra B.15, 11/61)
2. UK IRBMs. Truman and Attlee made an atomic inter-operation Agreement 8/12/50, largely to cover SAC B-29 deployment to Marham - PRC had invaded Korea 25/11/50. On 1/3/54 US tested an MT warhead light enough for IRBM/ICBM use; funding to develop Atlas was released 14/1/55, Thor and Jupiter, 8/11/55. UK/US Agreements on data "exchange" and on Co-operation in Use of Atomic Energy (short of warhead/re-entry vehicle design) were 12/6/54, 30/7/54 and 15/6/55. UK had abandoned V2-derived work ("Hammer") in 1947; RAE resurrected it early 1954 and first drew on EE(GW) for IRBM schemes. On 25/7/54 USSR demanded that NATO withdraw from FRG; Churchill's Cabinet of 26/7/54 initiated Green Grass (to be Yellow Sun/Orange Herald MT warhead), Mk.2 Victor/Vulcan, Avro 730 (as recce) and Blue Streak: Sir Ralph Sorley (he of 8x.303MG for Hurri/Spit), DH Props. MD had persuaded MoS that he would pursue the IRBM with alacrity, whereas EE's George Nelson was evidently pre-occupied with Canberra production and P.1 development. Agreements in 1958 gave UK more Atlas/Thor Intellectual Property and Light Orange Herald for Blue Streak and Red Snow warhead for Yellow Sun Mk.2 and Blue Steel. ATLAS was operational 31/10/59, Thor was dual-manned in UK 6/60, Jupiter in Italy, 6/61. In 4/60 Sorley's assertions had become tarnished, prospect of 1966 deployment was dim, cost opaque, so Blue Streak was chopped. Ministers would not have been impressed by talk of turning up the wick on the RR derivation of Rocketdyne's motor, to leap from unattained 1,500nm to puff of 3 times that.

SLL: EE's efforts were reduced from July,1954 to vague research: there may be no meaningful studies to be unearthed. A.R.Adams, Good Company, BAC, 1976 has,P.107: Red Dean AAM: "After Vickers had built up a team 800 strong...it was cancelled in 1957 (sic:1956)". A mere then-paper AAM had 800 people: how many, then, for a "real" IRBM project, yet, not a word on such things in this authorised industrial biography.
 
alertken said:
Sources are: M.Gowing: Independence and Deterrence(Vols.1/2), Macmillan, 1974; S.R.Twigge, Early Development of GW in UK, Harwood, 1993; C.N.Hill, A Vertical Empire, Imperial C.Press,2001; L.Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, Palgrave,2001; R.Bud/P.Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, Harwood,1999.

1. Oz nukes. Canberra licence for GAF was 1949: it could not carry 62ins. dia/10 ton Blue Danube. UK began light Red Beard in 1952 (deployed, 9/60, Canberra B.15, 11/61)
2. UK IRBMs. Truman and Attlee made an atomic inter-operation Agreement 8/12/50, largely to cover SAC B-29 deployment to Marham - PRC had invaded Korea 25/11/50. On 1/3/54 US tested an MT warhead light enough for IRBM/ICBM use; funding to develop Atlas was released 14/1/55, Thor and Jupiter, 8/11/55. UK/US Agreements on data "exchange" and on Co-operation in Use of Atomic Energy (short of warhead/re-entry vehicle design) were 12/6/54, 30/7/54 and 15/6/55. UK had abandoned V2-derived work ("Hammer") in 1947; RAE resurrected it early 1954 and first drew on EE(GW) for IRBM schemes. On 25/7/54 USSR demanded that NATO withdraw from FRG; Churchill's Cabinet of 26/7/54 initiated Green Grass (to be Yellow Sun/Orange Herald MT warhead), Mk.2 Victor/Vulcan, Avro 730 (as recce) and Blue Streak: Sir Ralph Sorley (he of 8x.303MG for Hurri/Spit), DH Props. MD had persuaded MoS that he would pursue the IRBM with alacrity, whereas EE's George Nelson was evidently pre-occupied with Canberra production and P.1 development. Agreements in 1958 gave UK more Atlas/Thor Intellectual Property and Light Orange Herald for Blue Streak and Red Snow warhead for Yellow Sun Mk.2 and Blue Steel. ATLAS was operational 31/10/59, Thor was dual-manned in UK 6/60, Jupiter in Italy, 6/61. In 4/60 Sorley's assertions had become tarnished, prospect of 1966 deployment was dim, cost opaque, so Blue Streak was chopped. Ministers would not have been impressed by talk of turning up the wick on the RR derivation of Rocketdyne's motor, to leap from unattained 1,500nm to puff of 3 times that.

SLL: EE's efforts were reduced from July,1954 to vague research: there may be no meaningful studies to be unearthed. A.R.Adams, Good Company, BAC, 1976 has,P.107: Red Dean AAM: "After Vickers had built up a team 800 strong...it was cancelled in 1957 (sic:1956)". A mere then-paper AAM had 800 people: how many, then, for a "real" IRBM project, yet, not a word on such things in this authorised industrial biography.

Hi Sealordlawrence, fredgell,
Yes given time to sort it out, my interest goes back 53 years and still definitely do not know all the answers. It was fifty years before I saw the first drawing of the engine and met people who worked first hand on it. I feel sure up until Blue Streak was made public it was generally thought that EE LRBM was the one.

Hi alertken,
Fully understand and in part agree with what you post, please be patient and step by step will share what little I have to offer
.
Hope to see the Vulcan fly so must go.
 

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